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ABSTRACT 
 
MICHAEL MENG: Shattered Spaces: Jewish Sites in Germany and Poland after 1945 
(Under the direction of Christopher R. Browning and Konrad H. Jarausch) 
 
 
By 1945, almost all that was left of Jewish life in Germany and Poland were shattered 
spaces –– synagogues, Jewish cemeteries, and Jewish districts. What happened to these damaged 
and largely abandoned sites after the Holocaust? This dissertation explores this question from a 
transnational and cross-political perspective; it analyzes the shifting appropriation of Jewish sites 
in Berlin, Essen, Potsdam, Warsaw, and Wrocław from 1945 to the present. In the early postwar 
decades, urban planners, historic preservationists, and officials completed the destruction of 
numerous damaged Jewish sites or allowed them to ruin by neglect. Jewish sites reflected spaces 
of violence and a minority culture that did not fit into the temporal demands of urban modernism, 
socialist realism, and the culturally inscribed boundaries of the “historic.” But in the late 1970s 
the appropriation of Jewish spaces started to shift as church groups, residents, political dissidents, 
Jewish leaders, and tourists became interested in recovering the few traces still left standing. 
Since 1989, this attraction to Jewish sites and more broadly almost anything perceived to be 
“Jewish” has increased at an almost dizzying rate as Germans, Poles, Americans, Israelis, and 
others have searched for the vestiges of the “Jewish past.” This surge of interest has not only 
produced numerous preservation projects, but it has also led to contradictory appropriations of the 
Jewish past. Jewish sites have come to reflect what I call “redemptive cosmopolitanism,” an 
mnemonic impulse that harnesses the Holocaust for the celebration of democracy’s cathartic, 
redemptive arrival in a post-communist and post-fascist world.  
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 This dissertation analyzes this shifting history to contest arguments about the role of the 
nation and the cold war in the formation of memory. Historians have long connected collective 
perceptions of the past with national identity and emphasized some remembrance of the 
Holocaust in the west compared to the sinister manipulation of it in the east. Although national 
and political differences certainly mattered, my work uncovers the rich interplay between the 
local and the transnational. It examines the multiple, conflicting, and shared ways that Poles, 
Germans, Jews, Americans, and Israelis have appropriated Jewish spaces in the local built 
environment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
SHATTERED SYMBOLS AND INTERPETATIONS OF THE PAST IN THE MIDST OF THE 
HOLOCAUST 
 
 
In July 1944, the great Yiddish novelist Isaac Bashevis Singer looked back on the Jewish 
life that had once existed in the capital city of his native Poland. A year earlier, the Nazis had 
brutally crushed the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, leveling the area that had confined Jews since the 
early years of the war and had made up the main district of pre-war Jewish Warsaw. In 1918, 
there were 320,000 Jews living in the city who comprised 42 percent of its total population. Just 
twenty years later, an additional 50,000 Jews were living in the Polish capital. Warsaw had 
become one of the largest cities of Jews in the world rivaled only by Moscow and New York. 
Most Jews lived in the northern part of the capital, clustered in three areas, with the district of 
Muranów being the most heavily populated where Jews made up no less than 90.5 percent of the 
inhabitants.1 As the mass murder of European Jewry had now virtually come to an end, this area 
was nothing more than a field of smoldering ruins, layered with mounds upon mounds of crushed 
cement and broken glass. Jewish Warsaw was simply no more.  
On Saturday morning the streets were full of the scent of cholent and kugel. The sound of 
Sabbath songs rang out from all windows. Here was the Land of Israel. ...“Those” streets 
included the following: Dzielna, Pawia, Gęsia, Miła, Niska, Stawki, Muranowski Square 
and first and foremost Nalewki and Franciszkańska. Those Jews traded before the First 
World War with Vladivostok, Petropavlovsk and even China. They had their stores 
packed up to the rafters with merchandise. … It is hard to imagine that all of that 
pulsating and glittering life has been extinguished, that this gigantic collection of human 
singularities was wiped off the face of the earth.2  
 
                                                 
1 Statistics located in Gabriela Zalewska, Ludność żydowska w Warszawie w okresie międzywojennym 
(Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1996), 63.  
 
2 Yitskhok Varshavski, “Yede Yidishe Gas in Varshe –– Geven a Shtot Far Zikh,” Forverts July 2, 1944; 
quoted in Jan Jagielski, Jewish Sites in Warsaw (Warsaw: City of Warsaw, 2002), 14-15.  
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After the Holocaust, the main traces of Jewish life in Germany and Poland were the 
shattered streets, synagogues, districts, and buildings that had caught Singer’s mournful 
attention.3 Since so few Jews survived Nazi Germany’s “Final Solution” and many of those who 
did left for Canada, Latin America, the United States, or Palestine, the physical spaces of Jewish 
life was all that was left in most places. A region that once had 3.6 million Jews had by the early 
1950s a mere 90,000. Germany and Poland, two countries with deep and rich histories of Jews, 
became after 1945 landscapes of shattered Jewish traces scattered from the smallest village to the 
metropolis. Indeed, writing some fifty years after Singer, Agata Tuszyńska told of her own 
mournful, melancholic search for the “world of Polish Jewry” through “shattered symbols” –– 
those found in the pages of Singer’s novels and those located on the streets of her hometown “in 
the remnants of synagogues, the remnants of traces.”4 “My movie theater –– severe, cold, devoid, 
to be sure, of the particular melody of prayerful voices, but obviously wiser than any ordinary 
move house –– was a Jewish synagogue,” she writes.5 Located on otherwise ordinary, everyday 
streets, these “shattered symbols” captured the lowest and most tragic moment in the history of 
Jewish-gentile relations in Germany and Poland. One might initially assume that this catastrophic 
past would simply have faded away, that it simply would have lost its immediacy among the 
many other demands of postwar reconstruction, among the sea of rubble that was the urban 
landscape of Poland and Germany. But it simply did not. Although the presence of Jews in the 
two Germanys and Poland was extremely small throughout most of the postwar period until 
recently, the problem of Jewish-gentile relations hardly went away and only intensified as it 
became refracted through the prism of the Holocaust. Jewish sites, broken, fractured, and ruined, 
                                                 
3 Given that the last chapter discusses the appropriation of Jewish spaces after 1989, I say “Germany” for 
the sake of simplicity when referring to 1949-2008. When speaking specifically about the 1949-1989 
period, I say “divided Germany” or the “two Germanys” when talking about the FRG and GDR together. In 
short, “Germany” is not meant to be anything more than shorthand for the 1945-2008 period. It is in no way 
an attempt to homogenize two different states.   
 
4 Agata Tuszyńska, Lost Landscapes: In Search of Isaac Bashevis Singer and the Jews of Poland, trans. 
Madeline G. Levine (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1998), 3, 8.  
 
5 Ibid., 5.  
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were arguably the most visible and everyday reminders of this destroyed relationship. When 
Germans and Poles rebuilt their bombed-out cities after the war, they faced a complex question. 
What should be done with the ordinary spaces of Jewish life, the shattered symbols of the past — 
the synagogues, Jewish cemeteries, Jewish districts left behind in the wake of mass murder?  
Few other societies faced the burden of the Holocaust — encountering those empty 
Jewish streets, synagogues, and cemeteries — quite like Germans and Poles.6 It was after all in 
Germany that the “Final Solution” originated and in Poland that it unfolded in the midst of the 
Nazi’s brutal, colonial occupation of the country. In ways similar, yet also clearly different, 
Germans and Poles became entangled in the Holocaust with a level of intensity matched by few 
other Europeans.7 This past made the issue of Jewish-gentile relations all the more central and 
palpable after the war. Moreover, almost every part of continental Europe had small Jewish 
communities after the Holocaust, but Poland and Germany were fairly exceptional in just how 
few Jews decided to stay or return from exile.8 A sizeable amount of Jewish communal property 
                                                 
6 In saying “Germans” and “Poles,” I mainly mean non-Jewish Germans and non-Jewish Poles, although 
Jews living in Germany and Poland –– who may or may not consider themselves to be German or Polish –– 
also figure into my analysis. Indeed, one of my main aims is to include the voice of Jews. But given the 
small size of the Jewish community the majority of those involved in dealing with Jewish property were 
gentiles. For simplicity, I do not include these distinctions in the text, but I want to mark the complexity of 
ethnic identity and the heuristic problem of language that scholars writing about these issues today face.  
 
7 What I mean by this I explore at length in this introduction. Of course, Germany’s entanglement in the 
Holocaust is deeper as the country that designed and implemented the “Final Solution.” As historical 
research on the Holocaust has recently shown, other European societies, even in the face of extreme Nazi 
brutality directed towards them, became involved in the Holocaust. I find this historiographical trend useful 
not least because it captures one of the most important aspects of the Holocaust –– its geographic scope 
across the European continent that involved tens of thousands of Europeans. The Holocaust was unique in 
its spatial breadth, making it different from all other genocides that have been limited to a certain area, 
nation-state, or region (see Ben Kiernan, Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination 
from Sparta to Darfur (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007)). However, I do think that historians 
must maintain the centrality of Berlin as they explore the continental dimensions of the “Final Solution.” 
One recent example of such an approach is Christopher Browning’s The Origins of the Final Solution: The 
Evolution of Nazi Jewish Policy, September 1939-March 1942 (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 
2004). An insightful analysis of these points is John Connelly’s review of Browning’s book, “Rule by 
Inspiration,” London Review of Books July 7, 2005. In this sense, Jan Gross’s historiographical intervention 
in Neighbors could have been even more pioneering had he situated the pogroms against Jews in eastern 
Poland more squarely within the evolution of Nazi anti-Jewish policy coming from Berlin.  
 
8 Bernard Wasserstein, Vanishing Diaspora: The Jews in Europe Since 1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1996), viii.  
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now remained abandoned. The absence of Jewish owners put the burden of dealing with it on 
gentiles to a greater extent than in other countries such as France or Hungary where Jewish 
communities were larger and more active. The small size of the Jewish community in Poland and 
Germany also meant that international Jewish organizations and foreign governments, above all 
the American Joint Distribution Committee, the World Jewish Congress, and the United States 
State Department, applied particularly intense pressure on German and Polish officials about the 
legal and physical condition of Jewish sites. No other European states received such intense 
international scrutiny. This transnational attraction to Jewish space only increased over the 
postwar years, moving in a number of different directions as international Jewish leaders, tourists, 
and foreign journalists became interested in the material traces of Jewish life left in both countries 
in the 1980s and 1990s.  
In short, the postwar history of Jewish sites unfolded in a fairly unique and intense way in 
Poland and Germany. In the early postwar decades, urban planners, historic preservationists, and 
political leaders generally completed the destruction of numerous damaged Jewish spaces or 
allowed them to go to ruin by neglect. Jewish sites reflected spaces of violence and a minority 
culture that did not easily fit into the temporal demands of urban modernism, socialist realism, 
and the culturally inscribed boundaries of historic preservation. The physical remnants of Jewish 
life gradually disappeared over the 1950s and 1960s as Germans and Poles rebuilt their cities and 
restored only those historic buildings deemed worthy of saving. Those Jewish sites that did 
escape the wrecking ball were either neglected or transformed into new spaces, into movie 
theaters, storage houses, swimming pools, libraries, exhibition halls. But in the late 1970s the 
appropriation of Jewish spaces started to shift as a number of different groups of people became 
interested in recovering the few material traces of Jewish life still left standing. Church groups, 
local residents, city officials, political dissidents, international Jewish leaders, and tourists 
became concerned about the ruins of synagogues and cemeteries.  
 5 
In Essen, city officials, local citizens, and historians restored the city’s synagogue to its 
original interior design after it had been completely altered in the late 1950s to house a museum 
for industrial products and later an exhibition on German resistance and victimization; East 
Germany’s top political leadership decided on the 85 million-mark restoration of the New 
Synagogue in East Berlin that had been left bombed-out for four decades; and Poland’s 
communist party restored Warsaw’s only remaining synagogue and staged a massive 
international event at the former site of the ghetto, its rubble buried under apartment complexes 
and tree-lined avenues constructed in the 1950s and 1960s. In a region of almost no Jews, the fate 
of Jewish sites started to shift from destruction to preservation before the collapse of communism. 
Since 1989, this attraction to Jewish sites and more broadly almost anything perceived to be 
“Jewish” has increased at an almost dizzying rate as Germans, Poles, Americans, Israelis, and 
others search for the vestiges of the “Jewish past.” Just as the Jewish communities of both 
countries have been growing (especially in Germany), Jewish culture has become something to be 
touched, experienced, photographed, examined, discovered, protected, preserved, recreated, and 
restaged. Reunited Germany and post-communist Poland have been witnessing what one might 
call the reconstruction and musealization of the Jewish past as “authentic” Jewish sites are 
recreated and Jewish museums are built in old synagogues or entirely new buildings.  
This shifting appropriation of shattered Jewish spaces lies at the center of this study. 
Jewish spaces reflected the violence of the Holocaust and the material articulation of ethnic 
difference in the built environment. I analyze this spatial appropriation of Jewishness and the 
Holocaust across the Iron Curtain and Oder-Neisse river, exploring the central question of how 
much, or how little, national and political differences shaped the interpretation of Jewish sites on 
the local level. Indeed, one of my main interests is to illuminate the multiple, conflicting, and 
shared ways that Germans, Poles, Jews and non-Jews appropriated these spaces. Although only 
small Jewish communities existed in all three cases for most of the postwar period, Jewish leaders 
vigorously contested the decisions of local authorities regarding Jewish sites. This varied, at times 
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conflicting engagement with the material traces of Jewish life only increased over the postwar 
decades. By the 1980s, people both far and near were attracted to Jewish sites for a variety of 
different reasons –– because of tourism, growing discussions about the Holocaust, postmodern 
fascinations with the “historic,” and longings for “cosmopolitanism” in a globalizing world. I 
analyze this steady transnationalization of Jewish sites in order to explore the interactive, 
reinforcing, and conflicting dynamics between the local, national, and transnational that together 
shape the mental and physical politics of space. In so doing, I hope to think through the tensions 
and contradictions that structure this recent obsession with the past and the urge to essentialize 
“Jewishness” in the urban landscape, producing what I call at the end “redemptive 
cosmopolitanism” that harnesses the Holocaust for the celebration of liberal, democratic values in 
a post-communist and post-fascist Europe.  
In pulling together these varied, yet entangled issues, I develop an historical analysis that 
has yet to be written in terms of its focus on Jewish sites, its comparative approach, and temporal 
breadth.9 In the German case, the postwar history of Jewish life has received increased scholarly 
interest over the past decade, but with the exception of studies on the return of individual Jewish 
property and the conversion of some Jewish sites into museums little has been written on the 
physical remnants of Jewish culture.10 Although Jeffrey Diefendorf, Rudy Koshar, and Gavriel 
                                                 
9 No study currently exists that compares these issues in Germany and Poland. Most studies are focused 
separately on Germany and Poland, creating distinct historiographies that only rarely overlap and interact. 
Moreover, the current historiography on both countries rarely looks at the entirety of the postwar and post-
communist periods. Exceptions include Aleida Assmann, Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit. 
Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik (Munich: Beck, 2006); Herbert Marcuse, The Legacies of 
Dachau: The Uses and Abuses of a Concentration Camp, 1933-2001 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001); Michael C. Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead: Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997); A. Dirk Moses, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
 
10 For historiographical overviews of Jewish life in West and East Germany respectively, see Michael 
Meng, “After the Holocaust: The History of Jewish Life in West Germany,” Contemporary European 
History 14, no. 3 (2005): 403-413; Peter Monteath, “The German Democratic Republic and the Jews,” 
German History 22, no. 3 (2004): 448-68. On Jewish propety and Jewish museums, see Jürgen Lillteicher, 
Die Rückerstattung jüdischen Eigentums in Westdeutschland nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Göttingen, 
forthcoming 2004); Jan Philipp Spannuth, “Rückerstattung Ost: Der Umgang der DDR mit dem ‘arisierten’ 
und enteigneten Eigentum der Juden und die Gestaltung der Rückerstattung im wiedervereinigten 
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Rosenfeld have published pioneering books on urban planning and historic preservation, almost 
no research has been done on how the traces of minority cultures fit into these wider 
discussions.11 Studies on Vergangenheitsbewältigung, how the two Germanys “came to terms 
with the past,” have also overlooked this problem. Focusing mostly on West Germany, historians 
have examined the legacies of the Third Reich in a wide range of areas from denazification 
policies to film to historiography to politics to legal trials to monuments.12 
Relevant literature on Poland is sparser. The major focus on the postwar period has been 
on the intertwined issues of antisemitism and the rebuilding of Jewish life after the Holocaust. 
David Engel, Krystyna Kersten, Dariusz Stola, Jan Gross, and others have written important 
studies on the violent pogroms just after the war and the anti-Jewish campaign of 1968, while 
Natalia Aleksiun, August Grabski, and Bożena Szaynok have looked at the organizational, 
political, and demographic challenges of reconstructing Jewish life during the immediate postwar 
                                                                                                                                                 
Deutschland” (Ph.D.  diss., Universität Freiburg, 2000); Sabine Offe, Ausstellungen, Einstellungen, 
Entstellungen. Jüdische Museen in Deutschland und Österreich (Berlin: Philo, 2000); Jens Hoppe, Jüdische 
Geschichte und Kultur in Museen. Zur nichtjüdischen Museologie des Jüdischen in Deutschland (New 
York: Waxmann, 2002); Katrin Pieper, Die Musealisierung des Holocaust. Das Jüdische Museum Berlin 
und das U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washighton D.C. (Cologne: Böhlau, 2006).  
 
11 Jeffrey M. Diefendorf, In the Wake of War: The Reconstruction of German Cities after World War II 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); Rudy Koshar, Germany’s Transient Pasts: Preservation and 
National Memory in the Twentieth Century (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); 
Gavriel Rosenfeld, Munich and Memory: Architecture, Memory, and the Legacy of the Nazi Past 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000).  
 
12 Norbert Frei, Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: The Politics of Amnesty and Integration, trans. 
Joel Golb (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002); Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a 
Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001); 
Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1997); Nicolas Berg, Der Holocaust und die westdeutschen Historiker: Erforschung und Erinnerung 
(Göttingen: Wallstein, 2003); Eric Santner, Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory, and Film in Postwar 
Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990); Rebecca Wittmann, Beyond Justice: The Auschwitz 
Trial (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Devin Pendas, The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial: 
Genocide, History, and the Limits of the Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Marcuse, 
Legacies of Dachau; Peter Reichel, Politik mit der Erinnerung. Gedächtnisorte im Streit um die 
nationalsozialistische Vergangenheit (Munich: Hanser, 1995); James E. Young, The Textures of Memory: 
Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1993); Wulf Kansteiner, In 
Pursuit of German Memory: History, Television, and Politics after Auschwitz (Athens, OH: Ohio 
University Press, 2006).  
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years.13 Some recent research has come out that touches on some of the basic problems dealt with 
here. Jonathan Huener, Michael Steinlauf, and Iwona Irwin-Zarecka have examined Polish 
memories of the Holocaust and appropriations of Jewishness; Geneviève Zubrzycki has 
insightfully analyzed the recent controversy about the installation of crosses at Auschwitz; the 
architectural historian David Ira Snyder has recently finished a dissertation on the clearing of the 
ghettoes in Prague and Warsaw; and the anthropologist Erica Lehrer has written a fascinating 
ethnographic study of the transnational appeal and production of Jewish Kazimierz in Cracow.14 
Some interesting work on historic preservation and urban reconstruction has also recently 
appeared, particularly the studies of Gregor Thum and Peter Oliver Loew, that analyze how Poles 
dealt with the material traces of German culture in western Poland.15  
 
                                                 
13 David Engel, “Patterns of Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland, 1944-1946,” Yad Vashem Studies 26 (1998): 
43-85; Jerzy Eisler, Marzec 1968. Geneza, przebieg, konsekwencje (Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawn. Nauk. 
1991); Eisler, Polski rok 1968  (Warsaw: IPN, 2006); Anna Cichopek, Pogrom Żydów w Krakowie 
(Warsaw: ŻIH, 2000); Krystyna Kersten, Polacy, Żydzi, komunizm. Anatomia półprawd 1939-1968 
(Warsaw: Niezależna Oficyna Wydaw., 1992); Jaff Schatz, The Generation: The Rise and Fall of the 
Jewish Communist of Poland (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1991); Dariusz Stola, 
Kampania antysyjonistyczna w Polsce 1967-1968 (Warsaw: ISP PAN, 2000); Piotr Osęka, Syjoniści, 
inspiratorzy, wichrzyciele. Obraz wroga w propagandzie marca 1968 (Warsaw: ŻIH, 1999); Joshua D. 
Zimmerman, Contested Memories: Poles and Jews during the Holocaust and Its Aftermath (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003); Bożena Szaynok, Pogrom Żydów w Kielcach 4 lipca 1946 
(Warsaw: Bellona, 1992); Natalia Aleksiun, Dokąd dalej? Ruch syjonistyczny w Polsce, 1944-1950 
(Warsaw: Trio, 2002); August Grabski, Maciej Pisarski, and Albert Stankowski, Studia z dziejów i kultury 
Żydów w Polsce po 1945 roku (Warsaw: Trio, 1997); August Grabski, Żydowski ruch kombatancki w 
Polsce w latach 1944-1949 (Warsaw: Trio, 2002); Jan Gross, Fear: Antisemitism in Poland After 
Auschwitz (New York: Random House, 2006); Bożena Szaynok, Ludność żydowska na Dolnym Śląsku 
1945-1950 (Wrocław: Wydawn. Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2000); Ewa Waszkiewicz, Kongregacja 
Wyznania Mojżeszowego na Dolnym Śląsku na tle polityki wyznaniowej Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, 
1945-1968 (Wrocław: Wydawn. Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1999).  
 
14 Jonathan Huener, Auschwitz, Poland, and the Politics of Commemoration, 1945-1979 (Athens, OH: Ohio 
University Press, 2003); Michael C. Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead: Poland and the Memory of the 
Holocaust (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997); Geneviève Zubrzycki, The Crosses of 
Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2006); 
Iwona Irwin-Zarecka, Neutralizing Memory: The Jew in Contemporary Poland (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction, 1989); David Ira Snyder, “The Jewish Question and the Modern Metropolis: Urban Renewal 
in Prague and Warsaw, 1885-1950,” (Ph.D diss., Princeton University, 2006); Erica Lehrer, “‘Shoah-
Business,’ ‘Holocaust Culture,’ and the Repair of the World in ‘Post-Jewish’ Poland: A Quest for 
Ethnography, Empathy, and the Ethnic Self after Genocide,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2005).  
 
15 Peter Oliver Loew, Danzig und seine Vergangenheit. Die Geschichtskultur einer Stadt zwischen 
Deutschland und Polen, 1793-1997 (Osnabrück: Fibre, 2003); Gregor Thum, Die fremde Stadt. Breslau 
1945 (Berlin: Siedler, 2003).  
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I. Interpretations of the Past and Spatial Hermeneutics  
 
 But while research on the specific problem of Jewish sites is limited, this study touches 
upon a set of theoretical concerns that is anything but sparse –– the analytical category of 
“memory.” The noun “memory” –– often preceded by the adjective “collective” –– has come to 
dominate academic discussions in the humanities. In the field of cultural history, it has arguably 
become the single most important way of analyzing the past, eclipsing the earlier concepts of 
“identity” and “language” that shaped historical research in the 1980s and 1990s. The now 
enormous body of literature on memory has made pioneering contributions to the discipline as a 
whole. It has made scholars more attuned to how the past is perceived, understood, and 
represented.16 The study of memory might be fashionable at the moment and its analytical 
attractiveness will ebb, but it is unlikely to pass as some mere academic fad. It has left too 
profound a mark on the discipline for it simply to fade away after too much use.  
Nevertheless, this recent “memory boom” is not without its own problems. Historians 
have typically relied on the French scholars Maurice Halbwachs and Pierre Nora for their 
understanding of “collective memory.” Halbwachs argues that memory does not exist solely on 
an individual level. Going against the long-standing philosophical tradition from Augustine to 
Locke to Husserl to Freud that accented the individual subjectivity of memory, Halbwachs 
radically claimed that to remember we must be among others: “a person remembers only by 
situating himself within the viewpoint of one or several groups and one or several currents of 
collective thought.”17 Pierre Nora has extended this notion of collective memory to include all of 
                                                 
16 Susan Crane, Collecting and Historical Consciousness in Early Nineteenth-Century Germany (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); Herf, Divided Memory; Dagmar Herzog, Sex after Fascism: Memory 
and Morality in Twentieth-Century Germany (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Jonathan 
Huener, Auschwitz; Marcuse, Legacies of Dachau; Moeller, War Stories; Reichel, Politik mit der 
Erinnerung; Henry Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944, trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991); Santner, Stranded Objects; Steinlauf, 
Bondage; Young, Textures of Memory; Joan B. Wolf, Harnessing the Holocaust: The Politics of Memory in 
France (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004).  
 
17 Maurice Halbwachs, The Collective Memory, trans. Francis J. Ditter, Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1980), 33.  
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French society. In Les Lieux de mémoire, he argues that cultural artifacts such as monuments, 
film, and literature reflect how certain groups in France remember the past. He understands 
memory as a force of cultural power that can be manipulated and used. Memory is constructed, 
managed, suppressed, remembered, and manipulated. As he explains, “[memory] remains in 
permanent evolution, subject to the dialectic of remembering and forgetting, unconscious of the 
distortions to which it is subject, vulnerable in various ways to appropriation and manipulation, 
and capable of lying dormant for long periods only to be suddenly reawakened.”18 
 This concept of collective memory as a cultural construct has had a strong impact on the 
discipline of history. Borrowing generally from poststructural thought, historians have largely 
continued the argument that memory is a form of cultural power: political and cultural elites 
construct, appropriate, repress, forget, and reawaken it. By examining historiography, 
monuments, film, literature, or public debates, they show how dominant elites “manage” or 
“construct” the “collective memory” of a given society. This approach, however, fails to examine 
how much this typically public, elite constructed memory reflects the broader “memories” of the 
general population. It overlooks the complex interaction between memories from “below” and 
memories from “above.” Historians cannot necessarily assume that the publicly articulated 
memories of political and cultural elites represent those of the broader public –– that they in fact 
make up a “collective memory.” As Alon Confino has put it:   
How the narratives of self—how individuals understand their past behavior, place it in a 
larger context, justify it, how they tell it to family and friends, how they change it over 
time, and how they translate their memories into social and political actions—are not 
quite the same as, and certainly not identical with, the narratives of national memory 
acted by states and institutions in the public sphere.19 
 
                                                 
18 Pierre Nora, Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, vol. 1, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 3.  
 
19 Confino, “Telling about Germany: Narratives of Memory and Culture,” Journal of Modern History 76, 
no. 2 (2004): 407. See also Confino, “Collective Memory and Cultural History: Problems of Method,” 
American Historical Review 102, Nr. 5 (1997): 1386-1403.  
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Indeed, one must ask: How collective is “collective memory?” My point in raising this question is 
not to exaggerate the differences between public and individual memories; political scientists 
have shown that elites have considerable impact on the shaping of ordinary views, perceptions, 
opinions, and memories.20 Through their very monopoly of discursive power, they may very well 
reflect a collective or shared memory. There is a symbiotic, interactive relationship between the 
private and public for sure.21 Rather, I want to suggest that the current conceptualization of 
memory does not fully take into account the critical fact that the past is often perceived, 
understood, and interpreted in different ways by different groups of people.22 Collective memory 
is not always so collective.  
But there is a deeper problem here. If one theoretical conundrum of “collective memory” 
involves the “collective,” another, more fundamental one is no less than the word “memory” 
itself. Memory often appears as a catchall noun to the point that it has lost its analytical edge. 
Historians speak of “memory culture,” “memory work,” or “memory politics” to describe the 
general process of either suppressing or remembering certain elements of the past. In the specific 
cases discussed here, the narrative this dichotomy produces is rather predictable and by now well-
known: Poles and Germans generally suppressed the Holocaust (1940s-1950s), gradually recalled 
it (1960s-1980s), and now have come to confront it with general frequency (1990s-2000s). 
Although there is some validity to this basic periodization, the analytical framework of evaluating 
a given society’s memory culture in terms of either failed suppression or successful remembrance 
has limitations. This conceptualization in and by itself, to return to Confino, does not “offer any 
true additional explanatory power” if in the end all it leads to are conclusions about remembrance 
                                                 
20 David Art, The Politics of the Nazi Past in Germany and Austria (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2006). 
 
21 See Assmann, Der lange Schatten.  
 
22 Some recent work has moved in this direction. For example, see Marcuse, Legacies, and Konrad Jarausch 
and Michael Geyer, Shattered Pasts: Reconstructing German Histories (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2003), chap. 11.  
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and suppression.23 What does the above periodization ultimately tell us beyond the facile fact that 
Germans and Poles supposedly failed to remember publicly the Holocaust for a rather long time?  
In my analysis of Jewish space, I move away from the concept of “collective memory” 
and closer to an hermeneutical understanding of historical temporality that opens up, in my mind, 
a more penetrating look into how Poles and Germans have interpreted the past. In Memory, 
History, and Forgetting, the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur distinguishes between the capacity 
to remember (la mémoire, memory) and the thing sought out or intended for recollection (les 
souvenirs, memories). This distinction enables him to define memory rather simply as the 
presence of the absence of a prior reality. Ricoeur emphasizes the temporalizing function of 
memory by recovering Aristotle’s declaration that “all memory is of the past.”24 Indeed, memory 
is the most fundamental reference to the past that we have. “To put it bluntly,” he writes, “we 
have nothing better than memory to signify that something has taken place, has occurred, has 
happened before we declare that we remember it.”25 In short, Ricoeur strips memory to its 
fundamental essence as grounded in time. He draws on the ontological problem of historical 
temporality that Heidegger developed earlier in Being and Time. Heidegger claims that 
temporality defines our existence or our Being (Dasein). Human beings are thrown into a world 
that is shaped by the temporal dimensions of past, present, and future (though Heidegger himself 
does not use this terminology). Temporality saturates the way we engage in and interpret our 
world. In this sense, Heidegger’s ontological exploration into human existence is hermeneutical 
by concluding that we interpret our world through time. Since time constitutes both the very 
essence of what it means to exist and our relation to our existence (our Being and our relation to 
Being qua Being), historical temporality –– the constant entanglement of past, present, and future 
                                                 
23 Confino, “Collective Memory.”   
 
24 Ibid., 6.  
 
25 Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2004), 21.  
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at any given moment –– structures and frames the very mode of human interpretative 
understanding. Historical time conditions our understanding of the world.  
Following Heidegger’s hermeneutical lead, Hans-Georg Gadamer has provided a 
particularly rich investigation into this crucial point.26 In his masterwork, Truth and Method, he 
claims that interpretation is the basic state of human understanding, which both history and 
language shape and structure. Our knowledge is finite in the sense that the “effects of history” 
(Wirkungsgeschichte), disclosed and refracted through language, frame all modes of 
interpretation and inquiry. We are thrown into a world that already exists, and we interpret that 
world through the historical and linguistic frameworks that we inherit from the past. Temporality 
and language make possible the multiple, relative, and normative “standpoints” from which we 
see and interpret reality. Gadamer’s understanding of human knowledge does not lead to a 
vicious circle of relativism (i.e. the only way to counteract a disputed interpretation is to posit yet 
another interpretation) nor does it result in the loss of rational autonomy to the stranglehold of the 
past. Our knowledge is situated in a certain temporal and linguistic framework, but we can freely 
act upon, modify, appropriate, and shape these “traditions” (albeit in a way limited by those 
“traditions”). History does not move progressively as a Hegelian Spirit that becomes ever more 
apparent to itself. Its various meanings shift and change at different moments in time.  
The basic thrust of this hermeneutical approach forms the general framework of my 
analysis of Jewish space. The past is not so much “managed,” “worked through,” “dealt with,” or 
“confronted.” The past is first and foremost interpreted as a constituent element of human 
existence within the temporal framework of past, present, and future. The past conditions and 
structures interpretations of the past. The Holocaust rendered the ways one thought about, 
reflected upon, and interpreted Jewish-gentile relations irrevocably different. Poles and Germans 
cannot transcend this past; it is an integral part of their hermeneutical condition or “standpoint” 
                                                 
26 In his much fuller understanding of historical temporality, Gadamer departs from Heidegger who places a 
distinct emphasis on the future dimension of time. Our forward confrontation with our own mortality, what 
Heidegger calls Being-towards-death, lies at the heart of Being and Time.  
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from which they interpret the world. The Holocaust saturated the stones of the shattered spaces of 
Jewish life left in its midst. Germans and Poles did not simply ignore and then recover Jewish 
sites as “suppressed” and “restored” memory. Moreover, interpretations of the past are inherently 
multiple and varied given the many different standpoints that exist. Many different groups of 
people interpreted Jewish sites –– historic preservationists, urban planners, politicians, Jewish 
leaders, Church authorities, intellectuals, opposition leaders, ordinary citizens, tourists. I call this 
multiplicity of meanings and interpretations of an ever-present past “spatial hermeneutics.” I use 
this as an analytical signifier of my point that at issue here is how the past gets interpreted at 
different moments in time and space by different groups of people, not whether it gets 
remembered.  
II. Gazing across National and Political Borders  
 
I study this “spatial hermeneutics” in concrete spaces, in five urban landscapes to be 
exact –– Berlin, Warsaw, Essen, Potsdam, and Wrocław. These cities are brought together here 
for what they reveal about the postwar history of Jewish sites in Germany and Poland and for the 
important features that they share. All five cities were heavily destroyed during World War II, 
making the dual challenge of historic preservation and urban reconstruction urgent and complex. 
These cities also had prominently in the center of town Jewish sites, which were mainly built in 
the nineteenth century and early twentieth centuries. Constructed in often grandiose and 
monumental styles, these Jewish spaces reflected the on-going acculturation of European Jewry 
that suddenly came to an end with the Holocaust. These traces of Jewish life were left behind 
while the vast majority of Jews were not. After the war, the official Jewish communities of these 
cities were either small or non-existent and thus most of the Jewish sites, except for the few used 
for religious purposes, were abandoned and fell into the hands of local governments.  
The selection of Warsaw and Berlin is perhaps most obvious: they were the two most 
important Jewish cultural centers of Poland and Germany before the Holocaust. The three 
medium-sized cites of Potsdam, Essen, and Wrocław had a much less celebrated tradition of 
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Jewish life, but this difference makes them compelling choices to broaden the scope of analysis 
from the capital cities. As smaller, more provincial locations, they also provide at times closer, 
more vivid glimpses into how Germans and Poles dealt with the material traces of Jewish life 
than would otherwise be offered by focusing simply on the two metropolises. But while these five 
cities have been chosen for specific reasons, they have not been selected as rigid case studies to 
be compared systematically among each other. I offer comparative and parallel readings of them, 
but I mainly bring them together here to form a kind of analytical kaleidoscope that offers 
shifting, various, and conflicting perspectives on the central theme of Jewish sites. Using micro 
histories to address macro questions, I hope to pull together from the specific urban landscapes of 
these five cities a broader narrative about the appropriation of Jewish spaces in postwar Germany 
and Poland. In short, my comparative interest is more global than local in scope, crossing the 
national boundaries of Germany and Poland and the political divisions of democracy and 
communism.  
In this sense, my analysis draws from recent discussions about transnational history, 
which has become attractive to French, American, and German historians over the past decade for 
several key reasons. Historians have gradually moved away from seeing culture as a cohesive 
system and more toward contested notions of “cultural goods” appropriated and negotiated by 
different social groups.27 If culture no longer is what humans produce in a given place à la 
Clifford Geertz, its earlier static, cohesive form fades away and it becomes a web of entangled, 
overlapping interactions among different societies throughout the world. Postcolonial theory has 
enabled scholars to study more closely these symbiotic relationships as Europe itself has been 
                                                 
27 On the earlier view of culture as a stable, coherent system, see Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of 
Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973). The notion of “cultural goods” comes from Pierre Bourdieu, 
Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University, 1984). For a probing analysis of both schools of thought see, William H. Sewell, Jr. “The 
Concept(s) of Culture,” in Victoria E. Bonell and Lynn Hunt, eds., Beyond the Cultural Turn: New 
Directions in the Study of Society and Culture (Berkeley, CA: University of California, 1999), 35-61.  
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decentered and provincialized.28 Whereas before historians studied the colonies as mere subjects, 
now they consider the impact they had on the colonizer in an effort to move beyond Eurocentric 
histories. The peripheries and borderlands — where cultures intermingle and bleed into each 
other — have received emphasis as the idea of a single “national culture” and “national history” 
has lost its analytical appeal.29 Moreover, transnational history has developed in opposition to 
earlier practices of comparative history. Transnational historians claim that comparative history 
often absorbs national and cultural differences in analyzing the past. Much of this is true. 
Comparative history has often been based on modernization and Marxist theories that attempt to 
explain the growth of nations or regions into modern, capitalistic, and industrial societies. These 
theories rest on a basic historicist assumption of development as modernity and capitalism 
progressively move from the center to the periphery, from England to Germany, from Europe to 
South East Asia. The variation in the end result, why some nation-states or regions have reached 
“modernity” while others have not yet arrived, is usually explained in terms of assumed national 
or cultural differences.  
In order to move beyond these limitations, transnational historians suggest decentering 
the nation by studying the relational and entangled nature of the past. As one prominent historian 
has put it, “attention to the relational aspects of historical phenomena is the key, and it 
differentiates this [transnational] approach from most comparative history, which not only tends 
to reaffirm the nation as a natural category, but, more important, seldom explores causal links 
between the two national experiences being compared.”30 But while the aim of moving beyond 
the nation might be clear, the way of getting there is less so. The problem lies immediately with 
                                                 
28 Sebastian Conrad, “Doppelte Marginalisierung. Plädoyer für eine transnationale Perspektive auf die 
deutsche Geschichte,” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 28 (2002): 145-169; Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 2000).  
 
29 Homi K. Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York: Routledge, 1994), 199-244.  
 
30 Thomas Bender, Rethinking American History in a Global Age (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 2002), 8.  
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the word transnational itself. Transnational comes from the Latin words trans and natio to mean 
beyond or across the nation, but historians differ on how much weight should be placed on the 
natio part of the word. How beyond the nation should historians go in their analysis? Currently, 
there are roughly three approaches that place varying degrees of emphasis on the nation: global 
history that examines the interactions of “civilizations” throughout the world and eclipses the 
nation altogether; cultural transfer or histoire croisée studies that look at interactions between 
individual nations and generally preserve the nation as an analytical category; and regional 
approaches that study the entangled history of regions and leave some room for the nation 
(although how much is left unresolved).31  
This study fits mainly within the regional approach to transnational history with some 
caveats. It examines a historical problem that proved to be particularly palpable and enduring to 
an area of Europe. I do not, however, share the skepticism about the analytical centrality of the 
nation in writing about the modern period and the European continent.32 Following the sensible 
lead of the German scholar Kiran Klaus Patel, I consider transnational history to be a perspective 
that challenges the “natural” focus on the nation without leading to the questionable aim of post-
                                                 
31 On global history, see Jürgen Osterhammel, Geschichtswissenschaft jenseits des Nationalstaats. Studien 
zu Beziehungsgeschichte und Zivilisationsvergleich (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001); Bender, 
Rethinking; Sebastian Conrad and Jürgen Osterhammel, Das Kaiserreich transnational. Deutschland in der 
Welt 1871-1914 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2004). An example of cultural transfer is Daniel T. 
Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: Social Politics in a Progressive Age (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press,1997). 
On the regional approach, see Philipp Ther, “Beyond the Nation: The Relational Basis of a Comparative 
History of Germany and Europe,” Central European History 36, no. 1 (2003): 45-73.  
 
32 Three points deserve further elaboration. First, key here is the writing of history concerning the modern 
period when the nation-state gradually became the central organizing principle of society, politics, and 
government in Europe (particularly between the 1850s and 1870s). To eclipse the nation altogether in the 
age of the nation-state would simply be ahistorical. Second, I believe that the nation must remain one 
among many other analytical tools but should not become the central and guiding framework for narrating 
the past as it long has. Third, proponents of transnational history often point out the role historians have 
played in nation-building in constructing national histories, but they must be equally cautious not to serve 
broader political agendas that, at the moment, might appear attractive, such as European integration. The 
French term histoire croisée explicitly sets out to uncover the entangled histories of Europe leading to the 
EU. Jacques Delors, former president of the European Commission, did after all write the preface to the 
first volume of histoire croisée edited by Bénédicte Zimmermann, Claude Didry, and Peter Wagner, Le 
travail et la nation: Histoire croisée de la France et de l’Allemagne (Paris: Maison des sciences de 
l'homme 1999).    
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national history when writing about modern Europe.33 Similarly, the near complete dismissal of 
comparative history seems unreasonable. Comparative history has certainly been based on 
research questions that reify national differences with its grounding in modernization and Marxist 
theories. Historians of Germany and Poland know them all too well: Why did Germany depart 
from the liberal, bourgeois, democratic model of England and France? Why did “East European” 
countries like Poland fail to modernize along the lines of the “West”? These are by now worn-out 
questions based on simplistic comparisons between nation-states and regions.34 But recognizing 
the limitations of earlier comparative approaches does not render useless the most central purpose 
of the craft –– understanding similarities and differences.35 On the contrary, I would argue that 
comparing should be one of the chief analytical tools available to transnational historians.36  
 Indeed, my analysis rests on two broad comparative levels that cut across national and 
political borders. It examines first how the different political cultures of the Federal Republic 
(FRG), the German Democratic Republic (GDR), and the Polish People’s Republic (PPR), 
shaped above all by the cold war, had an impact on the handling of Jewish space. The realities, 
demands, and political dynamics of the cold war set the basic framework for how Germans and 
Poles interpreted the past. It did so not just in the way one might predict: a “divided memory” of 
some remembrance in the democratic west compared to the complete suppression and cynical 
manipulation of the Nazi past in the communist east.37 This basic divergence forms part of the 
                                                 
33 Kiran Klaus Patel, “Überlegungen zu einer transnationalen Geschichte,” Zeitschrift für 
Geschichtswissenschaft 52, no. 7 (2004): 626-645. See also Deborah Cohen and Maura O’Connor, eds., 
Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective (New York: Routledge, 2004). 
 
34 On the paucity of modernization and Marxist comparative approaches to studying the past, particularly in 
the German context, see Jarausch and Geyer, Shattered Pasts.  
 
35 Hartmut Kaelble, Der historische Vergleich. Eine Einführung zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt am 
Main: Campus Verlag, 1999); Heinz-Gerhard Haupt and Jürgen Kocka, eds., Geschichte und Vergleich. 
Ansätze und Ergebnisse international vergleichender Geschichtsschreibung (Frankfurt am Main: Campus 
Verlag, 1996). 
 
36 See also Cohen and O’Connor, eds., Comparison.   
 
37 Herf, Divided Memory.  
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story told here, but more compelling are those moments when the cold war becomes politically 
contested: when, for example, in the late 1970s and 1980s local groups in both the GDR and PPR 
challenged the official interpretation of the past partly in opposition to communist rule; or when 
local citizens, mainly on the Left, contested the “normalization” of the Nazi past that became the 
hallmark of the conservative government of West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in the 1980s. 
And yet the Iron Curtain was not always so ironclad. The universal similarity of the three 
cases of the GDR, PPR, and FRG –– reflected in the gradual transformation of destroying Jewish 
sites to preserving them over the past sixty years –– stems from the deep entanglement of Poles 
and Germans with the Holocaust and how they came to interpret that reality afterwards. Whether 
it was the abandoned synagogue in Essen, the ruins of the Warsaw Ghetto, or the destroyed 
Jewish cemetery in East Berlin, these remnants of Jewish life symbolized the fractured and 
catastrophic relationship of Jews and gentiles. The postwar period cannot be untangled from the 
Holocaust because both the experience of Jewish-gentile relations during the war and the 
interpretations of that experience afterwards set the central and guiding framework for discussing, 
debating, and understanding Jewish issues after 1945. It perhaps makes sense then to work 
through, albeit briefly and generally by necessity, the history of Jewish-gentile relations just 
before and during the Holocaust. In so doing, I do not intend to suggest a causal determinacy that 
is reductive and simplistic, making the lowest and most tragic point in Jewish-gentile relations the 
only and inevitable explanation for what happens afterwards. As I hope to illuminate in the 
following five chapters, the impact of the Holocaust has shifted in different and contradictory 
ways over the past sixty years. Its influence is neither stable nor unidirectional but it is 
omnipresent. My sense then is that a short glance at gentile-Jewish relations just before and 
during the Holocaust, especially for the Polish case (which will receive more attention), is useful 
in setting both the background for understanding the postwar period and the necessary context for 
my argument to unfold more fully.  
III. Jewish-Gentile Relations and the Holocaust    
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 In the years immediately preceding the outbreak of the Second World War, Europe’s 
democratic states, which had emerged from the rubble of the First World War, collapsed one after 
the other. An era that was supposed to be of parliamentary elections turned out to be one of 
dictatorial decrees as democracy receded in Hungary (1919), Italy (1922), Poland (1926) Portugal 
(1932-33), Germany (1933), Austria (1934), Estonia (1934), Greece (1935), Romania (1938), and 
Spain (1939). The collapse of democracy in Europe came with a dramatic and devastating attack 
on those minority groups that the majority believed stood outside the “nation.” The most 
catastrophic case came of course with the fall of the Weimar Republic and the rise of Nazi 
Germany, but the failure of German democracy and the emergence of Nazism reflected broader 
European trends toward authoritarianism, fascism, and anti-Jewish hatred. Although the 
exceptional severity of the German case cannot be emphasized more strongly, there are 
compelling reasons to argue that, immediately before the outbreak of the Holocaust, threats to the 
security of the Jewish communities in Germany and Poland had reached a level of intensity 
matched by few others on the continent of Europe. Interwar Poland never became a fascist state 
and never carried out measures on the order of the Nuremberg Laws, but the authoritarian state 
that took power in Poland, following Marshal Józef Piłsudski’s coup-de-etat in 1926, came ever 
closer to implementing the kind of economic pauperization, boycotts, social exclusion, political 
subversion, and forced emigration that had defined Nazi anti-Jewish policies before the “Final 
Solution.”38 This was especially the case after Piłsudski’s death in 1935 when the nationalist 
right-wing greatly increased its attack on Jews.39 
 By 1939, the Nazi regime had crippled and marginalized the Jewish community in 
Germany to the point that it virtually ceased to exist. In a process of ever-increasing radicalization 
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from 1933, Jews became separated from every aspect of everyday life in Germany until massive 
forced emigration after 1938 in the wake of Kristallnacht and the rapid acceleration of seizing 
Jewish property. The gradual civic, social, and economic death of German Jewry during these 
years was dramatic: in the fall of 1941, when the Nazi leadership settled on mass murder as the 
“Final Solution” to its self-imposed Jewish question, over half of Germany’s Jewish community 
had already been forced to flee the country.40 In explaining these years of persecution, Saul 
Friedländer has developed the notion of “redemptive antisemitism” to capture the ideological 
obsession that Hitler and his closest allies had with the “Jewish question.” Believing that the 
German nation could only be redeemed through the removal of the Jews, they were driven to 
eliminate the Jewish community from German society because no less than the survival of the 
nation was at stake. Friedländer argues that this “redemptive antisemitism” remained limited 
mainly to the Nazi elite, suggesting that most ordinary Germans, though holding highly negative 
prejudices against Jews, did not adhere to such an extreme form of anti-Jewish hatred.41 
 But while the stereotypes, prejudices, and perceptions of ordinary Germans might not 
have been as radical as those of the Nazi elite, most Germans supported and participated in the 
persecution of German Jewry.42 The campaign against the Jews, pushed and formulated by the 
Nazi leadership, did not develop in isolation from German society as historians have long 
believed, arguing that it was the chaotic functioning of the Nazi state or the ideological intentions 
of a few Hitler henchmen that led to ever more radical proposals to solving the “Jewish 
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question.”43 As historians now know in light of new research that has appeared since the 1990s, 
the Nazi state enjoyed large support and encountered little opposition from the German 
population. Organs such as the Gestapo did not have to rely on a vast terror apparatus since many 
Germans became willing informants and proved forthcoming with information about their 
neighbors.44 As one historian has put it, Nazi Germany was a dictatorship of consent, although of 
course it was also one of coercion (Zustimmungsdiktatur).45 Indeed, the Nazi persecution of the 
Jews unfolded through the symbiotic interaction of state and society. Ordinary Germans were not 
just “indifferent” to the plight of their Jewish neighbors, but became actively involved and 
entangled in the persecution itself.46 On the local level, citizens and city officials pushed for the 
exclusion of Jews from German society often ahead of any direct or explicit orders from Berlin; 
the anti-Jewish measures that emerged in pre-war Nazi Germany came from a combination of 
pressures from above and from below.47 This involvement in the persecution of the Jews was 
often rather ordinary and everyday: shopkeepers showing hostility to Jewish consumers; 
landlords ending rental agreements with their Jewish tenants; strangers on trams and streets 
harassing those who “looked” Jewish; friends or acquaintances severing ties with their Jewish 
neighbors; local citizens taking over Jewish business, homes, and possessions.48 As Jews became 
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increasingly segregated and excluded from German society, Germans became directly drawn into 
supporting and contributing to their plight on a daily basis.   
 Attempting to understand why Germans became involved in the Nazi persecution of the 
Jews and seemingly showed little concern for their suffering is no easy task. Some acted to 
advance their own self interests; some went along with the Nazi system as the easiest way to get 
on with daily life; some felt pressure to conform from the “tyranny of the majority;” some found 
the ideas and policies of the Nazis attractive.49 But while keeping in mind the varied nature of 
human action, emphasis must be placed somewhere in order to explain the sheer commonality of 
German involvement in the Nazi campaign against the Jews. The historian Carolyn Dean has 
recently pointed in a useful direction by examining Jewish perceptions of Germans. Analyzing 
selections from the memoirs of Victor Klemperer, Mihail Sebastian, and Marcel Reich-Ranicki, 
she argues that the Nazi persecution of Jews had become so banal, so ordinary that Germans 
came to accept it; hatred toward Jews had become so embedded in daily life that the suffering of 
the victim had lost all meaning: “the indifference recorded by both Klemperer and Sebastian more 
accurately describes how this antisemitism manifests itself as a normalized prejudice. Thus it 
describes not only the sinister antisemitism that became so predominant, but also how society 
assimilated it, learned it, performed it, believed it, and thus came to conceive it and live it as 
normal.”50 From the Nuremburg laws to Kristallnacht to “Aryanization,” anti-Jewish hatred 
permeated daily life in Nazi Germany to the point that it had become an intrinsic part of it, 
becoming so normal that not participating in it seemed abnormal.  
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 This normalization of anti-Jewish hatred, however, did not take hold only in Nazi 
Germany. It also penetrated everyday life in Poland. By 1921, Poland regained its independence 
after having been partitioned for over a century by Prussia, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. Poland 
was a relatively poor and agricultural country with 35.1 million people on the eve of the Second 
World War. Its population was ethnically diverse with about 65 percent Poles, 16 percent 
Ukrainians, 10 percent Jews, 6 percent Belorussians, and 3 percent Germans.51 Poland’s 
constitution of March 1921 established a parliamentary democracy that concentrated power in the 
legislative branch, but this system proved highly unstable as successive governments failed to 
secure a parliamentary majority. In 1926, political power shifted dramatically from the parliament 
to the president when Marshal Józef Piłsudski carried out a military coup and consolidated 
authority in his hands. Lasting until the dissolution of the Polish state by the Nazis and the 
Soviets in 1939, this authoritarian regime, called Sanacja, emphasized loyalty to the state, anti-
corruption, discipline, and the overall restoration of “health” to the political system.52  
 The Sanacja regime had a rather mixed approach to Poland’s large ethnic population. 
Poland guaranteed on paper, through both its constitution and the Minorities Treaty, complete 
equality of rights to its large national minority population, but in practice ethnic minorities, 
especially Jews, suffered from intense discrimination, bias, persecution, and violence. In the late 
1920s, the Sanacja regime supported legislation to remove all restrictions that had been placed on 
Jews during the partition era and were still being enforced in independent Poland. In 1931, after a 
decade of languishing in parliament, the law was finally adopted, but no sooner had the ink dried 
on it Jews faced new assaults on their position in Polish society from increasingly vocal right-
wing nationalist groups. By the early 1930s, the powerful political movement of National 
Democracy or Endecja, founded in 1897 by Roman Dmowski, increased its call for the 
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curtailment of rights for Jews and their eventual emigration from Poland. Based on an ethnic 
vision of the nation that excluded minorities, Endejca was a movement of broad social support 
that strongly shaped official policy toward Jews, even though it never succeeded in forming a 
single government during the Second Republic.53 In 1935, its influence increased dramatically in 
the wake of Piłsudski’s death when the right-wing faction of Sanacja established the Camp of 
National Unity (Oboź Zjednoczenia Narodowego, OZN or OZON). OZON adopted a series of 
anti-Jewish measures that further curtailed the economic, educational, and political life of Jews 
that had become increasingly restricted throughout the 1930s.54 The Sanacja government also 
endorsed the Endecja position that the best solution to the Jewish question was for Jews to 
emigrate from Poland (the majority of Poland’s political elites, except those associated with left-
wing parties, shared this view as well).55 Although no clear program for Jewish emigration had 
yet to be formulated on the eve of World War II, Poland’s political elites were clearly moving 
toward the permanent removal of Jews from Polish society. In his pioneering analysis of 
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antisemitism in Poland and pre-war Nazi Germany, William Hagen puts it starkly: “Even though 
in various ways the Polish regime in fact fell short of fascism, the cumulative effects on the 
Polish Jews of its hostile policies, as well as of Endek aggression and the consequences of 
demographic growth amid still widespread economic depression, were threatening them by 1939 
with conditions comparable to those to which the German Jews had been reduced.”56  
 Contributing to this debilitating condition were the increasingly hostile actions and 
attitudes of Polish society toward the Jewish population. In the inter-war period, four major 
waves of anti-Jewish aggression erupted: the first exploded in 1918 during the Polish-Ukrainian 
War that left 230 Jews dead with the most fatal pogrom in Lwów; the second took place in 1930-
33 at universities where students staged anti-Jewish riots and protests; the third, organized by the 
newly founded National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny, or ONR), involved anti-
Jewish violence in the summer of 1934; and the fourth, occurring between 1934 and 1937, 
erupted on university campuses when the ONR and student groups such as the All-Polish Youth 
(Młodzież Wszechpolska) developed “ghetto benches” as the first step at the “dejudaization” of 
Polish higher education.57 As these waves of anti-Jewish hatred unfolded in Poland, antisemitism 
increasingly became an important and defining element of Polish Catholicism. By the 1920s, the 
Church had adopted the ideological language and concepts of racial antisemitism, developing a 
“modern militant model of Catholicism” that saw Jews as one of its and Poland’s central 
enemies.58 This racialized prejudice trumped earlier religious biases to a stunning degree, as one 
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article published on the eve of the war bleakly revealed: “No person of another race undergoing 
baptism, for example, a Negro, will be considered a member of the white race simply because a 
priest belonging to the white race baptized him. The Jew is no exception here. The more so since 
he falls under the ‘rule’ that because he was a Jew racially and ethnically before undergoing 
baptism, so racially and ethnically he remains a Jew even after undergoing baptism.”59  
 The imposition of Nazi rule with the outbreak of World War II exacerbated an already 
tense relationship between Jews and Poles. In pursuit of grand visions of Lebensraum, the Nazis 
established a brutal and deadly occupation of western Poland during the first twenty-one months 
of the war.60 While the Soviets established communist rule in eastern Poland, annexed to them by 
the Hitler-Stalin pact, the Nazis set out to reconfigure the ethnic make-up of their newly gained 
territory. The Nazis did not establish a Polish puppet state, but ruled and occupied Polish territory 
virtually on their own. The Polish government had been destroyed almost in its entirety except for 
minor bureaucrats who were kept to aid the German administration. If the Nazis had wanted a 
collaborating regime in Poland, they would have found enough sympathizers to form it, but they 
had different aims: the Nazis divided Poland into two parts with most of the western area directly 
incorporated into the Third Reich and the rest turned into the Generalgouvernement. They sought 
to make the incorporated territories as ethnically German as possible through a massive program 
of population transfer and mass murder mostly of ethnic Poles in the first months of the 
occupation.61 After first pushing Jews and Poles from this area into the “dumping ground” of the 
Generalgouvernement, the Nazis then transported thousands of ethnic Germans from across 
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northeastern Europe into the homes, businesses, and farms left behind.62 In these early months of 
the war, the German military carried out massive violence against Poles and Jews.63 
 Nazi policy toward both ethnic groups aimed toward the general goal of subjugation, 
persecution, and violence with one important difference. Poles experienced extreme terror and 
death, but the Jewish population bore the harshest blows of the occupation precisely and simply 
because they were the supreme racial enemy in Nazi thinking. While Poles could be “tolerated” 
as slave laborers, there was simply no room for Jews in any capacity within the Nazi empire. In 
the end, the Nazi occupation proved devastating for both Poles and Jews, leaving a combined 
total of about five million people dead who had been citizens of the interwar state.64 But the scale 
and proportion of the two ethnic groups differed dramatically: Poles lost about 10 percent of their 
population whereas around 90 percent of the Polish-Jewish population perished. These figures 
starkly underscore the Nazi goal of the complete and total destruction of the Jewish population in 
Poland and throughout the entire continent of Europe that was without any other parallel. At the 
same time, these percentages reinforce the crucial point that the “Final Solution” unfolded within 
a broader policy of population transfer, occupation, and mass murder that catastrophically 
impacted the lives of many different ethnic groups under Nazi rule as Karel C. Berkhoff has 
recently shown for Ukraine (a similar study has yet to be written for occupied Poland).65  
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In the midst of this engulfing terror, what were the dynamics of Polish-Jewish relations? 
They hinged above all on the actions and attitudes of ethnic Poles for the simple reason that the 
relationship between Poles and Jews during the war was asymmetrical. Crowded into ghettoes 
and death camps, Jews simply had little leverage to influence the type of interaction that they had 
with their Polish neighbors. The question inevitably becomes then less about relations per se and 
more about the general reaction of the Polish population to the Holocaust. Poles responded to the 
Nazi genocide in different and various ways. As part of the underground state, the organization 
Żegota (code name for Rada Pomocy Żydom, or the Council for Aid to Jews) helped Jews with 
locating housing, forging documents, medical assistance, and financial support from the fall of 
1942 to the end of the war. The extent of and the motivations for rescuing Jews are difficult to 
know for sure. In Warsaw, the historian Gunnar S. Paulsson estimates that about 27,000 Jews 
escaped from the ghetto and about 11,500 survived through the aid of perhaps 90,000 Poles (these 
numbers are debatable and await further research).66 The motivations for helping Jews varied as 
greatly as those involved in providing assistance: from anti-Semites to blackmailers to 
extortionists to good Samaritans. And yet whatever the individual reasons the fact remains that 
rescuing Jews was an unpopular and infrequent choice. Poles engaged in other illegal acts against 
the German enemy much more frequently than they did in saving Jews.67 Many Poles also did not 
support those who helped Jews, making survival on the “Aryan” side all the more treacherous and 
risky with blackmailers and denouncers roaming the streets.68 As one Holocaust survivor put it 
succinctly: “Hiding Jews was a very dangerous activity and no-one could expect from people 
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such heroism. Nevertheless there was no need for denunciation of one’s neighbor because he was 
hiding a Jew. I myself lived in constant fear that the Germans would kill me but I was even more 
afraid of Poles who were able to recognize that I was a Jew.”69  
On the very opposite end of the spectrum from assisting Jews is an action that recently 
has received extensive discussion in Poland: the involvement of Poles in the direct killing of 
Jews. Brought into the open by Jan Gross’s startling book, Neighbors, about the massacre of Jews 
in the small town of Jedwabne, the role of Poles as perpetrators challenges commonly held 
notions of Polish victimization, martyrdom, and resistance during World War II. It is thus a 
particularly emotional topic, but one that recently has benefited from important new research in 
the wake of the intense debate about Gross’s book.70 Although Jedwabne was by far the most 
deadly case with somewhere between 1,000 and 1,600 Jews perishing, it was not an isolated case. 
In over twenty other towns, ethnic Poles carried out violence against Jews during the summer of 
1941. As far as historians know today, the violence remained limited to the kresy (the eastern 
borderlands) with massacres and pogroms erupting in the Łomża and Białystok regions that had 
previously been occupied by the Soviets until June of 1941 when the Nazis pushed them out with 
the invasion of Stalin’s Russia.  
Explaining why some ethnic Poles would kill their Jewish neighbors is as difficult to 
grasp as why some would risk their own lives to save them. Both are extraordinary responses to 
an extreme situation when most ordinary people are thinking about survival rather than acting 
with heroic strength or catastrophic fragility. The reasons for becoming involved in the Holocaust 
were various: Some Poles killed Jews because the German soldiers in the area pushed them to do 
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so; others joined in seeking material gain through the seizure of Jewish property; others murdered 
out of sheer hatred. But what appears most common is that those who became involved in mass 
murder had lost any sense that the person they were beating with a club or shoving into a burning 
barn was a human being just like themselves. Prejudice against Jews had become so normalized 
that the division between “Pole” and “Jew,” between “human” and “non-human,” had become 
accepted, assimilated, and integrated into everyday life. This normalized prejudice took hold over 
years of increased persecution, violence, bias, and separation during the 1930s, but became 
explosive and murderous in the kresy during June-July 1941 for concrete reasons. The kresy had 
endured twenty-one months of Soviet occupation from September 1939 until June 1941 that 
ushered in dramatic and swift changes in Polish society.71 One of these many changes involved a 
small sliver of the Jewish population that became attracted to the equality granted by the Soviets 
that had long been denied to them by the Polish state. Ethnic minorities could now fill jobs, such 
as teachers and public officials, that earlier had been closed off to them. A very small number of 
Jews, perhaps somewhere between 7 and 10 percent of the population, benefited from the Soviet 
occupation, while the vast majority endured the harshness of occupation, war, economic 
restructuring, death, and deportation just like everyone else living in the kresy.72 Jews were 
naturally relieved when the Soviets arrived instead of the Nazis, but they clearly knew that Soviet 
occupation was the lesser of two evils and experienced rapid deterioration in their everyday life.73 
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Soviet-sponsored secularization transformed dramatically the basic everyday life of Shtetl Jews. See Gross, 
“A Tangled Web;” Ben-Cion Pinchuk, Shtetl Jews under Soviet Rule: Eastern Poland on the Eve of the 
Holocaust (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1991); Żbikowski, U genezy Jedwabnego.  
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But Poles perceived the overall condition of Jews in a much different way, believing that 
they had in fact collaborated with the Soviets en masse. Refracted through the enduring and 
powerful anti-Jewish stereotype of “Judeo-Communism” (żydokomuna), the reality of the Soviet 
occupation became utterly twisted to conform to the broad fears of Polish society that Jews had 
destroyed the Polish nation.74 This antisemitic fantasy of “Judeo-Communism” became explosive 
when eastern Poland switched from Soviet to Nazi occupation in June 1941.75 Some Poles viewed 
the Germans as “liberators” and became involved in the Nazi murder of the Jews that had now 
increased dramatically with the invasion of the Soviet Union. By late July 1941, Nazi special 
military and police units engaged in ever more extensive shootings of Jews.76 Just as the Nazis 
began to move closer to the “Final Solution,” pogroms and massacres in eastern Poland erupted, 
encouraged by the Germans on Reinhard Heydrich’s orders that “self-cleansing actions” 
(Selbstreinigungsaktionen) occur without leaving any trace of Nazi coordination. It is within this 
broader context –– of żydokomuna, of the Soviet occupation, and of the Final Solution –– that the 
violence in Jedwabne and in some twenty other towns in the kresy unfolded. Analyzing 61 
postwar trials of Poles involved in these attacks, the historian Andrzej Żbikowski notes that Jews 
were often forced to carry pictures of Lenin and Stalin, sing Russian songs, and bury statues of 
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Lenin during the massacres of June-July 1941.77 In those summer months, some Poles took up the 
chance to expunge żydokomuna from eastern Poland for good. Mass murder became possible in 
the midst of war, occupation, prejudice, and hatred, conceived as an attempt to cleanse eastern 
Poland from the fantastical Jewish-Communist menace and to avenge the horrors of Soviet 
occupation that it allegedly had caused.  
Since the murder of Jews by ethnic Poles has received extensive discussion recently, it 
must be stated clearly that the direct participation of Poles in the Holocaust was exceptional. If on 
a spectrum of social behavior killing Jews is on one end and saving them is on another, one can 
safely say that the overwhelming majority of Poles were neither heroic rescuers nor cold-blooded 
murders. Instead most Poles became drawn into, took advantage of, or benefited from the 
persecution of their Jewish neighbors in a much more ordinary and everyday way even in the face 
of a brutal Nazi occupation directed against them. It is not just that Poles and their government 
officials in exile observed the Holocaust with hardened indifference as historians have often 
concluded; many governments and societies certainly did the same, including those powers that 
possibly could have done something such as Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union.78 
Terms like “indifference” or “passive complicity” do not capture precisely enough how entangled 
and enmeshed in the Holocaust ordinary Poles became. In a country where Jews made up 10 
percent of the overall population and where in many small villages Jews comprised nearly half of 
the town’s population, the persecution, ghettoization, deportation, and mass murder of three 
million people over five years intersected with the lives of ordinary Poles to such a degree that 
historians cannot possibly reconstruct with any sense of completeness.  
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The entanglement of the Holocaust with everyday Polish life took on many different 
forms from identifying Jews to the Nazis to blackmailing those few Jews living on the “Aryan” 
side (szmalcownictwo) to moving into the enormous number of homes left behind now considered 
to be pożydowski (a peculiar Polish word invented to denote formerly Jewish property). One 
could cite many instances to illuminate the everydayness of these interactions, but the famous 
writer and literary critic Michał Głowiński provides one remarkable example in his memoir 
worthy of briefly highlighting. He recalls an experience in a café in Warsaw on the “Aryan” side. 
While his aunt, who looked “Aryan,” went to make a phone call, the young Głowiński, sitting by 
himself, piqued the interest of the women surrounding him who became increasingly anxious 
about his presence:  
In the beginning, it seemed to me that all was calm … Yet after a while I couldn’t escape 
the realization that the scene was playing out otherwise. It was difficult to harbor any 
doubts that I had become the center of attention. … The women stared at me as if I were 
an extraordinary monster, whose very existence called into question the laws of nature, 
and as if they would have to decide what to do with me that very moment, for things 
could not remain as they were. … I heard “A Jew, there’s no question, a Jew. She 
certainly isn’t, but him –– he’s a Jew.” … I heard one of them say, “We have to let the 
police know.” … Most often they spit out the threatening word “Jew,” but also, most 
terrifying, they kept, repeating “We have to let the Police know.” I was aware that this 
was the equivalent to a death sentence. If I’d then known something about Mediterranean 
mythology, I would doubtlessly have thought I’d landed in the possession of the Erinyes, 
the Furies, desirous of mutilating me. Yet would such an analogy be appropriate? For 
those women were not possessed by an uncontrollable hatred. … These were normal, 
ordinary women, in their own way decent and resourceful, hardworking, undoubtedly 
scrambling to take care of their families in the difficult conditions of the occupation. … 
They had found themselves in a situation that felt to them trying and threatening, and 
they wished to confront it directly. They only did not think at what price. Perhaps this 
transcended their imaginations –– although they must have known how it would end if 
they were to “let them know” –– or perhaps such thoughts were simply not within the 
boundaries of moral reflection accessible to them.79  
 
One might be tempted to consider these interactions with the Holocaust to be forms of 
“complicity,” “cooperation,” or “collaboration.” But such elegant labels overlook the utter 
everydayness of these actions. Poles who took over Jewish apartments, blackmailed Jews on the 
tram, or threatened to call the police did not, in their own moral universe, see these actions as 
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forms of collaboration with the German enemy. Their moral economy did not consider these 
ordinary intersections with the Holocaust as problematic. Thus the austere effects of the 
normalized prejudice that penetrated Polish society emerge: looking the other way, blackmailing, 
or taking over someone’s “former” possessions became so ordinary that the suffering and 
humanity of the victims was completely erased from everyday consciousness. Such actions did 
not seem wrong.  
Since German occupied Poland was the site where the Nazis implemented the “Final 
Solution,” Polish society inevitably became drawn into the Holocaust in a particularly intimate, 
anguished, and raw way. But as mass murder unfolded in Eastern Europe, German society was of 
course no less entangled in it, albeit in a much greater and different way. The conditions that 
shaped German behavior during the Holocaust must be clearly distinguished from those that 
impacted Polish actions. Polish society was terrorized by the occupation, war, and mass murder 
that the Germans had designed and implemented. The unequivocal responsibility of Nazi 
Germany for the Holocaust obviously meant that German society became involved in the mass 
murder of Jews on a scale of much greater proportions. In the midst of a brutal war against the 
Soviet Union, the Nazi elite decided to solve its self-imagined Jewish problem through the mass 
murder of European Jewry. Many Germans became directly implicated in implementing this 
policy from bureaucrats in Berlin to soldiers on the frontline. The Holocaust did not emerge 
simply from the functioning of a massive bureaucracy that, once set into motion, just kept going 
on as historians earlier argued, but through the participation of many different segments of 
German society from church leaders to industrial barons.80 The earlier bifurcated image of state 
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and society, whereby one carries out the horrendous crimes while the other remains uninvolved in 
it, has been severely undermined by historical research about the role of ordinary Germans in 
carrying out mass murder from those in the reserve police battalions to the enlisted army.81  
Nevertheless, most ordinary Germans, apart from those directly designing, perpetrating, 
and implementing Nazi policy, faced considerably less often the kind of up-close encounters with 
Jews that characterized Polish-Jewish relations during the war for the simple reason that the 
number of Jews who still lived in Germany when the Nazi elite decided on mass murder was 
proportionally miniscule. Since Germany was not the epicenter of where the Holocaust took 
place, the reaction and behavior of German society as a whole took on different forms thanks 
simply to its geographical distance from the death camps and frontlines of the east. Issues crucial 
to the Polish case –– for example the dynamics of gentile-Jewish relations on the “Aryan” side of 
the ghetto or the generally low societal approval for saving Jews –– either do not apply at all or 
are not nearly as central to the German situation.82 Instead, when studying the role of German 
society during the Holocaust, historians have focused on a different set of questions. What did 
ordinary Germans know about what was happening in Eastern Europe? How did they react to this 
knowledge? Did it impact in any way their support for the Nazi regime?  
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Over the past twenty-five years, extensive research has shattered the popular postwar 
refrain that ordinary Germans did not know anything about the Holocaust. Although Germans 
were not fully aware of the scope and method of the Final Solution, they had access to general 
information about the mass extermination of Jews in Eastern Europe. In fact, anyone who wanted 
to know about the “extermination” or “destruction” of Jews merely had to turn to the party-
controlled media. Hitler’s regime did not reveal specific details, but it did willingly and openly 
discuss its broad and central plan to destroy European Jewry in its newspapers and radio 
programs.83 Outside the party-run press, Germans heard about the Holocaust through letters from 
the front, soldiers returning from duty, and press coverage by international news organizations 
such as the British Broadcasting Company (BBC). The way Germans reacted to this information 
was clear. Ordinary Germans tellingly resisted Hitler’s policies when they directly impacted their 
own lives, whether it was against the Nazi euthanasia program, the taking down of crucifixes, or 
the deportation of Jews married to non-Jewish wives in Berlin.84 But when circumstances were 
otherwise, the vast majority of Germans expressed no protest and seemingly went along with the 
genocidal policies of the Third Reich with only a few noble exceptions. In his important study on 
popular opinion in Nazi Germany, Ian Kershaw has shown how Germans grumbled about small, 
ordinary annoyances with the regime, but voiced virtually no opposition when it came to the Nazi 
persecution of the Jews.85  
This silence largely stemmed from the basic fact that most Germans generally supported 
the Nazi regime and its persecution of the Jews for reasons that are open to interpretation.86 In 
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2005, the historian and journalist Götz Aly published a book that explored why Germans so 
willingly and enthusiastically supported the Nazi regime even in the last throes of an immensely 
deadly war that the regime was now losing. Taking seriously the socialist part of National 
Socialism, he posits the seductively simple argument that the Nazi regime satisfied the material 
needs of German society by redistributing the wealth that had been stolen from the Jews 
throughout Europe. Nazi Germany was an ethnically homogenous social-democratic state that 
became a “pleasing or accommodating dictatorship” (Gefälligkeitsdiktatur) for those members of 
the racially pure Volksgemeinschaft.87 The political scientist Daniel Goldhagen has put forward a 
much different argument about German society. In his highly discussed book, Hitler’s Willing 
Executioners, he claimed that a peculiar form of “eliminationist antisemitism” explained why 
ordinary Germans became involved in and supported the mass murder of European Jewry.88 
Embracing a murderous ideology unique only to Germany, Germans killed out of pure hatred and 
often expressed sheer enjoyment in doing so. If ideology plays no role in Aly’s materialist 
interpretation, it explains everything in Goldhagen’s monocausal analysis.  
Both of these interpretations fall severely short by either ignoring or over determining 
ideology, but the phrases “pleasing dictatorship” and “eliminationist antisemitism” have 
analytical appeal. When taken out of the problematic strictures that Aly and Goldhagen have 
placed them in and radically reconceptualized, they provide a useful way of thinking about the 
relationship between German society and the Nazi elite. As the reaction of German society to the 
persecution of Jews before the Holocaust shows most clearly, ordinary Germans generally 
supported the erosion of Jewish life from Germany that took place between 1933 and 1939. In 
these years, there was no doubt at all that they clearly understood the aims of the Third Reich as a 
steady stream of anti-Jewish policies unfolded that impacted every facet of everyday life and 
                                                 
87 Götz Aly, Hitlers Volksstaat. Raub, Rassenkrieg und nationaler Sozialismus (Frankfurt am Main: S. 
Fischer, 2005).  
 
88 Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: 
Knopf, 1996).  
 39 
every ordinary interaction with Jews from who could sit on a park bench to who could own 
property. In a way not entirely different from most Poles, most Germans wanted Jews removed 
from their economic, social, cultural, and political life; a general consensus existed between the 
Nazi elite and the German population that the Jewish question had to be solved by eliminating the 
Jewish menace from Germany. This eliminationist antisemitism –– conceived here broadly as the 
basic, shared belief that Jews must somehow be removed from a given society –– involved 
different modes of implementation.89 Germans accepted emigration as the best way to remove 
Jews from their nation, and the Nazi elite officially pursued this policy as late as October 1941. 
 But in the end Hitler and his closest allies decided on a much different method, and 
Germans became directly involved in mass murder or simply did nothing as they watched Jews 
being deported from their cities and villages. They reacted in this way not out of some innate, 
bestial hatred as the careful work of David Bankier, Omer Bartov, Christopher Browning, Peter 
Longerich, Edward Westermann and others have shown.90 Instead they acted partly out of their 
general consent to the anti-Jewish policies of the Third Reich; Nazi Germany was, indeed, a 
“pleasing dictatorship” not just because it delivered the material goods, but also because it 
fulfilled one of its most clearly stated and important policy goals –– the removal of Jews from 
German society.91 Most ordinary Germans were doubtlessly not concerned about the presence of 
Jews in France, Poland, the Ukraine, or anywhere else in Europe. They cared above all about their 
own local/national situation. They were not pushing for the “Final Solution.” Genocide emerged 
from the “redemptive antisemitism” of the Nazi elite during World War II with the general 
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knowledge of the German population, but it did not reflect a broad desire for mass murder. 
Nonetheless, the general approval and desire for the removal of Jews from German society paved 
the way for the continent-wide program of mass murder that Hitler and his closest allies pursued 
in the midst of war with the Soviet Union.92 
In November 1938, the Nazi party carried out a massive attack on Jewish property that 
historians have long interpreted as the one instance when the bourgeois sensibilities of German 
society became frazzled by Nazi anti-Jewish policy, which had left their usually clean and orderly 
streets piled with broken glass. The day after the pogrom a remarkable photo emerged of 
Potsdam’s lightly damaged synagogue. A sizeable crowd, dressed in long overcoats and top hats, 
is gathered in front of the building, some leaning close to each other as if in conversation, while 
others are standing by themselves, perhaps just stopping by for a quick look before moving on 
with their day’s schedule, their bicycles, in fact, nearby to ride them away. A small group of kids, 
perhaps eight in total, are perched on the sills of the synagogue’s two large bottom windows as 
they peer through the glassless frames. One of the large doors, held open, allows some an even 
closer glimpse inside, but at the moment they do not seem to be edging all the way in. No single 
face can be seen in this photo as the crowd gazes at the towering synagogue located on Potsdam’s 
central Wilhelmplatz. Is this crowd shocked? Are they concerned? Or are they curious? Or 
perhaps even a little bit amused by the almost theatrical-like display of broken windows, burning 
rooftops, and the growing group of spectators? One can only conjecture what this particular 
crowd’s reaction might have been, but what we do know is that, while the Jewish community 
clearly interpreted Kristallnacht as the last sign that it was now time for them to leave, German 
society as a whole did not protest strongly against the purpose of the pogrom as one more attack 
against the Jews, even if they did not like all the glass on their sidewalks and squares. After some 
six years of Nazi rule, the persecution of Jews had become so normalized that the meaning for the 
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victims of a violent act such as Kristallnacht had become lost on those gawking at the broken 
windows and burnt-out remains of their town’s synagogue. Unlike Poles, Germans often did not 
face during the Holocaust intimate encounters with Jews; they did not run into them in the pastry 
shops of their capital city or in the forests of their smallest village. But as knowers and observers 
of the persecution they faced the same question of how best to act; many Germans decided to 
pass by with perhaps some concern but generally not worried about what was happening to a 
minority group they no longer considered part of the Volksgemeinschaft.  
In these different and similar ways, German and Polish society became entangled in the 
Holocaust. Germany became obviously more so as the architect and implementer of the Final 
Solution, but Poland became drawn into it, not by choice, as the epicenter of where the mass 
murder unfolded. Both societies shared a relatively similar history of gentile-Jewish relations 
marked above all by the integration into everyday life of a normalized prejudice that rested on the 
basic notion that Jews should somehow be eliminated from German and Polish society. The 
division between Jews and gentiles had become so clear that many Germans and Poles came to 
believe that it was time for Jews to leave; forced emigration became a seriously considered option 
in interwar Poland and became the official policy of the Third Reich until the invasion of the 
Soviet Union. In studying this period, historians often confront the difficult problem about how 
belief shapes behavior. They construct narratives about the “indifference” of Polish and German 
society to the Holocaust with varying degrees of emphasis on the impact of anti-Jewish beliefs, 
biases, and prejudices on engendering this reaction. I have argued here that notions of 
indifference, collaboration, and complicity are either too intricate or too vague to be of much use; 
they fail to capture the much more common and direct way that the Holocaust intersected with the 
everyday lives of Germans and Poles.93 A coherent, stable, and sophisticated ideological belief 
system did not shape the behavior and actions of most Poles and Germans. Instead a much more 
basic prejudice about Jews as fundamentally separated from German and Polish society became 
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so integrated into everyday life that behaving or reacting with empathy toward Jews seemed 
peculiar and abnormal. In this moral economy, taking over “former” Jewish property, threatening 
to call the police, gawking at a damaged synagogue, severing ties with Jewish neighbors, or 
watching the deportation trains go by did not make one complicit in something awful. For it to do 
so, one would first have to interpret the surrounding reality as, in fact, awful, catastrophic, and 
morally alarming.  
By the end of the war, interactions between Jews and gentiles in Germany and Poland 
had become so severed, so frayed, so broken that it is difficult to think of other places in Europe 
that experienced such deeply fractured relations. Jewish spaces powerfully conjured up the 
complex nature of this past; fractured, shattered, confiscated, and abandoned, they were the 
physical symbols of violence, destruction, and persecution, scattered along otherwise ordinary, 
everyday streets. How Germans and Poles dealt with these sites –– how they interpreted the 
history of gentile-Jewish relations during the Holocaust in the midst of that history –– shifted 
over the postwar decades. Refracted through different present and future concerns, the past took 
on different meanings, implications, and significances as Poles and Germans gradually 
interpreted the tragic nature of their relationship with Jews and started to preserve the last 
remnants of their cultural heritage.  
Of course, no other European country after the war –– with perhaps the exception of 
Austria –– faced such a clear and heavy burden for the mass murder of European Jewry as 
Germany. In this sense, Poland’s relationship to the Holocaust has often been more oblique. 
While the notion of Vergangenheitsbewältigung inherently assumes that the “past” needs to be 
“dealt with” in some way, a similar demand has not emerged as forcefully in Poland (or France, 
the Ukraine, etc).94 What dark pasts would need to be “worked through” regarding one of the 
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most heroic and catastrophic periods in Polish history? To be sure, over the past twenty-five years 
critical debates about Polish-Jewish relations during the Holocaust have challenged the basic 
premise behind this question, but Poland’s asymmetrical relationship to the Holocaust is one of 
the defining differences between it and Germany.95 Poland has not embraced the “stigma” of the 
Holocaust nearly as much as Germany has in part because its own hermeneutical standpoint, 
shaped by its past as a destroyed, occupied –– indeed “martyred” –– country, does not interpret 
the mass murder of the Jews as a clear, unequivocal national stain.96  What is striking, however, is 
that in spite of this central, historically conditioned difference Poles and Germans have often 
interpreted and appropriated shattered Jewish spaces in many shared ways. The first part of this 
parallel and divergent narrative begins right after the war as Poles and Germans confronted the 
problem of what to do with the legally confiscated properties of their now largely absent Jewish 
communities.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
“ABANDONED” AND “HEIRLESS:” 
THE LEGAL APPROPRIATION OF JEWISH SITES 
 
As Nazi Germany implemented the “Final Solution” to its self-imposed Jewish question, 
it carried out a massive seizure of property throughout Europe that fell into the hands of the Nazi 
state, local governments, and ordinary residents. After 1945, dealing with this confiscated 
property was the first, most immediate issue regarding Jewish sites that Germans and Poles had to 
confront. It was no easy task. Since so few Jews survived the Holocaust, the legal possibility of 
giving back what had been taken away seemed daunting: Who should receive this heirless 
property? Just before and immediately after the Holocaust ended, Jewish leaders in the United 
States and Palestine became concerned about finding a solution to this unprecedented problem. 
They wanted to make sure that confiscated Jewish property did not remain in control of the 
German state and its accomplices. Jewish leaders of the World Jewish Congress (WJC), the 
Jewish Agency, and the American Joint Distribution Committee (AJDC) pushed the allies after 
the war to make the return of Jewish property and the broader issue of restitution a central 
element of Europe’s postwar reconstruction. Although Germany naturally became the primary 
focus, international Jewish leaders also worked with local Jewish officials in Poland to put 
pressure on the state to return Jewish property there.  
But no matter how much Jewish leaders emphasized to international, national, and local 
officials the importance of carrying out a resolute, speedy, and thorough handling of confiscated 
Jewish property the issue became embroiled in a web of complications, controversies, 
bureaucratic maneuvering, and political opposition. Perhaps this was to be expected to a certain 
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extent: returning property involved material possessions that had been taken by people, states, 
business, and organizations that did not, to put it mildly, come around very easily to the idea that 
now they suddenly should help the Jews by giving back what had been taken from them. 
Moreover, the emerging cold war division of Europe complicated matters. Pushed strongly by 
American military authorities, West Germany adopted a fairly wide-ranging program of 
restitution, while the Soviet bloc states, including the GDR and PPR, eschewed any form of 
returning Jewish property. Restitution became a political tool of the cold war, especially between 
the two German states, as the FRG sought to show that it was morally superior to the 
“totalitarian” dictatorship in the east, while the GDR claimed that it was the true antifascist 
Germany by removing fascist, capitalist measures such as property rights in the first place. This 
cold war division is not surprising but it could not have been predicted at the time: Why would 
the Christian Democrat-dominated West Germany eventually support a restitution program, while 
the leftist, theoretically egalitarian GDR and PPR oppose it?  
Historians who have focused on restitution have implicitly absorbed this cold war 
framework into their analysis. The research is acutely lopsided with a large amount of work on 
the FRG, a few titles on the GDR, and virtually nothing on the PPR.1 In the first two cases, West 
Germany appears as a country that dealt with Wiedergutmachung in a moderately successful way, 
while the GDR balked at any responsibility for the Nazi past and pursued a relatively sinister 
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approach toward its Jewish population.2 In the PPR, recent research has dealt with anti-Semitic 
violence and Jewish emigration in 1945-50 rather than with Jewish property, but to the extent that 
scholars make broader arguments about the period the early decades appear as a mix of benign 
neglect and general repression with a gradual increase in opposition culminating in the storm of 
anti-Jewish hatred in 1967-68.3 To be sure, this basic cold war framing of the past makes a certain 
amount of sense, but the task here is to peer underneath it and address how three different states 
across both sides of the Iron Curtain dealt with the shared problem of confiscated Jewish 
property. West Germany certainly proved more able to push forward restitution, but it 
encountered significant political opposition and became entangled in a long process of 
bureaucratic maneuvering that required constant outside pressure for it to be implemented. The 
PPR and the GDR obviously did not even put forward a program to dispute, but this opposition to 
restitution begs a puzzling question: Why did officials on the Left, who had either supported or at 
least not opposed Jewish rights before 1945, develop policies toward the survivors of Nazi 
persecution that oscillated between benign neglect and outright hostility? What happened to 
communism in Europe after the Holocaust? 
This chapter addresses these central issues by examining the general legal state of Jewish 
sites. This legal dimension is not only an important part of the postwar history of Jewish sites in 
divided Germany and Poland, but it is also crucial for understanding the physical handling of 
Jewish spaces. In all three cases, Jewish communal property was legally designated as 
“abandoned” and “heirless” and ultimately fell into the ownership of local municipal authorities 
who determined what to do with these sites. Although Jewish leaders in the two Germanys and 
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Poland vigorously protested this legal move and believed that the postwar Jewish communities 
were the legal successors to pre-war communal property, they were fighting against an intractable 
series of legal measures. These conflicts emerged mostly on the national rather than the local 
level with only some variation from city to city. The legal appropriation of Jewish property was 
not surprisingly more centrally governed by a series of unified laws than was the actual physical 
treatment of Jewish sites. This chapter mirrors this difference by focusing more broadly on the 
national, moving to the local only when a particular city, mainly Berlin, deviates significantly 
from the dominant legal situation.  
I. Conflicts over Returning Jewish Communal Property in West Germany 
 Even before the mass killing of Jews ended in Europe, Jewish leaders in the United States 
and elsewhere began pushing for the return of Jewish property that had been confiscated or sold 
by the Nazis. In 1944, the World Jewish Congress (WJC) passed a sweeping resolution in favor 
of restitution at the War Emergency Conference held in Atlantic City. “It is urged that uniform 
laws be enacted,” the resolution read, “in all territories formerly occupied, annexed, dominated, 
or influenced by Axis powers guaranteeing to the Jews resident in these countries … full and 
speedy compensation of property, rights, and positions and compensation for losses suffered.”4 In 
that same year, the jurists Siegfried Moses and Nehemiah Robinson published two books that 
articulated the need for reparations and the return of Jewish property.5 These works were highly 
influential in giving initial shape and inspiration to Jewish demands for restitution. In September 
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1945, Chaim Weizmann drew on Robinson’s basic ideas in a letter to the four Allied governments 
urging them to force Germany to pay reparations.6  
As these demands emerged over 1944-45, leaders from the American Jewish Conference, 
the American Jewish Committee, the WJC, the Jewish Agency, and the AJDC formed a working 
committee that became instrumental in advocating for and drafting the first allied restitution law 
promulgated in the US zone of occupation in 1947.7 This intense pressure from the outside 
pushing for restitution quickly became concentrated on the western zones of occupied Germany 
where the Americans and more grudgingly the British were fairly sympathetic to the demands of 
Jewish organizations. In particular, the U.S. military put the security and future welfare of 
Germany’s Jewish population high on its list of priorities partially because it fit into its notion of 
democratization. The Americans stressed the importance of individual rights in promoting 
democracy in Germany and believed that both fighting anti-Semitism and pushing forward 
restitution were important steps toward that broader goal.8 American Commander Lucius D. Clay 
stressed the need for rebuilding Jewish life in Germany, and John J. McCloy, the High 
Commissioner for Germany, wrote in 1952 when leaving his post that “I have always had a deep 
conviction that unless Germany dealt with the problems of restitution we had little hope for the 
future of Germany.”9  
 Indeed, already in May 1945, the U.S. military force under General Eisenhower enacted a 
directive that placed all stolen property under allied control in preparation for its subsequent 
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return through the passage of a restitution law.10 At first, American military leaders hoped to gain 
approval for a unified restitution law for all of occupied Germany through the allied command, 
but they failed to reach a compromise among the four powers. The Soviets were the most 
unpredictable since Stalin did not know exactly what he wanted to do with eastern Germany in 
general, and preferred on this matter that the state take over confiscated Jewish property rather 
than give it back.11 The French were the least powerful occupying force and generally followed 
the American-British lead, but insisted on a broader, nondenominational restitution law. The 
British were the most ambiguous and complicated; they recognized the need for returning Jewish 
property in principle, but preferred “indirect rule” over the more interventionist stance of the 
Americans and argued that German courts should handle the property issues themselves. 
Moreover, restitution became entangled with Britain’s policy toward the Middle East; the British 
feared that money regained from property would be directed toward illegal emigration to 
Palestine. 12 Isolated on this issue by all its allies, the U.S. military thus decided to act alone and 
issued on November 10, 1947 a restitution law for its zone of occupation.13 Both pressure from 
Jewish organizations on the State Department and support from U.S. military governor Lucius D. 
Clay, who personally promised to Jewish leaders his commitment to restitution a year earlier, 
ensured passage of the law.14 The French soon followed suit with a similar measure for their 
zone, but it took the British two years before they finally agreed to pass a law. Although it took 
time for a unified policy to emerge, in the long run the allies remained committed to the 
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restitution process and did not scale it back as they did with other occupation policies such as 
denazification. Without the continued support and insistence of the allies, especially the 
Americans and eventually the British, the return of Jewish property probably would not have 
taken place on the scale that it did in the early FRG.15 
The role of the allies was pivotal indeed because the restitution laws had quickly 
provoked intense opposition from parts of German society. Local, grass-roots anti-restitution 
organizations emerged throughout Germany that emphasized the hardship of the “buyers” of 
Jewish property. Anti-Semitic attacks about Jewish “revenge” became frequent as these groups 
sought to uncover the “real” intentions behind restitution.16 A basic denial of the anti-Jewish 
impetus behind the seizure of Jewish property underpinned these assaults. As one organization 
founded in Berlin put it, restitution had created “new injustices” because the “purchase” of Jewish 
property had often occurred in good faith out of concern for Jews. The confiscation of Jewish 
property was simply a consequence of the war that had no right to be repaid now:  
The adversity that Jews suffered during the Nazi period through the sale of their property … is 
being shifted to the current owners of the former Jewish property. … The restitution laws are 
based on the assumption that all sales of property by Jews between 1933 and 1945 rested on threat 
and force. … The restitution laws do not take into account that in many cases friends of Jews 
bought the property in order to supply financial means for emigration. The friend bought in order 
to help. … The losses caused by bombs, the losses in the eastern territories, the losses associated 
with the refugees, and the losses created by inflation cannot be settled. The sacrifices that the 
Jewish population had to make between 1933 and 1945 were losses of the war.17  
 
This assault on restitution is bold in its denial and relativization of the Nazi persecution of the 
Jews, but even more so given just how prevalent such attacks had become in West Germany. In 
1950, the U.S. military noted that “a large part of the German population considers the restitution 
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law unjust” since the transactions were conducted in “‘good faith’ for ‘good money.’”18 This 
broad opposition strengthened the anti-restitution movement across Germany. On May 4, 1950, 
many of the organizations representing “persons injured by restitution” across the FRG came 
together to form an umbrella organization to advance their interests –– the Bundesvereinigung für 
loyale Rückerstattung (The Federal Association for Loyal Restitution).19 In that same year, the 
journal, Die Restitution, began publishing articles about the political and economic injustice of 
the restitution laws. One of the most central targets of the anti-restitution movement were the 
Jewish successor organizations that emerged in the three western zones of occupation. 
Established by the allied restitution laws, these organizations were set up to petition for and then 
legally become the owners of heirless Jewish property. They became the source of incessant 
attacks from the anti-restitution movement as large, anonymous apparatuses that were out to harm 
the German economy.20 
The Jewish successor organizations also received harsh criticism, albeit for starkly 
different reasons from a rather unpredictable source –– German Jewish leaders. The largest and 
most important organization, the Jewish Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO), which was 
established by the U.S. military in 1947, became drawn into a tense and long conflict with 
German Jewish leaders over the fate of Jewish communal property. The U.S. military government 
declared all Jewish communal property abandoned and heirless and appointed the JRSO as the 
official successor to it even in towns where a Gemeinde existed after the war.21 The Americans 
based this decision on the dissolution of the Jewish community during the Nazi period. In 1938-
39, the Nazis removed the legal status of the Gemeinde as a public entity (Korperschaft des 
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öffentlichen Rechts) and dissolved the legal rights of the individual Jewish communities by 
incorporating them into the Reich Association of Jews. The U.S. military could have simply 
declared this legal dissolution of the Gemeinden invalid under its repeal of Nazi law (Military 
Government Law No. 1), but it decided to uphold it in light of concern among international 
Jewish leaders who feared that the small, seemingly temporary Gemeinden of postwar Germany 
would not be able to reclaim and take over the vast amounts of property that had once belonged to 
the Jewish community.22 The last thing they wanted was for unclaimed synagogues, community 
centers, and Jewish cemeteries to remain in the hands of the very state that had caused the 
destruction of German and European Jewry. Jewish leaders also planed to use the funds from the 
sale of reclaimed property to benefit Holocaust survivors throughout the world.23 Their aim was 
to regain the property as quickly as possible and then resell it; they believed they were making the 
best out of a difficult and complicated situation  
 But German-Jewish leaders resented the presence of the JRSO and relations between both 
groups quickly became nothing less than acrimonious.24  The JRSO tried to stave off a dispute by 
creating an Advisory Committee that included German Jewish leaders, but this did little to 
mollify German-Jewish concerns since the board could not make any policy decisions.25 German-
Jewish leaders not only resented this imbalance of power, but they contested the very right of the 
JRSO to reclaim Jewish communal property. No matter how hard the JRSO tried it could not 
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overcome the deep bitterness of German-Jewish leaders toward its basic purpose who firmly 
believed that the postwar Gemeinden were the legal successor to Jewish communal property. As 
the Jewish leader Philipp Auerbach in 1948 bluntly put it, the present Jewish communities were a 
“continuation of the former (pre-Nazi) Gemeinden and therefore there could be no discussion 
about ‘successor’ to the Gemeinde property.”26  
 The JRSO attempted to work with German Jewish leaders to reach a workable 
compromise. In 1949, it agreed that properties the Jewish communities needed to carry out their 
religious duties would be returned to them, while any others they did not need would be handed 
over to the JRSO.27 But German-Jewish leaders remained adamant that they receive all properties 
in locations where a Gemeinde existed.28 They were also concerned about the complicated issue 
of how to distribute the money from the sale of regained properties and reparation payments for 
damaged Jewish property. The JRSO wanted to use most of the funds to support social welfare 
programs outside Germany, while German Jewish leaders wanted to secure as much money as 
possible to sustain a future Jewish life in Germany. As these competing interests collided, an 
overarching agreement remained elusive and the JRSO decided to negotiate individual 
compromises with each Gemeinde. In the early 1950s, most Jewish communities had reached an 
agreement with the JRSO about the distribution of property and funds.29 
 Yet just as these agreements were being signed relations between the JRSO and German 
Jewish leaders reached a nadir. The conflict typically stayed within the confines of private letters 
and internal meetings, but occasionally erupted into the open with public attacks by men such as 
Karl Marx, Heinz Galinski, and Hendrik George van Dam. As the general secretary of the Central 
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Council of Jews (Zentralrat der Juden), a new umbrella organization founded in 1950 to serve the 
interests of all Jewish communities in the FRG, van Dam emerged as by far the most vocal and 
strident opponent of the JRSO.30 In a moment of clear frustration, one JRSO official even referred 
to the overall problem with the Gemeinde as “this van Dam (or should I say damn) issue.”31 The 
JRSO recognized van Dam as someone who was simply attempting to look out for the wellbeing 
of “his constituency,” but nonetheless grew tired of his often lengthy letters that emphasized the 
same point over and over again that the JRSO was not the legal successor to the community’s 
property. He insisted that it had created a “problem in this unpleasant manner” by refusing to 
reach “fair agreements” with the Gemeinden and by “dictating” its interest with the “complete 
exclusion” of the German Jewish community.32 In 1952, van Dam launched his boldest attack 
when he brought the matter to public attention in an article published in the Allgemeine 
Wochenzeitung der Juden in Deutschland. While repeating his basic claims about the exclusion of 
German Jews from the decision making process, he posited a new line of reasoning that depicted 
the JRSO’s existence as no less than an “act of one-sided seizure” that had led to the unfair 
confiscation of the Jewish community’s property:  
  This property has been transferred to the successor organizations by military government 
  law. We are dealing here with the heritage of German Jews … It is the heirless estate of   
  German Jewry, which above all is to be used for Jews from Germany who are still alive  
 and for those living in Germany. We are not dealing here with the property of perished 
American, French, or British Jews, but rather with the [property] exclusively of Jews who  
once lived in Germany …33   
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The JRSO was taken aback by this attack; impassioned letters and speeches in meetings it could 
take, but bringing the dispute into the public it could not. Benjamin Ferencz, one of the leading 
JRSO negotiators, responded immediately. In a spirited letter, he criticized van Dam’s 
“nationalistic principle that German property should be used only for German Jews” and 
emphasized that without the occupying powers restitution would have been severely limited since 
German state officials “have persistently been trying to undermine” it.  “Perhaps one day,” he 
continued, “you will have an opportunity for a free hand in trying to convince the German 
officials about German restitution problems without the interference of Americans. I would not be 
surprised if our actions up to now would be regarded as an ‘usurpation,’ as you call it, but I 
expected such criticism to come from the Germans and not from the Zentralrat der Juden in 
Deutschland.”34  
 In a sense, this response failed to grasp the real source of the conflict. On the surface, 
German Jewish leaders simply wanted back what they believed was their own property, but their 
continued discomfort with the JRSO stemmed from a much deeper, internal Jewish-Jewish 
dialogue about whether or not Jews should live in the “land of the perpetrators.” Most German 
Jews decided neither to stay nor return to the Federal Republic, but those who did, especially its 
community leaders, became strongly committed to rebuilding Jewish life even as they remained 
acutely aware of the continuing presence of anti-Jewish prejudices in German society.35 They 
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were hardly naïve about the challenges of living in postwar Germany, but they deeply resented 
the disapproval that they often received from Jews outside of Germany for their choice to stay.36 
The JRSO, no matter how good the larger cause it served, only exacerbated this tension not least 
because its very existence assumed that Jewish life in Germany had basically ended. In 1952, 
Karl Marx, editor of the Allgemeine Wochenzeitung, directly pointed to this basic, underlying 
tension in his response to Ferencz’s reply to van Dam. He went out of his way to emphasize that 
the existence of Jewish life in Germany “no longer can be denied” and that all Jews “must 
support with all their heart the task of strengthening these communities.” He stressed the 
solidarity of the German Jewish community with Israel before concluding with the hope that Jews 
in Germany will soon have the “feeling that they are not being treated as if they could not manage 
their own affairs, but are regarded as having equal rights.”37 
 This resentment and anger toward the JRSO reached a key turning point in the early 
1950s when German-Jewish leaders decided not to settle just for tough words but to fight for their 
“equal rights” in court. In towns and cities throughout Germany, Jewish communities registered 
claims for the return of the same property that the JRSO did. In some cases, German courts or 
local officials upheld the rights of the local Gemeinde in clear contradiction of American military 
law. It is not clear if German authorities were showing solidarity with the Jewish communities or 
simply attempting to undermine the restitution process by going against the JRSO. The most 
important and potentially damaging case for the JRSO occurred in the southern German city of 
Augsburg where a postwar community of thirty-five Jews successfully regained its property. The 
first two German courts that handled the JRSO’s appeal, the Augsburg restitution chamber 
(Wiedergutmachungskammer) and the Munich appellate court (Oberlandesgericht), ruled in favor 
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of the Jewish community in a stunning rebuke of American restitution law. The JRSO 
immediately responded by referring the matter to the Court of Restitution Appeals (CORA), the 
highest arbiter of restitution matters in the U.S. zone made up of American jurists and run by the 
U.S. High Commission.38 In 1954, CORA overturned the earlier rulings of the German courts. 
Although it recognized the needs of the local Jewish community, it concluded that the restitution 
law was an “unprecedented remedy necessitated by the commission of unprecedented wrongs.” 
The ruling continued: “The authority that enacted the legislation, and saw it fit to make sweeping 
exceptions from the usual measures of legal redress, was equally competent to restrict restitution 
… to successor organizations approved by it, in order to accomplish the greatest good for the 
greatest number of victims.”39 This ruling finally settled the legal dispute between the JRSO and 
the Gemeinden.40  
But as this conflict eventually dissipated, the JRSO faced a new and potentially more 
serious challenge. Growing opposition to restitution in West German society and politics 
threatened to limit its ability to settle thousands of claims it had accrued over the years.41 As anti-
restitution groups became more organized and vocal, the JRSO feared exactly what it wanted to 
avoid –– becoming involved in a protracted legal process that would prevent it from quickly 
dispensing of funds for Holocaust survivors and social welfare programs. In 1950, the JRSO 
turned to John McCloy, the American High Commissioner for Germany and long-standing 
supporter of restitution, with a possible idea for settling its claims in a fair, yet quick way. It 
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model, meaning that the allies had the final say in restitution matters.  
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proposed to negotiate global agreements with each German state to settle the vast majority of its 
outstanding claims for an agreed-upon sum of money. The JRSO emphasized the clear benefit of 
settling thousands of claims quickly, even if it meant a substantial loss in money than would 
otherwise be gained by pursuing each claim individually. McCloy supported the idea and agreed 
to put pressure on the German states to negotiate with the JRSO. Much pressure was needed in 
the end as the German states were hardly willing to enter into bulk agreements and stalled as long 
as they possibly could.42 One of the reasons was that the settlement actually sold the property to 
the individual states, meaning that they would now have to force the “buyers” during the Third 
Reich to either pay for the property or give it up. The German states did not want to become 
claimants against their own citizens, and did not want to become owners of Jewish communal 
property such as synagogues and Jewish cemeteries that they would then have to maintain. But 
after much haggling and intense pressure from McCloy, four out of the five states in the U.S zone 
finally agreed to enter into global settlements in 1951-52.43 
 The lone state government that did not was West Berlin. Controlled by three different 
foreign powers, West Berlin did not begin the restitution process in until 1949 when the British 
government finally passed a restitution law for its zone of occupation, making way for a unified 
law to be enacted for the city.44 At first, all three Jewish successor organizations in the French, 
American, and British zones filed claims for heirless property, but in 1950 the JRSO reached an 
agreement with them that it would be the sole representative for Jewish property in West Berlin.45 
As the JRSO decided that same year to reach global settlements with the German states, it 
became the central negotiator for the West Berlin agreement. Although Jewish communal 
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43 Hessen (02.13.1951), Bremen (6.28.1951), Württemberg-Baden (11.06.1951), Bavaria (07.29.1952). 
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property made up a relatively small amount of the JRSO’s total claims, it proved to be one of the 
main obstacles to reaching an amicable agreement with the city. West Berlin had the largest 
Jewish community in the FRG with about 6,000 members led by Heinz Galinski, a relentless 
advocate for the community and for the existence of Jewish life in Germany after the Holocaust. 
Sharing the views of van Dam and other Jewish leaders, he believed that the postwar Gemeinde 
was the legal successor to the prewar community’s property and filed restitution claims for the 
same property that the JRSO did.46 He also argued incessantly that the Jewish community should 
receive a greater share of the revenue from the sale of property and reparation payments than had 
originally been agreed upon with the JRSO.47 Galinski developed close relations with the Berlin 
government since he knew that its support was crucial to sustaining Jewish life and he used his 
contacts to stress to city officials that they must look after the community’s interests in 
negotiations with the JRSO.48 Berlin officials advocated strongly on behalf of the community 
partly out of solidarity with it against the JRSO, but also for purely financial reasons: the more 
money allotted to the Gemeinde from a JRSO agreement meant less money the city had to pay out 
overall. This mutually beneficial alliance between Galinski and city officials strained relations 
with the JRSO, which knew that both parties were pushing the other to force concessions from 
it.49  
 The Jewish community was, however, hardly the main obstacle to reaching a fair global 
settlement. The JRSO encountered intense opposition from West Berlin officials who simply did 
                                                 
46 Claims filed by both the Jewish community and the JRSO can be found in the files of the Berliner 
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not seem interested in brokering an amicable agreement. In negotiations that stretched over three 
years, the JRSO essentially had to cut its losses and sign an agreement of 13.5 million DM, which 
was drastically smaller than the total value of its assets in West Berlin estimated at 75 million 
DM.50 After final negotiations with the Berlin financial department, the JRSO ended up with an 
even lower settlement of just over 9 million DM, one million of which had to go to the Berlin 
Jewish community in a one-time, unconditional payment that was added to the agreement at the 
last moment.51 This clear defeat for the JRSO stemmed from a combination of bad fortune and 
basic bad will on the part of Berlin city officials. In 1952-53, the JRSO had developed a good 
relationship with mayor Ernst Reuter (SPD) who seemed determined to work out a fair and 
honest agreement with the JRSO, although he was uncomfortable with the idea of the state taking 
over Jewish religious sites that it would have to decide to preserve or tear down.52 But in 
September 1953 Reuter suddenly died; the person whom the JRSO considered to be “one of the 
few friends we might count on in Berlin” was now gone and chances of the settlement seemed 
grim.53 As one JRSO official summed up the situation, “it appears that the JRSO global 
settlement with Berlin is out of the window – if not for ever than at least for a long time to come –
– for Reuter was the only one with the prestige and the apparent desire to do something in 
connection with a global settlement for Berlin restitution and compensation.”54 
 Indeed, West Berlin’s new mayor, Walther Schreiber (CDU), expressed strong unease 
with the work of the successor organization. In a meeting with the JRSO in January 1953, he 
insisted that the Berlin Jewish community was the legal successor to the property and that the 
entire idea of restitution relied on outdated, allied legislation that had been imposed on Germany. 
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He reportedly went on to stress that Germans had suffered from the war and that no one spoke of 
restitution for them.55 Two months later, Schreiber followed up on these remarks with a rather 
stunning letter to the JRSO that challenged the organization’s claims and came close to rejecting 
restitution altogether. He noted that the city’s “permanent concern” lies with “helping Berlin’s 
economy with every power” and that Berlin’s “economic weakness” meant that it could not 
dispense with all restitution claims. Settling all claims in bulk could lead to “unfair treatment” 
toward the current owners of the property since the city would de facto be forced to prosecute 
them. As for those pieces of property that had already been returned to the JRSO, the mayor 
indicated that the city was not “indisposed” to purchasing them provided that they served a 
“public interest.”56 In short, Schreiber had all but relieved Berlin of responsibility for restitution 
claims except those for which it was “directly liable under the law.”57  
This letter rattled JRSO officials and they directly appealed to Chancellor Konrad 
Adenauer whom they tended to see as sympathetic to their cause. The chancellor reportedly said 
that his fellow CDU counterparts were “fools” and indicated that he would talk to them.58 In a 
private meeting with the mayor and his associates, the chancellor apparently urged them to 
conclude an agreement with the JRSO.59 This appeal from Adenauer had some effect as not too 
long afterwards the JRSO and Berlin officials verbally agreed on 20-25 million DM as a total 
settlement, but then the finance department came back with a much smaller amount in the spring 
of 1955 of 12-13 million DM. This news shocked the JRSO’s main negotiator, Benjamin Ferencz, 
who could not hold back his frustration: “At the moment it looks like the end of the bulk 
settlement, so that after 2.5 years of intensive negotiations and firm promises by three 
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Buergermeisters we are, in a thinly disguised form, being told to accept a crumb for our bother or 
go to hell.”60 On June 23, 1955, the Berlin senate passed the official offer with only a slightly 
higher proposal of 13.5 million DM. The JRSO realized that it had virtually little choice other 
than to accept it.61 Ferencz wrote to his superior:  
 We have been negotiating this bulk settlement for over three years. We have had  
 negotiations with Berlin’s last three mayors. We have brought to bear political pressures ranging 
 from Adenauer to Conant to Dulles, and the major political parties inside Germany. … 
 Nevertheless, the history of these negotiations has been the history of broken promises by the 
 German authorities and continuous concessions by the successor organizations. The failure to 
 conclude an agreement has been a clear indication that there never has been a strong desire to 
 reach an agreement. All this is clear evidence of the lack of public interest and the general hostility 
 to the restitution program. In Berlin we have, step by step, been beaten back into retreat since we 
 lacked the power or the possibility to do anything else. Our back is now against the wall. … In the 
 face of the existing and increasing hostility I cannot say with certainty that if we go on we will, 
 within the next few years, be successful in meeting more than Berlin now offers.62  
 
Ferencz’s analysis sums up well the tenuousness of restitution in West German politics and 
society. Forced into an agreement with the JRSO after much obstinance, Berlin ultimately paid 
out a paltry sum for property that it now officially owned. In comparison to either the GDR or to 
the PPR, the West German case seems rather impressive: there was no other country in Europe 
that adopted a more wide-ranging restitution program than it. But lying just below the surface 
were serious tensions, contradictions, and conflicts in practice. Although the existence of 
restitution was never in doubt –– American backing made that certain –– the basic lack of support 
for this “imported, victory justice” made its implementation difficult to put it mildly. West 
Germans ignored, dismissed, or directly opposed the return of Jewish property. Part of this 
obstinance stems from the dominant narratives of victimization and redemptive survival that 
emerged in the early FRG.63 Jewish claims for property appeared as only further evidence that the 
German population was being victimized after the war and not just by the allies but by Jews. 
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Some associated with the anti-restitution movement even called themselves Judengeschädigte 
(“people injured by Jews”).64 Anti-semitism played a central role in creating opposition to 
restitution, if perhaps less forcefully articulated in public than in the GDR and PPR given the 
government’s officially philosemitic posture.  
II. Debating the Return of Jewish Communal Property in East Germany 
In September 1950, Julius Meyer, head of the State Association of Jewish Communities 
in the GDR, sent a letter to the finance ministry inquiring about the current state of Jewish 
communal property. Throughout the immediate postwar years, he and other Jewish leaders had 
requested, though with little success, the return of Jewish property. With the occupation now 
over, Meyer hoped that the newly formed East German state might be sympathetic to the needs of 
the Gemeinde. He noted that the Jewish community had “still not acquired its own property” 
since most of it remained “under the control of the state” or in the hands of those who had seized 
it during the Nazi program of “Aryanization.” Meyer also pointed out that the Gemeinde needed 
money to reconstruct the numerous synagogues and Jewish cemeteries that had been damaged 
during Kristallnacht and World War II. “We ask,” he explained, “that you take into consideration 
the fact that the Jewish community, because of the extermination policy of the fascist state, finds 
itself in a situation like no other religious community.”65 
Meyer’s remarks underscore the challenges of rebuilding Jewish life in post-Holocaust 
Germany, but they also uncover a problem that became in effect East Germany’s Jewish question, 
one debated and pushed aside for four decades: what to do with confiscated and damaged Jewish 
communal property. At first glance, it seems puzzling that this would become an issue at all in 
East Germany. When the GDR came into existence in 1949, its ruling communist party of 
Socialist Unity (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, or SED), showed little sympathy 
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toward the needs of the Gemeinde and rejected calls to develop a wide-ranging policy of 
Wiedergutmachung, whether it involved supplying payments to Israel, returning individual 
Jewish property, or providing reparations to East German Jews. In justifying its decision, the SED 
argued that the GDR represented neither the legal nor historical successor to the Third Reich. It 
claimed further that returning individual Jewish property made no sense in a system where 
property rights did not exist, reparations had already been paid to the Soviet Union, and 
supporting Israel conflicted with the growing anti-Zionist stance of Moscow. Moreover, the SED 
understood restitution in a distinctly socialist way. In 1949, it agreed to give assistance for health, 
housing, and employment to those recognized as persecuted by the Nazi regime (though it made a 
distinction between Communist, antifascist fighters and Jewish victims). Eschewing the 
“capitalist” model of individual reparation payments and property rights, the SED had settled on a 
social welfare solution to the question of restitution.66  
There were, however, some in the SED who advocated for taking a different approach. In 
1948, a small group of SED officials, consisting of the party functionaries Helmut Lehmann, Paul 
Merker, and Leo Zuckermann, drafted a restitution law that built on measures recently passed in 
the U.S. zone. But top leaders in the SED (above all Walter Ulbricht) and Soviet authorities 
strongly opposed following what they saw as a western, capitalist solution to the problem; the 
proposed law conflicted directly with their project to build a communist Germany by removing 
one of the key elements of capitalism—property rights.67 As early as September 1945, the Soviets 
began confiscating both privately owned estates and communal property seized during the Third 
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Reich, including a large amount of holdings previously owned by individual Jews and the Jewish 
community.68  
Jewish communal property proved to be somewhat of an exception to these wider 
policies. Since Gemeinde property involved claims from organizations rather than individuals, the 
SED did not completely reject the idea of returning some of it. Indeed, on April 29, 1948, the 
SMA decreed order Nr. 82 that called for the “return of property confiscated by the Nazi state to 
democratic organizations.” While designed mainly for communist groups, the law also called for 
the return of property to “church or humanitarian” institutions.69 For the first and what proved to 
be the only time in the history of the SBZ and later the GDR, this order provided a legal basis for 
Jewish communities to reclaim their confiscated property.70 But the order was not without 
significant limitations. The SMA demanded that all organizations submit their claims within two 
months. Since most Jewish communities lacked the organizational resources to file the paperwork 
themselves, responsibility for doing so fell to the newly formed State Association of Jewish 
Communities in the SBZ (Landesverband der Jüdischen Gemeinden in der 
Sowjetbesatzungszone). Although the association tried to recover as much communal property as 
possible, its own scarce resources severely limited its efforts; it simply did not have the logistical 
capacity to track down in such short time all the holdings that the Nazis had confiscated. 
Nevertheless, it was able to recover about 122 pieces of property such as synagogues, Jewish 
cemeteries, and community centers throughout the SBZ, though the level of success varied 
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greatly by region.71 The state of Brandenburg, where Potsdam is located, faired by far the worst 
of any area in the SBZ. Without a Jewish community to aid the process, the Landesverband found 
it especially difficult to gather all the necessary information to file the claims. In the end, it had to 
submit an incomplete list and ultimately recovered a mere four properties in the entire state.72 A 
year later, the Landesverband sought to reverse this decision. Its director, Julius Meyer, asked 
Brandenburg’s state president to return thirty-seven pieces of Jewish communal property that had 
not been placed on the original list.73 In response, the state wrote to the SMA and argued that 
Meyer’s request should be granted given that the association’s “members had been treated 
especially hard by the measures of the National Socialist leadership.”74 For four months, the 
state’s letter languished until the SMA finally decided that the interior ministry of the newly 
formed East German state must now handle the case.75 After inspecting the claim, the interior 
ministry authorized the return of some property to the Landesverband, but Potsdam’s synagogue 
and Jewish cemetery were not among those given back.76  
The East Berlin Gemeinde would ultimately face a similar defeat with a much larger 
amount of property at stake. Unlike any other Jewish community in postwar Germany, the Berlin 
Gemeinde had to deal with four occupying powers rather than just one. While Britain, France, the 
Soviet Union, and the United States agreed in principle to cooperate through the Allied Command 
for Berlin, in practice they conflicted on almost every policy with the return of Jewish property 
being no exception. By 1949-50, the Berlin Gemeinde had made at least some progress in the 
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western zones with the help of international Jewish successor organizations, but negotiations with 
the Soviets had yielded no results regarding the release of a fairly sizable amount of property 
located in East Berlin (about 70-80 pieces). Complicating matters even more, SMA order Nr. 82 
had no jurisdiction in East Berlin. Since the city remained under the control of all four powers, no 
SMA order applied to the eastern sector and all Jewish holdings were confiscated by the state as a 
result.  
 Beginning in December 1947, Berlin’s city council moved to overturn this decision. At 
the suggestion of the SED political faction, the council proposed to draft a citywide restitution 
law (Wiedergutmachungsgesetz) that included the return of Jewish property. In the debate on the 
matter, members of the council argued that the city must give back what had been stolen from the 
Jews. One member in particular—a SED party member—suggested that the Nazi persecution of 
the Jews warranted the passage of a citywide restitution law. While opposition to returning 
Jewish property remained widespread among the SED’s leadership, it had not yet taken hold over 
all German communists: 
Ladies and Gentlemen. The proposal brought before us signifies the moral and political need to 
make justice out of injustice. … No one would ever claim that Jewish property was legally 
acquired, given that the Jews were already being subject to persecution at the time. . . . I don’t 
need to recount the details of Kristallnacht of 1938, but allow me to go through a few numbers 
that show the horrible havoc that persecution and destruction reeked on German and Berlin Jewry. 
Before 1933, 186,000 Jews lived in Berlin. Of these 186,000 about 40,000 Jews emigrated.77 Of 
the 146,000 Jews that were still in Berlin before Kristallnacht only 7,400 returned, which means 
that around 138,000 fell victim to annihilation by the Nazis.78 
 
Following additional comments by other members in support of the SED measure, the city 
council passed the proposal and requested the Magistrat (city government) to prepare a law for 
the “prompt return of formerly owned Jewish property located in the city of Berlin.”79 Two 
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months later, the Magistrat submitted a draft and on 10 June 1948, the council started debating 
the measure.80 Discussions involved technical and legal issues about a wide-ranging proposal.81 
But this measure ultimately came too late. On June 24, 1948, Stalin responded to the 
introduction of the new Deutschmark in the western zones by cutting off all road, rail, and water 
routes into the city. The Berlin Blockade and the subsequent division of the city shattered the 
prospect of the Wiedergutmachungsgesetz. Just two months later, even as local SED leaders 
were still debating the law, the SMA ordered the removal of all Jewish property in its zone that 
earlier had been put into a citywide trust and placed it under their direct control. Headed by a 
city official named Otto Stockfish, this new trust held somewhere between 1,400 and 2,800 
pieces of property, of which about seventy belonged to the Jewish community.82 Since the 
Soviets had already established a policy of confiscating property in East Berlin, this decision did 
not bode well for the Gemeinde.  
Despite this ominous development, Jewish community leaders continued to press their 
case. From 1949 until roughly 1953, Julius Meyer and Heinz Galinski sent a number of requests 
to the newly formed Magistrat in East Berlin.83 Although the city’s department of finance initially 
expressed little interest, it eventually came around to settling some of the Jewish community’s 
claims. After discussing the issue with East Berlin Mayor Friedrich Ebert, the department 
suggested giving back those holdings that the Gemeinde needed provided that the city was not 
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already using them.84 The proposal involved returning forty-four buildings for a community no 
larger than 2,000 at the time, clearly much more than it officially needed.85 But no sooner had it 
been submitted, than it ran into an emerging problem. It was drafted just as opposition toward 
Jews in East Germany started to increase dramatically. Just as the earlier 
Wiedergutmachungsgesetz had fallen victim to wider political changes, so too would this 
measure.   
By the end of 1951 and the beginning of 1952, accommodation toward Jews became a 
political liability in the GDR. As cold war tensions intensified and Ulbricht centralized the state 
along the lines of Stalin’s dictatorship, East German Jews became targets of the SED. Drawing on 
the show trial against Rudolf Slansky, a Jewish functionary in the Czechoslovak Communist 
party, the SED initiated a purge of “cosmopolitanism” that targeted veteran communists of 
largely Jewish origin. Defined loosely as a “key element of reactionary bourgeois ideology and 
American imperialism,” cosmopolitanism blended Stalin’s own personal antisemitism with more 
traditional stereotypes of the Jew as carriers of capitalism and bourgeois culture.86 One of the 
highest government officials affected by the purge was Paul Merker. While himself not Jewish, 
Merker’s alleged connections with the West and his plan to return confiscated Jewish property 
became the primary reason for the SED’s campaign against him.  
The 1952-53 purge has recently received considerable attention from historians. Most 
historians have simply interpreted the campaign as “a kind of tactical antisemitism” imported 
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from Stalin’s Russia with two important exceptions.87 Suggesting that 1952-53 was a “sonderweg 
in new clothes,” Jeffrey Herf has argued instead for a uniquely German form of antisemitism: 
“The links between Jews, capitalism, American imperialism, France, and Israel all evoked deep-
seated, long-standing antisemitic traditions of anti-western German nationalism. These traditions 
had, of course, been at the core of the ideological origins of National Socialism.”88 In contrast, 
Thomas Haury has located East German antisemitism in communist ideology, emphasizing the 
structural links between antisemitism, communism, and nationalism.89 These two arguments are 
not entirely convincing. Herf’s sweeping view of German history assumes a stable progression of 
antisemitism and overlooks the fact that late nineteenth-century German Jewish hatred was more 
deeply rooted in Christian prejudices than a supposed anti-western, völkish ideology.90 Haury’s 
argument falls short when one looks beyond the GDR: antisemitism in Poland, Romania, and the 
Ukraine did not reach the alarming levels during the early 1950s that it did in East Germany and 
Czechoslovakia. Thus, rather than essentializing East German antisemitism—seeing it as either 
an intrinsic part of a given society or a political system—it needs to be situated within the 
historical context of the early 1950s.  
At the height of the purge, the SED associated the Jews with the ideological enemies of 
communism: capitalism, American culture, and imperialism. Although this antisemitism drew on 
earlier stereotypes of the Jews as western, foreign, conspiratorial, and capitalistic, it operated 
within an entirely new framework. The SED did not target Jews because of their racial make-up 
or religious background (though some communists looked down upon religiously observant 
Jews), but rather because they represented what the party hated. East German antisemitism 
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became a “cultural code,” a symbol of the SED’s fight against U.S. imperialism, capitalism, and 
increasingly the state of Israel.91 The Jews were neither the source of the SED’s greatest 
apprehensions nor at the center of its politics, but they were highly visible symbols of the party’s 
broader fears. This strand of antisemitism was not violent as earlier outbursts of Jewish hatred 
often were and certainly was not “redemptive” as in the case of the Third Reich.92 In fact, it stood 
in direct opposition to these earlier forms. Equating antisemitism with fascism, the SED 
proclaimed that it had eliminated Jewish hatred by removing the main cause of the Third Reich: 
capitalism. But while rejecting as “fascist” any racial-biological bias against Jews, the SED had 
developed in reality a new form of prejudice—a distinctly antifascist antisemitism. 
What triggered this form of antisemitism to take hold in East Germany? Stalin’s paranoia 
about Jews and his growing antipathy toward Israel clearly had an impact, but he alone does not 
explain why the SED so vigorously carried out the campaign.  Internal developments in the GDR 
and the cold war also played key roles. In the early 1950s, the GDR was hardly stable: 
agricultural collectivization forced thousands to flee to the West, significant challenges to 
Ulbricht’s power still existed, and growing mass discontent erupted onto the streets in June 1953. 
The cold war, which the East German leadership experienced especially acutely with West 
Germany so close, only exacerbated these internal tensions. Thus as the SED looked to remove 
perceived internal and external threats to the GDR’s security, it turned to those with alleged ties 
to the West and capitalism—the Jews.  The emergence of this kind of antisemitism—targeting 
Jews at the height of political and social instability—represents a classic example of what the 
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medievalist Gavin Langmuir has called a “xenophobic assertion,” the tendency to project onto the 
Jewish minority the fears and anxieties of the majority.93  
The core elements of this prejudice appeared in a key document of the 1952-53 purge. On 
January 4, 1953, the SED published in its main newspaper, Neues Deutschland, an article entitled 
“Lessons from the Trial against the Slansky Conspiracy Center.” Written by Hermann Matern of 
the SED’s Central Party Control Commission (Zentrale Parteikontrollkommission), the document 
charged Paul Merker with harboring ties to American imperialism and Zionism. Merker’s call for 
the return of Jewish property was merely an attempt to enrich his “rich Jewish émigrés” and to 
“allow USA-finance capital to penetrate into Germany.” Matern argued further that Merker’s 
close affiliation with Jews and Zionist organizations had become a grave danger to East 
Germany. Zionism had infected the working class with the “poison” of “chauvinism,” 
“cosmopolitanism,” and “reactionary bourgeois ideology.” The Zionist movement stood in direct 
opposition to the ideological aims of communism: “[it] has nothing in common with the goals of 
humanity. It is ruled, directed, and commanded by USA-Imperialism, serving exclusively its 
interests and the interests of Jewish capitalists.”94 
The impact these antisemitic charges had on the East Berlin proposal to return some 
Jewish communal property proved decisive. In the spring of 1953, the city suddenly ceased 
negotiations with the Jewish community in East Berlin, even going so far as to refuse to supply a 
simple list of its property.95 Two years later, it developed a general policy toward Jewish property 
as a whole that effectively precluded any future negotiations with the Jewish community. After 
three years of internal debate in which some SED members feared that Jews tied to “international 
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Zionist organizations” might find out about the decision, the city passed an unpublished measure 
that allowed Jewish property (mostly individual) to be given back to those currently holding legal 
rights to it—those who “bought” the property in the 1930s (provided that they were still legally 
listed as the owner).96 Since administering the holdings proved an unexpected drain on the city’s 
budget, it wanted to see the property given back to someone, but just not to Jews (not least 
because most of them lived abroad). Reflecting a mix of cold war antagonism and outright 
prejudice, the city stated this directly: returning the property to its original owners 
(Voreigentümer) would follow the undesirable West German model of supporting “Israeli 
capitalists” through a policy of “restitution.”97 As the principal owner of the Gemeinde’s property, 
it now retained control over all its property with the exception of five pieces that it allowed the 
community to use as if it were the owner (Nutzung als Eigentümer).98 This policy remained in 
effect for the next four decades.  
III. Confiscating “Former” Jewish Property in Poland  
 In Poland, the handling of confiscated Jewish property overlapped in several ways with 
developments in the two Germanys, but was refracted through a qualitatively different historical 
condition. When the Nazis invaded Poland in 1939, the confiscation of Jewish property took 
place in the western areas along with the seizure of Polish property. In the incorporated 
territories, the Haupttreuhandstelle Ost (Main Trusteeship for the East, or HTO) was set up to 
deal with the confiscation of Polish and Jewish property that was used for the resettlement of 
ethnic Germans and the general benefit of the Third Reich.99 The HTO was charged with 
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expropriating all Polish private and state property as part of Himmler’s grand designs to 
Germanize this part of Poland. Although these utopian plans eventually proved impractical and 
fell to the wayside as Hitler prepared for war against the Soviet Union, they involved the forced 
deportation of no less than 500,000 Poles and Jews to the “dumping ground” of the 
Generalgouvernement.100 All of those deported — mostly non-Jewish Poles at this point –– lost 
their possessions, homes, businesses, and farms as they were forced to make room for incoming 
ethnic Germans.  
In central Poland, the Nazi seizure of property was much more selectively focused on 
Jewish possessions. The Nazis took whatever Polish property they needed or desired, but the 
seizure of Jewish property became linked to the ghettoization and mass murder of Polish 
Jewry.101 In a process that was both regulated and ad hoc, a variety of different owners took over 
Jewish property: some went directly to the Nazi state; some was stolen by German soldiers who 
were looking for their share of the war loot; some became controlled by Nazi-created trusteeships 
in Poland; and some fell into the hands of ordinary Poles who took over Jewish belongings left 
behind. The possibility for confiscating Jewish property came obviously from the German 
occupiers, but the actual process of identifying and taking it over involved the active participation 
of numerous Poles. In the GG, the Nazis created trusteeships that included Poles as managers. 
The Nazis preferred to have either Reichsdeutsche or Volksdeutsche fill these posts, but settled for 
Poles because they needed someone to do the job. In the Warsaw district, Poles made up no less 
than thirty percent of the trustees.102 Smaller cities had an even higher percentage not least 
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because local Polish mayors were often the ones who suggested to the German authorities the 
names of potential trustees. In the town of Otwock, for instance, only three Germans of 67 
applied to manage Jewish property, while in Pruszków not one single German was a trustee.103  
 Polish participation in the seizure of Jewish property was also at times more direct. In 
eastern Poland, local Poles simply moved into the homes, apartments, and shops left behind by 
Jews who were killed on the spot by the Einsatzgruppen or deported to the death camps. In some 
cases, Jews handed over their possessions to Polish friends, but more often than not those seeking 
material gain grabbed Jewish property once it became available. “The dregs of society poured out 
into the city,” Zygmunt Klukowski wrote in his diary, “with their wagons from the countryside as 
they stood waiting the entire day for the moment when they could start looting. News is coming 
from all directions about the scandalous behavior of segments of the Polish population who are 
robbing abandoned Jewish apartments.”104 Indeed, the seizure of Jewish property in eastern 
Poland became connected with the participation of some Poles in the persecution and mass 
murder of the Jews. The plunder of Jewish property was one of the main motivating factors for 
the wave of pogroms and massacres that erupted in over twenty towns in the Łomża and 
Białystok regions during the summer of 1941.105 
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What happened to this confiscated property once the war ended? Were there ever calls 
from Polish society or moves by the communist-dominated government taking hold in Poland to 
give Jewish property back to surviving heirs or to Jewish organizations? These questions emerged 
at a particularly precarious time for Poland. The country was ravaged by war, occupation, and 
genocide. Numerous Polish cities, industries, roads, and bridges lay in ruins; an astounding five 
million Polish citizens had died; and the country’s pre-war minorities, once making up one-third 
of the population, were virtually gone after the Holocaust and the forced removal of Germans, 
Ukrainians, Lemkos, Belorussians, and Lithuanians.106 No other geographic space in Europe with 
the exception of Soviet Ukraine and Belarus experienced such massive destruction and 
upheaval.107 The Nazi seizure of property created a massive, complex problem that was made 
even more complicated in the early postwar years. Poland’s border had shifted nearly 125 miles 
to the west as 47 percent of its prewar territory in the east became part of the Soviet Union 
(Poland lost in the end about a sixth of its size after gaining former German territory). As 
Germans were forced out and Poles were brought in from the lost territories of the east, property 
was lost and then gained as thousands had to leave their homes and move into new ones. The very 
idea of rightfully owned property –– including that once belonging to Jews –– was severely 
undermined in the midst of an unprecedented loss, transfer, destruction, and confiscation of 
property across Poland. All the while, Polish communists were transforming Poland’s political 
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system as they consolidated power between the years of 1944-47. By the late 1940s, Poland was a 
very different country indeed. 
The problem of confiscated Jewish property also emerged at a critical moment in Polish-
Jewish history. In June 1946, the Jewish population in Poland reached its postwar height of 
240,000 after thousands of Polish Jews returned home from the Soviet Union where they had 
survived the Holocaust.108 By 1949, the number had dropped to around 98,000. A surge of 
violence against Jews caused the massive emigration of Jews. In 1945-46, somewhere between 
500 and 1,500 Jews were murdered in villages and towns across Poland.109 This outbreak of 
violence had a direct impact on the issue of returning Jewish property. The violence itself 
stemmed partially from property claims. As Jews came back to Poland and sought what had been 
stolen from their families, some ethnic Poles physically attacked them in order to dissuade them 
from reclaiming their possessions.110 Moreover, the anti-Jewish hatred diverted much-needed 
attention and resources from the issue of returning Jewish property. As Jewish organizations in 
Germany were pressing for restitution, those in Poland had to worry first and foremost about 
security. Poles who expressed public concern about the condition of Jews in Poland –– mostly 
intellectuals writing in left-wing social and literary journals –– became equally overwhelmed by 
contemporary events and overlooked the problem of property almost altogether.111 There were 
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only a few exceptions. One member of the Council for Aid to Jews demanded in 1945 that Polish 
society “go after at last all of those who took over Jewish property from the hands of the 
occupiers and made a fortune; for it is precisely they who today are most interested in the 
extermination of the remaining Jewish survivors.”112 But such pleas were rare as those few Poles 
who were interested in working through their fractured relationship with Jews focused more on 
the on-going problem of antisemitism than with the question of Polish complicity in the 
Holocaust through such actions as the seizure of Jewish property.113  
The anti-Semitic violence in Poland also sent a clear signal to Polish communists about 
the prevailing mood of society. In a country where the anti-Semitic stereotype of żydokomuna 
held particular sway, they quickly realized that any overt association with Jews was politically 
caustic to say the least. Some communists recognized the needs of the Jewish community, but 
knew that the costs of offering support were simply too high: fighting for the rights of such a tiny 
minority group was bound to yield many more political loses than possible gains. As Jan Gross 
has succinctly put it, most Polish communists were running away from “any putative association 
between Jews and Communism, which was hurting the Party and which they knew was on the 
public’s mind.”114 Jews in Poland lacked political allies. They had virtually no one who was 
willing to press for their needs in a consistent, sustained, and vigorous manner.115 In this sense, 
the political condition of Polish Jews differed from that of Jews in occupied Germany who could 
at least count on the support of the U.S. military and a handful of politicians from the SPD and 
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the early SED. This does not mean that, ironically, “Jews were safe among the Germans,” as one 
author has shortsightedly put it.116 Jews found relative safety and support first and foremost 
among the occupiers of Germany. Polish Jews did not.117 They were, in effect, abandoned from 
all sides: the Soviets appeared oblivious to their plight; the communists, even if they wanted to 
help, were running away from them in their grab for political power; and the major political 
opposition –– the Polish Peasant Party and the militia bands made up mainly of right-wing groups 
–– were either generally silent about Jewish matters or embraced an ethnocentric vision of a 
future Polish state that did not include Jews.118  
Indeed, there are perhaps few other issues that reflect Poland’s abandonment of its Jewish 
population more starkly than the problem of Jewish property. There was simply no social, legal, 
moral, or political pressure pushing to return it. Part of the reason for this stemmed from the 
catastrophic condition that Poland found itself in after the war. Almost every Polish family in 
some way had been directly affected by the occupation and the postwar realignment of the 
country’s borders. The Nazi seizure of property and the postwar migration left tens of thousands 
without properties that they had once owned. The entire concept of rightfully owned property had 
to have been lost on many. But the issue of Jewish property also became entangled in the 
particularities of Polish-Jewish relations. After the war, Poles viewed individual and communal 
property as simply “abandoned.” The property was declared, perceived, and believed to be 
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ownerless and now could rightly be owned by someone else. A new linguistic phrase emerged 
that justified this confiscation of Jewish space –– mienie pożydowskie. The Polish prefix “po” 
indicates the leaving behind of something that is now gone; it translates as “formerly Jewish 
property,” but the sterility of the English does not capture its discursive power in Polish. The 
phrase reflected and produced a moral economy that justified the wartime and postwar seizure of 
Jewish property. In March 1946, the Marxist literary journal Odrodzenie republished a poem by 
the writer Zuzanna Ginczanka that powerfully captured this possession of mienie pożydowskie. 
Taking as the title a line from one of Horace’s odes about his own eternity, Non omnis moriar 
(Not all of me will die), she wrote bitterly and sardonically about what will survive the 
destruction of Jews like herself –– the material objects that now remain in the hands of those who 
took them:  
Non omnis moriar. My grand estate— 
Tablecloth meadows, invincible wardrobe castles, 
Acres of bed sheets, finely woven linens, 
And dresses, colorful dresses—will survive me. 
I leave no heirs. 
So let your hands rummage through Jewish things, 
You woman of Chomino, you from Lvov, you mother of a Volksdeutscher. 
May these things be useful to you and yours, 
For you are near and dear to me; no lute playing, no empty words. 
I am thinking of you, as you, when the Gestapo underlings came, 
Thought of me, in fact reminded them about me. 
So let my friends break out holiday goblets, 
Celebrate my wake and their wealth: 
Kilims and tapestries, bowls, candlesticks. 
Let them drink all night and at daybreak 
Begin their search for gemstones and gold 
In sofas, mattresses, blankets and rugs. 
Oh how the work will burn in their hands! 
Clumps of horsehair, bunches of sea hay, 
Clouds of fresh down from pillows and quilts, 
Glued on by my blood, will turn their arms into wings, 
Transfigure the birds of prey into angels.119 
 
Jews might be gone from Poland, but not everything associated with them had died, non omnis 
moriar. Their belongings might now have new owners, but they were understood, absorbed, and 
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ascribed as being connected to Jews, as mienie pożydowskie. The property was at once “formerly 
Jewish” and yet still “Jewish.” It is precisely this uneasy, constant relationship with the past that 
avoiding a thorough return of Jewish property promised to transcend. To embark upon a complete 
engagement with Jewish property would have opened up and interrogated just how entangled 
with the Holocaust Polish society had become; it would have involved looking into when, how, 
and why the property had been confiscated in the first place.  
  This physical, cultural, and linguistic possession of mienie pożydowskie became coded 
into law by the communist-influenced provisional government. In May 1945, the state passed a 
law concerning “abandoned and deserted properties” that treated Jewish property –– both 
individual and communal –– as “abandoned” and “heirless.” In terms of individual property, the 
law allowed direct heirs (children, parents, spouses, brothers, and sisters) the possibility to 
reclaim property left behind, lost, or confiscated during the occupation.120 A year later, the 
measure was slightly altered and reissued as a decree regarding “abandoned and formerly German 
property” (majątki opuszczone i poniemieckie) to include more specifically possessions that had 
been left behind by Germans expelled from western Poland.121 In both measures, “abandoned 
property” was a euphemism for mienie pożydowskie. The architects of the law intentionally 
limited the line of successorship with this in mind against the expressed reservations of Jewish 
leaders. In discussions about the measure in May 1945, Emil Sommerstein, chairman of the 
newly created Central Council of Jews in Poland (CKŻP), argued that legal successorship should 
be extended to other family members such as cousins, aunts, and uncles since the current 
regulation would be disadvantageous to Jews who had lost so many direct family members. His 
suggestion was rejected on the grounds that broadening the line of heirs would place too much 
property in the hands of a small group of Jews and would potentially trigger anti-Semitic attacks 
                                                 
120 “Ustawa z dnia 6 maja 1945 r. o majątkach opuszczonych i porzuconych,” Dziennik Ustaw 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, May 6, 1945.  
 
121 “Dekret z dnia 8 marca 1946 r. o majątkach opuszczonych i poniemieckich,” Dziennik Ustaw 
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej, April 19, 1946.  
  
 
 82 
by increasing the number of restitution claims.122 Several months later, he and other members of 
the CKŻP discussed similar problems about the measure, but decided not to voice their concerns 
publicly any more.123  
 Polish Jewish leaders probably realized that a more sweeping return of Jewish property 
conflicted with what the communists hand in mind. In February 1945, Władysław Gomułka, at 
the time chairman of the PPR’s Central Committee, made clear the direction the communists 
were moving in: “It is also common knowledge that part of the capital before 1939 rested in 
Jewish hands and that [now] this capital is ownerless because the Germans killed the Jews. … It 
is clear that we do not want to put the nation’s vast property back into the hands of private 
owners.”124 Gomułka points here to one of the central facts that shaped the handling of Jewish 
property in Poland –– the sheer “vastness” of the holdings previously owned by Jews. Although 
Polish Jewry was of the lower middle class, it made up nearly one-third of Poland’s urban 
population. For communists, putting this property back into “Jewish hands,” which historically 
worked in commerce, industry, and the professions, could be interpreted through the lens of their 
own anti-Jewish biases as giving it to “capitalists.” Moreover, returning property to either 
individual Jews or to a Jewish successor organization like the JRSO would in fact create fairly 
sizeable, non-state property owners. Reporting from Warsaw in 1948, the AJDC underscored this 
point directly: “A very ticklish political question arises with respect to Jewish property in Poland. 
It should be borne in mind that in pre-war Poland, the Jews owned over 30 percent of all property 
                                                 
122 AAN, KRN B 7678, protocol of session, May 3-6, 1945.   
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in Poland. If, of course, all such property was restituted, either to individual Jews or to a 
successor organization, Jews would be the largest property holders other than the state.”125 
In short, returning all Jewish property would mean taking it away from a significant 
number of Poles who had occupied this “formerly Jewish” space. Gomułka expressed a clearly 
materialist desire not to disrupt the wartime and postwar spoilage of genocide. If the line of heirs 
were to be extended, or if a Jewish successor organization were to take control of all heirless 
property, a not too small number of Poles would have been forced to give up what they had 
gained.126 A Polish historian has recently estimated that at least 500,000 Poles took over Jewish 
property, which does not take into account the additional family members occupying it.127 The 
reluctance to extend the line of heirs stemmed partially from the basic realization that doing so 
would displace thousands of Poles precisely at a moment when hostility toward Jews was 
reaching a deadly pitch. Since no research has been done on this topic and it would take several 
historians to sift through the hundreds of files located in municipal archives across Poland, it is 
impossible to guess how many Jews actually filed claims and of them how many were able to get 
their property back under the law on abandoned and former German property.128 There is, 
however, little doubt that the number was extremely small given that only ten percent of Polish 
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Jewry survived the Holocaust and those who did were fleeing Poland.129 The legal process of 
going through local courts also took time and money from a population that had neither.130  
Although governed by the same law on abandoned and former German property, Jewish 
communal property was handled rather differently. The provisional government did not allow 
even the slightest possibility of it being returned. Instead the state confiscated synagogues, Jewish 
cemeteries, schools, and community centers across Poland. The legal justification –– cited 
continually throughout the history of the PPR even as late as the 1980s –– stemmed from a single 
measure published in 1945 by the newly formed Ministry for Public Administration 
(Ministerstwo Administracji Publicznej, or MAP). In a circular on “provisionally regulating 
matters of the Jewish religious population,” the MAP declared that ten or more Jews in a locality 
could establish a “Jewish religious association” (kongregacja). This organization would not be 
given the same legal rights afforded to the prewar Jewish community (gmin), which the circular 
indicated had ceased to exist and would not be reconstituted. This meant that, while local 
religious organizations could use some of the “former” property of the Jewish community, they 
                                                 
129 Although it was possible to file claims from outside Poland, Jews had to give power of attorney to a 
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could not legally reclaim it since there was no legal connection between them and the prewar 
communities.131  
 Since these regulations were supposedly “provisional,” the newly formed Jewish 
organizations in Poland had reason to believe that they could perhaps change this understanding 
of legal successorship. In October 1946, the Organizing Committee of Jewish Religious 
Congregations requested that all “abandoned property of former Jewish religious communities, 
foundations, and other organizations” be returned.132 In that same year, the CKŻP made a similar 
request to Polish authorities and noted that “the demands presented here do not require any 
justification given that they emerge behind the backdrop of the murder of 95 percent of the 
Jewish community by the occupiers, an exceptional barbarity in the history of mankind.”133 
Jewish organizations requested their property back for both moral and practical reasons. The 
CKŻP argued that it was necessary for the rebuilding of Jewish life in Poland and saw restitution 
as a “partial undoing of the moral injustice committed against the Jews by the occupiers.”134 
Moreover, it wanted Jewish organizations to control its property in order to protect the cultural 
heritage of Polish Jewry. The CKŻP was aware of the misuse and destruction of Jewish sites that 
was occurring in towns throughout Poland as synagogues were being used for other purposes and 
Jewish cemeteries were being cleared away to make room for new building projects. Returning 
the property directly to Jewish organizations was the only way to preclude the continued 
defilement, mismanagement, and neglect of these sites.135 
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135 The MAP officially did not approve of Jewish sites being used in any way that went against its 
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The MAP saw matters differently. It effectively blocked the return of Jewish communal 
property by quickly turning a “provisional” regulation into a permanent one. Its 1945 circular 
indicated that Jewish communal property would “provisionally remain in control of the state until 
the introduction of a law on abandoned property.” 136 Such a law came into existence a mere three 
months later but included an important provision. Article twelve stated that abandoned property 
could be “used and managed” by “public service institutions, cooperative and social institutions, 
cultural and educational organizations as well as help organizations for groups of people who 
were particularly persecuted by the Germans.”137 At first glance, this clause would seem to give 
Jewish organizations the chance to reclaim their property. Numerous Polish officials on the local 
level thought that it might and wrote to the MAP for clarification. In late 1945, the Białystok 
regional government (Urząd Wojewódzki) asked if Jewish communal property was considered 
“abandoned” and, if so, whether the Jewish religious associations were legally allowed to reclaim 
it as “organizations continuing with the legal recognition of the former religious communities.”138 
In this and many other cases, the MAP explained that Jewish communal property was in fact 
“abandoned” given that the former Jewish communities no longer existed, but that it could not be 
given back since the postwar kongregacje were not the legal successors to the prewar gminy as 
stated in its circular of 1945. It had deliberately created a circular reasoning that precluded the 
return of Jewish communal property. Local Jewish congregations could only “use and manage” 
those properties it needed for religious purposes. The state granted itself permission to confiscate 
any other Jewish communal holdings not being used by local Jewish congregations. The MAP 
clearly understood that this would lead to the wholesale confiscation of Jewish communal 
property throughout Poland, for it knew the facts on the ground: the few Jews who survived the 
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Holocaust were leaving Poland by the thousands precisely as it was deliberating about these 
issues in 1945-46. The amount of property the Jewish congregations needed was dwindling day 
by day.139 In areas where no Jewish congregation existed –– hundreds throughout Poland –– the 
MAP allowed third parties to take over the property.140 Polish archives are filled with 
correspondence between officials in Warsaw and local authorities about seizing abandoned 
synagogues, schools, hospitals, and Jewish cemeteries.141 The MAP almost always approved the 
transfer of the property. Although in theory local authorities had to consult with it about the 
future use of the building, in reality this was only rarely done and numerous Jewish sites over the 
years were turned into storage houses, museums, movie theaters, libraries, factories, cafeterias, 
archives, and schools.142  
 As this transfer of property was going on in town after town throughout Poland, Jewish 
leaders in Warsaw continued to press authorities to approach the issue with some degree of 
flexibility. At this point, their most likely chance was to persuade MAP officials to allow the 
CKŻP to take over the property as a centralized, state-approved organization. Created by the 
provisional government in 1944, the secular CKŻP had from the outset more leverage with Polish 
authorities than the religious Jewish congregations.143 Although no concrete proposal was 
probably ever drafted, the MAP did express its general support for possibly returning some 
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Jewish property to the CKŻP. In 1946, it pointed out that the CKŻP’s position as the only legally 
recognized Jewish organization would justify its “actual claims to take over the property of the 
former Jewish religious communities and Jewish foundations.”144 The CKŻP even expressed 
cautious optimism that some property would be returned, writing at one point to the World Jewish 
Congress that the “restitution of immovable property belonging to associations and societies 
seems to be quite probable and is only a matter of time.”145 In another correspondence, it 
suggested that a “concrete possibility” existed for the return of some Jewish property, although it 
recognized that “hundreds and even thousands of properties … belonging to Jewish associations 
and organizations remains to the present day in the hands of third parties.”146  
It is not entirely clear what caused this cautious optimism. The files of the MAP that exist 
today at least do not indicate any concrete plan to return communal property to the CKŻP. In 
some letters to local officials, the MAP indicated that authorities should wait until “a definitive 
regulation of the matter of the successorship of Jewish communal property” was put forward, but 
these were rare cases among numerous others in which it simply agreed to the seizure of the 
properties.147 In all probability, the likelihood of returning Jewish communal property to the 
CKŻP was slim because time was rapidly running out. By the fall of 1947, the Polish communist 
party had gained political control of the country after the farce elections in January and after 
destroying its last political rivals in the spring. It now had the political power to implement its 
wide-ranging economic plan that rested in part, as Gomułka anticipated in 1945, on the 
                                                 
144 AAN, MAP 788, MAP to GUL, August 3, 1946. The Jewish congregations were officially not 
recognized as legal entities; they did not have osobowość prawna, which the CKŻP did. See Ewa 
Waszkiewicz, Kongregacja Wyznania Mojżeszowego na Dolnym Śląsku na tle polityki wyznaniowej 
Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej, 1945-1968 (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 
1999), 42-46 and 55. 
 
145 USHMM, RG 68.045, reel 50, Jewish World Congress, Geneva Office, “Brief information about 
restitution problems in Poland,” undated, but before 1948.  
 
146 USHMM, RG 15.089, reel 1. CKŻP to AJDC, January 27, 1948.  
 
147 E.g. AAN, MAP 1095, B-2612, MAP to GUL, August 18, 1947; AAN, MAP, 1528, B-3139, GUL to 
GUL in all provinces, October 6, 1947.  
 
  
 
 89 
nationalization of property. At the same time, the Stalin-Tito split and the growing suspicion of 
“right-wing nationalist deviation” was transforming political life in Poland. Gomułka’s insistence 
on the “national way to socialism” and his conciliatory tone toward the Polish Socialist Party led 
to his ouster as general secretary of the party in September 1948, opening the way for a purge of 
suspected “deviators” throughout Poland.148 In the case of the CKŻP, this meant above all 
targeting Zionists. Since the very beginning of its existence, the CKŻP had been riddled with 
political conflicts, but now the time was ripe for Jewish Communists to settle old scores for 
good.149 They decided to dissolve the CKŻP in favor of a new organization more subservient to 
the newly formed PZPR. In October 1950, the Socio-Cultural Association of Jews (TSKŻ) was 
established and focused on developing a secular Jewish life in Poland.150 This new organization 
did not continue the important advocacy work of the CKŻP in legal and restitution matters. The 
clamor against “right-wing nationalist deviation” had silenced the main voice arguing for 
restitution.   
But it did not quiet all Jewish voices. There were still some Jewish leaders around who 
remained concerned about the fate of confiscated Jewish property and continued to press the party 
on the issue. Indeed, it was, paradoxically, after the PZPR consolidated its power and dissolved 
the CKŻP that the most significant and drawn-out dispute over the handling of Jewish communal 
property in the history of the PPR took place. Although it remained limited to one specific case –
– the Jewish congregation in Cracow –– the conflict had much broader implications throughout 
Poland and involved some of the highest officials of the PPR. The conflict began in early January 
1956 when municipal authorities in Cracow officially became the owners of the Jewish 
                                                 
148 Overview in Friszke, Polska and Paczkowski, Spring.  
 
149 Aleksiun, Dokąd dalej, 245-66; Aleksiun, “Zionists and Anti-Zionists in the Central Committee of the 
Jews in Poland: Cooperation and Political Struggle, 1944-1950,” Jews in Eastern Europe vol. 33 (Fall 
1997): 32-50; Hana Shlomi, “The Communist Caucus in the Central Committee of Jews in Poland, 
November 1944-February 1947,” Gal-Ed 13 (1993): 81-100.  
 
150 Contrary to what most scholars have repeated in their work, the initiative to close the CKŻP down did 
not come from the PZPR but from Jewish communist leaders as August Grabski has discovered: “Sytuacja 
Żydów w Polsce w latach 1950-57,” Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego no. 4 (2000): 504-519.  
  
 
 90 
congregation’s property and attempted to transfer some of its holdings. This legal move was a 
mere formal confirmation of the confiscation of the property that had taken place during the 
1940s. The law on abandoned and former German property stipulated that the state would 
officially become the owner of any “abandoned” property that it had managed after ten years (the 
legalese was ownership through positive prescription). The Jewish congregation in Cracow was 
furious with what it saw as spurious legal moves not least because it had been using some of the 
holdings the state now claimed to own. In a series of lengthy and impassioned letters, it argued 
forcefully that the city had no legal right to take over its property and that the PPR should settle 
the problem of Jewish communal property altogether by simply giving it all back to the Jewish 
congregations.  
“All property belonging to the Jewish Religious Community,” one letter tersely wrote in 
underlined letters, “should be returned to the congregations without any exclusions.”151 The 
Jewish congregation argued this position on several grounds: the law on abandoned and German 
property allowed organizations like itself to become owners of the property after ten years; 
Jewish congregations were legal entities with successorship to the property of the Jewish 
communities; and the claim that “abandoned” Jewish communal property belonged to the state 
was erroneous since “the exterminating actions of Nazi hordes” did not mean the end of the 
gmin’s legal existence.152 The Jewish congregation also pointed out that the state’s control of 
Jewish communal property was “in reality leading to the destruction” of Jewish sites across 
Poland.153 It pleaded that “every piece of property” be returned as the “only way to avoid the 
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desecration of religious sites.”154 The Department for Religious Affairs, the successor to the 
MAP, responded by simply reiterating the basic approach that the PPR had taken toward Jewish 
communal property since the end of the war. Since the Jewish congregation was a “completely 
new religious organization” with no legal ties to the prewar Jewish community, the property had 
rightfully been declared “abandoned” and escheated to the state. As for the on-going destruction 
of Jewish sites, the department explained that local officials were doing everything possible to 
protect them, but that “time and the effects of the weather were above all contributing” to their 
ruin.155  
Such obstinance did not force the Cracow Jewish Organization to back down. In an 
unprecedented legal move, it took the issue to the courts and met with limited success. In 
December 1958, the local court in Cracow sided with the Jewish congregation and ordered that its 
name be placed on the land registry (księga wieczysta) as the owner of fourteen pieces of property 
that had formerly belonged to the Jewish community. The court based its decision on a series of 
correspondences written by municipal authorities in 1946-1947 that declared it “the appointed 
institution … in place of the former Jewish religious community for religious and social 
purposes.”156 This statement seemingly implied that the Jewish congregation was the legal 
successor to the former Jewish community, or at the very least was not an entirely new 
organization without any legal connection to the prewar gmin as the MAP and the Department for 
Religious Affairs had long maintained.  
Officials in Warsaw were not enthused with this decision to put it mildly. They decided 
to appeal the decision to Poland’s supreme court, but limited their petition to only one piece of 
property: the old synagogue, the Stara Bożnica, that the Jewish congregation allowed the city to 
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renovate and incorporate into its Museum of History. It is not clear why the state decided to limit 
its appeal to this property alone; perhaps it thought that a building renovated by state funds stood 
no chance of losing in court and would easily achieve the larger aim of setting a legal precedent 
for its confiscation of “abandoned” Jewish property. If this was its strategy, it only worked so 
well. In a cautiously written decision, the supreme court ruled that the Jewish congregation 
technically had no legal right to reclaim property of the former Jewish community. The court had 
no legal basis to recognize the congregation as the successor to the prewar gmin. The court had 
upheld the state’s position that the Jewish congregation had no legal claim to successorship; its 
confiscation of the property was therefore legally sound. But then, in an intriguing twist away 
from the strictures of the law, the court added that “in this concrete case” the state had “abused 
the law” by “demanding” to own the property. The court came to this view in light of the 
“notorious destruction of the Cracow Jewish population by the German invaders” and the 
“indisputable cultural-historical character” of the synagogue. “It is the opinion of the supreme 
court that the People’s Republic has a moral responsibility to respect the above-mentioned 
emotions of its citizens.”157 It ordered that the Jewish congregation be allowed to manage the 
synagogue.  
This decision reflected a subtle rebuke of the postwar handling of Jewish communal 
property. Bound by a series of legal maneuvers set right after the war, the court reaffirmed the 
basic fundamentals of the case that the Jewish congregation was not the successor to the prewar 
Jewish community’s property. It did not challenge the premise that the property was abandoned 
and in the end it only gave the Jewish congregation the right to manage the synagogue. The 
decision changed nothing in terms of the legal state of Jewish communal property throughout 
Poland, but it did indicate that at least some jurists in the PPR –– and no less than those sitting on 
the bench of the supreme court –– recognized the limitations, if not even the absurdity, of a law 
that declared a synagogue abandoned that had been serving Jewish religious needs since the early 
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sixteenth century and was located in a city with a Jewish congregation that spiritually, 
psychologically, and legally saw itself continuing in that long tradition.  
The Department for Religious Affairs could barely hold back its frustration with the 
court’s decision. In numerous internal letters sent to Cracow officials, the courts, and the justice 
department, it strongly criticized the decision for making it “very difficult to take up legal action 
in the matter” of Jewish communal property.158 It then clearly emphasized that the Cracow case 
had no legal precedent and that local Jewish congregations had no legal basis for filing motions 
before the courts.159 In 1961, it legally reinforced this point by officially granting the Religious 
Association of the Jewish Faith (ŻRWM), an umbrella organization of the local Jewish 
congregations, status as a public entity. This measure allowed solely the ŻRWM to represent the 
legal interests of the religious Jewish population and thereby prevented any other Jewish 
organizations from turning to the courts. It also opened the way for the ŻRWM to become the 
owner of a handful of properties that the Jewish congregations were currently using, while still 
maintaining that it was not the “legal successor to the former Jewish religious communities.”160 
Although this regulation solved the immediate problem of other individual Jewish congregations 
going to court, it tabled the longer-term and pricklier issue of the state owning the vast majority 
of Jewish communal property since the amount the ŻRWM was allowed to manage was 
negligible.161 This shortsighted move later proved to be a mistake for the PPR as the “Jewish 
problem” of property reemerged more strongly and complicated than ever in the 1970s and 
1980s.  
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IV. Conclusion  
In certain ways, the issue of returning Jewish property and restitution fell along the lines 
of the Iron Curtain. While the Federal Republic returned confiscated Jewish property and paid 
billions of marks in reparations, the GDR and the PPR pursued policies toward Jews defined by 
indifference, ambivalence, and at times open hostility. The political cultures shaped by 
communism and democracy had an important impact. The SPD, even if cautiously, endorsed 
restitution the most often of any other political party in the early FRG and its support was crucial 
for the passage of measures such as the Luxembourg Agreement that supplied reparations to 
Israel. Such voices of support for Jewish issues could not be expressed as easily or as publicly in 
the Soviet bloc countries precisely as the SED was embracing antifascist anti-Semitism and the 
PZPR was running away from any overt association with the Jews in the face of żydokomuna. 
Indeed, in both the GDR and the PPR, anti-Jewish bias shaped the handling of Jewish property, 
albeit in different ways and to different degrees. Anti-Semitism had the most overt impact in the 
GDR. From the very beginning, East German “antifascism” did not place much emphasis on the 
Jewish fate during World War II and the SED settled on a distinctly socialist approach to 
restitution. At the same time, some room still existed for possibly returning Jewish communal 
property in East Berlin, but the SED decided to cease negotiations with the Gemeinde at the 
height of its campaign against cosmopolitanism. In the formative years of the GDR, the party 
made anti-Semitism part of its antifascist politics.  
In Poland, the PZPR’s decision not to return Jewish property came from a combination of 
its own ambivalence toward Jews and the anti-Jewish violence that erupted in 1945-46. 
Communist leaders declared Jewish property “abandoned” partly because it did not want to 
consolidate a large amount of property outside the state and partly because it knew that 
confronting the issue was not politically expedient. The presence of the belief in żydokomuna in 
parts of Polish society and the outbreak of violence against Jews made Polish communists skittish 
about providing overt support to Jews. One recent estimate that around 2.5 million Poles were 
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connected to the use of Jewish property is admittedly tentative and imprecise, but it gives at least 
a rough sense of the problem that the communists were facing: the possibility of alienating a 
fairly sizeable percent of the population for a minority group that totaled no more than 250,000 at 
its height and was shrinking with each passing month.162 Anti-Jewish attitudes among Polish 
communists also reinforced this tactical distancing from Jews. The numerous legal moves to find 
any possible way to obstruct returning even the smallest amount of Jewish communal property 
underscores the ambivalence of the PZPR toward Jewish life in Poland. In the 1950s, the Polish 
communist party did not unleash a public assault against Jews like its counterparts did in East 
Germany, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Soviet Russia. It even nurtured the closest diplomatic 
ties with Israel of any Soviet bloc country (its purge of “Zionism” would come later in 1967-
68).163  
Nevertheless, Polish communists were hardly strong promoters of Jewish issues. The 
PZPR was a uniquely fractious party in the Soviet bloc, but a number of its members in 
leadership positions or rising into power embraced an ethnically exclusive notion of the Polish 
nation.164 This ethno-nationalization of Polish communism stemmed in no small part from the 
actual demands of serving the needs, desires, and concerns of a society that, after the Holocaust 
and the postwar removal of Germans, Ukrainians, Lemkos, Belorussians, and Lithuanians, had 
become almost exclusively Polish. The few Jews left in Poland were essentially the last 
minorities of Poland and the communists preferred that they not stay, which they made plainly 
clear by leaving the emigration gates open when they were closed off to the rest of the 
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population.165 As the Polish premier Edward Osóbka-Morawski put it bluntly, “the government 
will not hinder the emigration of its Jewish citizens.”166 This was not done out of some conscious, 
burning malice, although some in the PZPR hardly minced words about Jews.167  It reflected 
rather the ascendancy of an idea of the Polish nation that was in its mildest form exclusively 
Polish and in its most extreme form outright xenophobic.168 As in East Germany and other Soviet 
bloc states, Polish communism underwent a transformation after the war as it gradually embraced 
the ethno-nationalism that had largely been the hallmark of the political right.169 
 This rather remarkable ideological shift in communism is one of the most significant 
consequences of the communist seizure of power in Eastern Europe. Anti-Jewish biases and 
attitudes had been present in socialism and communism from the very beginning; critiques of 
capitalism, industrialization, and the middle class could easily slip into anti-Semitic attacks. Still, 
there was no other political movement in Europe before the war that supported and defended the 
Jews more consistently than socialism and communism. But communists in Eastern Europe found 
themselves in a much different position after 1945. Seizing power in countries that did not want 
them, they had to choose their political battles wisely and could not afford to fight for issues that 
might weaken their still shaky political hold. Since the 1930s, the situation for Jews had 
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deteriorated in almost all parts of Europe, but especially in those countries that later came to 
make up the Soviet bloc.170 It was after all in this region that the Holocaust intersected most 
directly with the lives of Europeans who became involved in or at least passively indifferent to 
the Nazi persecution of the Jews.171 By 1945, anti-Jewish hatred had become a normal aspect of 
European politics and society. Any communist official with even an ounce of political acumen 
doubtless realized that fighting for the rights of the Jews made simply no sense. Turning away 
from the Jews and even directly attacking them was an “implicit ‘give’ for the ‘take’ of power” in 
Ulbricht’s East Germany, Gomulka’s Poland, Gottwald’s Czechoslovakia, and Gheorghiu-Dej’s 
Romania.172 An antifascist anti-Semitism became a central element of communism in Eastern 
Europe: while rejecting as “fascist” the category of the “Jew” and the method of physical assault, 
the communists went after “Zionists” and “cosmopolitans” in vicious campaigns of linguistic 
violence throughout the 1950s and 1960s. 
 It is perhaps then of little surprise that Polish and East German communists placed little 
priority in the return of Jewish property. They did so not just out of political calculation but also 
because, crucially, there were no outside or internal pressures suggesting that they act differently. 
The Soviet Union did not push the East Germans or the Poles to return Jewish property and no 
Jewish successor organization formed in either country. The only main advocates for restitution 
came from local Jewish leaders who insisted as strongly as they could that returning confiscated 
property was important and necessary. Polish and East German authorities largely did not listen 
to their pleas with the exception of some members in the SED who eventually were silenced in 
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1952-53. Although Polish and East German intellectuals, writers, poets, and politicians wrote at 
times rather passionately about the need to fight anti-Semitism in 1945-1950, one cannot say that 
they reflected or sparked any significant level of social interest in dealing with the problem of 
Jewish property and restitution. In the absence of both outside and internal pressure, the GDR and 
the PPR could rather easily reject the requests of Jewish community leaders whose views alone 
were simply not persuasive or important enough. 
In this sense, the West German case diverged from the two communist examples: there 
was significant pressure pushing German authorities on the issue of restitution in the FRG, 
although it tellingly came from the outside. Without disregarding the important actions of a few 
West German politicians, it is safe to say that without the forceful and constant insistence of the 
Americans and much more grudgingly the British the course, manner, and scope of restitution in 
the FRG would not have taken the shape that it did. The Americans pushed through the first, 
zone-wide restitution law that established a Jewish successor organization. The creation of the 
JRSO provoked immense tension among Jewish leaders in Germany, but its importance cannot be 
stressed too strongly because it fought tirelessly for restitution in the face of growing opposition 
among German authorities by the late 1940s. The long, drawn-out process to reach a final 
settlement in SPD-dominated West Berlin of all places and the emergence of grass roots anti-
restitution groups formed to protect the “rights” of those “damaged by Jews” are two of numerous 
examples that underscore the tensions and conflicts that underlie the implementation of restitution 
in the FRG. Without the continued presence of outside pressure groups like the JRSO and the 
American military there doubtlessly would have been even more conflicts, if not even an eventual 
scaling back of the restitution laws.173 
It was, however, the very presence of the Americans that paradoxically made restitution 
so difficult to implement. By being able to dismiss restitution as “victor’s justice,” West German 
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society could distance itself from both the need for returning Jewish property and its active 
involvement in confiscating it during the Third Reich. The impetus for returning Jewish property 
did not stem from an engagement with the most recent past that reflected upon German 
complicity in the persecution of the Jews. With the exception of a few politicians motivated by a 
variety of different concerns and interests, most German intellectuals, church leaders, writers, 
journalists, and ordinary citizens were not pushing their political leaders to confront the problem 
of confiscated Jewish property. Such social pressure simply did not exist in the early FRG; 
restitution did not become assimilated and normalized into West German politics and society. It 
became an official element of West German democratization during the 1950s, but not a part of 
the “internal democratization” of West German society as a whole.174 As West Germans thought 
of themselves as the victims of the war, they simply ignored claims for the return of Jewish 
property. Some even directly opposed Jewish claims for their property. After watching, 
supporting, and participating in the Nazi persecution of the Jews, significant parts of West 
German society in the early postwar years continued to embrace anti-Semitic prejudices. Indeed, 
the normalization of anti-Jewish hatred took much longer to weaken in everyday life than it did in 
the highest echelons of West German politics.175 
It is perhaps then on this deeper level of social acceptance and normalization that the 
seemingly sharp cold war trajectories of east-west begin to fade away. In all three cases, the need 
for restitution and working through the injustices brought upon the Jewish population remained 
absent; there was no social norm that called for or sanctioned the return of Jewish property in the 
FRG, GDR, and PPR. In the immediate postwar years, both Germans and Poles had to deal with 
rebuilding their lives after enduring two starkly different military campaigns, had to confront the 
influx of new populations and border changes, and had to adjust to the new political realities that 
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were rapidly taking place between 1945-1949. Perhaps it is partially understandable that 
restitution would be low on their list of priorities. It must have been difficult to initiate a dialogue 
about what just happened and how possibly to repair broken relationships when there was no food 
on the tables, no lights on in the bombed-out houses, no water running through the pipes. But this 
material situation did not last long and a basic desire for reconciling with past deeds had to exist 
in the first place, no matter what conditions were like on the ground. This urge did eventually 
emerge among certain segments of German and Polish society, but it was largely not present in 
the late 1940s and early 1950s. In the two Germanys, the population after all had lived through, 
absorbed, and become directly involved in the persecution and mass murder of the Jews. It was 
then above all the entanglement of German society with twelve years of anti-Jewish persecution 
that precluded Wiedergutmachung from becoming a widely accepted social norm.176 
In this regard, the Polish case is clearly different given the brutality of the Nazi and 
Soviet occupations. Poles had a large amount of their property confiscated in the incorporated 
territories, were deported in the hundreds of thousands to the Third Reich, the General 
Government and Siberia, and about two million died between 1939-45.177 The issue of restitution 
became refracted through the perspective of the colonized. Ordinary Poles could rather easily 
dismiss or simply not even think about the need for restituting crimes committed by someone else 
during an occupation that also severely altered their own lives. In comparison certainly to the 
FRG and to some extent even to the immediate postwar years of East Germany, the return of 
Jewish property was much less central for government officials and Polish society as a whole. 
One could even go so far as to say that it was barely an issue at all in a society that had 
experienced enormous destruction, the realignment of its borders, and massive postwar migration. 
The sense of rightly owned property, including that once belonging to Jews, had been lost in the 
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massive upheaval of war, genocide, and expulsions. This perspective rested, however, on an 
interpretation of the past that blurred the ways that the Holocaust intersected with the lives of 
ordinary Poles. The Holocaust was not some distant affair but became entangled in everyday 
Polish life as the issue of property reveals in an especially vivid way.178 Although the bulk of 
Jewish property went to the Nazi state, possibly hundreds of thousands of Poles became involved 
in the management, seizure, and use of “formerly Jewish property.” Returning this property 
would not just mean a material loss but would mean confronting one’s own complicity in crimes 
more easily thought to have been carried out exclusively by someone else. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
JEWISH SPACES, URBAN MODERNISM, AND SOCIALIST REALISM 
 
 
Warsaw and Berlin, two of Europe’s largest and most culturally productive Jewish 
capitals, became after 1945 cities of shattered Jewish spaces. The Nazi campaign against 
European Jewry destroyed the Jewish communities of both cities and afterwards the few Jews 
who miraculously survived generally opted to flee Poland and Germany for North America, Latin 
America, and the Middle East. Only a small number of Jews decided to stay and rebuild their 
lives in the region. In the early 1950s, the Jewish communities of Warsaw had a mere 150 
members, East Berlin around 1,000, and West Berlin about 6,000.1 In the GDR and the PPR, a 
very small population of non-religious Jews also existed who saw themselves more as 
communists than as Jews but the overall population remained miniscule.2 A complicated and 
peculiar question thus emerged in these Jewish cities of so few Jews: What now was to be done 
with the synagogues, Jewish cemeteries, and districts that had distinctly marked the urban 
landscape of Berlin and Warsaw?  
This unprecedented problem played out just as Germans and Poles went to rebuild their 
war-ravaged capitals. In 1945, Berlin and Warsaw lay in ruins after enduring military attacks with 
fundamentally different intentions and aims. The Nazis destroyed the Polish capital in 
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deliberately savage attacks of the ghetto and the rest of the city. This two-prong destruction 
occurred as the Nazis brutally squashed the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943 and the Warsaw 
Uprising of 1944.3 These two acts of demolition were obviously different, even if the destructive 
effect on the built environment was the same. Although the Nazis intended to destroy the ghetto 
even before the uprising, the devastation of the rest of the city was a brutal response to the 
rebellion of 1944. In both cases, the Nazis clearly had no military or strategic reason for engaging 
in such massive destruction. They pursued a ruthless campaign against the Jews left in the ghetto 
and then a year later expelled the city’s population as savage revenge for the Warsaw Uprising. 
These campaigns against Warsaw’s civilian population reflect the overall brutality of the Nazi 
occupation of Poland that left ninety percent of its Jewish population and ten percent of its non-
Jewish population dead. The destruction of Berlin was different in important ways. It occurred 
primarily as a consequence of military operations –– Allied air raids and Soviet assaults –– 
intended to defeat Hitler and thus ceased once victory had been achieved. In short, the allied 
military attacks against German cities were means to achieve the end of victory and the cessation 
of hostilities, while the Nazi attacks on the civilian populations of Polish and other East European 
cities were post-victory war aims of genocide and racial imperialism that were implemented after 
military resistance had been crushed.4 
 These fundamental differences, however, did not matter much at the time to the postwar 
planners who had to rebuild divided Berlin and Warsaw. They had before them the enormous task 
of reconstructing two ravaged cities despite what had caused the destruction. Urban planners 
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confronted a shared set of questions: How should the city be rebuilt? Should it be reconstructed in 
an entirely new way? What role should the city’s historic core play in the rebuilding effort? At a 
surprisingly early stage, a general consensus emerged in both capitals about the framework for 
reconstruction. A modernist impulse for the “new” –– whether it was to be in the spirit of 
interwar functionalism or postwar socialist realism was to be negotiated later –– defined the basic 
contours of urban reconstruction in divided Berlin and Warsaw, although the degree of emphasis 
varied considerably in each city. Engaged in direct competition with each other, the two Berlins 
staked out the most radical position that left little of the city’s historic buildings standing, whereas 
Warsaw developed an exceptional blend of the “old” and the “new.” Imagined as Poland’s 
“martyr city,” Warsaw became the metonym for Poland’s renewal from the destructiveness of 
Nazism. The PZPR rebuilt its old town in a massive project of historic reconstruction and built 
the rest of the city on the basic principles of urban modernism with influences from socialist 
realism in the early 1950s.  This embrace of the “new,” the “modern,” and the “socialist” might 
appear to be a flight into the future, but in actuality it remained deeply entangled with the past. 
While Warsaw and Berlin were heavily destroyed during the war, most of their buildings 
remained standing in some form after 1945 so that almost every erection of the “new” involved 
clearing away the “old.”  
This chapter analyzes this negotiation of future and past. In so doing, it aims to enrich our 
understanding of the cultural appropriation, interpretation, and use of historic spaces in cities 
dominated by urban modernism and socialist realism. The historiography of postwar 
reconstruction and historic preservation has only started to untangle the cultural meanings 
embedded in physical spaces. Much of the scholarship has long focused on the technical aspects 
of the rebuilding process such as architectural discussions about planning and institutional 
practices of preservation.5 But some important exceptions have recently come out. Rudy Koshar, 
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Gavriel Rosenfeld, Gregor Thum, and Joshua Hagen have offered insightful analysis into the 
interplay of national identity and memory in the urban landscape.6 Some of these studies draw on 
the pioneering work of cultural geographers and architectural historians such as J.B. Jackson, 
Simon Schama, and M. Christine Boyer.7 This chapter builds on this literature, while also pushing 
it in largely unexplored directions. Little research has been done on the treatment of historic 
buildings and spaces of cultural-ethnic minorities that often times do not easily fit into local, 
national, or regional identities. This chapter examines how ethnicity became inscribed and 
appropriated in the built environment. There was, in short, a “Jewish question” in the urban 
landscapes of divided Berlin and Warsaw: Jewish sites reflected a minority culture that had long 
been excluded from the nation and empty Jewish spaces laid bare just how “hateful” that 
nationalism had become during the Holocaust.8  
This shared question unfolded, however, in different ways depending on the local 
dynamics of each city. In Warsaw, the Nazis destroyed the main area of prewar Jewish life that 
was heavily concentrated in the district of Muranów (the main part of the Warsaw Ghetto). There 
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were virtually no Jewish sites left in the city with only a few exceptions. Religious Jewish life had 
virtually come to an end in the Polish capital. The question became then not so much what to do 
with specific Jewish sites, but what to do with an entire ruined landscape: how was the ghetto 
space to fit into Warsaw’s rebirth both materially and mnemonically? What place was the ghetto 
to have in postwar appropriations of the city’s past and future, in its eclectic embrace of historic 
reconstruction, urban modernism, and socialist realism? In divided Berlin, the questions were 
framed differently. Berlin never had one single, concentrated “Jewish” district like Warsaw since 
its prewar Jewish community lived and worshiped in all parts of the city. Numerous damaged 
Jewish sites still remained standing after the war and were scattered across the city. Thus the 
postwar history of Jewish sites in divided Berlin is not about the appropriation of one central 
district, but about the physical handling of numerous individual sites. Moreover, Jewish leaders in 
divided Berlin strongly contested the postwar treatment of these shattered spaces. This kind of 
conflict occurred less often in Warsaw given the sheer destruction of Jewish communal property 
and the extremely small size of the community there (in the early 1950s West Berlin’s 
community was thirty times the size of the one in Warsaw, East Berlin’s five times). Finally, 
Berlin was a divided city right in the center of the cold war battle. Its reconstruction became 
deeply entangled in cold war competition. Jewish space became a part of this broader 
confrontation, but one of the central questions that this chapter hopes to explore is exactly how 
much political divisions shaped the appropriation of Jewish space in three different urban 
landscapes. Can one speak of a distinct “divided memory” across the Iron Curtain in divided 
Berlin and Warsaw? Did the appropriation of Jewish sites differ starkly in the modernist and 
socialist realist reordering of urban space? How did the shattered symbols of Jewish life fit into, if 
at all, the temporal and ideological demands of reconstructing cities ravaged by war?  
I. Jewish Warsaw  
By the interwar period, Warsaw had become one of the largest cities of Jews in the world. 
In January 1918, there were 320,000 Jews living in the soon to be capital of independent Poland, 
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comprising 42 percent of the city’s total population and twenty years later that number had 
increased by almost 50,000.9 This emergence into a “Jewish city” took place during the 
nineteenth century when Warsaw was located in the Kingdom of Poland, a semi-autonomous 
region under Russian rule during Poland’s partition by Prussia, Russia, and Austria-Hungary.10 
Although the earliest documentary trace of Jewish life in Warsaw dates back to the fifteenth 
century, the Jewish community experienced its greatest growth from roughly 1800 onward: in 
1792, about 6,750 Jews lived in a city of 81,300 people (8.3 percent), which grew over the 
nineteenth century by an astonishing 46.4 percent to reach 320,030 Jews in 1918 (of 758,411 total 
people, or 42.4 percent).11 The changing regulations about where Jews were allowed to live in the 
city precluded the emergence of a distinct Jewish district from developing until the mid-
nineteenth century when Jews living in the Kingdom of Poland were granted legal 
emancipation.12 Jews were now allowed to live wherever they wished and gradually gravitated to 
the northwestern section of the city. Jews lived in all parts of Warsaw, with large numbers around 
Grzybowski square, the old town, and in Praga, but the northern districts, especially Muranów, 
became the cultural, economic, social, and religious center of Jewish life.13 In 1938, Jews 
comprised no less than 90.5 percent of all inhabitants in this district alone.14 
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Making up one of the most densely populated areas in the city, Muranów epitomized 
Warsaw’s sudden, yet uneven and conflict-ridden transition to industrialization and modernity 
over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Tied to the Russian imperial economy, the 
Kingdom of Poland became one of the most economically productive regions for tsarist Russia, 
supplying 40 percent of its coal, 25 percent of its steel, 19.5 of its textiles, and 42 percent of its 
linen.15 This economic development enabled Warsaw to turn into a modern, industrial metropolis, 
but its sudden growth went unchecked by municipal authorities. Restricted by the harsh political 
conditions set by tsarist Russia following the failed Polish uprising of 1863-64, Warsaw’s 
government had little power to meet the demands of the booming population that came with 
sudden industrialization. The city’s development into a modern metropolis occurred haphazardly, 
which became clearly evident in the built environment. Warsaw lacked the kind of grand 
monumental building projects of central railroad stations, opera houses, museums, libraries, and 
stock exchanges that dominated late nineteenth-century urban development in Europe, as well as 
a clear, unified approach to managing the city’s economic and demographic growth.16 Some small 
building projects did occur, but they were not integrated into a general plan for Warsaw and were 
eclipsed by much grander buildings constructed in “Russian” style such as the erection of the 
towering, onion-domed shaped Russian Orthodox Church.  
Indeed, few other areas of the city reflected Warsaw’s disorganized, chaotic growth more 
starkly than Muranów. Between 1875 and 1890, 800 tenement houses based on the Berlin 
Mietskaserne model were erected in Muranów, but they were not nearly enough to meet the 
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booming demand.17 With municipal authorities unable to regulate its growth, Muranów became 
one of the most overcrowded districts in Warsaw with 590 people living to the hectare. Filled 
with shops, workshops, small factories, and markets, it was a bustling economic area made up 
mainly of small craftsmen and retailers that provided the city with many of its basic consumer 
goods and services (half of Warsaw’s clothing and linen was bought there). The Jewish 
population was generally poor, but it produced an exceptionally rich intellectual, political, 
cultural, and religious life that made Warsaw one of the most vibrant Jewish cities in the world.18 
Speaking mostly Yiddish and largely orthodox in religious belief, the population in Muranów 
distinguished itself from the rest of the capital; it was a city within a city that was clearly Jewish 
to the general population and to itself. 19 As Poland transitioned from a rural to an industrial 
society, the district reflected the important economic position of Jews in that transformation, and 
naturally elicited a mixture of reactions from Poles who saw it at as a place of bustling energy to 
one of disease, crime, and decay.20 
But Muranów was not the only part of “Jewish Warsaw.” There was also a small group of 
Jews, generally wealthier and considered to be of the middle class, who had acculturated into 
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Polish society and became proponents of the Jewish Enlightenment (Haskala).21 These 
“progressive” Jews tended to live further south on Marszałkowska, Królewska, and Nowy Świat 
streets. Their greatest mark on Warsaw’s urban landscape was the construction of the Wielka 
Synagoga (The Great Synagogue). In 1870, a group of Jews purchased a plot of land on 
Tłomackie street next to Plac Bankowy (bank square) where the synagogue, designed by the 
Italian architect Leandro Marconi, was unveiled in a grand ceremony in 1878. Located in 
Warsaw’s economic core that had been grandly redesigned by Antonio Corazzi in the 1830s, the 
synagogue made a bold statement about the presence of Jewish life in the capital. Built in a 
classical style that fit into the surrounding architecture of Plac Bankowy, it reflected the 
acculturation of Jews into Polish society and placed Judaism on the same level as the other 
religious faiths.  
But its sheer presence also underscored just how marginal the Haskala was in Warsaw. In 
contrast to the numerous architecturally rich synagogues of Berlin, the cultural center of the 
Haskala, Warsaw had only two other houses of Jewish worship of architectural prominence: a 
rotunda building in Praga that was erected in 1839 and the Nożyk synagogue on Grzybowski 
square completed in 1901 in a neo-Romanesque and neo-Byzantine style. The vast majority of the 
city’s other synagogues –– totaling some three hundred by the interwar years –– were simple, 
small, private, orthodox prayer houses scattered in the areas where Jews lived and worked. In 
short, for all its grandeur and symbolism, the Wielka Synagoga reflected only a small sliver of the 
Jewish population; Warsaw Jews –– and for that matter Polish Jewry at large –– expressed little 
interest in acculturating into Polish society with Zionism, socialism, and orthodoxy offering more 
attractive ways of life and the rise of antisemitism lessening the desire to embrace polskość 
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(Polishness).22 This general absence of acculturation did not make Polish Jewry less “modern” 
than its exceptional counterparts in the Bohemian lands, Germany, France, and Britain; the 
dominance of Zionism, socialism, and orthodoxy simply reflected different ways that Jews 
experienced and responded to modernity (and for that matter by far the most common Jewish 
engagement with modernity).23 Still, the effect was clear. Just as the Wielka Synagoga attempted 
to bring the Jews out of the ghetto, Muranów in essence kept them back in: “The ghetto had been 
abolished long ago,” the Polish-Jewish journalist Bernard Singer wrote about Muranów, “but 
there still existed an invisible wall which separated the district from the rest of the city.”24 The 
isolation of Muranów became all the more clearly articulated as the main center of urban life in 
Warsaw moved south to Krakowskie Przedmieście, Nowy Świat, and Marszałkowska streets over 
the course of the mid-to-late nineteenth century.  
The ultimate separation of Muranów came, however, with the Nazi invasion of Poland in 
September 1939. The Nazis immediately targeted the city’s Jewish population with 
discriminatory measures. On November 15, 1940, they created Europe’s largest ghetto that held 
at its height 460,000 Jews.25 Most of central Warsaw, bordering along the old town in the east, 
including the entire area of Muranów in the north, and stretching almost all the way down to 
Aleje Jerozolimskie in the south, had now been separated from the rest of the city by ten-foot 
walls. After the deportation of 280,000 Jews to Treblinka in July-August 1942, the ghetto shrunk 
in size and came to a tragic, final end with the outbreak of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in April 
1943. The Nazis leveled the entire northern-most part of the ghetto following a month of fighting 
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and left in their wake a field of ruins that was previously Muranów; the district became one of the 
most heavily destroyed areas of Warsaw. In one final, triumphant act, the Nazis exploded the 
Wielka Synagoga on May 16, 1943. Jewish Warsaw was largely no more.   
But there were some traces of it that remained after the war. The immense emptiness of 
the ghetto space in the center of the city served as grim, even surreal portrait of Nazi brutality. In 
rebuilding the new Warsaw from the ruins of the war, urban planners and historic preservationists 
remained distinctly ambivalent about what place these material ruins of Jewish life should have in 
the city’s “rebirth.” As the last traces of Jewish life disappeared throughout the 1950s, Warsaw’s 
urban landscape became almost entirely ethnically Polish with only the fewest traces of the 
Jewish minority remaining. The Holocaust and the systematic destruction of Warsaw in the last 
throes of World War II largely account for this dramatic transformation in the city’s urban form, 
but the near complete absence of Jewish Warsaw today also stems from the type of urban 
planning that developed immediately after the war. In an eclectic combination of modernism, 
socialist realism, and historic preservation, Warsaw’s urban reconstruction aimed to secure at 
once the socialist future and preserve the “Polish” past, a dual move that left little room for 
Jewish space.  
II. Resurrecting Warsaw among Sacred Ruins  
 On August 1, 1944, the Home Army (Armia Krajowa, AK) initiated the Warsaw Uprising 
against the few German troops still stationed in the capital city.26 Within three days, it controlled 
most of Warsaw, but the Nazis quickly responded by sending in reinforcements and aerial 
bombardments over the next 63 days before fighting ceased when Polish supplies ran out. As the 
Red Army sat idle on the east bank of the Vistula river in the Warsaw neighborhood of Praga, the 
Nazis brutally destroyed the Polish opposition and set the city ablaze in one final act of an 
immensely fatal occupation. Since Stalin wanted to extend control of the newly established 
provisional communist state, called the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PKWN), he 
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refused aid to the AK and did not allow Allied aircraft to use Soviet controlled airfields to bring 
in desperately needed supplies. He simply decided to wait for the Nazis to do him the favor of 
crushing one of the last nuisances to his rule in Poland. A confederation of resistance groups 
backed by the Polish government-in-exile, the AK did not pose any significant military challenge 
to the now triumphant Soviet army, but its anti-Soviet leanings were well known and only 
reinforced by the exile government’s refusal to recognize the authority of the PKWN. By the end 
of the Warsaw Uprising, about 150,000 civilians and 16,000 soldiers had died, bringing the total 
number of Varsovians who perished during the Nazi occupation to around 685,000.27 The main 
opposition to Soviet rule, the AK, had lost a demoralizing battle. The imposition of communism 
in Poland now proceeded apace with the western Allies largely conceding to Stalin’s demands at 
Yalta and Potsdam.28 Thousands of guerillas and armed groups continued to fight against Soviet 
and Polish forces, but their efforts were in vain as Soviet support for communism in Poland 
proved unyielding. Stalin’s clear position regarding Soviet domination in Poland was much 
different from his rather ambiguous policy toward eastern Germany in the immediate postwar 
years.29 
 In 1945, Warsaw stood eerily silent –– a ghost town of desolate streets among burnt-out, 
smoke-billowing ruins. Almost its entire Jewish population had been killed.  Its civilian 
population had vanished after the Nazis expelled the last 150,000 people in no less than four days 
in early October 1944. Its urban landscape was ravaged: 11,229 of 25,498 buildings were totally 
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destroyed and 3,879 suffered partial damage.30 The total cost of damages in Warsaw amounted to 
21.9 billion złoty, which today would be about 54.6 billion dollars.31 Recovering from this 
immense disaster became one of the most pressing tasks of the newly formed communist state. In 
comparison to divided Berlin, the rebuilding of Warsaw moved at an astonishingly quick pace. 
The PZPR quickly realized that it could use the reconstruction of the capital to gain support 
among a population that had historically shown little interest in communism.32 Publishing two 
newspapers about the rebuilding effort, Stolica and Skarpa Warszawska, the regime tactfully 
turned Warsaw into a “martyr city” whose “rebirth” served as a larger metonym for the 
destruction and reemergence of the Polish nation. Warsaw’s reconstruction was hardly just a 
matter of rebuilding streets, apartments, and offices; it was a sacred effort to restore what the 
Nazis had ruthlessly destroyed.  
 Plans for Warsaw’s rebuilding emerged immediately after the war and stemmed largely 
from left-wing, avant-garde architects who had formed the backbone of interwar Poland’s small, 
yet active modernist movement. Centered mainly at the Warsaw Polytechnic School of 
Architecture, this modernist milieu, which included architects such as Roman Piotrowski, Helena 
and Szymon Syrkus, Barbara and Stanisław Brukalski, Bohdan Lachert, and Józef Szanajca, 
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followed international developments in Germany, France, and the United States and attempted to 
apply modernist, functional designs to Warsaw’s notoriously chaotic, cramped urban layout. 
Publishing articles in experimental journals such as Blok and Praesens, these architects focused 
mostly on providing solutions to housing and became involved in international discussions about 
modern architecture through meetings such as the Congrès Internationaux d’Architecture 
Moderne (CIAM).33 During the Nazi occupation, they joined together to form the underground 
Architecture and Town-Planning Studio (Pracownia Architektoniczno-Urbanistyczna, or PAU) 
that worked on plans for Warsaw’s reconstruction.  
In 1945, Poland’s communist provisional government created the Office for the 
Rebuilding of the Capital (Biuro Odbudowy Stolicy, BOS) that oversaw Warsaw’s reconstruction. 
Filling the ranks of BOS, Poland’s interwar architects now had the unprecedented opportunity to 
carry out in practice what before they had only imagined on paper: a modern, functional Warsaw 
of green areas, socially progressive housing complexes, and a sensible transportation system.34 
Created for a maximum population of 1.2 million, the first plan for Warsaw organized the capital 
into functional parts of housing, industry, leisure, green space, and areas for work.35 The design 
received an enthusiastic response in Poland and a warm reception in the United States during a 
tour entitled “Warsaw Lives Again.”36 Walter Gropius and Lewis Mumford praised the creativity 
of the design, and Wacław Ostrowski, head of the BOS Division for Urban Planning, clearly 
noted the significance of the work: “Poland has today the possibility of building a capital that 
fully satisfies the needs of the state and the nation. If we seize this opportunity, Warsaw will 
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come back to life from catastrophe better and more beautiful. If we miss this only chance, it will 
be a new catastrophe for the capital.”37  
Ostrowski had little reason to fear. In 1949, the PZPR announced the Six-Year Plan for 
the Reconstruction of Warsaw that guided the bulk of the capital’s rebuilding.38 The plan kept the 
basic modernist, functional design intended to alleviate the city’s cramped, disorganized layout, 
but departed from earlier proposals in several key ways. Although socialist realism with its 
monumental, ornamental, and representative architecture had not yet permeated the rebuilding of 
Warsaw, the ideological basis for building a “socialist city” had become much more clearly 
articulated in the Six-Year Plan than it had earlier. The plan stressed two main elements of 
socialist Warsaw: the development of industrial production as befitting a “city of workers” and 
the building of new housing complexes that transcended the cramped, poorly accommodated 
tenement houses of the capitalist, bourgeois past, which had deprived the workers of “greenery, 
recreation grounds, and cultural facilities.”39 The Six-Year Plan also departed from earlier designs 
by clearly including in Warsaw’s reconstruction the rebuilding of the city’s “historic” core. Since 
1945, BOS had been cataloguing and rebuilding Warsaw’s stare miasto or old town, which the 
Nazis had flattened, but central plans for Warsaw’s reconstruction just after the war barely 
touched on this effort. The impulse to build a modern city eclipsed the importance of historic 
preservation until 1949 when the Six-Year Plan made rebuilding the stare miasto the centerpiece 
of Warsaw’s reconstruction. The old town became central to Warsaw’s rebirth from the 
destruction of war. Warsaw was a city that “now lives through the apogee of its martyrdom;” it 
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was “in one word, a gigantic Oświęcim for the whole nation.”40 The old town personified this 
martyrdom and Warsaw’s “rebirth” would have been impossible without its reconstruction.  
The Six-Year Plan was then, at its core, a highly symbolic attempt to portray Warsaw’s 
reconstruction as a metaphor for Poland’s regeneration after the ravages of occupation, war, and 
genocide. In the opening statement of the Six-Year Plan, the symbolic meaning of Warsaw’s  
“resurrection” from the “sacred” ruins could not have been clearer:  
As late as January 1945, when the Nazi armies caught in a deep encircling movement were already 
fleeing in mortal fear –– special squads of destroyers of Warsaw were with sadistic precision 
boring holes in the walls of the remaining historic buildings. … Six months of planned destructive 
activity was not sufficient to raze everything to the ground, as was the case almost two years 
earlier in the northern part of the city –– the Ghetto. All the same, the Nazi criminals left Warsaw 
convinced that nothing could ever bring about its reconstruction. … It was clear that for the 
majority of [Varsovians] what counted above all was their love for the heroic city and their 
veneration for the sacred ruins of Warsaw.41 
 
As the capital, as a city flattened by the Nazis, and as the site of the greatest Polish effort to 
oppose Nazism, Warsaw epitomized Polish suffering, martyrdom, and resistance. In both a real 
and imagined sense, Warsaw was the symbol for Poland’s wartime and postwar condition; 
destroyed and broken, yet resilient and invincible, its “sacred ruins” represented Poland’s 
tragically heroic past and its “resurrection” from near total destruction. The PZPR used this 
symbolism as much as it could to underscore the basic, simple point that the party was the 
guardian and patriarch of the nation: the future sustenance of Poland remained secure in the hands 
of the communists who were meticulously rebuilding the historic core of the naród.  
Yet this blending of the past with modernist, functional urban planning was not just a 
move by the party to gain political legitimacy. The fate of Warsaw’s “historic” and “cultural” 
monuments animated discussions about the rebuilding of the city that went deeper than mere 
politics. Although a few voices opposed the idea of reconstructing buildings that virtually no 
longer existed, a general consensus emerged that some portion of Warsaw’s “past” had to be 
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preserved. 42 In the opening essay to the first issue of Stolica, the illustrated weekly published by 
BOS, the crucial role of the “old” had already been clearly staked out. Surrounded by pre-war 
pictures of Warsaw’s Royal Castle, medieval Cathedral, and market square, the article 
acknowledged that the old town would not “be the same as it was before,” but its “resurrection” 
would bring back its old “atmosphere.” The old town had to be reconstructed in order to restore 
what the Nazis had destroyed and show the indestructibility of the Polish nation by locating it in 
an eternal past:  
Warsaw has her own eternal, living beauty. She has not lost it even now when many of her most 
beautiful monuments were totally exterminated. Whether it is the area of the Royal Castle, lying in 
a shapeless pile of ruins, the beautiful gothic cathedral, lying in one large heap of rubble, or the 
old-town market square where only three tenement houses remained in small fragments –– this 
tragic spell rivets the people today and draws them to the ruins. … There was no dispute, there 
were no two ways about it among Polish society that monuments of cultural and architectural 
value in Warsaw –– from the Royal Castle to the Cathedral to the Old Town –– must be 
resurrected. … The resurrected walls of the old town will not be a lifeless creation, but will stand 
as a living link connecting the past to the present and the future. … We are not a nation whose 
history began in January 1945 at the moment when the barbarians from the west were chased 
away. Our history dates back to the tenth century of the Christian era.43 
 
In an observant, Catholic country, the religious casting of Warsaw’s resurrection from sacred 
ruins implied a clear set of meanings. It reified the past by locating Warsaw’s present in a pure, 
eternal, historical moment that provided stability and normality for a society ravaged by war, 
occupation, and genocide. Drawing implicitly on the deeply rooted perception of Poland as the 
“Christ among Nations” –– a country crucified for the sins of the world that would return to 
rescue humanity –– it portrayed Warsaw as an innocent, martyr city that was now determined to 
come back from its death. The reconstruction of the old town was not a nostalgic flight into a lost, 
romanticized past. This past had not been lost: Warsaw’s “eternal beauty” remained lying in the 
ruins that were to be rebuilt. The historic recreation of the old town rested on a teleological, 
sacrosanct sense of time that possessed, altered, and utilized the past for the present and future.   
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 The main person charged to put this utopian vision into practice was the historic 
preservationist Jan Zachwatowicz who became Poland’s General Conservator for Historic 
Monuments in 1945. This newly created position within the Ministry of Culture and Art gave 
Zachwatowicz an unprecedented opportunity to reshape the field and practice of historic 
preservation in Poland. He is often claimed to have developed the “Polish School of 
Conservation” that insisted on reconstructing war-torn historic buildings literally from the ground 
up. Zachwatowicz later denied that any new school had been created, insisting that the massive 
destruction of World War II had simply created an exceptional situation that demanded an 
unprecedented rebuilding program.44 “It isn’t a school,” he is known to have often said, “it is 
simply good work done by Poles.”45 But such patriotic modesty aside, the uniqueness of his 
approach cannot be denied. Active in saving from destruction art and other cultural artifacts in 
Warsaw during the war, Zachwatowicz set out immediately afterwards to reconstruct what the 
Nazis had torn down. With smoke still billowing from the ruins of his beloved Warsaw, he 
formulated a fundamentally new approach to historic preservation that rejected the long-standing 
predilection for conservation among preservationists and boldly advocated for the reconstruction 
of old buildings that virtually no longer existed.46  
Imbued with a strong sense of patriotism, he passionately argued that the reconstruction 
of Poland’s historic buildings was absolutely necessary for the revitalization of the Polish nation 
after the Second World War: “The experiences of recent years –– when Germany wanted to 
destroy us as a nation and demolished our historic monuments –– have brought into dramatic 
clarity the significance of the monuments of the past for the nation. For the nation and its cultural 
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monuments are one.”47 Zachwatowicz expressed little patience with previous concepts of historic 
preservation and above all the romantic engagement with the past with its melancholic meditation 
on ruins. The past was to be harnessed for the present and the future; there was no time for 
melancholy, no time for reflecting on what had been lost, no time for wallowing in the past. A 
vital task was at hand: historic preservation was about “defending our culture, about fighting for 
one of the most fundamental elements of our immortal nation. It is not about sentimental 
affections, oldness, or longings, about that sort of song ‘about old Warsaw.’”48 Poland’s war-
damaged monuments were appreciated less for their historic value and more for their utility: they 
were to be rebuilt, recreated, and reconstructed for the future.  
 And rebuilt they were. Zachwatowicz’s ideas influenced the reconstruction of historic 
monuments across Poland, but his most important project was the meticulous rebuilding of 
Warsaw’s old town that had practically been flattened by the Nazis. This massive reconstruction 
project represented on the grandest scale Zachwatowciz’s vision of utilizing historic monuments 
for the future. Just after the liberation of the city, Zachwatowicz and others who made up BOS’s 
Division of Historic Preservation (Wydział Architektury Zabytkowej) started assessing the damage 
and cataloguing monuments deemed worthy of reconstruction.49 In 1945, Zachwatowicz 
submitted a plan designating many of Warsaw’s districts as historic, covering some 4.2 square 
miles, but this early proposal was not taken seriously.50 BOS decided instead that Warsaw’s old 
town, along with two important historic streets that flowed into it, would be restored. Lasting into 
the 1960s (and for some buildings into the 1980s), the reconstruction of Warsaw’s old town 
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involved carefully rebuilding hundreds of buildings, based usually on photographs and drawings 
that had been preserved by Zachwatowicz and others during the Warsaw Uprising.51  
 But this notion of historic preservation only included “Polish” historic buildings, a crucial 
distinction that has been overlooked in discussions about Warsaw’s postwar reconstruction. 
Brushing up just against the perimeter of the old town, the district of Muranów remained absent 
from any historic preservation plans. Jewish space remained outside the culturally constructed 
boundaries of the Polish nation and bracketed from the teleological sense of time that shaped 
Warsaw’s rebuilding. In a programmatic essay on Warsaw’s reconstruction written in 1945, the 
sociologist Stanisław Ossowski brilliantly captured the future’s past of Warsaw’s rebirth and the 
ambivalence of Jewish space in that temporal framing. Moving through the “conservative” 
emphasis on restoration and the “radical” focus on the modern, Ossowski advocated precisely for 
the combination of the “new” and the “old” that later formed the cornerstone of the Six-Year 
Plan.52 He then went on to describe what parts of “old Warsaw” should be included in building 
the new metropolis. Making both a temporal and cultural argument, he maintained that those 
buildings constructed before the November Uprising of 1830 should be included in the “sphere of 
the historic,” although he left the possibility open for some structures built afterwards to be 
incorporated as well.  
Since the failure of the 1830 uprising began a new period of increased repression by 
tsarist Russia, marking this date as the end point made a clear political-cultural statement that 
preserving historic buildings erected during one of the lowest moments in Polish history was 
simply out of the question. Moreover, he claimed that historic buildings should be preserved only 
if they aspire to “eternity” and “permanence,” while clearly fitting into the future needs and 
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appearance of the city as a whole.53 Ossowski addressed directly the issue of the ghetto area, but 
made it clear that this space did not fit into the past worthy of preserving for the future. When 
referring to the destruction of the ghetto, he noted that “Warsaw did not suffer … any serious loss 
of its historic monuments” there and pointed out that reconstruction was not necessary since the 
Jewish population no longer existed.54 He added that the “Jewish question” had “soured the 
atmosphere of the capital” and acknowledged that Muranów was “to a considerable extent 
culturally foreign to Polish society.”55 His demarcation of Muranów as culturally, if not ethnically 
different are all the more telling coming from someone who published just a year later a 
penetrating critique of ethnic nationalism in response to the Kielce pogrom.56 Even he could not 
fully overcome ethnic notions of difference and separation.  
It is perhaps not surprising then that no Jewish sites were ever included on Warsaw’s list 
of historic monuments, and one can search in vain through the hundreds of BOS files located in 
the Warsaw city archive for any discussion about the “historic” value of Muranów.57 Jewish 
Warsaw was not harnessed for the future; it did not fit into the “historic core” of the city’s past 
that was to be rebuilt for future sustenance of the nation. Instead the area of Muranów was used 
and consumed for an expansive socialist realist housing project. It was to be one of the main 
“socialist” parts promised by the Six-Year Plan. As Zachwatowicz’s team waded through the 
ruins of the old town scavenging for the minutest architectural piece to be saved, catalogued, and 
rebuilt, thousands of Varsovians sifted through the rubble of Muranów to find anything that could 
                                                 
53 Ibid., 412.  
 
54 Ibid., 395.  
 
55 Ibid., 398, 395.  
 
56 Stanisław Ossowski, “Na tle wydarzeń Kieleckich,” Kuźnica 38 (1946): 5. On the context of Polish 
intellectual engagement with postwar anti-Semitism, see Michlic, “Holocaust and its Aftermath.”  
 
57 APW, BOS, 244, “Spis budowali zabytkowych na terenie Wielkiej Warszawy stan w lipcu 1945.”  
  123 
be reused for the rebuilding effort.58  The ruins of the old town were preserved as “sacred” 
remnants of Polish culture; the ruins of the ghetto were recycled as material to be consumed and 
used for something better: “The Muranów housing development stands on the ruins of the former 
ghetto. However, the ruins are not being removed thanks to skillful planning. … As much as 
possible, bricks are being taken out from the remaining ruins, which is saving billions in terms of 
both money and labor. Muranów will not only be the largest housing area, but perhaps the most 
beautiful one in the capital.”59 A new Muranów to be built from the rubble of the ghetto would 
transcend both the “antagonism” of Polish-Jewish relations and the cramped, dark tenement 
houses of the capitalist past; a new Muranów of functional buildings spread out among green 
spaces would provide comfortable housing for the workers and end the demarcation of this area 
as distinctly “Jewish.”  
III. Consuming the Ghetto Space  
In the immediate postwar years, the small number of Jewish survivors of the Holocaust 
became active in postwar Jewish life mainly through the CKŻP, which was founded in 1944 as 
the main organizing body of Jews in Poland. They naturally perceived the rubble of the burned-
out ghetto in a much different way. Organizing commemorations of the uprising, Jews interpreted 
the ghetto space as the ultimate place of Jewish martyrdom and resistance. For a very brief 
moment after the war, the significance of the ghetto space as a site of Jewish suffering and 
opposition was clearly articulated. Already in 1946, the first monument to the ghetto uprising was 
unveiled. Designed by the architect Leon Marek Suzin, it featured a red circular tablet raised 
above the ground by stone masonry with the following inscription in Hebrew, Yiddish, and 
Polish: “To those who fell in the unprecedented heroic battle for the dignity and freedom of the 
Jewish people, for a free Poland and for a man’s liberation. From the Polish Jews.” The 
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inscription of this small plaque captured the dominant way that the ghetto became interpreted as 
carried out by Polish Jews fighting for the freedom of both the Jewish and Polish people.  
In articles published by Jewish organizations about the ghetto uprising, a general 
consensus emerged that the ghetto uprising represented a heroic moment of solidarity among left-
wing Jews and Poles who fought bravely against the Nazis. The ghetto uprising appeared as the 
ultimate example of Jewish resistance and martyrdom carried out by the same left-wing forces 
who were now fighting for democracy and socialism in postwar Poland.60 On the second 
anniversary of the uprising, Yitzhak Zuckerman, active in the youth Zionist movement and the 
last commander of Jewish Combat Organization (Żydowska Organizacja Bojowa, or ŻOB), 
proclaimed that a broad left-leaning alliance of the Bund, the PPR, Polaj-Zion, Zionists, and 
workers had carried out the uprising. His take did not differ greatly from the Jewish-communist 
historian Ber Mark’s commentary, which also stressed the solidarity of the left.61 The political 
divisions among Jews in postwar Poland –– especially between Zionists and Communists –– had 
not yet colored how the most recent past was viewed. In 1947, the CKŻP reinforced this broad 
message of left-wing heroism by announcing the change of two prominent street names in 
Muranów: Nalewki street, the heart of the Jewish district’s once bustling economic life, was 
renamed The Ghetto Fighters’s Street and Gęsia street was now called Mordechai Anielewicz 
street after the leader of the ŻOB.62  
 As Jewish groups took the lead in interpreting the ghetto space, urban planners dealt with 
the rebuilding of Muranów only partially aware of this discursive negotiation with the past. From 
the earliest plans, BOS decided to turn Muranów into a large housing complex as a key element 
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of Warsaw’s transformation into a socialist city.63 The plans stemmed from heady designs created 
during the interwar period by a group of avant garde architects who dreamed of building a 
modern, functional Warsaw. Since Muranów was a heavily cramped tenement area, it became one 
of the main areas for implementing a new, socialist conception of housing that transcended the 
limitations of capitalism. Muranów presented, however, a particularly difficult task for BOS’s 
architects. They not only had to deal with the enormous amount of rubble, especially in the 
northern part of the district that had been flattened completely, but also with the symbolism of the 
space itself –– an area that the Nazis had created to imprison and then later annihilate Warsaw’s 
Jewish population.64 Most urban planners tellingly paid little or no attention to the fact that it was 
the center of Jewish life, now lying in a heap of ruins so thick that officials determined it would 
be too costly and too time consuming to remove all the broken stone. Published in 1946-47, the 
first plans for the district focused solely on the specific details of the housing complex to be built 
there.65 In 1948-49, a new architect, Bohdan Lachert, took over the project and proved to be more 
conscious of the symbolism of the ghetto space than any other designer that worked on it before 
or after him.66 As a young, avant-garde architect during the interwar period, Lachert had designed 
a number of housing complexes for the Warsaw Residential Cooperative. He understood the 
unprecedented opportunity that Warsaw’s destruction presented to architects like himself. “The 
task of rebuilding Warsaw is great,” he said before a meeting of BOS architects, “we are standing 
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before the greatest architectural competition of all times in our history.”67 Following his own 
enthusiastic charge, Lachert set out on an ambitious plan for Muranów to implement a new 
district of geometrically square, functional, unadorned apartment buildings erected among ample 
green space. 
But Lachert was also well aware that his new project would be sitting on top of the 
former ghetto. Partly out of practical reasons and partly for symbolic effect, he decided to build 
the apartments directly on top of the ruins and to use the rubble mixed with concrete for the 
foundation of the buildings, dramatizing the idea of Warsaw reemerging back to life from the 
death and destruction of the war. He also left the front of the apartment buildings unstuccoed with 
a dark red, rusty brick that was intended to capture the somberness of the ghetto space in a 
redemptive narrative of material renewal. “The history of the great victory of the nation,” he 
wrote, “paid for through a sea of human blood, poured out for the sake of social progress and 
national liberation, will be commemorated in the Muranów project. … The building of a new 
residential district in Muranów for the working class, on a mound of rubble, will testify to the 
emergence of a new life on the old ruins of social relations, on an area that commemorates the 
great barbarity of Nazism and the heroism of the Ghetto fighters.”68  
Lachert intended the rebuilding of Muranów to complement the symbolic meaning of the 
Warsaw Ghetto Monument that had just been erected in 1948 slightly north of the area of his 
housing complex. The idea of building the monument came from the CKŻP, which launched an 
international funding campaign to pay for the monument. The Central Committee settled on a 
design by the Polish-Jewish sculptor Natan Rapoport that heroically and triumphantly 
commemorated the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, depicting on its western side proletarian-looking 
figures brandishing arms as they almost jump out from the granite in which they are carved. The 
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eastern side, in a much more subtle way, shows twelve Jews, their heads slouched, reluctantly 
moving to their fate.69 Bohdan Lachert, on the board of experts for evaluating the ghetto 
monument, praised Rapoport’s design and tellingly stressed how it would fit into the larger 
rebuilding of Muranów:  
The grim atmosphere of this great mausoleum, erected among a cemetery of ruins, soaked with the 
blood of the Jewish nation, should remain, as new life comes into existence. The architectural 
project, carried out in the rebuilding of Muranów, should not reduce these artistic elements, which 
the sculptor Rapoport created through a magnificent sculpture of bronze and granite … The ruins, 
in the largest possible amount, should remain in place, remembering the days of terror and 
resistance, constituting the ground on which a new city, a new life will be raised.70 
 
In a symbolic sense, Lachert’s apartment buildings constructed from the rubble in a rusty red 
brick would be an extension –– even a dramatization –– of Rapoport’s monument. The spatial 
design of the apartments on top of the ruins would contribute to the monument’s impact by 
maintaining the “grim atmosphere” that pervades Muranów. “Built from red rubble, as if from the 
blood of Warsaw” was how Lachert’s project manager described the symbolic effect.71 Additional 
articles published about Muranów recognized Lachert’s attempt to capture the ghetto as a 
“symbol of human tragedy and human bestiality.”72  
Indeed, Lachert’s sensitivity to the meaning of the ghetto space reflects a broader 
confluence in the immediate postwar years in how non-Jewish communists and left-wing Jews 
interpreted the ghetto space. As the historian Marci Shore has convincingly argued, communists 
and the Zionist-Left shared a common language and a common purpose that can perhaps be best 
described as Zionist socialist realism, embodied not least of all in Rapaport’s monument with its 
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proletarian ghetto fighters.73 A common understanding took hold that saw the Ghetto Uprising as 
a central part of a broader opposition movement against Nazism led by the Polish Worker’s Party, 
Marxist-Zionists, and young, progressive Jews. As the Marxist-Zionist leader Adolf Berman 
triumphantly proclaimed, “the armed brotherhood of the Polish and Jewish radical workers’ 
movement was not a phrase, but a fact. … The uprising in the ghetto, the first massive, 
revolutionary rebellion in Poland during the occupation, undoubtedly became one of the sparks 
that triggered the Polish resistance movement.”74 Similarly, the communist party press stressed 
solidarity with the Jews in order to brandish its image as a progressive force for Poland: “Our 
party, the Polish Worker’s Party, is proud that its forces, units of the People’s Guard, was at the 
front of those who provided aid to the heroic defenders of the Warsaw ghetto from the ‘Polish’ 
side of the ghetto wall.”75 The Polish Left could evoke the meaning of the ghetto uprising much 
more so than the Warsaw Uprising of 1944, even if only tenuously since non-Jewish participation 
in the rebellion was limited.76 For those small number of left-wing Jews committed to staying in 
Poland, this use of the ghetto uprising did not appear problematic because they, too, largely 
interpreted it as part of a broader Polish struggle against the Nazi occupier. Other Jews who might 
have reflected upon the ghetto space differently –– and there were probably many –– had already 
fled from Poland by the thousands in the face of anti-Semitic violence.  
But this uneasy alliance did not last long once the PZPR consolidated political power in 
Poland. Fissures had developed already following the grand unveiling of Rapoport’s monument. 
Jewish Communists in the CKŻP claimed that those from the Zionist camp had “aspired to 
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transform the commemoration into a Zionist demonstration and attained their aim.”77 As the 
PZPR implemented a one-party dictatorship in Poland, both non-Jewish and Jewish communists 
started to question the political loyalty of Zionists within the context of the campaign against 
“right-wing nationalist deviation” that took hold across the Soviet bloc.78 During the sixth 
anniversary of the Ghetto Uprising, Gregorz Smolar, the new head of the CKŻP, stressed the 
importance of communists in initiating the uprising and directly attacked any Zionists left in 
Poland: “And when we find among ourselves people who, like dratted flies, are buzzing about 
some greater and more vital allegedly Jewish national goals, we will eliminate those people from 
our society, just as the fighters in the ghetto removed from themselves those who were faint-
hearted and cowardly.”79 The political diversity that had once shaped Jewish life immediately 
after the war now largely came to an end.80 The PZPR now demanded political support from the 
few Jews still remaining in Poland and replaced the CKŻP with the newly created Socio-Cultural 
Association of Jews (TSKŻ) that remained fairly loyal to the regime.81  
The consolidation of political power under the PZPR also had an impact on Lachert’s 
design for Muranów. As a way to express its ideological priorities in the built environment, the 
PZPR embraced the tenets of socialist realism by 1950. Socialist realism promised to transcend 
the cosmopolitan, bourgeois universalistic functionalism of urban modernism by constructing 
buildings socialist in content and national in form. What exactly this meant in practice was rather 
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simple ––large, monumental, and ornate buildings that produced in the end a similarly 
universalistic aesthetic across the Soviet bloc. Warsaw’s two most celebrated, socialist realist 
projects were the towering Joseph Stalin Palace of Culture and Science and the grandiose housing 
complex on constitution square (Marszałkowska Dzielnica Mieszkaniowa). Just as these projects 
were being designed and implemented, Lachert’s plans were strongly criticized for their 
modernist expression and alleged gloominess on the former space of the ghetto. In a stinging, 
five-page rebuke, Jerzy Wierzbicki sharply concluded that “Muranów does not attain a fully 
positive expression.”82 His remarks focused mainly on modernist “premises” that no longer 
remained valid four years later with the advent of socialist realism and thus his criticism can 
partly be read as a formulaic rejection of previous “errors” at the peak of Stalinism. But his 
remarks also dealt specifically with Lachert’s architectural representation of the former ghetto 
space. He recognized “the difficult task” that Lachert faced and acknowledged the general 
symbolism of the ghetto space: “In 1940, Muranów was included in the ghetto by the Nazis in 
order to wipe it literally from the face of the earth three years later after murdering the Jews 
enclosed in the ghetto. That once animated and lively part of the city was turned into a wasteland 
covered with a layer of rubble several meters deep …”83 Yet he then attacked Lachert’s attempt to 
give expression to this reality. Wierzbicki criticized the construction of the apartments on top of 
the ruins, which he claimed had produced “an interesting, flat lay of the land and a monotonous 
terrain.” The buildings themselves were also “monotonous, sad, and grey” with “rubble hallowed 
brick” creating a somber environment.84 In a short response to his critics, Lachert defended parts 
of his project, but conceded that an error had been made in attempting to symbolize the 
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ghastliness and destruction of the ghetto space (he clearly knew what to say to save his 
professional career).85  
The fallout from the criticism of Lachert’s project proved decisive. The PZPR decided to 
stucco Lachert’s buildings, claiming that it had received complaints from new residents about the 
somberness of the district. It then painted on the white surface small designs and implanted on the 
cornices decorative ornaments. Muranów was to be a cheerful, bright, and colorful place for the 
working class.86 This decision reflected the ideological demands of socialist realism with its 
emphasis on ornamental and monumental architecture. The result was all too clear: the 
ornamental stuccoing had painted over –– both literally and figuratively –– Lachert’s attempt to 
represent a space that had been “soaked with the blood of the Jewish nation.” The party did not 
want to meditate upon the death and destruction of the ghetto; it did not want to reflect upon the 
ghastliness that lay beneath the Muranów apartment buildings; it wanted instead nice, pretty 
apartments to surround the Ghetto Monument that increasingly represented the heroic, triumphant 
pages of Polish and communist history. Any sign or symbolic representation of what happened to 
Jewish Warsaw –– both to its inhabitants and its urban landscape –– was to be buried under 
beautiful, stuccoed apartment buildings. In a certain sense, this change in Lachert’s design was 
probably bound to occur; he appears to have been the only architect advocating at the time for 
even the most oblique representation of the ghetto space. In 1949, the official announcement of 
the Six-Year Plan made only fleeting and vague reference to the ghetto space; instead the urban 
landscape of Jewish Warsaw was to be consumed and used for building the socialist future.87 
With its eastern most edge bordering the old town, Muranów reflected the unique 
blending of the socialist and the nationalist –– of the new and the old –– that shaped Warsaw’s 
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rebuilding. Historic preservation and socialist realism were two co-existing and intertwined 
aspects of Warsaw’s reconstruction. The meticulous reconstruction of the old town represented 
the revitalization of the Polish nation from the ruins of war, while Muranów reinforced the 
importance of the new, communist order in that rebirth. Both supported a redemptive narrative of 
material and mnemonic renewal. While Warsaw’s old town was perceived as a great national loss 
that must be restored, its rubble carefully sorted and picked through for even the most minute 
surviving architectural piece, Muranów was ultimately seen as scattered debris, ruins that could 
be shoveled up for the building of the socialist future: “New, bright houses grow on the ruins of 
the ghetto; a new life grows, which prevails over destruction and mass extermination. These 
houses and the forest of scaffoldings that are rising up throughout all of Warsaw are evidence of 
the constantly growing power of peace and socialism.”88  
The transformation of Muranów into a socialist realist housing project signaled the near 
complete disappearance of “Jewish Warsaw” with the exception of a few notable Jewish sites that 
were still standing, although most of them would also soon vanish. The Wielka Synagoga on 
Tłomackie street, lying in a pile of ruins after the war on the southeastern edge of Muranów, was 
never included in the city’s unprecedented historic reconstruction program. The synagogue only 
rarely and fleetingly made its way into popular discussions about the city’s architectural history; 
this landmark building, destroyed as a symbol of the Nazi defeat of the ghetto uprising, ceased to 
exist as part of the city’s past.89 The rubble in fact was cleared away and the space remained 
empty until as late as the mid-1970s when the city started building a skyscraper on it. Although 
the construction project had been approved already in the 1950s, work on it languished for 
decades for reasons that are not entirely clear (probably a combination of limited funding, worker 
strikes, and other priorities). In 1976, the first metal shell of the building started to appear only for 
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it to rust away before work resumed in the late 1980s. Redesigned in a light blue, reflective glass, 
the building was finally completed in 1991 and to this day towers over the northern part of central 
Warsaw.    
Warsaw’s oldest synagogue faced a similar fate. Located in Praga on the east side of the 
Vistula river, which had been home to Jews since the late eighteenth century, the synagogue was 
constructed in 1836 by the architect Józef Lessel. Built in a highly original design that featured a 
two-story rotunda, the building suffered damage during the war, but remained in good enough 
shape that massive reconstruction was not necessary. In late 1948, BOS sent a letter to the 
Warsaw Office for Conservation inquiring about the status of the building as an historic 
monument before it proceeded with plans to tear it down.90 The office responded initially that the 
building was not on any historic preservation list, but then revised its opinion several months later 
after the CKŻP indicated that the Jewish community planned to rebuild the structure for religious 
purposes.91  The synagogue was officially placed under historic preservation for its “artistic and 
historical value,” but this decision never led to any results.92 Officials in the building department 
suggested tearing it down to make room for a parking lot.93 Since the CKŻP did not have the 
funds to reconstruct the building and the city rejected its requests for financial assistance, the 
synagogue was destroyed and the area was ultimately used for a playground.  
A few Jewish sites did, however, survive both the war and postwar urban reconstruction. 
The Judaic Library, designed by Edwar Eber and adjacent to the Wielka Synagoga, remained well 
intact and was restored in 1947 as the Jewish Historical Institute (Żydowski Instytut Historyczny, 
or ŻIH), which became home to a magnificent archival collection on Polish Jewry, including the 
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clandestine collection of Emanuel Ringelblum that was recovered buried in the ruins of the 
Warsaw ghetto. In the 1950s and 1960s, ŻIH was arguably one of the leading institutes in the 
world publishing articles on the Holocaust, especially concerning the extermination of Polish 
Jewry.94 Moreover, the city’s two Jewish cemeteries and an orthodox synagogue, used after the 
war by the city’s tiny religious community, remained intact, but all three gradually fell into severe 
dilapidation over decades of neglect. Since so few religious Jews lived in Warsaw, the nominal 
Jewish community that existed there had virtually no resources to look after and maintain its 
former property.  
IV. Commemorating the Ghetto Space  
One might be tempted by the simple argument that Polish communists had much more on 
their minds than the fate of Jewish sites in a city virtually of no Jews. The ambivalent handling of 
Jewish space was not necessarily deliberate or out of bad faith, but rather the natural outcome of 
an ideological and political system dominant throughout the Soviet bloc. Although the influence 
of communism is clearly evident, the ambivalence toward Jewish space in Warsaw reflects a 
distinct unease with the Holocaust. It is not just a couple of Jewish sites that is at issue here, but 
an entire district of central Warsaw that remained unequivocally linked to the persecution and 
murder of the Jews. Few other spaces in Poland symbolized so exclusively the Nazi campaign 
against the Jews than the area of the former ghetto. The PZPR boldly used this space for the 
redemptive renewal of Warsaw. And it did so not just through the physical rebuilding of the area, 
but also by turning the ghetto into a site of Polish martyrdom that all but denied its connection to 
Polish Jewry. This mnemonic erasure of Jews from the history of the ghetto was the final act in 
the postwar disappearance of Jewish Warsaw.  
On April 19, 1948, on the day that Rapoport’s monument was unveiled, the writer Maria 
Dąbrowska noted in her diary: “I do not have anything against the Jewish heroes. But so far 
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Warsaw does not have a monument for the insurgents and children who fought in the uprising!”95 
Dąbrowska attempts to reassure herself that she has nothing against the “Jewish heroes,” but she 
unmistakably does: they are overshadowing Warsaw’s rebellion against the Nazis. The Jewish 
rebellion is not her rebellion; her rebellion is Warsaw’s rebellion. Many ordinary Poles probably 
resented the attention the PZPR lavished on the ghetto uprising as it ignored the city’s other 
rebellion of 1944. The party in fact realized this and responded by transforming the ghetto 
uprising into a distinctly Polish event. Unable to use the Warsaw uprising led by the AK, the 
PZPR tailored the ghetto rebellion into a heroic moment of opposition that valorized the actions 
of left-wing Poles and Jews who fought against the Nazis.96 The rhetoric employed to construct 
this image of the past was at times formulaic and predictable. In 1950, at the height of Stalinism, 
the party’s leading paper, Trybuna Ludu, declared that the ghetto uprising was “a constituent part 
of the fight of the entire Polish nation to expel the occupant from the country, a constituent part of 
the war for liberation, carried out by the subjugated countries of Europe, of which the heroic 
forces of the Soviet army played the central and deciding role under the leadership of the 
magnificent Stalin.”97  
In 1953, the party went even further, boldly linking the uprising with the communist 
resistance movement during the war and the formation of the PPR: “The fight in the ghetto was 
an inseparable part of the struggle in the entire country led by the Polish Worker’s Party. … 
Almost all died, sacrificing their lives for People’s Poland.”98 By connecting the ghetto uprising 
with the larger opposition movement in Poland, the PZPR not only reduced to vague references 
that the uprising broke out as a rebellion against the genocidal policies of Nazi Germany, but also 
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portrayed it as a crucial moment when Poles and Jews had fought hand-in-hand against the Nazis. 
The ghetto uprising epitomized the heroic actions of Poles who supported every opportunity to 
oppose the Nazis, even when it came to Jews whose fate they saw as inseparable from their own. 
In short, the party used the ghetto uprising to valorize the behavior of Poles and put forward a 
highly fabricated image of Polish-Jewish brotherhood. As an article published on the tenth 
anniversary clearly put it, “the ghetto uprising was an expression and effect of the efforts and 
struggles in the unified fight against the occupant. It was not an isolated act, but a precise, 
organized one in connection with the struggle of the entire nation; it was a heroic, grand epoch in 
the pages of the history of the Polish opposition movement.”99 
This interpretation of the ghetto uprising dealt uneasily with the Nazi policies against the 
Jews that lay at the heart of the ghetto’s history. In the 1950s and 1960s, Poland was one of the 
leading places in the world for research on the genocide of European Jewry conducted at ŻIH, but 
the PZPR only marginally touched upon the isolation, ghettoization, and extermination of 
Warsaw’s Jewish population.100 It portrayed the ghetto as merely one part of Nazi policies against 
the Polish nation as a whole: “The Nazi criminals transformed the entire country into one large 
prison, into one large concentration camp. From the first days of the occupation, the Nazi 
torturers applied toward the Jewish population the most terrible racist terror and mass 
extermination. The terrible fate that Nazism brought upon the Jewish population was the 
beginning of the huge crime of destroying the entire Polish nation.”101 This unease with the 
Holocaust became particularly pronounced by 1960 when the Union of Fighters for Freedom and 
Democracy (Związek Bojowników o Wolność i Demokrację, or ZBoWiD) took over the task of 
designing, organizing, and implementing the commemoration, severely limiting the role that the 
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TSKŻ had played in the 1950s.102 ZBoWiD was the most important veteran organization in 
postwar Poland that cultivated an interpretation of World War II around Polish resistance and 
victimization.103  
In 1963, ZBoWiD transformed the twentieth anniversary of the ghetto uprising into a 
tragically heroic moment of Polish opposition, sacrifice, and martyrdom.104 If before the ghetto 
uprising represented the progressiveness of Polish communism, now it reflected the general 
benevolence of Polish society as a whole. This Polonization of the ghetto rebellion reflected not 
only the nationalization of Polish communism in the 1960s, but also the growing anxiety among 
some in the PZPR and ZBoWiD about Jews. The twentieth-anniversary of the uprising was 
celebrated across parts of the world. Some in the party feared that its growing internationalization 
challenged the image of the past it wished to fashion. In an interestingly worded letter to the 
PZPR, ZBoWiD noted that “in West Berlin a large exhibition on the issue of Jewish martyrology 
is being planned. … Converting the commemorations into a demonstration against West-German 
neo-fascism and militarism is not the intention of the organizers in the United States and the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Rather they want to use the matter of celebrating the memory of 
the ghetto victims for their own benefit, masking the true face of the West German 
government.”105  
The cold war Manichean division of the world into the militaristic, fascist west and the 
peaceful, anti-fascist east is less notable here than is the significant, if oblique reference to the 
“memory of the ghetto victims.” ZBoWiD feared that remembering the Jewish victims would 
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directly challenge its narrative about Polish martyrdom and resistance. The growing discussion 
about the Holocaust in the “West” became worrisome to ZBoWiD because it threatened its 
interpretation of the past. The only way to counteract this challenge was to erase virtually any 
connection between the ghetto uprising and the Jews: “The struggle and extermination of the 
Warsaw ghetto is one of the most tragic moments in the history of the Second World War … The 
German racists directed their blade of extermination against millions of people just because of 
their origins.”106 Jews had in fact been deleted so much from the history of the ghetto during the 
twentieth anniversary that Jewish leaders in and outside Poland complained to the PZPR. In a 
meeting with party officials, the board of the TSKŻ indicated that “certain shortcomings and 
errors” concerning the anniversary resulted in “inappropriate repercussions.” The TZKŻ regretted 
the “diminishing” of the “specificity of the Jewish martyrology during the Nazi occupation and 
attempts to equalize it with the general Nazi politics of extermination.” “We believe,” the board 
continued, “that by clearly exposing the full truth about the total extermination of the Jews in the 
context of the Nazi campaign to destroy [other] nations we can show the deepest viciousness of 
German fascism …”107  
The World Jewish Congress expressed similar concerns in a meeting with the PPR’s 
Deputy Foreign Minister. “I described,” the WJC official noted, “the feelings of profound 
disappointment and even disquiet felt by Jewish delegations from abroad … that the various 
ceremonies in Poland to commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Revolt 
were being given a character and form which conveyed the impression that this was a Polish 
national event …” The Polish deputy foreign minister responded by citing two main 
considerations that had shaped the organization of the commemorative events. First, he explained 
that the PZPR wanted to avoid arousing “feelings of resentment and indignation” among the 
Polish population for emphasizing the ghetto uprising over the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. 
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Second, he indicated that a “Zionist aspect” and Israeli polices became “entangled” in the 
decision “against giving the Commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto Revolt an exclusively Jewish 
character.”108 This second reason is the most important one. In the 1960s, Gomułka’s regime 
became increasingly more nationalistic by both glorifying the Polish past and attacking Germans 
and Jews.109 In the face of internal party divisions and continued social unrest, it turned sharply to 
national rhetoric to solidify its power. This move reached its apogee in the linguistic assault of 
1968 that forced some 13,000 Jews to flee Poland.110 As an anticipation of the verbal hate that 
was to come five years later, the discursive transformation of the ghetto uprising into a glorious 
moment of Polish martyrdom and resistance reveals how much this nationalization of Polish 
communism rested on a particularly exclusive notion of Polish identity. As the rebuilding of 
Muranów erased the particularity of the district’s history, the central physical marker of the area’s 
past –– the ghetto monument –– was itself Polonized.111 
IV. Rebuilding Berlin among Divided Ruins  
In 1945, Berlin also lay in a pile of ruins. 300 allied aerial bombardments and intense 
fighting in parts of the city left its urban landscape in shambles. Although only 19 percent of the 
city’s buildings were not salvageable, in certain parts of the city –– above all in “old Berlin” –– 
the destruction was enormous with more than half of all buildings deemed non reparable. Berlin’s 
rubble lined streets came to symbolize for the German population their own suffering and 
victimization.112 Since Germans experienced great hardship from aerial bombardments, flight 
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from the east, and rape by Soviet soldiers, these experiences dominated postwar interpretations of 
the past and elided the complicity of German society in war and genocide. In film, literature, and 
photography, the ruins of the war became an integral component of this emerging narrative about 
the past. One of its most central, iconic symbols were the Trümmerfrauen (“rubble women”) who 
came out after the war and started sifting through the city’s shattered stone. As civilians who 
endured bombing raids, widowhood, evacuation, and rape, women became ideal figures to recast 
and re-imagine the Nazi past as a time of innocence, anguish, and hardship. The tireless efforts of 
the Trümmerfrauen to clear away the city’s rubble while trying to feed their own children became 
a heroic symbol of sacrifice and strength that endured in both the FRG and the GDR.113  
 But the ruins also symbolized something different for the architects who started to 
redesign Berlin: an unprecedented opportunity to build the city entirely anew. Looking out on the 
ruins of the city from the Brandenburg gate, one architect could not hold back his almost gleeful 
excitement about the prospect that awaited him: “I was beaming: what a possibility to plan here a 
new landscape, and what a possibility to remove this field of ruins and build new, modern 
houses.”114 But unlike in Warsaw such utopian imaginations were soon dashed by the rapidly 
shifting politics of occupied and divided Berlin. Urban planners not only had to deal with the 
immense amount of rubble, but also with the chaotic, four-power administration of the city just as 
cold war tensions were mounting. Berlin’s reconstruction quickly took on a much more practical 
shape and lacked the kind of grand, redemptive vision that dominated Warsaw’s “rebirth.” The 
increasingly divided condition of Berlin made this impossible, but also Berlin was the capital of a 
defeated nation that had wreaked enormous havoc across the continent of Europe. Its urban 
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planners made no claims to rebuilding a “martyr city” and embraced a fairly decentralized, 
practical form of urban modernism. The Nazi past complicated Berlin’s reconstruction like no 
other German city except Munich. Monumentality and grandeur in Hitler’s former capital –– even 
to some extent in East Berlin once the utopianism of socialist realism faded by the mid-1950s –– 
was generally rejected for more modest designs. Finally, there was the basic problem of Berlin 
itself: What was the city’s purpose? Although in 1949 its eastern half had become the capital of 
the GDR, the identity of its western part emerged largely in reaction to this development. With 
Bonn now the seat of political power in the FRG, West Berlin became essentially a showcase of 
“democracy,” “capitalism,” and “freedom” on the frontlines of the cold war. Engaged in constant 
competition with each other, both Berlins tried to out-maneuver the other with urban 
reconstruction being no exception. 
 The first designs for Berlin emerged, however, before the city’s division. Already in May 
1945, two groups of urban planners came together in the districts of Mitte and Zehlendorf to 
develop two general plans for Berlin’s reconstruction. The Kollektivplan, designed mainly by the 
architect Hans Scharoun, envisioned a radical restructuring of the urban landscape that left hardly 
any of Berlin’s historic core in place.115 Although less utopian in spirit, the Zehlendorf plan, 
conceived by Walter Moest, also called for little preservation of the city’s historic buildings and 
focused on a new layout for the city.116 These plans never left the desks on which they were 
drafted, but they indicate at this early stage the general consensus that emerged about the basic 
shape of Berlin’s reconstruction.117 A modernist impulse to build Berlin almost entirely anew 
dominated rebuilding plans from the beginning, distinguishing its reconstruction from the blend 
of modernism, socialist realism, and historic reconstruction found in Warsaw.  
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 Berlin’s reconstruction did not begin in earnest until the division of the city in 1948-49. 
Just as cold war tensions were mounting, both cities started moving in two different, competing 
directions as they sought to use architecture to legitimize their respective democratic and 
communist systems of power. In East Berlin, Walter Ulbricht took an active role in urban 
planning and announced in 1950 the “sixteen principles” for making “cities destroyed by 
American imperialism more beautiful than ever.”118  Drawn up after a tour of Moscow by GDR 
architects, the principles rejected urban modernism as “cosmopolitan” and advocated for 
centralized, hierarchical, and monumental designs that incorporated “progressive” national 
traditions from the German past. “In its structure and architectural design,” the guidelines stated, 
“the city is an expression of the political life and the national consciousness of the people … 
Architecture must be democratic in content and national in form.”119 In its attempt to distinguish 
itself from the modernist practices of the United States and the FRG, Ulbricht settled on Stalinist 
monumental architecture that gave preference to grand city centers and large boulevards. What 
the old town was for “traditionalist” rebuilding approaches, the city center was for communist 
urban planning.120 The new had eclipsed the old: the socialist city center reflected the hopeful 
triumph of the communist future over the bourgeois, capitalist past. As urban planners in Warsaw 
were attempting to combine the historic with the socialist, those in East Berlin staked out a much 
more radical position as they located material renewal in the utopianism of socialist realism. 
“Away with the rubble and with erecting what’s new … Down with the old remains. Stone for 
stone then the new … Berlin, you will be more beautiful than ever.”121 So went two refrains sung 
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by the Free German Youth in the early 1950s. This enthusiastic embrace of socialist realism 
intersected in obvious, if broad ways with Nazi ideas of monumental, representative architecture, 
but urban planners genuinely believed that urban space could reshape society. The Soviet Union 
was a model of progressiveness for the SED. Socialist realism appeared as a genuine way toward 
improving and changing German society after Nazism. 
East Berlin became the most important city where the SED attempted to implement these 
grand ideas. In 1949, the party set out on its first major construction project with the building of a 
wide, east-west boulevard named in honor of Stalin on the occasion of his seventieth birthday. 
Just before the shift to monumental architecture in 1950, the first buildings erected on the street 
were simple, functional buildings designed in the modernist tradition, but shortly thereafter the 
SED commissioned Hermann Hanselmann, the GDR’s most famous architect, to redesign the 
street in socialist realist form. This long, massively wide boulevard, framed on both sides with 
ornamental apartment buildings held together on both ends by a pair of towers, became the 
showpiece of East Germany’s new architectural style. Celebrated in newspapers, placards, and 
illustrated volumes, the project was billed not only as the first step in building a socialist Berlin, 
but as proof of the GDR’s supremacy over the FRG. Germany’s future clearly lay in the hands of 
the SED, which was working tirelessly to rebuild a better, more progressive society after the 
catastrophes of war and fascism.122  
Of course, West Berlin’s political leadership could not simply sit idly by as the SED 
made these claims. It also had to locate an architectural tradition that could compete with socialist 
realism and demonstrate Germany’s transformation into a parliamentary democracy. In 1949, 
West Berlin’s mayor, Ernst Reuter, declared that “Berlin must become a showcase of freedom as 
well as a showcase of economic prosperity. That is the function of this city behind the Iron 
Curtain –– to show to the residents living in an impoverished and ever more plundered zone that 
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life in freedom pays off economically.”123 The Department for Building and Housing faced the 
daunting task of attempting to convert Reuter’s sweeping words into reality. How was one to turn 
Berlin into a “showcase of freedom”? Was there a “democratic” style of architecture to compete 
with the east’s socialist realism? Rolf Schwedler, director of West Berlin’s rebuilding during the 
1950s, argued that the general answer lay in building a “modern” metropolis. For “no other city in 
Germany,” he wrote, “is urban development so problematic as it is for impoverished Berlin. 
Nevertheless, if a modern Berlin (neuzeitliches Berlin), although not new, gradually emerges 
from the ruins of the past, then hopefully future generations will affirm that its builders made the 
best out of Berlin under the conditions given to them.”124 This basic notion of “modern Berlin” 
shaped the city’s reconstruction throughout the 1950s.125  
Urban modernism became the west’s answer to socialist realism as the most suitable 
architectural form to reflect Germany’s development into a transparent, prosperous, and new 
democratic society. The CIAM’s Charter of Athens, the central, guiding statement on urban 
modernism, became the Leitbild of West German urban reconstruction despite the fact that 
Germany’s famous architects of the Bauhaus movement never returned to the FRG (Walter 
Gropius, Mies van der Rohe, and Martin Wagner). In 1947, 38 well-known architects and 
planners called for building modern, decentralized, functional cities following the general thrust 
of the CIAM charter.126 Two of the most influential publications on urban reconstruction in 1950s 
West Germany, The Structural and Decentralized City and Organic Urban Architecture, 
perpetuated the basic tenets of modernism. These works envisioned a utopianism of bright, sun-
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filled houses, efficient transportation, and adequate green space that would move beyond the 
crowded city of the past into the harmonious, idyllic, and organic Stadtlandschaft (urban 
landscape) of the future. The modern city included neighborhood units filled with different types 
of housing that offered a peaceful setting for residents and coexisted harmoniously with the 
natural surroundings. This approach to urban planning built on housing plans that emerged during 
the Nazi period.127 Although Germany’s most well-known modernist architects fled Nazi 
Germany, many stayed behind and were able to continue their work even as Nazi architecture 
emphasized monumental, representative styles.128 But these continuities with Nazism seemingly 
did not tarnish the postwar appeal of urban modernism, although “traditionalists” in the 1950s-
60s and later “postmodernists” in the 1970s-80s strongly underscored modernism’s parallels with 
Nazism in their attack against rationality and functionality.129  
In West Berlin, urban modernism was all the more attractive given the city’s competition 
with East Berlin. The decentralized layout, the functional, unadorned buildings, and the use of the 
surrounding landscape stood in stark contrast to the ornamental, monumental buildings carried 
out along Stalinallee in East Berlin. This cold war juxtaposition was made deliberately clear in 
the most celebrated and debated rebuilding project of West Berlin’s postwar reconstruction –– the 
rebuilding of the Hansaviertel near Berlin’s sprawling Tiergarten park.130 Heavily destroyed 
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during the war, this traditionally middle-class neighborhood of a fairly sizeable Jewish population 
was completely leveled to make room for a new, modernist apartment complex. The rebuilding of 
the Hansaviertel hoped to move away from the cramped, stone structures of the district’s past and 
toward a better future of functional buildings set in harmony with the nearby park. In a way not 
entirely different from the utopianism of socialist realism, the design explicitly aimed at 
improving society, which the growth of industrialization had allegedly altered for the worse. The 
“city of tomorrow” promised to transcend the atomization of the masses and restore above all 
balance to the family. Based on a heterosexual model of society and an inherent assumption about 
gender difference, the Hansaviertel offered an ideal place for women to raise their children and a 
relaxing setting for men to return to after a long day at work.131 It removed the “added burden” 
placed on female wage earners by suggesting that they return to homemaking and allow children 
once again to grow up in a “loving and secure” environment (Nestwärme).132 In short, though 
stylistically modern, the Hansaviertel reflected the “postfascist conservatism” of the 1950s that 
sought to realign sexual, gender, and familial norms in an attempt to distance the FRG from the 
Nazi past.133  
Initiated by West Berlin’s government in direct response to the construction of 
Stalinallee, the Hansaviertel was also unabashedly provocative. “Situated in a natural setting, the 
planned towers are located around two wide openings of the Tiergarten and this informality will 
stand in clear expression as an antithesis to dictatorially structured buildings.”134 The Hansaviertel 
aimed to showcase Germany’s transition from dictatorship to democracy and the moral 
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superiority of the west in guaranteeing the “freedom” of its people. As the winning architects 
explained, “the free person does not want to live in a camp or in houses that are lined up one after 
the other like workers’ barracks.”135 In fear perhaps that such political symbolism would not be 
clear enough, West Berlin’s government went even further: it launched in conjunction with the 
Hansaviertel the International Building Exhibition in Berlin. This project boldly envisioned the 
reconstruction of the entire city as if it were simply not divided. These grand plans for a unified, 
modern metropolis never materialized, but West Berlin made its point by staging an international 
competition that, in effect, ignored the existence of the east. In his opening address for the 
exhibition, mayor Otto Suhr (SPD) called the plans a “demonstrative documentation of freedom” 
that “proved the achievement of the western world.”136  
The East German leadership interpreted this move as the sheer provocation that it was, 
but it proved unable to respond effectively to its challenge. In fact, the SED partially brought this 
direct attack onto itself because of its erratic shifts in architectural design and its general 
ineptitude in rebuilding its part of the city, which included the historic, symbolic core of Berlin. 
The reconstruction of East Berlin languished behind rebuilding in the west as the Federal 
Republic experienced record economic growth, and the SED failed to deliver on its own incessant 
promises to build a “socialist center” after grandly starting with Stalinallee. In 1950, Ulbricht 
ordered the destruction of Berlin’s famous war-damaged Stadtschloß to make room for a large 
demonstration square and a central building that was to form the center of East Berlin, but it took 
a long time to be started and the space left by the dynamited castle remained virtually empty for 
the next twenty-five years. Conflict within the party about how best to build a “socialist center” 
                                                 
135 Gerhard Jobst, “Ordnung im Städtebau,” Bauwelt no. 3 (1953): 48.  
 
136 Hanauske, Bauen, 356.  
  148 
and inconsistent ideas about the GDR’s prescribed architectural style hindered any immediate 
consensus from emerging.137  
In 1955, Ulbricht declared the need for building cheap, practical prefabricated apartment 
complexes in an apparent move away from the utopianism of socialist realism, but he still 
remained fixed to the idea of constructing a monumental, representative urban center. After years 
of different plans and contesting visions, the SED finally announced an international competition 
for East Berlin, which was hastily put together in response to the West Berlin competition.138 
With the stated aim of turning Berlin into a “showcase of the socialist camp,” the design contest 
was nothing less than a debacle: a mere 124 architects expressed interest in the East Berlin 
competition as opposed to 392 for the West Berlin one.139 The ideas that eventually came out of 
the competition were never realized, and the SED ultimately settled on a futuristic, 1,200-foot 
television tower (Fernsehturm, 1965-69) and a glossy, modernist-style “palace of the republic” 
(Palast der Republik, 1973-76) to comprise the focal point of its “socialist” city that it had been 
planning since the late 1940s. That it took so long for this symbolic “city center” finally to 
emerge reinforces the general ineptness of the East German leadership in the area of urban 
reconstruction.  
Indeed, as the SED moved away from monumental architecture and returned to 
modernism by the late 1950s, the urban landscape of the two Berlins did not appear as altogether 
entirely different. The ideologically driven urban planning of the early 1950s had largely fallen to 
the wayside as both cities focused more on the practical demands of housing. The simple, 
unadorned apartment buildings that emerged throughout West Berlin differed from the East 
German Plattenbauten in craftsmanship and size, but not much in architectural style or form. The 
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reconstruction of both Berlins rested on a shared, broadly modernist impulse that saw little value 
in the historic. Whereas Warsaw combined the old and the new in a redemptive recasting of the 
“martyr” city’s “rebirth,” Berlin’s urban planners firmly embraced the “new.” Striving to 
overcome Berlin’s torturous past as Hitler’s capital, they believed in the promise of modernism to 
shape Germany’s transition to a better, more peaceful “democratic” and “communist” future. As 
the wrecking ball moved across both parts of the city, Berlin lost large parts of its historic 
landscape.  
VII. Shattered Jewish Spaces in Divided Berlin  
The destruction of war-damaged buildings was commonplace, but the demolition of 
Jewish sites stood out in particular as symbols of the city’s traumatic past. Destroyed before the 
war during Kristallnacht, Jewish sites were exceptional places of violence and persecution that 
inevitably conjured up the shattered relationship between Germans and Jews. Unlike in Warsaw, 
Jews lived in all parts of Berlin before the war. The district with the highest percent of Jews, 
Wilmersdorf, did not come even close to Muranów (13 versus 90 percent).140 Mitte, Schöneberg, 
and Charlottenburg also had a significant Jewish population, but still the central physical markers 
of “Jewish Berlin” were its many synagogues and cemeteries rather than one single, “Jewish” 
district. Although these Jewish sites were heavily damaged after the war, there were many more 
of them than in the completely destroyed district of Muranów. Jewish leaders strongly contested 
the appropriation of these Jewish spaces, but municipal authorities in both East and West Berlin 
rarely listened to their pleas.  
This conflict over Jewish space began immediately after the war. Amid the rubble left 
behind by Nazi Germany awaited a question of unprecedented proportion in the city of Berlin ––
 the handling of vast amounts of property belonging to the city’s Jewish community. Once the 
largest and most vibrant in Germany with a membership of 160,564 in 1933, the newly 
reconstituted Berlin Jewish community (Jüdische Gemeinde zu Berlin, or Berlin Gemeinde) 
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confronted the nearly impossible task of piecing together some semblance of life after the 
Holocaust. The Jewish community had shrunk dramatically in size to about 7,000 in 1945, but 
appeared resilient. In May 1945, Rabbi Martin Riesenburger held the first religious service and 
only several months later six different buildings throughout the city had become houses of Jewish 
worship.141 Still, the challenges of rebuilding Jewish life were daunting. With its bank accounts 
confiscated and its physical possessions sold, burned, destroyed, or bombed, the Berlin Gemeinde 
had lost nearly everything and had to rely on the assistance of city and occupying authorities for 
the most basic of needs, even requesting in 1946 “a box of small candles” for Chanukah.142 
Securing such aid from authorities in occupied Berlin was complicated to say the least. Unlike 
any other Jewish community in postwar Germany, the Berlin Gemeinde had to deal with four 
occupying powers rather than just one. Although Britain, France, the Soviet Union, and the 
United States agreed in principle to cooperate through the Allied Command for Berlin, in practice 
they conflicted on almost every policy and Jewish property was no exception. 
There were, however, some limited signs of hope. As the first occupying power to arrive 
in the city, the Soviets installed Berlin’s initial postwar government made up largely of German 
Communists that recognized early on the needs of the Gemeinde. Just two weeks after the war, it 
established the Liaison for Jewish Affairs (Referent für Jüdische Angelegenheiten) designed to 
handle Jewish issues and directed by the Christian Democrat Siegmund Weltlinger. An active 
member of Berlin’s Jewish community during the 1930s, Weltlinger survived the Holocaust and 
set out after the war to restore Jewish life in the city. He strongly advocated providing financial 
aid to the Jewish community and argued for combating antisemitism. “An enduring presence of 
Jewish life can only be built,” he wrote in 1946, “when the ideology of racism in Germany is 
                                                 
141 CJA, 5 A 1, Nr. 001, VJGB to Soviet Central Command, December 12, 1945.   
 
142 LAB, B Rep. 002, Nr. 4860, Letter of 28 November 1946.  
  151 
overcome and when the Jews are fully compensated for their injustices.”143 As the strongest 
advocate for the Jews in the city government, Weltlinger worked fervently to assist the Berlin 
Gemeinde.  
But his efforts were made all the more difficult by the continued presence of antisemitism 
in Berlin and throughout occupied Germany. The United States occupying force concluded in 
numerous memos that the German population continued to harbor negative views toward Jews, 
and a government report written in the Soviet zone singled out antisemitism as the most pressing 
concern among Jews.144 The Jewish communities “request a vigorous campaign,” the memo 
explained, “to fight back an already resurgent antisemitism. Just recently tombstones at the 
Jewish cemetery in Berlin-Weißensee were damaged and knocked over without any prosecution 
of the perpetrators.”145 In that same year, the Berlin Gemeinde reported destruction at another 
Jewish cemetery in the small town of Oranienburg just outside the city. Notifying the Soviet 
Military Administration (SMA) about the incident, the Gemeinde ended its letter ominously: “We 
believe that such acts of destruction are the beginning of a new wave of antisemitism.”146  
 It was thus behind the backdrop of this broader political world –– defined by limited hope 
and concern –– that the Gemeinde attempted to negotiate with city and occupying officials for 
assistance regarding its property. In 1945, the SMA established as the community’s headquarters 
the synagogue on Oranienburgerstraße, and the western powers allowed the Gemeinde to use 
synagogues in their sectors, but the vast majority of its religious sites remained in a state of severe 
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destruction.147 Since the Gemeinde simply did not have the funds to rebuild and renovate them, it 
had to rely on the assistance of municipal and occupying forces who were hardly eager to help. 
The U.S. Office of Military Government flatly denied requests to fund small repairs on the 
synagogue on Münchenerstraße in Schöneberg, and the Berlin government refused to assist the 
rebuilding of the synagogue on Pestalozzistraße in Charlottenburg.148 Whatever assistance the 
Gemeinde was able to secure from officials came only after months of repeated requests. In 1947, 
Jewish community leaders Julius Meyer and Hans-Erich Fabian requested money to restore three 
of the city’s main Jewish cemeteries.149 Berlin’s mayor, Ferdinand Friedensburg, voiced his 
support and promised “to do everything in order to bring about a new trust between the Jewish 
people and the wider populace, and to this end to restitute as much as possible the spiritual, 
physical, and material injustices of the Jews.”150 But months passed until the city returned to the 
issue again. In July 1947, the city began discussing covering the costs for repairs on select Jewish 
sites, but it took another eight months for the money finally to be approved and more months 
passed before the funds ever reached the Jewish community.151 After one final push from 
Weltlinger and the Jewish community, the city council, at the suggestion of the SED, agreed to 
draft a measure that allotted 100,000 marks for general repairs and the erection of a monument in 
memory of the Jews at the cemetery in Weißensee located in East Berlin.152 Although consisting 
only of a small plaque, the memorial later became the central site of remembrance for the 
Gemeinde throughout the history of the GDR.  
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Such haggling for even the smallest amount of financial support became even more 
difficult with the political division of Berlin. The Jewish community under the leadership of 
Heinz Galinski continued pressing its case as a unified organization until January 1953 when the 
Gemeinde split into two separate institutions during the height of the SED’s campaign against 
“cosmopolitanism.” A small community of virtually no financial resources formed in East Berlin 
(Jüdische Gemeinde von Groß-Berlin) and depended on the goodwill of the state for its survival. 
Weltlinger worked for the GDR until 1950 when his position as Liaison for Jewish Affairs was 
terminated.153 He subsequently held a post in the West Berlin government as an advisor on Jewish 
matters throughout the 1950s. The absence of an office for Jewish affairs in East Berlin, 
combined with the growing hostility of the SED toward Jews, did not bode well for Jewish 
leaders.  
But in early 1953 the situation changed slightly for the better after the Berlin Jewish 
community officially split into two separate organizations. The East Berlin government agreed to 
give the now newly formed East Berlin Gemeinde 300,000 marks for the rebuilding of its 
synagogue on Rykestraße, constructed in classical and local styles inspired by the nearby brick 
churches of the Mark Brandenburg.154 The city decided to assist the Gemeinde not for any 
architectural or preservationist reasons — because the synagogue represented a monument of the 
German past worthy of protection — but for largely practical and political concerns. In January 
1953, the Gemeinde had between 45,000 and 52,000 marks in its account.155 Well aware of the 
organization’s scarce financial resources, the city justified its decision in strictly practical terms. 
Since Rykestraße was the only functioning synagogue in East Berlin, the city agreed to supply 
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money for a project that was necessary for the community’s survival.156 Throughout the 1950s, it 
continued this approach, granting the community about 700,000 marks from 1952 to 1958.157 The 
community typically used these funds for general repairs on the Weißensee cemetery and to 
maintain its retirement home in Niederschönhausen. 
Cold war politics largely motivated the SED. The East German leadership knew that 
having no Jewish community in the capital of the “antifascist” Germany would be paradoxical to 
say the least. It realized that it could effectively use the community to portray West Germany as 
“fascist” and “antisemitic.” Renamed the “Temple of Peace,” the Rykestraße synagogue became 
home to a Gemeinde loyal to the party. Its religious leader, Martin Riesenburger, served the 
interests of the SED well by often publicly chastising West Germany for its “antisemitism” and 
clarifying the GDR’s critical stance toward Israel.158 Riesenburger was a classic example of the 
handful of German Jews who became attracted to the egalitarian message of communism despite 
the anti-Semitic position of the SED. Leading Jewish Marxist politicians, writers, artists, and 
academics returned to East Germany and reached high positions in the party. Seeing themselves 
less as Jews and more as communists, they worked to build an antifascist, communist state in 
Germany and generally had little interest in the Gemeinde, but Riesenburger was exceptional in 
the sense that he did. His support for the SED proved crucial to the community’s survival. When 
it came to allocating money, the party noted his fight against the “antisemitic leadership in West 
Germany.”159  
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But this pragmatic policy had serious drawbacks. The money was not nearly enough to 
preserve or even keep standing the many synagogues and Jewish cemeteries scattered throughout 
East Berlin. In 1956, a SED memo noted that numerous Jewish sites severely damaged during 
Kristallnacht and World War II had yet to be repaired. The list included some of most prominent 
relics of Berlin’s once flourishing Jewish community: the Moorish styled, three-domed 
synagogue on Oranienburgerstraße, the city’s oldest Jewish cemetery on Große 
Hamburgerstraße, and Europe’s largest Jewish cemetery in Weißensee.160 In a clear signal of the 
city’s neglect of these Jewish sites, a Protestant minister called on the youth of Berlin, including 
those living in West Berlin, to meet at the Jewish cemetery in Weißensee to perform small repairs 
on its dilapidated grounds. “The once flourishing Jewish community,” he wrote, “that gave our 
city so many loyal citizens, artists, benefactors, and scientists, was exterminated almost entirely. 
A cemetery of 113,500 tombstones remains behind and is not being preserved because its 
members died, were murdered, or have emigrated.”161 Sensing an opportune political moment, the 
East German leadership welcomed the call as a way to show that the “same bandits who started 
such crimes against humanity” are back running the government of West Berlin.162 But this 
potential political use of Jewish space ultimately yielded no results. Additional reports on Berlin’s 
three Jewish cemeteries indicated a continued state of decay. Two memos on the Schönhauser 
Allee Jewish cemetery noted that not only had “hundreds” of tombstones fallen over, but that 
piles of trash had been thrown over the wall and collected on the cemetery’s grounds.163 In the 
late 1950s and early 1960s, the city even wanted to build a sport’s complex on the grounds of 
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Berlin’s oldest Jewish cemetery on Große Hamburger Straße in Berlin-Mitte, but resistance from 
Riesenburger precluded this from happening.164  
The Jewish community’s war-damaged synagogues suffered an even severer fate: a 
number of them were torn down in the 1960s. Built largely in the mid-nineteenth century and 
clustered mostly in the north central part of Mitte, they included synagogues large and small, 
simple and ornate: Heidereutergasse 4, Johannisstraße 16, Kaiserstraße 29, Artilleriestraße 40, 
and Gerlachstraße 19. As the oldest synagogue in Berlin and the site where thirty-five Jews were 
hanged in the sixteenth century, the last synagogue—the one on Gerlachstraße—elicited an 
intriguing exchange between the Jewish community and city officials. In the mid-1950s, the 
Jewish community convinced the city to place the synagogue under historic preservation, but by a 
decade later it had changed its position.165 To make room for the rebuilding of East Berlin’s city 
center, city officials decided to tear down the synagogue. Lacking power to halt the decision, the 
Jewish community agreed with the city’s plans, only asking that the plaque attached to the 
synagogue remembering the death of the thirty-five Jews be saved.166 
It might seem hardly surprising that East Berlin’s city government showed little 
sensitivity toward the protection of Jewish sites. With images of East Germany’s infamous 
Plattenbauten in mind, one might assume that the GDR rarely, if ever, paid attention to 
preserving historic buildings in the first place. Although historic preservation in the GDR was 
certainly weaker than in the PPR, it was not as anemic as one might assume.167 In 1953, East 
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Germany established the Institute for Historic Preservation (Institut für Denkmalpflege, or IfDP) 
to preserve “the cultural heritage of the German people.”168 Historic preservation was a part of a 
larger effort by the party to foster the study of Heimat culture in the GDR.169 In 1955, the SED 
boldly concluded that “the struggle for the development and victory of a Marxist-Leninist 
historiography in the German Democratic Republic must also be waged in the area of the history 
of Heimat.”170 
The SED continued a largely traditional understanding of historic preservation that 
inherently, although not necessarily explicitly, excluded Jewish sites. East Germany’s historic 
preservationists formed part of what one historian has called the “relics of the Bildungsbürgertum 
in the GDR.”171 In the 1950s, East Germany’s historic preservationists were largely carried over 
from earlier years. Historic preservation in Germany had long been a local or regional affair 
headed by state, city, and provincial (in Prussia) conservators.172 Just as in the PPR, East German 
preservationists adhered to a fairly classical understanding of protecting “national” cultural 
heritage. Aside from a new emphasis on “technical monuments” that represented the “activities of 
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work,” the canon of historic sites in the GDR rarely deviated from the traditional examples of 
town halls, Bürger houses, and churches.173 As one former conservator succinctly put it, “a 
cultural revolution did not take place in the GDR.”174 Despite the strong anti-religious policy of 
the SED, the IfDP continued the long-standing tradition among German historic preservationists 
that considered churches important monuments of the German nation.175 From 1950-1955, the 
state supplied over six million marks for the reconstruction of 336 “culturally important 
churches.”176  
 Moreover, the IfDP typically emphasized the protection of buildings constructed in 
baroque, gothic, and classical styles. At first glance, this should not have been a problem for 
German synagogues. By the 1850s, Jews in Germany and western Europe had brought the 
synagogue out of exclusion both literally and symbolically—moving it into the city center and 
building it in neo-baroque, neo-gothic, and neo-classical styles. But synagogues still reflected a 
different tradition; a number of them combined traditional architectural designs with 
appropriations from Middle Eastern, Islamic, and Moorish styles.177  Thus when GDR historic 
preservationists dealt with Jewish sites, they confronted an architectural tradition that did not fit 
neatly into their canon of historic monuments. Reflecting largely “exotic” styles, synagogues 
appeared different and remained on the margins of East German culture. Perhaps no other Jewish 
site in the GDR illustrates this point more clearly than the Neue Synagoge in East Berlin. Built in 
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1866 in lavish, oriental style and arguably one of the gems of Berlin architecture, it featured a 
red-striped yellow brick façade with a large golden dome that towered above the city’s skyline. 
Although the synagogue survived Kristallnacht with only minor damage (a Berlin precinct police 
chief forced the Nazis out of the building), it sustained severe destruction during the war. In 1958, 
the SED ordered the destruction of the large, bombed-out sanctuary, but left the damaged façade 
standing at the request of the East Berlin Jewish community. It remained in damaged form for the 
next four decades as the rest of the city was slowly rebuilt.  
The area around the synagogue that contained most of East Berlin’s neglected, slowly 
dilapidating Jewish sites –– the Scheuenviertel or Spandauer Vorstadt –– was located not far from 
the massive effort to build a “socialist” center in the capital of the antifascist Germany. As the 
SED planned for East Berlin’s city center to symbolize the triumph of communism over the 
capitalist, bourgeois past, it became clear that Jewish space had as little place in the GDR’s 
“future” as it did in its “past.” Socialist realism promised to overcome the social, economic, and 
ethnic tensions of modern society that were produced by capitalism. As Jews became associated 
with American imperialism, capitalism, and cosmopolitanism in the GDR, Jewish culture 
reflected the ills of modernity itself –– the very past that the new, antifascist Germany hoped to 
transcend.178 In its 1951-52 purge of cosmopolitanism, the SED deliberately excluded the 
wartime fate of the Jews that the shattered spaces of Jewish life reflected and symbolized. In 
short, Jewish sites fit neither into the GDR’s culturally inscribed boundaries of the “historic” nor 
into its interpretation of the Nazi past that was consolidated at the height of antifascist 
antisemitism. The “Jewishness” of these sites mattered indeed in terms of their postwar 
appropriation.  
But despite the GDR’s intense attack on “cosmopolitanism” in the early 1950s, its 
handling of Jewish sites in Berlin reflected a broader unease with Jewish space that was hardly 
limited to the east. Although the Jewish community’s most monumental and historic Jewish sites 
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were found in East Berlin, a large number were also located in the west where nearly all of them 
disappeared from the urban landscape. Since the Gemeinde was not the legal successor to its 
property, it had little power to influence the handling of Jewish sites except for those few that it 
was using. The official owner of the property was the JRSO, but it was not designed to deal with 
preservation issues. It was established to handle the legal issue of confiscated Jewish property. 
Thus, just as in East Berlin, the physical fate of Jewish sites in the western part of the city hinged 
largely on municipal officials who determined the extent of damage and required course of 
action. As West Berlin officials prolonged negotiations with the JRSO over the global reparations 
settlement, the physical condition of Jewish sites deteriorated with each passing year that the city 
dragged its feet as the rest of the city was rebuilt. By the mid-1950s, Jewish sites had become 
among the few buildings along otherwise reconstructed streets that remained virtually in the same 
damaged condition that they were in since 1938.  
District officials saw Jewish sites as a nuisance that they did not want to deal with, often 
demanding that the JRSO take care of them instead. This led to often bitter conflict between 
JRSO and city officials. The synagogue on Fasanenstraße in Charlottenburg, one of Berlin’s most 
majestic houses of Jewish worship, provides one intriguing example of such an exchange. 
Designed by Ehrenfried Hessel in 1910-12, the synagogue featured three large cupolas and 
vaulted tunnel passageways that drew on early Christian Byzantine architecture. The massive 
stone structure survived the war intact, but the Nazis heavily destroyed its interior and roof when 
they set the building on fire in November 1938. After the war, the building suffered from 
complete neglect as district authorities showed no interest in providing even the most basic forms 
of protection for the structure, which was often being misused and vandalized. By the early 
1950s, the synagogue had become such a run-down and derelict place that the police expressed 
concern about it posing a threat to public heath and safety. “The site of the ruins,” one police 
report noted, “is being frequented by asocial elements and prostitutes and thus is to be regarded as 
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a danger to public safety.”179 Another report described in more detail: “[the site of the ruins] is 
very strongly contaminated. An abundant amount of human feces, litter, and underwear were 
found there among other things. … Since residents of the surrounding houses are always 
complaining of rat infestation … not just a quick sanitation of the ruins must take place because 
they are probably the source of the rats but also the property needs to be fenced in to preclude 
further defilement.”180  
City officials followed this report’s advice, but demanded that the JRSO pay for the cost 
of constructing the fence. The JRSO was hardly amused by this request. In a lengthy letter, it 
stated simply that it was not the responsibility of a Jewish organization to repair and provide 
security for sites that had been deliberately and heinously destroyed by the Nazis. The JRSO 
pointed to the participation of the local police during Kristallnacht and implied that their actions 
were not far removed from those of the current force. The tone of the JRSO’s letter, a sardonic 
blend of contempt and frustration, probably does not surface as clearly in the English translation, 
but it permeates the German original: 
The property in question was previously a synagogue, which during Kristallnacht was destroyed 
by unknown persons, but, as you ought to know, this was induced by the Reich government at the 
time and carried out under the acquiescence of the appropriate security forces.  The fact that the 
building is currently in such a condition that it provides safe heaven for asocial elements and 
prostitutes is not because of wartime destruction but because of Kristallnacht. So, from now on, 
the Jewish Trust Organization is supposed to cover the costs because the security forces cannot 
protect this once holy site, which was desecrated in such a terrible manner, from further 
desecration. Money set aside for charitable purposes is supposed to be spent to remove a danger to 
public safety that arose because the security forces at the time were not able to prevent this danger 
from happening. We assume that your letter to us was processed just routinely without taking into 
consideration the peculiarity of this case.181  
 
If the FRG was any break from the Nazi past, the JRSO certainly did not think so: the current 
defilement of the synagogue was simply a continuation of what had occurred in 1938. Perhaps not 
surprisingly city officials did not see it this way. Failing completely to understand the JRSO’s 
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perspective, the district building department noted dryly that “the costs accrued for property 
owners of damaged or destroyed buildings … are part of the losses of the war.”182 Although the 
district eventually agreed to cover temporarily the costs and the synagogue was fenced in, it 
remained intent on getting reimbursed for the paltry 522 marks that it spent for the barrier.183 In 
an internal memo, the Charlottenburg district mayor noted that the city’s continued demand for 
funds from the JRSO was “legally in order –– politically unjustifiable!”184 Still, district officials 
continued to press their case and even turned to the restitution office for funds, which concluded 
that the JRSO was responsible for reimbursing the money in light of the global agreement that it 
had just signed with the state of Berlin.185 It is not clear if the city ever received its money, but the 
global agreement of 1955 proved to be the key turning point in the postwar fate of the synagogue. 
With the city now taking ownership of the property, the department for urban planning proposed 
to tear down the building and use the space for a parking lot given the surrounding area’s 
“pressing parking problems.”186  
But no sooner had this suggestion been made than a radically different proposal surfaced. 
Aware of both the symbolic importance of the synagogue and its pitiful postwar treatment, West 
Berlin’s top political leadership intervened and halted plans to use the space for a parking lot. It 
decided instead to build a cultural center for the Jewish community to be placed on the grounds of 
the synagogue after it was torn down. The idea for a cultural center had been circulating since the 
immediate postwar years, but crystallized after a series of high-level meetings between West 
Berlin Jewish community leader Heinz Galinski, mayor Otto Suhr (SPD, 1955-57), mayor Willy 
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Brandt (SPD, 1957-66), and federal president Theodor Heuss (SPD, 1949-59). In 1956, West 
Berlin’s parliament officially approved of the “erection of a cultural center for the Jewish 
community.” Couched subtly in historical terms, the measure conceived of the project as a form 
of restitution: “The Jewish community of Berlin had until 1933 numerous cultural institutions, 
which all fell victim during the Nazi period and especially during Kristallnacht. Since the 
restitution law does not earmark funds for the reconstruction of such cultural institutions, the 
parliament sees it as Berlin’s honorable duty to make available at the very least the necessary 
funds from its budget for such a cultural establishment.”187  
On November 10, 1957, the ceremonial groundbreaking of the community center took 
place as hundreds of Berliners, Jewish leaders from across the world, and leading city and federal 
officials gathered in front of the damaged synagogue.188 With the Israeli, Berlin, and German 
flags flying in front of the building, Willy Brandt and Heinz Galinski led the festive occasion that 
was as much about the past as it was about the future. Held just a day after the anniversary of 
Kristallnacht in front of the still monumental, yet deeply scarred synagogue, the ceremony 
carried different meanings for Jews and Germans gathered there. For the Gemeinde, it was above 
all about remembering the catastrophe of the Holocaust, while at the same time showcasing its 
commitment to rebuilding a permanent Jewish community in postwar Germany. The charred 
ruins of the Fasanenstraße synagogue captured in one single image the collective destruction of 
Germany’s Jewish community that strongly shaped the conflicted identity of the postwar 
community. What did it mean to be a Jew in Germany after the Holocaust? Should one even 
remain in the “land of the perpetrators”?  
Many Jews who miraculously survived living in Hitler’s capital preferred to leave and 
saw life in Germany as a merely a temporary waiting station or “community in liquidation” on 
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their way to North America, Latin America, or the Middle East. As Rabbi Leo Baeck starkly put 
it in 1945, “the history of Jews in Germany has found its end.”189 In 1946, a survey of Jews in 
Berlin indicated that only 2,611 of 6,303 respondents wanted to remain.190 But as strong as the 
desire to leave Germany was, some Jews decided to stay and a number of Jewish leaders, such as 
Heinz Galinski, Siegmund Weltlinger, Hendryk George van Dam and Karl Marx, became 
committed to rebuilding Jewish life in postwar Germany. In a way not entirely different from 
Riesenburger’s attraction to the liberating power of communism, they believed in reviving Jewish 
life as a crucial component of democratization and as proof that Nazism had not made Germany 
Judenrein.191 “I have always held the view,” Galinski observed in the early 1990s after serving 
for over forty years as West Berlin’s community leader, “that the Wannsee Conference cannot be 
the last word in the life of the Jewish community in Germany.”192 This firm resiliency marked by 
a clear, attentive awareness of the Holocaust shaped the basic contours of Jewish identity for the 
generation of Holocaust survivors who decided to stay in Germany after 1945.  
The community center erected on top of the former site of the Fasanenstraße synagogue 
clearly captured this dual blend of the past and the future. The Jewish community requested that 
the winning architects of the design competition integrate into the new building the portal of the 
old synagogue. The winning design envisioned a simple, functional building that included the 
surviving portal and three glass convex windows on the roof that mimicked the three towering 
cupolas of the old synagogue. While the overarching modernist design of the building reflected 
the new beginning of Jewish life, the architectural incorporation of the old made clear that any 
future had to come with an earnest reflection on the past. The building was at once a functional 
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space for communal activity and a monument to the Gemeinde’s destruction. “A piece of the 
façade of the old synagogue will be incorporated into the new building as a way to remember 
both the great times of Jewish life and culture in Berlin as well as the terrible times lived through 
during the Hitler regime.”193  
If the erection of the community center reflected the Gemeinde’s internal negotiation 
between remembering catastrophe and rebuilding communal life, its meaning for West Berlin’s 
political elite, dominated by the Social Democrats whose support of the project was crucial, was 
refracted through a qualitatively different set of concerns. In contrast to Adenauer’s generally 
cautious approach toward dealing with German-Jewish relations, the SPD was the most important 
political supporter of restitution and some of its politicians believed that reflecting upon the 
catastrophe of the past was essential for Germany’s democratic redemption. Remembrance had 
cathartic effect; it promised to transcend Nazism by producing a less racist and anti-Semitic 
citizenry through “enlightened knowledge.”194 In West Berlin, the Social Democrats controlled a 
majority in parliament for nearly thirty years, and the city’s two dominant political leaders of the 
1950s –– Ernst Reuter and Willy Brandt –– followed the lead of Theodor Heuss and Kurt 
Schumacher in reflecting more openly upon Germany’s catastrophic past than members of the 
other mainstream parties did at the time.195 In 1951, Reuter described Kristallnacht as a “day of 
disgrace for Germany” when “thousands of our fellow citizens and fellow human beings” had 
their “property destroyed” and their “freedom and life deprived.”196 Reuter’s statement remained 
vague and the word Jew never appeared once in his remarks, but two years later on the tenth 
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anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising he spoke poignantly about the Holocaust: “the 
terrible attack on the ghetto was only a small link in a large chain in a terrible campaign of 
destruction against the Jews in Germany and against the Jews in all of occupied Europe that the 
National Socialist regime undertook and pursued with a scientific-technical precision to the bitter 
end.”197  
During his time as mayor, Willy Brandt advanced reconciliation between Germans and 
Jews in the name of democratic renewal. His powerful genuflection in 1970 as chancellor in front 
of the Warsaw Ghetto Monument is well known, but already in 1939 while in exile he wrote 
about the persecution of the Jews and just before the end of the war he argued that restitution was 
an important component of rebuilding Germany.198 At the groundbreaking for the new 
community center, Brandt emphasized the need for not forgetting Germany’s past and stressed 
the important contribution that Jews made to Berlin’s history. He noted that “the enormous 
sacrilege and bloody shame of our recent past” could only be overcome “when we do not forget, 
but courageously deal with” the Nazi past.199 These words were probably spoken genuinely by a 
staunch resister to Nazism, but they no doubt also stemmed from clear political motivations. The 
erection of the community center reinforced the “progressiveness” of the democratic west. 
Support for the Jewish community carried as much political meaning in West Germany as it did 
in the GDR. The return of Jews to Berlin produced a redemptive script of German renewal 
through the liberal, democratic celebration of “cosmopolitan Berlin:” the community’s visible 
presence signaled West Berlin’s cathartic departure from Hitler’s capital.200 In this sense, the 
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building of the community center was largely a project of West Berlin’s political elite that 
probably did not reflect the main concerns of the wider population. When the construction of the 
center was first proposed, Weltlinger expressed concern that carrying out such an “extravagant 
project for the Jewish community” could create “bad blood” among a “general public” that was 
still recovering from the economic hardships of the war.201 Newspaper coverage about the center 
was limited in the local press and the few articles that did appear only obliquely touched on its 
significance.202 
Indeed, the building of the community center proved to be the exception in how Jewish 
space was dealt with in West Berlin during the 1950s. The clearing away of damaged Jewish sites 
to make room for housing, green space, office buildings, and playgrounds was much more 
common. Since damaged Jewish property could not be removed until the legal question of 
ownership was clarified in the mid-1950s, city officials increasingly expressed concern that 
Jewish sites were becoming eyesores in their otherwise reconstructed neighborhoods. In 
Kreuzberg for example, the district mayor complained about the ruined state of the synagogue on 
Fraenkelufer street. Built in 1913-1916 to serve the Jewish community’s growing population, this 
large, neo-classical synagogue remained standing in highly damaged form for over twenty years. 
After the war, the Jewish community used a small part of the building for religious services, but 
repairs were badly needed and the district mayor disdained the building’s overall appearance so 
much that he refused to walk foreign visitors by it.203 In one of its requests for repairs, the 
Gemeinde reminded the mayor that the synagogue had been “completely destroyed” to which 
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either he or one of his assistants scribbled in the margins “during the war or in 1938?”204 In 1959, 
the synagogue was torn down.  
But the most concentrated erasure of Jewish sites in West Berlin took place in Tiergarten 
where four destroyed synagogues were cleared away to make room for urban renewal: 
Lessingstraße 19/Flensburgerstraße 14, Lützowstraße 16, Levetzowstraße 7-8, and Siegmundshof 
11. As the largest and most monumental of the four buildings, the synagogue on Levetzowstraße 
provoked the most attention. Located in the Hansaviertel, the synagogue was the district’s main 
house of Jewish worship and was built in neo-classical style with four large pillars defining its 
façade. The building was damaged during both Kristallnacht and the war, but its imposing 
structure remained largely intact after 1945. Ten years later, city officials wrote to the JRSO 
complaining about the poor condition of the building, pointing out that pieces of it were falling 
off. The JRSO was hardly pleased with the city’s accompanying demand that it cover the costs of 
repairs. “We would like to point out,” it wrote, “that the synagogue was not damaged during the 
war but was willfully destroyed in November 1938.” Citing two paragraphs of the Nazi order that 
Jewish organizations must pay for the damages of Kristallnacht, the JRSO then continued: “Now, 
in 1955, the building regulation department is going so far as to demand that the owner of a 
destroyed synagogue pay for clearing away damage caused in 1938. Difficile est saturam non 
scribere [“it is difficult not to write satire (about that), from the Roman satirist Juvenal].”205 The 
building was torn down several months later and the area was turned into a playground.  
As part of the old Hansaviertel that was now being transformed into a modernist utopia of 
green spaces and functional buildings, this synagogue captures well the ambivalent position of 
historic structures in general and Jewish spaces in particular in West Berlin’s postwar 
reconstruction. In building the “new” Berlin, urban planners were reacting precisely against the 
compactly built, ornately designed historicist tenement houses that made up the Hansaviertel. 
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This modernist, universalistic aesthetic built over the particularity of the district’s previous form 
and identity. Urban space was used and consumed to showcase West Berlin’s transition into a 
transparent, democratic, and free city. Historic buildings simply played little role in this recasting 
of Berlin’s identity. As Jeffrey Diefendorf has usefully summarized the general lack of interest in 
historic preservation at the time, “traditionalist and modernist architects, planners, and citizens 
agreed that a major historic monument –– which usually meant a religious or government 
building predating the 1830s –– should be preserved if undamaged and restored if only 
moderately damaged.”206  
And yet the question remains: Was not the ambivalent position of Jewish space within 
West Berlin’s urban reconstruction particularly striking? Did it not matter that Jewish sites 
represented a minority culture that fell outside the culturally and aesthetically inscribed 
boundaries of the “historic” and reflected a traumatic past? In the late 1940s, Weltlinger pleaded 
to Berlin’s mayor about one of the city’s oldest synagogues on Auguststraße 10 that had been 
transformed into a barn. Asking that this “holy site” not be “debased any longer,” he continued: “I 
am convinced that you will show full understanding for the feelings of the Jewish community; 
one would probably hardly even think of putting a barn in a Protestant or Catholic church.”207 
Desperation, shock, and frustration shape the tone of this and the many others letters written 
about the city’s Jewish sites by Jewish leaders. Whether serving as barn or as a hideout for 
prostitutes, Berlin’s empty Jewish spaces, destroyed during Kristallnacht with the participation 
and awareness of the general population, had become abandoned in the truest sense of the word. 
Urban planners had no use for them as they focused on building the city anew, and historic 
preservationists remained silent about their destruction.208 Indeed, what is not said or done is 
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often as illuminating as what is: the fact that the former area of the Fasanenstraße synagogue 
became the only attempt to articulate and reflect upon the loss of Berlin’s Jewish material culture 
speaks silently, yet powerfully about just how much the material traces of Jewish life remained 
suspended from German perceptions of the past in rebuilding West Berlin.  
 It is thus hardly coincidental that West Berlin’s most central and famous war-damaged 
historic building to be saved after the war was none other than a church. Built in 1895 in neo-
romantic style and damaged in November 1943, the Kaiser Wilhelm Church was supposed to be 
torn down, but then a storm of protest from Berliners in the late 1950s, led by Der Tagesspiegel’s 
“Save the Tower” campaign, saved the building from destruction. The church stands awkwardly 
in an area dominated by shops, tourists, cars, and businesses. The Kurfürstendamm district (or 
Ku’damm for short) was West Berlin’s closest thing to a city center, and was intended to be a 
paragon of capitalism with chic stores and a towering glass building complete with a circulating 
Mercedes sign on its roof. Just off the bustling avenue of shoppers on a fairly quiet street sits the 
Jewish community center on Fasanenstraße and further down the Ku’damm another synagogue 
once stood on Passauer street. The synagogue was leveled in 1950-51 to make room for a 
parking garage for West Berlin’s KaDeWe department store (Kaufhaus des Westens, or 
Department Store of the West).209 But the central focus of the Ku’damm is the towering church. 
Situated in the surrounding movement of cars, tourists, and shoppers, it seems at once out of 
place and naturally situated, its stillness and permanency giving both particularity and weight to a 
light, modern built environment.  
VII. Conclusion 
 In the ruined landscapes of Berlin and Warsaw, urban planners, historic preservationists, 
municipal officials, and Jewish leaders encountered the shattered spaces of Jewish life after 1945. 
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Warsaw dramatized perhaps like few other cities the catastrophic effects of the Nazi campaign 
against European Jewry. The city had on the eve of the Nazi invasion 370,000 Jews. By the early 
1950s, its Jewish community totaled less than two hundred. Although there were certainly more 
Jews living in the capital than those who were registered with the community, Jewish life in the 
city had all but ended as the postwar rebuilding of the tiny Polish Jewish community shifted 
westward to Lower Silesia. Warsaw ceased to be the cultural capital of Polish Jewry in a matter 
of a few years. Almost all that was left were the charred ruins of Muranów, the piles upon piles of 
shattered glass and broken concrete. Writing from New York in July 1944, Singer simply could 
not grasp what this meant: “I know that the Jews have disappeared from Warsaw, but I cannot 
truly imagine it. … I cannot present Warsaw judenrein nor Jewish streets as heaps of rubble.”210 
Anyone looking across the ruined landscape of Berlin would have been equally unable to imagine 
the destruction that the Nazis brought upon its Jewish population. The Berlin of 160,000 Jews in 
1933 had by the early 1950s no more than 7,000. Berlin, too, had become a landscape of Jewish 
ruins. There was, however, a difference. Many more Jewish sites survived the war in Berlin than 
in Warsaw, and the city had a much larger postwar Jewish community that contested the 
appropriation of these spaces.  
Yet in the end the shattered, broken spaces of Jewish life vanished from the urban 
landscapes of Warsaw and divided Berlin roughly around the same time in the 1950s or in a few 
cases in the early 1960s. Jewish leaders ultimately had generally little power over the treatment of 
most Jewish sites. In the GDR and PPR, this was obviously a direct effect of the postwar 
confiscation of Jewish property by the communist state. But local Jewish leaders in West 
Germany did not own most of their property either since the vast majority of it legally went to the 
JRSO. The context of lost property rights in the west could not have been more different than 
those in the east, but the effect was essentially the same: the fate of damaged Jewish sites rested 
mainly in the hands of municipal officials who were more interested in rebuilding their war-
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damaged cities than protecting them. This disinterest might not be altogether that surprising. 
Jewish spaces were cleared away in other contexts and in other periods. The late nineteenth 
century demolition of the Prague ghetto is one of the most well known examples of city officials 
clearing away the blight of the old in the euphoric embrace of the new.211 As in this case and 
others, urban modernism –– with its urge to form unified, functional, and organized cities through 
managing urban space –– remains dialectically engaged in the past and future. The “destructive 
creativity” of modernism involves paving over the particular, historic form of the urban landscape 
as it makes room for functional urban planning and universal styles.212  
In certain ways, the destruction of shattered Jewish sites in divided Berlin and Warsaw 
reflects this destructive creativity in its modernist and socialist realist guises. The rebuilding of 
Berlin and Warsaw, capital cities destroyed heavily during the war by two starkly different 
military campaigns, both diverged and intersected in several key ways. Destroyed by the Nazis in 
the last throes of the war, Warsaw became a metonym for the occupation, suffering, and 
persecution of Poland between 1939 and 1945. Warsaw was Poland’s “martyr city.” The PZPR 
used its reconstruction as a tool to gain political legitimacy and support. In an exceptional blend 
of the old and new, Warsaw planners combined urban modernism, socialist realism, and historic 
reconstruction into one grand project that attempted to preserve the cultural remnants of the 
nation and secure a better, more prosperous socialist future. A similarly monumental planning 
scheme largely did not shape the reconstruction of divided Berlin. With the exception of the 
energy put into Stalinallee and the Hansaviertel, Berlin was built up over the years (West Berlin 
much more quickly) to meet such practical needs as housing and major, representative 
architectural projects proved to be the exception. With the historic center located in East Berlin, 
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the SED had many grand plans for building a “socialist city,” but they never materialized and the 
concrete slabs of the Berlin Wall remained its most notable mark on the built environment until 
1989.  
 Nevertheless, a shared, teleological sense of time underpinned by a basic, reformist belief 
in progress shaped the rebuilding of all three cities. Urban planners embarked on a project of 
urban renewal that embraced a more progressive future by moving beyond the perceived limits of 
late nineteenth century industrial city. The building of a new metropolis could improve and 
change society itself. Muranów, Stalinallee, and the Hansaviertel –– three housing projects 
constructed in the 1950s –– reflected a common appropriation of urban space for the building of 
new socialist and democratic societies that stood in contrast to the tenement houses of the past. 
This reformist impulse that emphasized the “new” over the “old” stemmed largely from the 
modernist movement of the interwar period, even though in architectural style, form, and size 
Warsaw and East Berlin departed from the major tenets of urban modernism in the early 1950s at 
the height of socialist realism. Jewish sites fit uneasily into this vision of urban reconstruction; 
they remained bracketed from the temporal conceptions of both past and future in Warsaw and 
divided Berlin.  
Indeed, as the cornerstone of a socialist Warsaw, the rebuilding of Muranów promised to 
eclipse the social, economic, and ethnic tensions of the past. The socialist realist redesign of 
Lachert’s modernist housing project promised to transcend the “heritage of bourgeois 
cosmopolitanism.”213 Jews had played a prominent role in Poland’s economic modernization 
since the very beginning of Jewish settlement in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. 
Criticisms of “capitalism” became entangled, if not always directly articulated, in the complicated 
history of Polish-Jewish relations. The rebuilding of Muranów represented in part the clearing 
away of this past in search of a normative, socialist future free of ethnic strife in the now 
homogenous Poland. In the early 1950s, the East German attack against “cosmopolitanism” 
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directly linked Jews with American “imperialism,” “capitalism,” and “bourgeois culture.” The 
cultural and aesthetic boundaries of the “historic” excluded Jewish sites not just because of their 
age value or architectural style, but also because they were unmistakably “Jewish.” They were 
cultural markers of an ethnic minority that the SED had expelled in 1951-52. In West Berlin, the 
appropriation of Jewish sites was both similar and different to the GDR and PPR. The critique of 
the late nineteenth century industrial city of the Mietskaserne that implicitly shaped the 
Hansaviertel’s effort to restore sexual, familial, and gender mores effaced the historic 
particularity of the area as a middle-class neighborhood with a sizeable Jewish population, 
including the destruction of its nearby synagogues.214 At the same time, the philosemitic demand 
of the early cold war became expressed in the built environment with the building of the West 
Berlin community center.215 The rebuilding of Jewish life carried redemptive meanings as the 
“jüdischer Mitbürger” (Jewish co-citizen) became reintegrated into the urban landscape and 
cultural life of “cosmopolitan” Berlin. It provided a symbolic, cathartic cleansing of German sins 
from Nazism as the city welcomed Jews back after their violent expulsion. It signaled Germany’s 
democratic, redemptive renewal. In this new liberal, democratic order, this embrace of 
cosmopolitanism through the celebrated presence of Jews also provided a stark, intended contrast 
to the communist east.  
 Finally, the catastrophe of the Holocaust obviously shaped the postwar appropriation of 
Jewish sites in all three cities. This postwar history simply cannot be read only in terms of the 
much longer history of modernity’s destructive creativity.216 In Poland, World War II represented 
an immense caesura when for the fourth time foreign powers had partitioned, occupied, and 
destroyed its state. Poles interpreted this wartime experience as a redemptive moment of 
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destruction, heroism, and resistance.217 Research on this topic is still lacking, but what seems 
clear is that Polish interpretations of the war became defined strictly along ethnic lines to a 
striking degree.218 One of the most unequivocal spaces where exclusively the persecution and 
destruction of the Jews unfolded –– the Warsaw Ghetto –– became a site to celebrate Polish 
martyrdom and resistance after 1948-49. Part of this Polonization of the Holocaust stemmed from 
the machinations of the communist party; competing interpretations of the ghetto space existed 
only very quietly among (mainly) Jewish individuals such as those connected with the Socio-
Cultural Association of Jews whose voice the vast majority of Poles simply never had the chance 
to hear.  
The absence of pluralistic democracy –– where at least the potential exists for a freer 
flow of ideas –– does indeed matter, but one cannot simply discard this interpretation of the 
ghetto space fashioned by the PZPR as merely the product of a defunct political system that never 
represented the wishes of the Polish population in the first place.219 Indeed, as the historian 
Marcin Zaremba has shown in his pioneering book, the anti-Jewish and anti-German policies of 
the PZPR reflected a broad consensus between state and society.220 Muranów not only epitomized 
decades of ethnic tension as Jewish emancipation failed and an exclusive idea of the Polish 
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“nation” became dominant by 1900, but it also reflected the sheer breakdown of “Polishness” in 
the face of human suffering between 1939 and 1945.221 Nazi and Soviet imperial designs never 
allowed a Polish Quisling to emerge, but the one area that Poles usually did not resist the Nazis 
was the persecution of the Jews.222 Why then, after the war, would one want to insert this 
traumatic past into a sacred time of catastrophe, sacrifice, heroism, and communal strength? Why 
would one want to reflect upon the fragility to empathize with human suffering? Why would one 
want to recall the very collapse of one’s identity as a nation –– the “Christ among the Nations,” 
the “For our Freedom and Yours,” the Romantic mythos of the brotherhood of victims –– that 
fractured just before reaching the ghetto walls?  
Jewish sites reflected an equally traumatic past for German society, if refracted even 
more sharply given the country’s unequivocal responsibility for the Holocaust. Research on 
German attempts to deal with the past is highly developed and the careful, nuanced studies that 
recently have come out have shown that Germans did not so much suppress the Nazi past as they 
interpreted it to conform to their perceived suffering and victimization.223 In the Federal Republic, 
a victimization narrative took hold that emphasized the bombing of German cities, the expulsion 
of the Germans from eastern Europe, the rape of women by Soviet soldiers, and the harshness of 
Allied denazification policies, while in the GDR the communist party fashioned an anti-fascist 
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account of communist resistance and victimization. Of course, West Germany’s political elite 
proved much more willing to accept responsibility for the Holocaust than the SED ever did not 
least because they wanted to portray West Germany as the opposite of the antifascist Germany, 
which had refused to implement a restitution program. Competition between the two Germanys 
played a crucial role in shaping the handling of the Nazi past on the level of high politics, but 
when one looks below the sharp differences begin to fade.224 The overall appropriation of Jewish 
space did not differ that starkly in the two Berlins. Germans became drawn into the Nazi attack 
against the social, cultural, economic, and physical existence of Jews, and attempting to interpret 
this complicity afterwards was hardly easy. They faced after the war their own active 
involvement and support for a criminal regime. Other interpretations of the past that suggested 
German victimization, reflected on other parts of Third Reich than its criminality, emphasized 
German resistance against the Nazis, or elided the generally widespread support for the regime 
proved much more common and enduring. All the more so once the material markers of a 
traumatic past were gone from the built environment.  
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CHAPTER THREE  
 
 JEWISH SITES AND THE AESTHETICS OF THE HISTORIC  
 
Poles and Germans confronted after 1945 their war-damaged historic buildings and old 
towns in strikingly different ways that one initially might assume would lead to different 
appropriations of Jewish sites on the local level. In 2007, the German weekly Die Zeit published 
an essay on the destruction of Germany’s “architectural monuments.” In a country on its way 
toward “demolition,” it noted with alarm that in just the last few years one hundred thousand 
historic buildings had been torn down and the “destruction continues.” “Since 1945, many more 
architectural monuments have fallen than in the aerial war. Just after the first wave of destruction 
from the air ended, the second began in the Federal Republic. It was called reconstruction,” it 
concluded with ironic play on the word “Wiederaufbau.”1 This glance at the postwar period only 
includes West Germany, but the other Germany also certainly added to the destruction. Although 
historic preservation was not nearly as anemic in the GDR as one might assume, the SED built 
many more Plattenbauten than it restored Baudenkmäler.2 But not far to the east almost the exact 
opposite was the case in communist Poland. Historic reconstruction became the dominant 
architectural style of the postwar period.3 To be sure, modernist and socialist realist buildings 
replaced numerous historic sites, and in the mid-1950s historic preservationists grew alarmed that 
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the state was not doing even more to protect Poland’s built environment, but still the old towns of 
Warsaw, Wrocław, Gdańsk, Poznań, Lublin, and others were carefully and extensively rebuilt on 
a scale unmatched in Europe.4 Indeed, the “existent problem” of historic reconstruction led one 
Polish architectural critic to conclude that Poland had a peculiar “obsession” with protecting its 
past.5 
Germans and Poles approached historic buildings in different ways mainly for political 
and historical reasons. The two Germanys had strong historic preservation movements to draw on 
after the war, but building modernist and socialist cities was generally more attractive after 1945. 
Both states used reconstruction to legitimize their vying claims to being the better Germany. 
Urban modernism and socialist realism sought to provide new, normative beginnings after 
Nazism, promising a clean break from the destructiveness of the recent past and a prosperous, 
progressive tomorrow. Important exceptions in West Germany such as Freiburg, Munich, and 
Rothenburg embraced historic reconstruction, but in the main the future underpinned the temporal 
framing of divided Germany’s urban planning.6 In Poland, the cataclysm of the Nazi occupation 
strongly shaped its concept of reconstruction (odbudowa). Although the PZPR also promised a 
better, more prosperous future through socialism, it strongly emphasized the preservation of the 
past. The restoration of the country’s historically important buildings –– its zabytki –– became 
both an actual and symbolic act of preserving the cultural expressions of the Polish nation that the 
Nazis had destroyed (the Soviets, too, although that was rarely mentioned). This desire to 
reconstruct Poland’s savagely destroyed cities was not necessarily born out of a restorationist or 
nostalgic impulse. It came from a deeply felt nationalistic need to save from destruction Poland’s 
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architectural heritage. In this sense, the concepts of odbudowa and Wiederaufbau could not have 
diverged more sharply. If the year 1945 in Germany signaled a mythic hope for a new beginning 
from the destruction its war of aggression had caused, in Poland it meant restoring and 
strengthening the cultural basis of Polishness that had survived the war and occupation.  
 This chapter seeks to explore what impact, if any, these basic differences had on the 
interpretation and handling of Jewish spaces on the local level. Whereas the previous chapter on 
Berlin and Warsaw explored the position of Jewish space within urban modernism and socialist 
realism, this one looks more closely at whether or not Jewish sites fell within the culturally 
inscribed boundaries of the historic in societies with different interests in preservation. This issue 
has received surprisingly little attention from historians despite the rich literature that exists on 
historic preservation in Poland and Germany. Most historians have written institutional histories 
that rarely probe the cultural boundaries of the historic.7 Historic preservation is less about 
protecting a building with definable, abstract qualities such as age value and architectural style. It 
is imbedded in socio-cultural interpretations and assumptions about the past; historic buildings 
are cultural goods with meanings that are negotiated, appropriated, and contested. Some recent 
studies have started to move in this direction. Rudy Koshar, Susan Crane, and Joshua Hagen have 
analyzed German identity and memory through historic preservation, while Gregor Thum, 
Zbigniew Mazur, and Marek Zybura have examined the preservation of “German” historic 
buildings in western and northern Poland.8 But few scholars have analyzed systematically the 
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position of minority cultures in historic preservation and even fewer have examined historic 
preservation from a transnational perspective, which is especially odd given its cross national 
history.  
Since its inception as a profession in the nineteenth century, historic preservation has 
long been shaped by transnational discussions about the theory and practice of protecting historic 
buildings. Debate often centered on the central problem of whether a building should be 
conserved in its current form or restored to its original architectural style. By the late nineteenth 
century, conservation emerged as the preferred approach of most preservationists in Europe, but 
the destructiveness of the two world wars soon shattered this consensus. After 1945, most 
preservationists rejected the idea of conserving a building in its war-damaged state and advocated 
restoring it to its prewar condition or to an earlier, seemingly more “authentic” period. This basic 
approach underpinned the reconstruction of old towns throughout Europe, although critics of this 
“creative historic preservation” opposed what they believed was an imaginary and fictitious 
restaging of the past. These transnational discussions and especially the actual practice of historic 
preservation were not linked as exclusively to the nation as Koshar and Hagen have argued. 
Although protecting historic buildings has been entangled with broader efforts to preserve 
“national” cultures, it has also underpinned broader regional identities and has been supported by 
local governments to attract national, regional, and global tourism.  
But above all historic preservation often unfolds on the local level in a particular urban 
landscape where the nation remains an important reference point but not always the central one. 
Indeed, discussions about historic buildings in the three cities that form the focus of this chapter –
– Essen, Wrocław, and Potsdam –– were connected to each city’s new, postwar identity. All three 
cities hoped to move away from their most recent, Prussian past and develop new local identities 
that were connected to the nation to various degrees of intensity. Essen’s identity had long been 
tied to the Krupp firm and to Germany’s industrial barons who became complicit in Hitler’s rise 
to power and war of aggression. As the allies dismantled the Krupp factory and Essen shed its 
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Nazi slogan as the “Armorer of the Reich,” the city embraced the consumerism of West 
Germany’s economic miracle and styled itself as the “shopping city.” Wrocław, a city with a 
shifting history under Piast, Bohemian, Austrian, Prussian, and German rule, became part of 
Poland in 1945 with the 200-mile westward shift of the country’s border. Portrayed after the war 
as having deep “Polish” roots from the medieval period onwards, Wrocław expunged its most 
recent status as Breslau and became a “Polish” city complete with the expulsions of Germans and 
the forced resettlement of Poles. Potsdam, a Prussian garrison city, had long military traditions 
that Hitler celebrated in his infamous “Day of Potsdam” in 1933. The SED hoped to overcome 
these legacies by building a socialist, antifascist Potsdam among war-damaged Prussian ruins.  
This chapter analyzes the position of historic preservation in the reshaping of these three 
local, urban identities. Heavily destroyed during the war, each city confronted the shared problem 
of what to do with its bombed-out historic core. In Essen and Potsdam, many historic buildings 
were torn down, while in Wrocław preservationists carried out an extensive, if selective program 
of historic reconstruction. In all three cities, municipal officials and historic preservationists also 
faced the material traces of Jewish life scattered among their scarred urban landscapes. What did 
they do with these physical traces? How did the handing of Jewish sites compare with the 
treatment of other historic buildings? Did Jewish sites ever fit into the new postwar identities of 
Essen, Potsdam, and Wrocław? In what ways, if any, did the different position of historic 
preservation in the reconstruction of these cities lead to different approaches toward Jewish 
spaces?  
I. “Essen, The Shopping City”  
 At the beginning of the nineteenth century, Essen was a small, agrarian town of 3,500 
residents, but a mere one hundred years later it had become an industrial city of coal and steel, a 
Großstadt of 118,000 people that contributed in no small part to Imperial Germany’s rapid 
economic expansion. Essen benefited from the coalmines of the Ruhr area, the technological 
advances of the steam engine, and the entrepreneurial ingenuity of its most famous family –– the 
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Krupps. In 1811, Friedrich Krupp established a steel foundry that eventually became one of the 
economic powerhouses of the German economy and employed 16,000 people from the city of 
Essen in 1890 (20.2 percent of the population). The Krupp steel factory, which produced railroad 
products and armaments, single-handedly transformed Essen into a major city.9 Essen’s rising 
prominence became expressed in an array of splendid buildings constructed in the historist style 
favored by the burgeoning middle class at the time. A neo-gothic town hall towered over Essen’s 
center by 1887; several years later the industrialist Friedrich Grillo built a neo-classical theater, 
and in 1913 the architect Edmund Körner unveiled his monumental, domed synagogue located in 
the heart of the old town on Steelerstraße just 200 meters away from the market square and the 
historic Burgplatz.  
 Essen had arrived indeed and so too had its Jewish population. In the 1870s, only 832 
Jews lived in Essen, but by 1912 the population had expanded to 2,839. Benefiting from the city’s 
economic boom, the Jewish population became integrated into Essen’s middle class and sought to 
express its new stature through the building of a new synagogue. The Jewish community and 
municipal officials selected a design from the local architect Edmund Körner who used simplified 
elements of Romanesque and Byzantine to create a compact structure of stone. While an 
imposing, monumental structure, the building fit into its surroundings rather than dominating 
them. The extension of a courtyard enclosed by turrets and a metal gate helped to achieve this 
symmetry by gently bringing the synagogue into the street in front of it. The choice of this 
architectural style reflected the changing self-definition of Jews in Essen by the turn of the 
century. In 1870, the Jewish community built a much different synagogue for its then much 
smaller population. Following the general trend of synagogue architecture at the time, it was built 
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in Moorish style with two onion domes towering in the sky complete with Stars of David.10 Forty 
years later, the Jewish community expressed its “Jewishness” more subtly by choosing a building 
that was at once distinct and native to the surrounding landscape.11 The Essen synagogue was as 
much “Jewish” as it was “German.” On the day of the unveiling, the Jewish community member 
Max Abel noted that the synagogue rested on the “ground” of both Essen and “our German 
fatherland.” The building expressed the “faithful quest” of Jews to achieve what the emancipation 
process had allowed –– “being citizens of our state.”12 He spoke as a bust of Kaiser Wilhelm II 
dominated the hall of the synagogue and as Essen’s mayor gave a toast to the Hohenzollerns. The 
Essen synagogue captured, as historian Paul Mendes-Flohr has so aptly put it, the “bifurcated soul 
of the German Jew.”13  
 This dual combination of Germanness and Jewishness received enthusiastic praise in the 
local and national press. “I am convinced,” exclaimed one local in the Essener Volkszeitung, “that 
the entirety of Essen is proud of this noble building, just as Essen’s citizenry is with the same 
right proud of the unprecedented development of our hometown, which now has experienced 
through this wonderful building such a splendid enhancement that so magnificently fits into the 
image of our city.”14 The sheer monumentality of the building captured the interest of most 
observers, while others emphasized the synagogue’s innovative, modern style.15 “The building’s 
forms are no longer oriental and are also not copies of some older style, but are the ‘beginning of 
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the twentieth-century.’”16 The synagogue received warm praise precisely because its building’s 
“orientalism” was modestly articulated, its Jewishness ever present, yet subtly expressed. One of 
the leading architectural critics in the Rhineland praised Körner’s design for not being too 
“Jewish.”17 “The purely stylistic appropriation of oriental forms,” he wrote, “in most locations 
[is] a foreign object, which annoyingly stands out and has no connection to the surrounding 
landscape. The preservation of the native, local landscape is also the main precondition for a 
synagogue, for a ‘mosaic Mosque’ will always make itself out to be an intrusive trouble maker 
under German skies, in the environs of north German brick buildings or south German half-
timbered structures and stucco buildings.”18 In fin-de-siècle Germany, Körner’s 
“Monumentalbau” had become an integrated part of Essen’s urban landscape.  
The building’s monumentality was also the main reason why it survived into the postwar 
period. Just after midnight on November 9, 1938, local SA, SS, and other Nazi activists broke 
into the synagogue and then rolled in barrels of gasoline. “I saw black clouds of smoke rising out 
from the synagogue,” a local firefighter reported, “I determined that two industrial barrels holding 
about 200 liters of gasoline were lying on the street before the synagogue.”19 The next morning 
Esseners gathered in front of the synagogue with smoke still billowing out from its windows. 
Although the Nazis tried to force the Jewish community to pay for its demolition and then later 
contemplated funding it themselves, the cost and the risk to nearby houses was simply too high 
for it ever to be carried out.20  
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The synagogue also survived the massive destruction of Essen’s old town. Essen endured 
thirteen aerial attacks over two years from 1943 to 1945 because the Krupp firm was a central 
producer of armaments.21 The Nazis had after all dubbed Essen the “Armorer of the Reich.” In 
1945, Essen’s old town lay in a pile of ruins. The city’s oldest churches, its town hall, its city 
theater, and nearly 90 percent of its stores were completely destroyed. Pictures taken just after the 
war show a field of ruins with virtually no central point of orientation with one exception –– the 
synagogue on Steelerstraße. The Nazis had blown out its windows, damaged its cupola, and 
burned its interior, but the building remained standing. As one local resident recalled returning to 
Essen just after the war:  
When in the summer of 1945 I was released from a short stint as a prisoner of war, I had 
trouble getting my bearings in my hometown. The synagogue was a point of orientation. 
In the middle of a vast field of rubble, the unique domed building towered above, 
damaged, but spared by the war. It reminded me of the day when before our eyes the 
smoke billowed out. It was in the year before the start of the war. On the way from the 
“castle,” as we called our school, to swimming lessons in the pool on Steelerstraße we 
saw what could not be ignored on the morning of November 10, 1938.22   
 
The synagogue had become indeed a central point of reference in Essen, but one that conjured up 
memories of violence and persecution. It was conspicuous partially because it survived the war 
and partially because it symbolized the fractured history of German-Jewish relations. It was 
precisely this symbolism that local residents and urban planners struggled to make sense of 
throughout the 1950s as they discussed how to rebuild Essen and what place, if any, historic 
structures such as the synagogue should have in the reconstruction effort. How would a building, 
once celebrated for its grandness but now sitting empty and damaged in a city of almost no Jews, 
fit into the postwar urge for “reconstruction” and “normalcy”? 
The rebuilding of Essen became closely tied to the restructuring of its economy after 
1945. The Krupp firm had turned Essen into a major city, but it no longer could serve as the 
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linchpin of its economic vitality and urban identity. Essen’s status as the “Armorer of the Reich” 
made it a target like few other cities of allied measures to dismantle the German wartime 
economy. The British destroyed seventy-two buildings of the Krupp plant and transformed an 
additional one hundred into shops that could produce materials for strictly peaceful purposes.23 
Since Krupp had been the largest employer in Essen, many people were now left without a job 
and city leaders were forced to diversify the economy. Essen still relied heavily on mining as an 
important source of employment, but also attracted new industries in areas such as electronics, 
automobile, resale, service, banking, and insurance. In the 1950s, retail in particular became one 
of its main sectors as hundreds of shops filled the streets of the old town. This economic strategy 
was not entirely new. In the 1920s, several large department stores had been built in the old town 
and a number of smaller shops started to fill its streets. As the world economic crisis reached its 
height in 1929-30, Essen increasingly became known not just as the “Kruppstadt” but also as the 
Einkaufsstadt (the shopping city).24 This identity became solidified after 1945 as Essen became 
one of West Germany’s central places to shop during the “economic miracle.” It was also one that 
the city warmly embraced. In 1950, the city began marketing itself as “Essen, die Einkaufsstadt” 
with a large placard that greeted arriving visitors from the train station that remains to this day. 
This diversification of Essen’s economy shaped the rebuilding of its heavily damaged old 
town, which urban planners decided to turn into a shopping district. In 1949, Essen’s urban 
planning office put forward its general plan for the reconstruction of the city.25 It drew heavily on 
the basic ideas of city building manager Strum Kegel who set out to build a modern city of wide 
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streets, spacious city squares, and pedestrian streets for shopping.26 The plan divided the city 
center into two parts. North of the train station was to become the shopping district, while the 
south would serve as the central business district for Essen’s emerging service, banking, and 
insurance industries. A traffic ring was to encircle the old town allowing easy access for shoppers 
and two large squares were to be built in order to make the city center less congested and 
compact. This plan, which was implemented throughout the 1950s, preserved the medieval, 
kidney-shaped lay out of the old town, but left hardly any room for the reconstruction of Essen’s 
damaged historic buildings.27 Of the three cities discussed here, Essen was by far the most radical 
in embracing the modernist urge for the new. The drive to free up space for wide squares, 
greenery, parking, and wide traffic streets altered the urban landscape in notable ways. In the 
1950s, urban planners constructed a 14,000-meter square that became the new central organizing 
point of the old town, “the commercial center, the heart of the shopping city.”28 Called 
Gildenplatz until it was changed to Kennedyplatz in 1963, it reflected the planning department’s 
impulse for a less congested, tightly packed city and became defined by an array of modernist 
buildings (Amerika-Haus/Kennedy-Haus, 1951, Allbauhaus, 1954-56, Hochhaus am Gildenplatz, 
1955, and Heroldhaus, 1954-55).29 
The construction of Kennedyplatz stood in sharp juxtaposition to the historic Burgplatz 
that had long been Essen’s main square. Located about 200 meters away from Kennedyplatz, this 
square was intended to “remain” a “tranquil island” anchored by the meticulous reconstruction of 
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Essen’s most important historic monument –– the Münsterkirche.30 This church, dating back to 
the ninth century, had long been the focal point of Essen’s old town, tying the nineteenth-century 
industrial city to its medieval past.31 A local, grassroots effort to reconstruct the heavily damaged 
church began immediately after the war. Lasting from 1947 to 1958, the reconstruction involved 
rebuilding most of the structure completely.32 The Münsterkirche was one of the few historical 
buildings of Essen’s old town to be reconstructed after the war.33 Its presence, however, fit 
awkwardly into the rest of Essen’s postwar reconstruction. In the early 1950s, city officials 
finalized plans for the old town by proposing to build another sprawling square and a new town 
hall. Two large squares, Kennedyplatz and Porscheplatz, were linked together by two north-south, 
east-west retail streets. By the mid-1950s, most of these plans had been carried out except for the 
town hall, and city leaders proudly looked back upon the speed of Essen’s reconstruction. In 
1956, they published, Essen: From Ruins and Ashes a New City Emerges, that triumphantly 
declared the reconstruction a success. In pictures of the destroyed urban landscape, the book 
noted that “never before have communities in their history been assigned tasks of such greatness 
and difficulty as after the collapse of 1945.”34 The rest of the volume concluded that the city had 
accomplished these grand tasks masterfully: “All in all it follows that eleven years after the 
enormous caesura of the war Essen is on the best path to pursuing a modern urban planning that 
fundamentally turns away from the flaws of the nineteenth century city.”35 
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But as much as urban planners looked to Essen’s future as a new, modern city they could 
not escape the past altogether. For still lying right in the center of the old town was the 
synagogue. One of the striking elements of the basic plan that guided Essen’s rebuilding was how 
much the synagogue became spatially separated from the emerging center of the Einkaufsstadt. 
When Essen city officials and the Jewish community built the synagogue on Steelerstraße, they 
made a deliberate statement about its importance in the urban landscape: it faced the medieval 
market square and was located east of the Münsterkirche by less than 200 meters. It had become, 
both visually and spatially, an integral part of the built environment. The exact opposite occurred 
after the war. As the city meticulously rebuilt the Münsterkirche, preserved Burgplatz as a 
“tranquil island,” and constructed Porscheplatz, no attempt to integrate the synagogue into any of 
these nearby projects ever emerged. Indeed, as the center of the downtown moved slightly north 
to the retail area between Kennedyplatz and Porscheplatz, the market square became over the 
years less and less important and with it the synagogue.  
The Burgplatz with the reconstructed Münsterkirche remained a focal point, but the 
construction of a wide street just east of it eclipsed its centrality. In Essen, four main streets were 
built to encircle the downtown and the one on the east skirted the synagogue. This wide, five-lane 
highway, the Schützenbahn, effectively divided the downtown into two parts: the major retail 
center to the west and the synagogue in the east. For thirty-five years, the synagogue sat isolated 
in this area of the downtown until 1979 when the town hall was finally unveiled. The town hall 
had been planned since the early 1950s and was always intended to be located in this area, but as 
a 28-floor glass skyscraper it hardly went together with the synagogue. Urban planners could 
have designed a way to integrate the synagogue with the town hall but they did not and the effect 
today is all too clear. Looking east from Burgplatz, Porscheplatz, or Kettwigerstraße (one of 
Essen’s main retail streets), the cupola of Körner’s structure peaks just slightly above the tops of 
department stores, but its monumental stone remains hidden. One has to walk down to the 
Schützenbahn to see it. The postwar surroundings of the synagogue ultimately eclipse its still 
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imposing architecture: the huge parking garage behind it, the busy intersection of the five-lane 
highway, the bus terminal underneath the enormous, cavernous passageway to the shopping mall 
on Porscheplatz, and the dominating, 28-story skyscraper town hall. Standing there among the 
buzz of cars and the nearby chatter of shoppers one realizes just how little urban planners thought 
about the presence of the synagogue in rebuilding the city; one even wonders: Why did they not 
simply make that parking garage even larger on the empty space of the dynamited synagogue? 
The wrecking ball was after all moving at a furious pace along the streets of Essen’s old town. 
The short, simple answer is that city officials did not want to pay the high costs of demolition and 
probably wanted to avoid the pretence of carrying out what the Nazis had planned to do in 1938, 
but there is also a much longer, more interesting answer that lies in the shifting appropriation, 
use, and handling of the building after 1945.  
In 1948, a local newspaper asked simply: “What was to become of the synagogue?” It did 
not supply an answer, but pointed out that its “fate” was “still not clear” given that a mere 145 
Jews were now living in a city that once had 4,500.36 The postwar Jewish community from the 
beginning had made it clear that it did not want to use the synagogue for both practical and 
psychological reasons. It had become a “defiled house of worship” and was simply too large.37 In 
1959, the Jewish community dedicated a new, much smaller synagogue on Ruhrallee designed by 
the same architects who built the West Berlin Jewish community center on Fasanenstraße.38 But 
the synagogue remained fully intact and something had to be done with the building. One of the 
first moves city officials made was to tear down its heavily damaged courtyard so that “traffic can 
operate more easily.”39 In place of it, the city erected a large stone sarcophagus that was covered 
with large metal plates topped with a small fixture of the Star of David. A short plaque was 
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placed on the sarcophagus that read: “More than 2,500 Jews had to lose their lives in 1933-1945.” 
This “Jewish monument,” as the local newspaper described it, seemed offensive to some 
Esseners.40 Soon after it was erected the Star of David was pulled down in April 1949 and then in 
the following year on several other occasions.41 
After the destruction of the courtyard and the erection of this small monument, the city 
simply abandoned the synagogue as the rest of the city was rebuilt. Local journalists were quick 
to point out the disparity. “What the bombs were not capable of doing,” one newspaper article 
ironically put it, “the ravages of time now threatens.”42 Another asked directly if the synagogue 
“will be built up” and endorsed an apparent plan to use it as “a temple of humanity, which will 
remember the victims of brutality.”43 Still another asked: “Is the Essen Synagogue being left to 
ruin?” Its answer was damaging.  
The rebuilding of Essen has taken place rapidly. Even on Steelerstraße there are new 
buildings on the Schützenbahn: the labor union building, the Porscheplatz, the complete 
rearrangement of Burgplatz. Only the synagogue seems to have been forgotten. The 
burned-out walls do not bother anyone. Those who now go by this architectural work 
probably wonder why one has not let it ruin even more.  Grass and even trees are growing 
out of the rounded cupola and through the holes in the windows. The interior offers an 
image of desolation. The columns have collapsed and pieces of the ceiling fall down with 
every vibration from the congested street. Three months ago, the building inspection 
department prohibited entry into the synagogue. Danger of collapse!44 
 
The synagogue had indeed fallen into such a dilapidated state that plans for it to be cleared away 
often surfaced. With rain pouring in from its damaged roof and pieces of stone falling off onto the 
nearby street, the city was forced to put up a protective fence to enclose the building as the 
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possibility of tearing it down appeared more likely by the mid-1950s.45 A city report concluded 
that in a few years it would no longer be salvageable and urged city officials to decide whether 
the synagogue should be preserved or torn down.46   
As much as the idea of destroying the synagogue might have seemed like the easiest 
solution, the likelihood of it actually happening anytime soon was low for several reasons. The 
synagogue symbolized the absence of Jewish life by its sheer emptiness, but it also represented 
another, seemingly less destructive past that some Esseners did not want to be cleared away. In 
the numerous articles about the synagogue published in the 1950s, its architectural greatness 
continued to be celebrated as an important landmark of Essen’s Stadtbild. Local journalists, 
citizens, and municipal officials expressed interest in preserving this “valuable structure,” “this 
most beautiful and impressive Jewish building in Germany,” “this proud building,” and “this 
magnificent creation of Professor Körner.”47 Körner’s monumental design had yet again helped to 
save the building. It is striking, however, how much interest in the synagogue became focused 
exclusively on its architecture. The Nazi destruction of the building and the city’s Jewish 
population is hardly ever mentioned; why the synagogue is actually abandoned and shattered 
receives virtually no reflection. An article published on November 9, 1956 of all dates is a telling 
example. Although its headline notes that the “synagogue was set on fire seventeen years ago,” it 
immediately turns away from Kristallnacht. “That was seventeen years ago. Today not much has 
changed with the lifeless architectural work. It is really too bad about a building … whose design 
… has long been the object of many visitors throughout the world. … One thing is certain: The 
current condition has to be rectified. The new design of the city alone demands that.” The only 
slightest, indirect mention of the Nazi period appears when the article notes that the Jewish 
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community has been so “melted down” that it cannot possibly use or maintain the building.48 
Otherwise interest in the building remained limited to its architectural legacy and implicitly to the 
historical moment when German-Jewish relations were seemingly harmonious.   
 But the main reason why the city could not tear it down in the 1950s was rather simple. It 
had not yet owned the building. In 1953, Essen’s district court formally handed the property over 
to the Jewish Trust Corporation (JTC).49 Fully aware that the small, local Jewish community in 
Essen had no interest in using the building anymore, the JTC offered to sell it to the city.50 
Municipal authorities were reluctant to purchase it because they had no concrete plans for using 
the building and did not want to be responsible for its maintenance.51 But the city had few 
alternatives and the JTC was anxious to sell it.52 The synagogue was becoming a serious physical 
danger to pedestrians and the JTC refused to pay for repairs on it.53 In 1959, the city spent 
300,000 marks to secure the building as it reluctantly became more involved in its upkeep. In 
April 1960, it decided simply to purchase it and now faced “the synagogue problem” of what to 
do with the building.54 There was no shortage of ideas. The local Jewish community had long 
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proposed turning the building into a memorial for “all the victims of National Socialism,” while 
another suggestion was to use the building to house a regional museum.55 
But municipal officials had another idea in mind. Just before agreeing to purchase the 
synagogue, they decided to solve two problems with one solution. The “Haus Industrieform,” a 
local association that sponsored an exhibit on designer industrial products, needed a new location 
after its lease was suddenly cancelled at the Krupp’s historic villa Hügel. City officials offered a 
number of different locations in Essen’s downtown, but none satisfied the association’s 
leadership and it began to look for better offers from the nearby cities of Köln and Dusseldorf. 
City officials were desperate not to lose this “Essen institution.”56 In early November 1959, about 
a week after the city agreed to purchase the synagogue, it suggested putting the exhibit in the 
building to the association’s director, Carl Hundhausen, who immediately took to the idea. 
Hundhausen believed that the architecture of this “monumental structure” was the perfect setting 
for displaying “modern objects.”57 Several months later, the city approved the plan with little 
debate. When one city council member asked if the local Jewish community “had upon the sale of 
the synagogue reserved the right to have its say” in its future use, the chief municipal director 
“unequivocally answered in the negative.”58 No one suggested that the Jewish community should 
be contacted in advance out of plain decency, even if it had not secured a formal 
“Mitspracherecht.” The local Jewish community was incensed when it heard of the news. “We 
are astonished to learn about the fate of the synagogue from newspaper clippings,” it wrote, 
“especially since at the time we were assured that the Jewish community would be consulted in 
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deciding the use of the building. The synagogue in Essen is regarded as the most beautiful and 
dignified in Europe. It bears witness to the yearnings for closeness with God that lie in the hearts 
of men … And now this building is to house an exhibition of the German Wirtschaftswunder?”59  
Essen’s Jewish community was not the only one disturbed by the city’s decision. Essen’s 
local clergy and its branch of the Association for Christian-Jewish Cooperation expressed strong 
opposition to the plans in private letters, newspaper articles, and even in an appeal to Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer.60 Essen’s Bishop noted that there were “substantial reasons against a 
commercial use of the old synagogue.”61 The city dismissively responded that “the current plans 
for the old synagogue represent a dignified use of the building.”62 Most of the protest was against 
the “profane” use of a religious building. Almost none reflected on the symbolism of the 
synagogue as a site of Nazi persecution against the Jews except for the rare passing mention that 
it could be a monument to the “victims of the 1,000 year Reich.”63 Several citizens wrote in to the 
local newspapers wondering if such a similarly “absurd” idea would be proposed for “Essen’s 
Münsterkirche or Cologne’s Dom,” while others cautioned against taking the communist “East as 
an example” by turning houses of worships into museums.64  
 This criticism, although it probably never threatened the city’s proposal, was taken 
seriously. Hundhausen enlisted the support of West Germany’s leading Jewish leaders to help end 
the discussion. He first received support, if tepid, from Julius Dreifuss, president of the State 
Association of the Jewish Communities in North Rhine-Westphalia, who wrote in a private letter 
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that the planned exhibition would not “provoke any offense.”65 As criticism of the project 
continued in the local press, he then turned to Karl Marx, editor of Germany’s most powerful 
Jewish newspaper, to write an article in favor of the project. “I am convinced,” Hundhausen 
wrote, “that a public approval will be given in this article.”66 In March 1961, Marx delivered as 
anticipated, expressing his thanks to the city of Essen for turning the synagogue into a “living 
cultural center of our century.”67 Such support from Jewish leaders seems surprising, but the 
synagogue had fallen into such disrepair after fifteen years of neglect that they were probably 
relieved for at least something to be done with the building. It is also possible that either 
Hundhausen knew Marx personally or that higher state officials called upon him for a favor. 
Whatever the possible reason, Marx’s intervention had the intended effect of ending public debate 
about the project.  
 On November 24, 1961, the Haus Industrieform opened its doors to the newly renovated 
synagogue, which cost the city two million marks. “Anyone who saw the interior of the old 
synagogue before will hardly recognize it now,” one local newspaper observed.68 The interior had 
been altered completely for the exhibition, and the grand opening capped the building’s 
transformation with an odd negotiation between past and present. The state cultural minister of 
North Rhine-Westphalia, Werner Schütz, cautioned Hundhausen in advance that the ceremony 
had to be “carried out in the right manner” and must be an “hour of reconciliation with our Jewish 
co-citizens.”69 In his own speech, Schütz touched on the controversy about the building’s use. He 
noted that “perhaps it would have been a good solution” to turn the synagogue into a “powerful 
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monument … of the terrible things in the past,” but then promptly suggested that the current 
exhibition was intended in part to nurture such remembrance. He said that visitors would after all 
pass by the sarcophagus before entering the building and would be reminded of past “events.”70 
This was a rather imaginative assumption. How could an exhibition of dishwashers, stoves, and 
irons possibly represent even the vaguest notion of the past? Press coverage of the exhibition 
overlooked the building’s historical symbolism altogether, while visitors warmly praised the 
exhibition. Criticism of the project had now faded almost completely. “The synagogue has been 
used very well,” one visitor exclaimed, “the city of Essen could not have done any better out of 
it.”71 The synagogue’s past had, indeed, fallen almost entirely to the way side as the Haus 
Industrieform became a showcase for Essen’s economic revitalization. Neglected for nearly 
fifteen years, the synagogue had now finally, if peculiarly been integrated into the city’s identity 
as the Einkaufsstadt.  
II. Returning Wrocław to “Our Fatherland”  
 As in Essen, Breslau became a major city in the German empire by the end of the 
nineteenth century. It benefited from the industrial output of Upper Silesia and became the most 
important center east of Berlin for manufacturing, banking, and commerce. But it was still a 
rather provincial city that was not nearly as economically dynamic as Essen; it had seen more 
glorious days in the sixteenth century when it was one of Europe’s most important trading towns. 
To be sure, its university, music clubs, artistic societies, and old town offered a vibrant cultural, 
educational, and social life, but Breslau was not Berlin, Vienna, Prague, or Warsaw, no matter 
how much some historians today might wish it to have been. There has been a recent surge of 
attraction to this city with at least fifty recorded names –– Vratislavia, Wrotizla, Vretslav, 
Presslaw, Breslau, Wrocław to name just the most common ones — that reflects the multinational 
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richness of the naively innocuous concept of “Central Europe.” Fritz Stern has waxed about 
Breslau being the “true entrance to German life” for Jews; Till van Rahden has argued that 
Breslau was a “multicultural” city of harmonious relations among Catholics, Protestants, and 
Jews; and Norman Davies and Roger Moorhouse claim it to be the quintessentially “Central 
European City.”72 Such ruminations stem from the allure of a “past” that seems so different from 
the harsh reality of the twentieth-century when the city’s Jewish population was murdered, its 
former German residents expelled, and its current inhabitants forcibly resettled there from central 
and eastern Poland. The city’s shifting existence under Piast, Bohemian, Habsburg, Prussian, 
German, and Polish rule must be clearly emphasized because it does indeed reflect the diverse 
history of a region that for too long has been nationalized by historians, but moving too far in the 
other direction is equally problematic. It frames the past in national terms for historical periods 
when “ethnicity” and “nation” simply did not exist. In my view, it makes sense to contextualize 
the city’s past in a given period rather than attempting to insert into larger national or 
multinational metanarratives.  
 In the early twentieth century, the city was indeed neither multinational nor multicultural 
with a mere 8,927 Polish speakers, but it was diverse in terms of its religious composition. The 
Protestant faith had dominated the city since the Reformation, but Catholics became an 
increasingly large minority over the nineteenth century, while the Jewish community became the 
third largest in Germany with 23,000 members in 1920 (about 4 percent of the total population).73 
Relations between Jews and Germans were relatively free of strife thanks to the fairly tolerant 
policies of city officials. Breslau’s municipal government, a left-liberal coalition that depended on 
Jewish support in local elections, relaxed the exclusionary practices of social clubs, bestowed the 
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city’s highest civic award to Jews, and increased access to higher education. Jews in Breslau were 
involved mostly in commerce and trade, but they rarely earned enough money to maintain a 
middle-class lifestyle. Still, Breslau’s Jewish community had firmly become acculturated into 
German society by the turn-of-the-century and built a strong tradition of Jewish life in the city 
with institutions such as the Jewish Theological Seminary.74 
 As in Essen and Berlin, Breslau’s Jewish community expressed its integration into 
German society through architecture. The Storch Synagogue located on Wallstraße in the old 
town was the first architecturally notable synagogue to mark Breslau’s urban landscape. Designed 
by Carl F. Langhans, son of the architect of Berlin’s Brandenburg Gate, the synagogue was 
constructed in neo-classical style with five rounded windows and four pilasters held together by a 
triangular pediment. A circular lantern topped the plastered brick building, which from the 
outside barely resembled a religious building. The design reflected the importance of the 
Enlightenment for Breslau’s Jewish population and the growing acculturation among those even 
of the orthodox tradition who used the synagogue.75 Built in 1827-29, the Storch Synagogue was 
eclipsed forty-years later by the monumental New Synagogue located not far from it on 
Schweidnitzerstraße. Beginning in 1838, the reform Rabbi Abraham Geiger, who had a tense 
relationship with the orthodox community, set out to establish Breslau as a center of reform 
Judaism through the founding of the Jewish Theological Seminary and the construction of a new 
synagogue. Although he later left for Frankfurt am Main in 1863 before the synagogue was 
actually erected, he had a strong influence on the general design of the building.  
The Jewish community accepted plans by the well-known Jewish architect Edwin Oppler 
who designed a massive, cathedral-looking synagogue just near the center of the city’s old town. 
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Oppler decided to design the building in Romanesque, a style that, in his words, “certainly can be 
considered purely German.”76 Responding to the oriental, Moorish style of the New Synagogue in 
Berlin that was completed in 1866, he wanted to place Judaism on equal footing with the other 
confessions in Germany by adopting a “German” architectural style. Just as Körner had intended 
in Essen, Oppler wanted his building at once to dominate the surrounding landscape and naturally 
fit into it. But whereas Körner succeeded in creating such a building, Oppler failed in the eyes of 
his contemporaries. The enormous, Romanesque synagogue stood out among the gothic and 
baroque styles of Breslau’s old town. As one critic put it, the synagogue appeared “exotic in the 
local character of Breslau.”77 Nevertheless, the towering presence of the synagogue testified to 
both the acculturation of the Jewish population and the generally benevolent policy of municipal 
authorities toward the Jewish minority. 
But such tolerance did not penetrate deep enough into the social fabric of the city for it to 
survive the instability of the interwar years.78 As Breslau’s liberal, middle-class governing 
coalition collapsed in the 1920s, Breslau became one of the strongest bastions of Nazi support. 
On November 9, 1938, the Nazis set the New Synagogue on fire and a pile of smoldering ruins 
was all that was left of it several days later. “The SS precluded the fire fighters in Breslau from 
saving the synagogue,” a Jewish observer wrote in his diary, “Only the nearby buildings and trees 
were doused. … The synagogue itself was burned down with firebombs.”79 The city’s other main 
synagogue on Wallstraße survived Kristallnacht given that it was too close to nearby buildings, 
making it the central Jewish building to last into the postwar period. But the vast majority of 
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Breslau Jews, deported to Sobibor, Bełżec, and Auschwitz in 1942-43, did not survive. By 1945, 
the Jewish population of Breslau had a mere thirty survivors.80  
This number would, however, soon change dramatically in the shifting context of the 
immediate postwar years. Lower Silesia, now part of Poland, became home to the largest 
population of Jews in the region outside the DP camps in occupied Germany. In 1945, the great 
powers reduced Poland’s size by 20 percent mainly because Stalin wanted to keep his wartime 
gains in the east. In return, Poland gained a 300-mile long Baltic coastline and land up to the 
Oder-Neisse line, which was generally more economically developed than the territory lost to the 
USSR. With a few strokes of the pen at Tehran and Potsdam, Poland lost the important cultural 
centers of Lwów and Wilno, while gaining the now Polish cities of Wrocław and Gdańsk. The 
Great Powers also agreed to the “transfer” of about 3.5 million Germans from Silesia, Pomerania, 
and eastern Prussia followed by the “resettlement” of about 3.5 million Poles from central and 
eastern Poland.81 Seeking political legitimacy in a country where communism had historically 
been weak, the Polish communist provisional government carried out the expulsions and 
supported the general idea of an ethnically homogenous nation-state.82 The state also embarked 
on a massive propaganda campaign to Polonize the western territories, drawing heavily on the 
historical legacy of tenth-century Piast Poland whose political boundaries roughly followed those 
of the postwar state. The communist party urged Poles to return “home” to the “Recovered 
Territories” (ziemie odzyskane) of the west where they would find material riches left behind by 
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the expelled German population. As one propaganda poster grandly promised: “Historical justice 
has been done. The power of the Third Reich lies in ruins. The lands, once robbed by Crusades, 
Bismark, and Hitler, has returned to the motherland. In panic, the invader has fled across the 
Oder, leaving behind villages and towns, manor houses, sown fields, developed ponds and 
gardens.”83  
The communist leadership encouraged Jews to resettle in Silesia in order to assist in the 
rebuilding effort, even though it remained acutely ambivalent about the long-term presence of the 
Jewish minority in Poland.84 Some Jews eagerly responded to such calls and absorbed the 
nationalist propaganda of the state. Jakub Egit, chair of the Lower Silesian Jewish Committee, 
suggested that the choice of this area was simple. “Thanks to the liberation of this land by the Red 
Army … seven thousand Polish Jews were saved here who expressed their will to rebuild their 
new life precisely on this land. In this way, they wanted to satisfy their lust for revenge and at the 
same time to receive at least partial compensation for incurred losses.”85 Jewish communists and 
Bundists also presented the “recovered territories” as a viable option to the Zionist alternative of 
leaving Poland.86 But the vast majority of Jews who settled in Lower Silesia were motivated not 
by politics, nationalism, or revenge; they were looking above all for a relatively safe place where 
they could work and live. Most Jewish settlers had survived the Holocaust in the USSR and 
returned to Poland to find their families obliterated and their homes stolen. Lower Silesia seemed 
like the best alternative for them not least because it remained largely free of the strife that 
erupted in central and eastern Poland in 1945-46. Western Poland was in such a state of flux with 
Germans moving out and Poles moving in that the return of Jews did not provoke nearly the 
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amount of tension that it did in other parts of Poland. At its height, the Jewish population in 
Lower Silesia reached 82,305 in July 1946 and the possibility of Jewish life reemerging in Poland 
seemed possible.87  
But the postwar anti-Semitic violence, even though it never reached western Poland, was 
too bloody not to persuade Jews to leave. By 1950, a mere 30,000 Jews had decided to stay in 
Lower Silesia and that number only continued to decrease with each passing year. In 1960, only 
7-8 thousand Jews were living in the region.88 The Jewish community in Wrocław mirrored these 
broader trends. It became the largest city of Jews in Lower Silesia with about 16,057 in 1946, but 
that number dropped to 12,240 just two years later and then continued to decline over the 1950s. 
In 1963, only two thousand Jews were living in the city and after 1968 only a handful remained.89 
In many ways, Wrocław reflects the postwar trajectory of Jewish life in Poland with an initial 
surge of energy and even cautious hope only to be dashed by the physical and linguistic violence 
of 1946 and 1968.  
In the immediate postwar years, Wrocław was hardly an easy place to rebuild one’s life 
no matter if one was Jewish or not. The three-month battle for the city massively destroyed the 
urban landscape. As fighting turned into urban warfare with soldiers battling from street to street, 
the city lay in a pile of ruins by 1945. About 68 percent of Wrocław had been destroyed with 
21,600 buildings damaged. Wrocław’s old town was heavily destroyed and many of its most 
prominent cultural markers, especially its many churches, were severely damaged.90 Just three 
days after the fighting ended, authorities from the Polish communist provisional government 
moved into the city. The forced removal of Germans, which had begun with the Nazi evacuation 
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of the city in January 1945, continued in the months before the legally sanctioned “transfer” of 
the population at the Potsdam conference in August 1945. By 1948-49, the demographic 
revolution of the city had largely come to an end. The German population had been expelled and 
Poles had been forced to replace them. The new Polish communist government now faced not 
only the difficulty of integrating the so-called “repatriates” into the economic fabric of western 
Poland, but also making the cities of Silesia “Polish.”91 In a broad propaganda campaign led by 
the West Institute in Poznań (Instytut Zachodni), the PZPR portrayed the “recovered territories” 
as an area that had always been Polish.92 As one author wrote, “Silesia … was not only the seed 
and bastion of the Polish economy and Polish culture, but at the same time ranks as the area 
where a national Polish consciousness developed perhaps the earliest and the fullest.”93 
Historians, writers, art historians, and archaeologists focused special attention on the medieval 
period when the dukes and princes of a distinct political entity known at the time as “Poland” 
ruled Silesia from 1138 to 1335. The following six hundred years of history under Bohemian, 
Habsburg, Prussian, and German rule received much less attention and when they did even the 
minutest trace of “Polishness” was emphasized.94  
Recasting the past in such nationalistic ways was obviously easy to accomplish in print, 
but making the urban landscape of Wrocław “Polish” was substantially more difficult. Municipal 
officials quickly replaced German street names and monuments with Polish ones, but these 
important, albeit minor changes were not that difficult to make, even though they naturally led to 
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disputes among local, regional, and national authorities.95 The handling of historic buildings was 
much more problematic since hardly any physical trace of Piast Poland remained in the city. 
What was to be done with a city constructed during the Bohemian, Habsburg, and Prussian 
periods? Should the city’s historic buildings be reconstructed or simply cleared away for the 
building of an entirely new, distinctly “Polish” city? At a surprisingly early stage, urban planners 
and historic preservationists argued for the reconstruction of the city’s historic buildings, 
especially those built in gothic style during the Middle Ages that they believed reflected Piast 
Poland. Of course, these buildings could hardly be considered “Polish” just as those built in neo-
classical style in the nineteenth century could hardly be considered “German.” If there is one 
form of material culture that is transnational, it is architecture with its blend of different regional 
and historical styles.  
Yet societies appropriate buildings in distinct ways that fit into their own interpretations 
of the past. Polish urban planners and historic preservationists argued that by peeling away the 
veneer of the most recent “Germaness” of Breslau’s built environment the older, medieval, 
Catholic, and deeply Polish Wrocław would emerge. The ruined landscape offered the 
unprecedented chance to recover the Polish origins of the city that had been destroyed by the 
German enemy over the years. “In 1945, we came into Lower Silesia with the false belief that we 
were entering into the old Polish country where the German oppression had wiped out every trace 
of Polishness,” wrote Stanisław Kulczyński, an academic instrumental in rebuilding university 
life in the city. “The malicious enemy returned this land to us having earlier destroyed almost all 
of its civilized achievements. Inadvertently, it dug out from the ruins the old, eternally Polish 
layers that exude beautiful and noble culture.”96 The task now for urban planners and historic 
preservationists was to reconstruct the city’s historic monuments that they interpreted to be 
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Polish. The stakes of the challenge were clear: “We feel with full awareness the weight of the task 
that history has put into our hands, the hands of Polish urban planners; it is a task that aims to 
return to our fatherland this city that once was perhaps more Polish than Cracow.”97 
This vision of rebuilding Wrocław’s historic core was largely carried out, although it 
occurred more slowly than in other cities especially in comparison to Warsaw. Wrocław was a 
significant city in the politically important region of the “recovered territories,” but it still was a 
medium-sized, outer lying city in a country of scarce resources where funds for reconstruction 
went first to the capital. Nevertheless, the meticulous reconstruction of Wrocław’s old town was 
no less than remarkable, if not for its “authenticity” then for its sheer extensiveness. The 
emphasis on historic reconstruction dominated the rebuilding effort to a striking degree, even 
more so than in Warsaw.98 It became the architectural style for Wrocław’s postwar transformation 
into a Polish city. Municipal authorities focused on selectively reconstructing a medieval past that 
involved rebuilding the city’s many gothic churches, its market square, and its gothic town hall. 
Gothic architecture, especially of churches, was singled out for its “very serious value for 
propaganda, urban, and architectural reasons.”99 Although most of these buildings were actually 
constructed during the Bohemian and Habsburg periods, historic preservationists argued that they 
must “reemerge again” since they were “documents from the historical foundations of the Piast 
period and above all reveal unique, native Silesian-Polish architectural forms.”100 The focus on 
gothic architecture temporally brought the city back to its history under the rule of the Piast 
Dukes of Silesia, while the reconstruction of churches made an unequivocal statement about the 
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city’s Polish identity. In the age of the partitions (1795-1918), Catholicism became a salient 
feature of what it meant to be Polish. Roman Catholicism had long been a defining aspect of 
Polish society, but it became nationalized throughout the nineteenth century. Roman Dmowski’s 
formulation of the “Polak-katolik” captured succinctly the entangled association of religion and 
ethnicity in Polish conceptions of the nation.101 In the postwar period, the PZPR attempted to 
curtail the power of the Church, but it also skillfully used national symbols that were connected to 
Catholicism for its own purposes.  
In Wrocław, local preservationists focused particular attention on rebuilding the churches 
located on the north side of the Oder where the city’s history as a bishopric in 1,000 CE began. 
This area, known as the Cathedral Island, was also the site of both the first Piast castle and the 
city’s cathedral. It was here that urban planners and historic preservationists believed that the 
traces of Wrocław’s Polish past could most fully be recovered. Archaeologists searched for even 
the minutest remaining trace of the Piasts, while historic preservationists rebuilt the island’s many 
churches into the 1980s.102 The most celebrated project was the rebuilding of the heavily 
damaged cathedral.103 In 1946, Marcin Bukowski, one of the leading figures in Wrocław’s 
reconstruction, led the first stage of the building’s restoration completed in 1951. One of his 
students continued work on the building in 1968 and enhanced the gothic features of the cathedral 
by adding two towers that had not existed earlier. The carefully restored cathedral, towering 
above Wrocław’s skyline, epitomized the city’s recovered Polish past on the grandest scale. In 
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1965, on the occasion of the twentieth-anniversary of the Polish Church in western Poland, Stefan 
Cardinal Wyszyński assuredly proclaimed that the Wrocław Cathedral had always been “Polish:”   
The church is a preeminent conservator of the past. … We decode, beloved ones in the Lord, these 
stone relicts. In this Cathedral from the year 1000 we know our markers. These stone relicts, 
wonderful markers of the past, say: We were here! Yes! We were here! And were are back here! 
We have returned to this patriotic house. We recognized the markers that have remained. We 
understand them. We understand this language. This is our language! The stones speak to us from 
the walls. … When we see these churches of the Piasts, when we listen to their speech, then we 
know: this is certainly not German land! Those are our traces, traces of the Piasts! They speak to 
the Polish people without commentary. We do not need any explanations; we understand their 
language well.104  
 
The Polish Catholic Church and the PZPR often collided, but both were involved in an uneasy 
dance that included at times warm embraces and coordinated moves. The image of the Church as 
an eternal bastion of resistance, while a convenient post-1989 memory, elides the important areas 
where the Church supported the PZPR when it came to issues such as reinforcing Polish claims to 
the “recovered territories” or maintaining traditional gender norms.105 Indeed, Wyszyński’s 
speech absorbed and reified the nationalist framing of Wrocław’s reconstruction crafted by the 
PZPR. The communist language about building a “socialist city” –– more present in Warsaw and 
certainly in East Berlin and Potsdam –– was almost entirely absent in Wrocław as the PZPR faced 
the more pressing need to legitimize its claim to the city (and region). This political need partly 
explains the reconstruction of Wrocław’s old town at a time when both capitalist and communist 
Europe generally embraced the modern over the old.  
But it does so only in part. Wrocław’s old town was hardly the only one rebuilt in Poland. 
Historic reconstruction was one of the most dominant architectural styles in Poland during the 
1950s long in advance of the postmodern discovery of the “old” in the 1970s and 1980s.106 This 
was the case largely because of the importance of the past for Polish national identity. In a society 
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without a state for over hundred years, “Polishness” became expressed not just through the 
romantic lines of Adam Mickiewicz, but also through the growing desire to preserve the cultural 
monuments of the past. Historic preservation became entangled with the sustenance of the Polish 
nation. The destruction of the Great War only strengthened this connection in the interwar years, 
while World War II provided the cataclysmic moment for historic preservationists who saw Nazi 
attacks against Poland’s architectural heritage as central to Hitler’s aim to destroy Poland. An 
almost sacred reverence for zabytki emerged in Polish society after 1945. “The cataclysm of the 
Second World War,” wrote Jan Zachwatowicz in 1946, “made the entire situation all the more 
acute. Entire pages of our history, written in the stones of architecture, were deliberately ripped 
out. We cannot stand for that. The sense of responsibility for future generations demands the 
rebuilding of that which was destroyed.”107 Zachwatowicz became the strongest advocate for 
carefully restoring the pages of Poland’s national narrative through the meticulous reconstruction 
of historic buildings. His most important achievement was the rebuilding of Warsaw’s old town, 
but his ideas were highly influential throughout the country and shaped the reconstruction of 
Wrocław. One of his critics at the time astutely observed that this “obsession” with the past 
stemmed from a distinctly Polish “inferiority complex” after decades of statelessness, occupation, 
and war.108  
 Indeed, the postwar emphasis on historic reconstruction was uniquely Polish, and it raises 
in a uniquely acute way the central issue of whether or not the material culture of the Jewish 
minority ever fit into Polish conceptions of the past. In the 1950s and 1960s, Wrocław’s history 
as an important center of Jewish life had vanished entirely from written accounts of the city’s 
history. Most scholarly and popular works focused on the Middle Ages in an attempt to pay 
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“particular attention to the role of Polish elements in the historical processes of the city.”109 This 
narrow, nationalistic focus, which rarely dealt with the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth 
centuries, overlooked the period of the Jewish population’s expansion and destruction. The few 
accounts that cover the modern period make no mention of the city’s Jewish community at all; no 
description is given either of its economic, demographic, and cultural growth in the nineteenth 
century or of its persecution during the Nazi period.110 The Jewish population simply did not exist 
in these accounts.  
 This erasure of the city’s Jewish presence became articulated in urban space. As the 
historic buildings of the old town were meticulously rebuilt, the city’s Jewish sites fell into a state 
of neglect, dilapidation, and destruction. Wrocław’s Jewish district, located between the streets of 
Krupnicza (Graupenstraße), św. Antoniego (Antonienstraße), Włodkowica (Wallstraße), Złote 
Koło (Goldeneradegasse), and Podwale (Schweidnitzerstraße) was never included in the city’s 
historic reconstruction program. Historic preservationists and architectural historians simply paid 
little attention to this part of the old town as they focused their energy on reconstructing the city’s 
churches, town hall, and cathedral.111 The historic core of the Jewish district, Karlsplatz and 
Goldenstraße, lying just southwest of the city’s market square, was eventually cleared away in 
the early 1970s with the construction of a four-lane highway (Kazimierza Wielkiego). Once made 
up of numerous shops and tenement houses, it lay damaged and neglected for thirty years until 
construction of the highway began in 1974. Karlsplatz had now disappeared entirely and only 
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five apartment buildings of Goldenstraße were maintained.112 The only main trace of the Jewish 
district today is a surviving strip of Karlsplatz, renamed the Ghetto Heroes’ Square, that contains 
a monument erected in 1963 on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto 
Uprising. The spatial effect of this destruction is clear today. This area of the old town remains 
distinct and separate from the carefully rebuilt historic buildings of the nearby salt and market 
squares, which form the cultural life of the city. 
 Not far from the Jewish district lay the city’s most visible Jewish site –– the once 
towering, Romanesque New Synagogue. In 1945, little was left of the burned-down building. As 
historic preservationists rushed to begin work on the Cathedral, the ruins of the synagogue were 
simply cleared away to make room for a parking lot for the nearby police compound. In the 
1950s, the area surrounding the former synagogue became home to Wrocław’s most expansive 
socialist realist housing project. Local architect Roman Tunikowski transformed the former 
Tauentzienplatz into a grand central square surrounded by five-story apartment buildings. The 
housing project of the newly named  Tadeusz Kościuszko Square provided a new, socialist entry 
into the city center. Urban planners in Wrocław also attempted to combine the old with the new, 
although in a much less visible way than in Warsaw. A modernist housing project was also 
erected on the New Market Square, but such projects were largely the exception in a city 
dominated by historic reconstruction.  
Still, what is striking is that urban planners in both Warsaw and Wrocław decided to 
build large thoroughfares and expansive housing projects precisely in those areas of the city 
where it did not matter if the old was cleared away for the new.113 Direct evidence for any 
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concrete intentionality behind this juxtaposition between “Jewish” and “Polish” space does not 
exist, and of course urban planners tore down many other historic buildings in both cities that 
were not connected to the Jewish minority. But the absence of Jewish space in historic 
reconstruction projects is telling.114 Jewish sites and districts remained bracketed from the 
architectural history of the city. Published works that celebrated Worcław’s architectural legacy 
never mentioned any Jewish sites. Part of this absence stems from long-standing traditions and 
perceptions among historic preservationists throughout Europe, which typically focused on 
castles, homes, and churches. Coming mainly from the ranks of the Christian gentry, 
intelligentsia, and later middle class, historic preservationists developed an understanding of the 
historic that naturally reflected their own interests, desires, tastes, and prejudices. As Jews moved 
out from the ghetto throughout the nineteenth century, their former districts, synagogues, and 
cemeteries became abandoned and some were destroyed to make room for modernist urban 
renewal projects. Few historic preservationists voiced concern and members of the Jewish 
community seemed equally disinterested in preserving these relicts of the past.  
These broader, European continuities are important, but at the same time the post-1945 
and Polish context remains crucial. Poland was now an ethnically homogenous nation-state with a 
small Jewish community, and the reason why so many Jewish homes, synagogues, and cemeteries 
were desolate was because of mass murder rather than cultural integration. The emptiness of 
these Jewish spaces was refracted through the new and unprecedented prism of genocide. 
Moreover, historic preservation since the nineteenth century had become tied to national identity 
and this link became only stronger after the war. The rebuilding of Wrocław was a national 
project in a way that the reconstruction of Essen and Potsdam simply was not. By 1945, the 
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exclusivist, ethnic vision of the Polish nation that National Democracy propagated had in the 
main become dominant. The communist regime presented the postwar state as the truly legitimate 
Polish nation since its borders included the western lands that had long ago been taken away from 
Poland but now had heroically been recovered by the communists. By expelling the Germans and 
later the remaining Jews from Poland, the communist regime carried through with this vision and 
completed the formation of the ethnically homogenous nation that Dmowski had long dreamed 
would some day emerge. In this highly politicized environment, the culturally inscribed 
boundaries of the historic tended more often than not to exclude the cultural heritage of minority 
groups and perhaps even more acutely so in the “recovered territories.” 
The role of local officials was, however, at times even more direct. Wrocław had several 
Jewish sites that still remained standing after the war and all eventually fell into a state of severe 
dilapidation despite pleas from local Jewish leaders to restore them. In the late 1940s and 1950s, 
Jewish life in Wrocław centered mainly on Włodkowica street where the White Storch 
Synagogue was located. Both the Religious Congregation of the Jewish Faith in Wrocław 
(KWMW) and the local, secular branch of the Socio-Cultural Association of Jews used the 
assortment of buildings around the synagogue. A vibrant religious and cultural life reemerged in 
the city right after the war, although now it was made up almost exclusively of Polish speaking 
Jews (the few German Jews were forced to flee in the expulsions). But over the 1950s, as more 
and more Jews left Poland, the Jewish community in Wrocław steadily decreased in size with a 
total of 2,000 in 1963. The Jewish community also faced the constant problem of securing even 
the slightest amount of money to maintain its religious existence. Wrocław city officials paid 
virtually no attention to the KWMW and it had to rely on meager funds supplied to it from the 
Religious Association of the Jewish Faith in Warsaw (ZRWM).115  
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This lack of financial support meant that the Jewish congregation had little money to 
maintain its property. By the early 1960s, the White Storch Synagogue had fallen into disrepair as 
a result of both vandalism and neglect: “The synagogue is found to be in such a state that the 
building is in danger of complete destruction and its current state and appearance creates a very 
unpleasant impression for people attending services. The ceiling is falling apart, the majority of 
the windowpanes are knocked out, and the plaster is coming off the walls. The building is 
decaying completely.”116 Indeed, the condition of the building had become so poor that local city 
officials ordered it to be vacated in 1966 for the “sake of public safety.”117 Wrocław’s Jewish 
community was now forced to use a small, fifty-person prayer room in an adjacent building. One 
might assume that both local and national officials would now recognize the urgent need for 
repairs since such a small place for worship was clearly not sufficient for a community of around 
2,000. But they flatly refused to offer any financial assistance and insisted that the congregation 
pay for the costs on their own.118  
At one point, the Department of Religious Affairs in Warsaw did support the idea of 
repairing the building, but for rather curious reasons. It noted that the building was in “too good 
of condition to tear down,” and since it was “not visible from the street its possible repair would 
not stand out.” It also suggested that maintaining the synagogue could be politically useful abroad 
as “proof of the freedom of religion in the PRL.”119 The last reason given is neither that surprising 
nor that interesting, but the second is striking. Tucked in a courtyard just off a back street, the 
synagogue would hardly draw the attention of passerby, but that such obscurity would be reason 
for maintaining it seems odd. Why would repairing a synagogue possibly “stand out?” And to 
whom? Perhaps it would seem conspicuous to a population that the party believed held anti-
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Jewish biases or in an urban landscape now deemed “Polish,” but these are speculations when 
what is most salient about this phrase is that it was written down in the first place in an official 
memo produced by a central government agency in Warsaw.  
In other words, what is remarkable is the sheer politicization of an issue involving a mere 
dilapidated building in need of repair. The rebuilding of Wrocław was an intensely political effort 
for obvious and conceivable reasons. One can understand the reasoning of a political regime that 
legitimizes its rule through such grandiose projects as the meticulous rebuilding of a cathedral, 
even if it seems peculiar in a political system where religion was supposed to disappear 
altogether. But less understandable is why something as simple as repairing a synagogue would 
become political. The issue at hand did not involve technical, historical, or architectural issues. 
Historic preservationists and urban planners were tellingly not even involved in discussions about 
the synagogue, but rather officials of the Department of Religious Affairs, who along with those 
of the Interior Ministry, closely observed the religious communities of the PPR. One could 
reasonably claim that in communist societies virtually everything had become acutely political, 
but different issues were more political at different moments. In the mid-to-late 1960s, Polish 
communism underwent a significant transformation as it gradually embraced the nationalistic 
language, symbolism, and ideas that had long been the hallmark of National Democracy.120 The 
reasoning behind this shift involves a mix of factors that will be analyzed in the next chapter, but 
important here is that anti-Semitism became one of the guiding ideological elements of this 
change. It would be too simplistic to conclude that the politicization of Jewish space in Wrocław 
(and Warsaw) stems from anti-Semitism alone, but at the very least it reflects how much the 
growing anxiety about Jews in the mid-to-late 1960s had permeated discussions about Jewish 
matters, even ones as seemingly banal as restoring a decaying synagogue.  
Indeed, it is hard to imagine another explanation for the obstinance of local and national 
leaders to the continued pleas of Jewish leaders for assistance to renovate the building. In ever 
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more frustrated tones, the ZRWM in Warsaw “urgently appealed” to the Ministry for Religious 
Affairs to intervene, while the local Jewish congregation wrote to the Wrocław president:  
The Congregation of Jewish Faith in Wrocław is the largest in Poland and the residents of 
Wrocław are practically deprived of participating in services because the large and historic 
synagogue on Włodkowica 9 — the only one even in the country — has been closed as of August 
30, 1966 … The small synagogue on Włodkowica 9 can only house fifty people and thus Polish 
citizens of the Jewish faith living in Wrocław do not have the possibility of attending Saturday 
services … The state of things is causing an understandable feeling of dejection among the Jewish 
residents of Wrocław … In this state of affairs, every reason from a moral, social, and political 
standpoint exists to justify renovating the only large, historic synagogue with the support and 
financial assistance of local authorities.121  
 
Such appeals fell on deaf ears, and just a year later the verbal assault of 1968 decimated the 
Jewish community of Wrocław. A handful of religious Jews remained in the city, but many 
joined the some 13,000 Jews who left Poland in the late 1960s. In 1974, the entire province of 
Wrocław had just 331 Jews registered with the Jewish congregation.122 There were doubtlessly 
more people of Jewish origin than those officially associated with the Jewish community, but 
needless to say Jewish life in Lower Silesia had all but ended. The synagogue continued to fall 
into further disrepair and the city officially confiscated it from the Jewish congregation in 1974; 
what would happen to the building over the next thirty years is the subject in part of the next two 
chapters.  
 Wrocław’s two Jewish cemeteries suffered from a similar form of neglect and 
destruction. The oldest one, located on Ślężna street dating back to the 1850s, became the site of 
intense fighting during the last days of World War II and remained closed after 1945. It fell into a 
state of severe dilapidation, and in the 1970s city officials tore down the small synagogue chapel 
located on its grounds. The Jewish Congregation managed the city’s other Jewish cemetery, 
located on Lotnicza street, but it too gradually suffered from neglect and destruction. In 1954, the 
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TSKŻ noted that the cemetery was “in a condition of complete neglect.”123 Additional reports on 
the cemetery pointed out disturbing forms of vandalism: “it was found that countless graves had 
been dug up with scattered human remains. The graves have been systematically dug up in search 
of gold teeth and valuables.”124 Warsaw officials responded coolly that the local religious 
congregation was responsible for the cemetery’s upkeep and security.125 The synagogue chapel 
located at this cemetery was also torn down, which Wrocław’s building department approved and 
carried out in 1965. The local Jewish congregation simply did not have the financial ability to 
preserve this building or to maintain its cemetery.  
 It had no support because an explicit policy of neglect and destruction of Jewish 
cemeteries had taken hold in Poland after 1945. Local, municipal authorities could have played a 
more active role in the preservation of Jewish cemeteries, but no policy urging them to do so ever 
emerged from Warsaw despite the efforts of Jewish leaders to craft one. In 1946-49, the CKŻP 
and Jewish religious organizations appealed to officials in Warsaw to develop a systematic, 
regulated approach for the maintenance of Jewish cemeteries. Government agencies in Warsaw 
discussed drafting a unified policy, but none was ever developed and throughout the 1950s 
Jewish cemeteries no longer in use fell into the hands of the state as “abandoned” property. In 
1964, the Minister of Public Works issued an official memo that sanctioned the closing, 
liquidation, and redevelopment of these cemeteries, which had been occurring on the local level 
for the past twenty years. It decreed that all Jewish cemeteries not used by the Jewish community 
–– at least 400 –– were to be closed with the possibility of destroying them to make way for local 
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redevelopment projects.126 This measure understandably incensed Poland’s Jewish leaders, 
especially the outspoken Rabbi Wawa Morejno. In dozens of letters to the highest authorities of 
the PPR, he forcefully opposed the legal confiscation of Jewish communal property and the 
defilement of Jewish cemeteries that he implicitly suggested continued Nazi practices of 
destroying Jewish property.127  
Needless to say, state officials were hardly pleased with his “aggressive tone,” but did for 
a brief moment appear willing to shift their policy in light of his concerns and those expressed by 
other Jewish leaders in Poland and abroad.128 In the spring of 1965, the Ministry for Public Works 
drafted a circular that called for the protection of Jewish cemeteries. It recognized that “Hitler’s 
policies of exterminating the Jewish people” had left hundreds of Jewish cemeteries in Poland 
unprotected. It was now the task of the state to “assure the orderliness of Jewish cemeteries and to 
keep them in an appropriate condition.”129 This rather stunning document was the first time that 
Warsaw officials fully recognized the scope of the problem and accepted responsibility for the 
care of Jewish cemeteries. But the circular never left the desk on which it was written. Its paper 
trail suddenly and inexplicably ends after being sent to the Department of Religious Affairs. 
Perhaps financial and logistical concerns intervened, or others in the government, possibly in 
Moczar’s increasingly anti-Semitic Interior Ministry, simply ended the idea before it even had the 
chance to be implemented. The reason is not apparent, but the Polish government’s policy of 
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neglect, destruction, and liquidation continued throughout the 1960s and 1970s in cities such as 
Wrocław.  
III. Building an Antifascist Potsdam  
 In comparison to Essen and Wrocław, Potsdam had a much smaller Jewish community 
before the war. In 1925, the community totaled around 600 members. Jewish life centered around 
the newly built synagogue in the center of Potsdam’s old town on Wilhelmplatz. Designed in neo-
baroque style by J. Otto Kerwien, the synagogue fit almost seamlessly into its surroundings. It 
was a small and modestly constructed building, but distinctive for its central location on one of 
Potsdam’s main squares. With Berlin so nearby with the largest Jewish community in Germany, 
Potsdam’s community was dwarfed in comparison both in size and in prominence in a city that 
after World War I had lost its main reason for existing with the collapse of the monarchy. Since 
the mid seventeenth century, Potsdam’s identity had been linked with the Hohenzollerns who 
chose the city as their second seat of residence next to Berlin. Potsdam city grew substantially 
over the eighteenth century as it became an important place for the quartering of soldiers. It 
became not only a Residenzstadt, but a Garnisonstadt. Potsdam’s urban landscape reflected its 
monarchial and military ties with majestic castles, towering churches, homes, and administrative 
buildings constructed by some of Prussia’s most famous architects such as Knobesldorff and 
Schinkel.130  
 In April 1945, allied bombs destroyed substantial parts of this architectural past. Of 1,656 
buildings in the downtown, 509 were destroyed, 103 partially damaged, 989 unlivable, and just 
55 fully intact. The city’s main ensemble of its castle, town hall, and church was heavily 
damaged, while the nearby Wilhelmplatz suffered no better: the post office was the only building 
left untouched. The synagogue, only lightly damaged by the Nazis in Kristallnacht given its close 
proximity to nearby buildings, remained standing, but its roof and interior had been heavily 
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bombed. Soviet troops occupied the city and the reconstruction process soon fell into the hands of 
local SED leaders who struggled to reach a consensus about rebuilding the city. Unlike in 
Wrocław, urban planners and historic preservationists rarely agreed on the role historic buildings 
should play in the reconstruction effort. The SED, especially in Potsdam, pushed for a radical 
transformation of the urban landscape into a “socialist” city, while preservationists in Berlin 
advocated saving Potsdam’s architectural monuments.131 In the 1950s and 1960s, local SED 
leaders won the most crucial battles and their approach toward historic preservation sharply 
diverged from that of the PZPR given the different historical conditions of both countries. While 
the PZPR portrayed itself as the guardian of the Polish national past, the SED had a more 
ambivalent approach toward German history as it looked to create a new, antifascist society out of 
the ashes of Nazism.  
 The SED faced the obvious dilemma of establishing communism in a country most 
recently known for Nazism. In contrast to the Soviet Union, the GDR was not the product of a 
communist revolution, but rather the collapse of a fascist regime and foreign occupation. The 
absence of a “real” communist revolution meant that the SED had to reach back into German 
history and find a socialist past that it could use to justify the existence of its state.132 The SED 
stressed the earlier traditions of the Communist Party of Germany, idolized German communists 
like Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, and emphasized the proletarian and antifascist origins 
of German socialism. But while the SED espoused the “progressive” legacies of German history, 
it claimed that the formation of the communist state had eliminated the darker sides of the 
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German past such as fascism, war, capitalism, and antisemitism.133 In order to propagate this dual 
view of German history, the SED developed a broad cultural program that involved film, 
literature, monuments, and historiography.134 Historic preservation and urban reconstruction also 
formed an important part of this effort, but their use for ideological purposes was complicated. 
The SED often confronted buildings that reflected some “bourgeois,” “militaristic,” “fascist,” or 
“capitalist” style. It had to deal with historical buildings that did not easily fit into the image of 
the German past that it wished to fashion. 
In few other East German cities did this dilemma emerge more acutely than in Potsdam. 
The city’s grandiose buildings of Prussian glory and its symbolic ties with the Nazi movement 
hardly represented a socialist city of workers or an ideal model of antifascism. In 1933, 
Potsdam’s Prussian heritage attracted Hitler to Potsdam when he used the city’s famous Prussian 
church, the Garnisonkirche, to celebrate the Nazi rise to power during a grand ceremony dubbed 
the “Day of Potsdam.” Although this use of Potsdam by Hitler was more superficial than 
historians have often suggested, some communist officials interpreted it as a central legacy that 
had to be overcome.135 A new, socialist Potsdam had to emerge from the ruins of the Prussian 
Garnisonstadt, which meant tearing down historic buildings and replacing them with new ones. 
As the local party newspaper noted, Potsdam’s reconstruction was not simply about rebuilding 
streets, but about transforming the image of the city. Plans for the city’s rebuilding aimed to 
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document the victory of Communism over the spirit of “reactionary Prussian-German militarism” 
and “the brutality of fascism and war.”136  
Although the demand for building a new city was apparent, the actual process of carrying 
it out languished. Just as in East Berlin, extended discussion about how best to build a “Potsdam 
more beautiful than ever” delayed the actual implementation of the numerous and often shifting 
plans that emerged for the city.137 Part of the problem was that Potsdam was an outerlying city 
that received less attention than the capital, but numerous conflicts among local SED leaders, 
cultural ministry officials in Berlin, and architectural experts also stalled reconstruction. Despite a 
number of architectural competitions drafted over the 1950s, it was not until 1960 that the basic 
shape for the city’s rebuilding finally reached some level of consensus and even then its 
implementation remained contested into the 1980s.138 The plan involved widening streets for 
traffic, adding housing complexes, and a creating a central square that involved both protecting 
and tearing down a number of war-damaged historic buildings in Potsdam’s old town.139 In the 
1950s and 1960s, destruction tended to prevail over meticulous historic reconstruction, but by the 
1980s a stronger, albeit still limited concern for Potsdam’s historic buildings had taken hold.140 
This chapter discusses mainly the earlier period when Potsdam’s synagogue was destroyed along 
with a number of other historic buildings as local SED officials searched for a way to build an 
antifascist, socialist Potsdam among Prussian ruins.  
One of the central elements in this effort was the need to build a “socialist” city center. In 
East German urban planning, the Zentrum defined above all by a large demonstration square, 
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named usually in honor of a communist hero, served as the city’s central point both 
architecturally and ideologically: it stood in the heart of the city and was used to stage huge 
political demonstrations.141 In Potsdam, SED officials poured much of their energy into plans for 
a grand Zentrum and searched for a local communist leader to honor. But while Potsdam’s history 
had an abundance of Prussian kings to offer, it had little in the area of communist heroes with one 
minor exception. In 1912, the city elected Karl Liebknecht to the Reichstag where he emerged as 
an outspoken opponent to World War I. Five decades later, Liebknecht’s connections to Potsdam 
became key to the city’s reconstruction as SED officials decided to build a Platz in his honor 
located in the heart of the city center.142 As the local paper explained, “the old Potsdam was once 
bound with the ideas of reactionary Prussian-German militarism and the brutalities of fascism and 
war. . . . [But] today we carry on for ourselves the precious legacy of the antimilitarist Karl 
Liebknecht. . . . The city council has therefore proposed to design Potsdam’s city center in the 
spirit of Karl Liebknecht’s legacy.”143  
Although discovering Liebknecht’s “local” ties signaled a triumph for the SED’s project 
to build a socialist, antifascist Potsdam, it took years for the city center actually to be built.144 The 
party had to figure out first what to do with the city’s many historic buildings that, while 
damaged, still remained prominent markers of the urban landscape. This was not nearly as easy as 
one might assume in a country that, on the surface, had little regard for historic preservation, but 
intense conflicts over Potsdam’s architectural heritage precluded a simple policy of complete 
destruction from emerging. Still, by the late 1950s, local party leaders concluded that constructing 
a socialist Potsdam inherently conflicted with historic preservation. As the city council put it in 
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1958, “those buildings that were turned into ruins by the terror attack of Anglo-American 
bombers in April 1945 will be restored only when they are of extraordinary cultural-historical 
significance, when they do not interfere with all of the demands associated with developing a 
modern urban traffic system, and when their reconstruction is economically sound.”145 Key here 
is the phrase of “extraordinary cultural-historical significance.” The SED did not provide a clear 
definition of the term, but rather assigned “cultural value” to buildings that either complimented, 
or at least did not hinder, the practical and ideological demands of building the socialist city.  
 In January 1949, Peter Scheib, the local chairman of the SED in Potsdam, published in 
the local newspaper an open letter to the mayor, opposing recent plans to rebuild the war-
damaged Stadtschloss, a majestic eighteenth-century Prussian castle that stood in the heart of 
Potsdam and was designed by the renowned architect Georg Wenzeslaus von Knobelsdorff. He 
argued that its reconstruction would be too expensive and would obstruct current plans to widen a 
street. But Scheib’s chief complaint rested on less practical concerns, opposing the reconstruction 
of the Stadtschloss because it symbolized the militaristic and exploitative tendencies of the 
Prussian past:  
If today there are still people who know their history, then they ought not to forget that 
this castle of the Hohenzollerns was built with the sweat and blood of the people of 
Brandenburg and destroyed through the politics of Prussian militarism. If someone still 
believes today that our manpower is here to rebuild this broken magnificence of the 
Hohenzollerns then he is mistaken. If someone wants to say that we show no sensitivity 
to historical buildings, then we only need to remember that no one is demanding that the 
well-preserved Schloß Sanssouci be destroyed. But the actions of the Hohenzollerns 
toward our people were not worthy enough to warrant the rebuilding of a destroyed 
castle. It was not coincidental that Hitler’s henchmen implemented their criminal 
activities in line with the methods of Frederick II. Even today one can still see where the 
politics of the Hohenzollerns led. Thus we are of the view that in light of these actions 
there is no reason to rebuild these ruins, but rather it is our duty to clear away this rubble 
of history.146 
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By connecting the Stadtschloss to Prussian militarism and fascism, Scheib rejected the notion that 
the castle could possibly represent a monument of “cultural-historical significance.” But not 
everyone agreed with Scheib’s assessment. In the winter of 1949, a flurry of letters from citizens, 
politicians, and architectural historians strongly criticized his position.147 Several days later, 
Potsdam’s city council agreed and declared that the “the ruins of the Stadtschloss will be 
preserved” and used for “a museum and picture gallery or for some other cultural purpose.”148 It 
appeared as if historic preservation had triumphed over Scheib’s call to “clear away this rubble of 
history.” And for nearly a decade it had: all of Potsdam’s plans included the reconstruction of the 
Stadtschloss until 1956 when top local SED leaders opposed its preservation for the first time. 
Reflecting Walter Ulbricht’s order to construct cheap, prefabricated apartment complexes, they 
argued that its reconstruction would cost too much money and take away resources from the 
building of affordable housing.149  
A year later, the destruction of the Stadtschloss appeared increasingly certain. Party 
officials continued their argument about cost and the need for apartment buildings, but they now 
employed a more overtly political approach, arguing that the historical symbolism of the 
Stadtschloss prevented it from fitting into the “socialist” city.150 In the same meeting at which the 
SED decided to build a “socialist” Potsdam centered on the figure of Karl Liebknecht, it decided 
that it would be impossible for such a monument of Prussian militarism to remain and suggested 
that the space created by its destruction be used to build the Liebknecht Platz.151 “The proposal to 
tear down the ruins of the former Stadtschloss was approved in order not to hinder the building of 
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a socialist center.”152 When the SED announced its decision to tear down the castle, it received 
intense criticism from citizens, academics, and politicians who argued for rebuilding the war-torn 
Stadtschloss.153 East Germany’s Institute for Historic Preservation even prepared an extensive 
report on the castle, concluding that it must be preserved “as the best example of baroque 
architecture in the German Democratic Republic,” but the SED ignored its advice and tore it 
down in 1960.154 
 In the same year that the SED dynamited the Stadtschloss, it moved to destroy Potsdam’s 
Garnisonkirche. In 1933, Hitler used this towering, baroque church to open the newly elected 
Reichstag of 1933. With some 100,000 spectators lining the streets of Potsdam, Hitler and Field 
Marshal Paul von Hindenburg paraded through the city before giving speeches at the church, 
where they both spoke of the “eternal connection” between National Socialism, Imperial 
Germany, and Prussia.155 Despite these clear connections to the Nazi past, the Garnisonkirche at 
first did not appear problematic for the SED. In the early 1950s, the SED even assured its 
religious community that the church would remain intact, and in 1956 the Institute for Historic 
Preservation officially placed the building under historic preservation.156 But by 1960 the future 
of the Garnisonkirche increasingly appeared less certain. In a design competition announced that 
year, the SED for the first time omitted the church’s reconstruction from its plans.157 Throughout 
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the early 1960s, it appeared as if the Garnisonkirche would eventually be destroyed, but nearly 
seven years elapsed before the SED finally decided to tear it down. The order came most likely 
directly from Ulbricht who visited Potsdam that year and indicated to city officials that the church 
should be removed.158 Potsdam city’s council agreed and cited plans for a new street and the 
political symbolism of the church as reasons for its decision: “in our opinion, destruction is 
necessary in order to erase this symbol of Prussian militarism from the memory of local citizens. . 
. . The former Garnisonkirche was designed to be a museum for the military rather than a place of 
worship. The Day of Potsdam, the alliance between Hitler and Hindenburg, is likewise associated 
with the former Garnisonkirche.”159  
The destruction of these historic buildings signaled the SED’s urge to build a new 
Potsdam, but what is striking is how late they were actually torn down. Although in the 1950s the 
SED did not put much energy or resources into restoring either one, it did include them in plans 
for the reconstruction of the city. The party knew it wanted to build a new Potsdam of wide 
streets, housing complexes, and demonstration squares, but it still could not decide on the exact 
role the city’s Prussian past should play in this transformation. In the end, it went with a rather 
odd blend of the old and the new. Since 1960, the SED envisioned constructing the “Karl 
Liebknecht Forum,” with its planned ensemble of a new theater, hotel, demonstration square, and 
monument to the slain communist.160 This former area of the Stadtschloß was to link the garrison 
city with the nearby, working class district of Babelsberg, but next to it were three historic 
buildings that were meticulously rebuilt over the 1960s and 1970s: Potsdam’s nineteenth-century 
Nikolaikirche, its eighteenth-century Rathaus, and the Marstall, an elaborate late eighteenth-
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century building used originally as a royal stable.161 This plan took over two decades to 
materialize. The monument to Liebknecht, which was supposed to form the center of the new 
Potsdam, was not erected until 1983.162 In comparison to both Essen and Wrocław, Potsdam’s 
reconstruction was thus nothing less than haphazard. The result was that in piecemeal form 
Potsdam’s urban landscape underwent dramatic changes after 1945. One of the first areas where 
extensive construction actually did take place was Wilhelmplatz where the synagogue was 
located. In 1958, it became home to one of the city’s first housing complexes.  
Unlike either the Stadtschloß or Garnisonkirche, the postwar fate of Potsdam’s 
synagogue was complicated by legal matters. Before the SED could consider what to do with the 
building, it first had to confront the complex problem of returning property that had been 
confiscated by the Nazis to its original owner in a city where an official Jewish community 
(Gemeinde) no longer existed. Once an organization of 600 members, Potsdam’s Jewish 
community totaled a mere two after the war.163 The absence of an official Gemeinde did not, 
however, mean that returning the synagogue was legally impossible. On April 29, 1948, the 
Soviet Military Administration issued decree Nr. 82 that ordered the “return of property 
confiscated by the Nazi state to democratic organizations.” Although intended mainly for 
communist organizations, the decree allowed the return of property to “church or humanitarian” 
institutions.164 In theory, Jewish communities in the Soviet zone had a legal basis to reclaim their 
confiscated property, but doing so was hardly easy not least because Soviet authorities demanded 
that all organizations submit their claims within a mere two months. Since most Jewish 
communities lacked the organizational resources to file the paperwork themselves, the newly 
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formed State Association of Jewish Communities of the Soviet Occupied Zone (Landesverband 
der Jüdischen Gemeinden in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone) was forced to do much of the 
legal work itself. Established in 1947 and directed by the Holocaust survivor Julius Meyer, the 
Landesverband sought the return of as much property as possible, but its own scarce resources 
severely limited its efforts. Without any Jewish community to assist in gathering the necessary 
paper work, the Landesverband had to submit an incomplete list for the state of Brandenburg and 
ultimately recovered a mere four properties in the entire region.165 In 1949, the Landesverband 
was able to secure the return of additional property in Brandenburg, but Potsdam’s synagogue 
and Jewish cemetery were not among those given back.166  
Thus the city of Potsdam remained after the war the official owner and caretaker of both 
Jewish sites. At first, city and party officials decided to rebuild the synagogue, which had been 
damaged during the war and Kristallnacht. In an issue commemorating the sixth-year anniversary 
of Potsdam’s destruction, the Märkische Volksstimme reported that the reconstruction of the 
synagogue’s façade had begun. The three-sentence caption underneath a picture of the synagogue 
enclosed with scaffolding read: “The façade of the synagogue on Platz der Einheit is being 
restored. It went up in flames during Kristallnacht of 1938. The work of fascist cultural barbarism 
was only continued by British and American air force squadrons on April 14, 1945.”167 As this 
short report suggests, the synagogue was seen as part of the larger destruction of Potsdam. It 
suffered from the “cultural barbarism” of fascism and war just like any other building in the city. 
Restoring the synagogue would not fulfill any religious purpose (city officials clearly knew that 
the Jewish community no longer existed); rather its reconstruction would reinforce the antifascist 
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message of the GDR: the East German state was restoring what the fascists and western allies had 
destroyed.  
The fact that city officials initially supported the reconstruction of the synagogue should 
be of little surprise. Including the persecution of the Jews in the communist, antifascist project of 
the SBZ/GDR proved common in the immediate postwar years even if it was not a major priority 
for SED leaders. Just a month after the war ended, in their now famous “Appeal” (Aufruf) to the 
German people of June 1945, German Communist leaders confronted openly the need for 
accepting responsibility for the “consequences” of the Third Reich: “awareness and shame must 
burn in every German person, for the German people carry a significant part of the shared guilt 
and shared responsibility for the war and its consequences.”168 Commemorations of Kristallnacht, 
scholarly investigations into the origins of German antisemitism, and a dialogue about financial 
restitution for the Jews built upon the political message of the “Appeal.”169 But such solidarity 
with Jews did not last long. By early 1952, the situation for East German Jews turned highly 
repressive as the SED carried out its campaign against “cosmopolitanism.” Employing an overtly 
nationalist tone about the “enslavement and destruction of the German Volk,” the SED purged a 
number of Jews from the government and charged them with harboring an international 
conspiracy against the state.170 Although the purge ended ten months later during the period of 
de-Stalinization, it had a lasting impact on the interpretation of the Nazi past that the SED 
fashioned in East Germany. The attention once given to the Nazi persecution of the Jews in the 
SBZ vanished after 1952. East Germany’s antifascist ideology, with its understanding of fascism 
as a dictatorial and imperialist form of finance capital, now left little room for the remembrance 
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of the Jews; rather the German Communists—those who fought against Hitler’s regime—were 
commemorated and celebrated. They were the victims of “fascism.”171 
 In the wake of the 1951-52 purge, it became increasingly impossible to include the 
reconstruction of Potsdam’s synagogue in the GDR’s antifascist interpretation of the past. After 
1951 no other mention of the synagogue’s rebuilding can be found, and by 1956 Potsdam’s city 
council moved to tear the building down. City officials began discussions with the Institute for 
Historic Preservation (Institut für Denkmalpflege, or IfDP) to destroy three structures on the 
eastside of Platz der Einheit –– two eighteenth-century buildings and the synagogue. Citing 
Ulbricht’s demand to increase the number of apartment buildings, the council proposed to use the 
space to erect a housing complex.172 The IfDP protested the proposal since it had just put the two 
buildings next to the synagogue under historic preservation, but it left out any plans for the 
synagogue. In a letter to the IfDP, Potsdam’s chief architect referred specifically to the synagogue 
to support his argument against restoring all three buildings, suggesting that reconstructing the 
two eighteenth-century buildings “would also mean that the synagogue . . . would have to be 
restored as well.” Since the synagogue was “in general of no architectural value,” he asked the 
institute to “clarify” its position.173 The institute responded by proposing to tear down the 
synagogue, while restoring the two other buildings.174 City officials rejected this proposal and two 
years later decided that all three buildings should be torn down. As Potsdam’s local party 
newspaper reported, the decision signaled a clear triumph for the city: “Buildings protected under 
historic preservation often stand in the way of Potsdam’s current building projects. One only has 
to think of the façade next to the post office, which from the beginning was to remain absolutely 
preserved . . . [now] this motto will be followed: What’s valuable will be preserved! What’s of no 
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value will be cleared away! ”175 What this article referred to as the “façade next to the post office” 
was Potsdam’s synagogue.  
 How should the destruction of the synagogue be understood? The city’s decision must 
first be seen within the wider context of Potsdam’s reconstruction. Similar to the Stadtschloss and 
the Garnisonkirche, the city’s definition of “cultural-historical buildings” did not include the 
synagogue. Restoring it would have precluded the city from its aim of building a socialist 
Potsdam. By the mid-1950s, constructing apartment complexes had become an important 
ideological element of East German urban reconstruction: it showed the party’s commitment to 
economic equality by providing affordable housing for all citizens. In Potsdam, one of the central 
areas targeted for an apartment complex was Platz der Einheit itself.176 As the building of a new, 
socialist Potsdam languished among conflicting ideas, local SED leaders held an internal design 
competition to increase the number of houses in the city center by 800. The architects Hans-
Jürgen Kluge and Hellmut Schulz submitted a design for transforming Platz der Einheit into a 
housing complex with five-story apartment buildings along the eastern side where the synagogue 
was located.177 “As throughout the GDR,” the local newspaper proudly wrote, “we are also 
starting here in Potsdam to clear away the ruins and to erect in the spaces of the destruction new, 
beautiful apartments, stores, and social buildings.”178 Not all, however, greeted the plan with such 
warm enthusiasm. The project received sharp criticism from experts in East Germany’s leading 
journal on architecture. In a four-page critique, Willi Nitschke pointed out that the design did not 
fit into any clear concept for building Potsdam’s city center and suggested that the area be turned 
into a park instead. He concluded bluntly that the project “perhaps complies with capitalist 
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building practices, but has nothing in common with the socialist urban architecture and even 
stands in gross contradiction to it.”179 But he tellingly did not criticize the basic transformation of 
the space itself into something new that would involve destroying its historic buildings, including 
the synagogue.   
Indeed, the silence surrounding the synagogue’s destruction is what is most striking. 
Extensive archival searches found no attempts by citizens, politicians, architectural historians—
not one single person—to save the synagogue. Even the Institute for Historic Preservation, which 
at the time was arguing vigorously for the protection of Potsdam’s historic buildings (including 
the Stadtschloß and Garnisonkirche), made no effort to preserve the synagogue, but rather 
suggested its destruction. In all likelihood, the institute simply did not perceive it to be a site 
worthy of preservation. In the early postwar years, most conservationists understood historic 
preservation largely in terms of “age value” and emphasized the protection of buildings usually 
predating the mid-nineteenth century. Although designed in neo-baroque architecture, the 
synagogue was built in 1900 and was not placed on the city’s list of historic monuments 
published in 1956.180 If the synagogue stood any chance of being preserved, it would have to be 
considered a major Baudenkmal (architectural monument). As the city stated directly in 
discussing plans for Platz der Einheit, “those buildings that were turned into ruins … will be 
restored only when they are of extraordinary cultural-historical significance.”181 
There was, however, another, more subtle reason for the silence. City officials, party 
leaders, and historic preservationists did not argue on behalf of the synagogue partly because of 
what it represented—a site of Jewish culture. In 1952, the East German state established the IfDP 
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in order to preserve the “cultural heritage of the German people.”182 In an earlier law, the SED 
defined clearly what it meant by “cultural heritage.” It called for the development of “a 
progressive, democratic culture” that stood in direct opposition to cultural developments in West 
Germany:   
The provisional government of the German Democratic Republic wishes to point out to 
the entire German people the development of a new, progressive German culture that 
demands a resolute and ruthless fight against all manifestations of neo-fascist, reactionary 
culture and decadence, against the penetration of the cultural barbarism of American 
imperialism in West Germany. The struggle for this culture requires a determined 
resistance against all cosmopolitan tendencies …183  
 
By 1952-1953, the very cultural heritage that became the epitome of “cosmopolitanism” and 
“western decadence” was of course Jewish. As the tensions of the cold war increased, the GDR 
presented itself as the true bearer of German culture and its only defender from the “penetration” 
of foreign elements. In this sense, historic preservation became a key way for the GDR to 
emphasize the distinctly “German” aspects of its regime. As the director of the IfDP put it clearly 
in 1956, “after Germany’s collapse and subsequent national catastrophe in 1945, the GDR created 
the conditions necessary for a powerful development of national consciousness. [Historic 
preservation] seeks to bring the worker closer to our national tradition by preserving those 
monuments of our national heritage and thereby arousing love for the homeland (Heimat).”184 
Potsdam’s synagogue did not fit into this idea of Heimat. It fell outside the culturally constructed 
boundaries of East German historic preservation.  
IV. Conclusion  
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  In a slim, recently published book, Omer Bartov travels through Ukraine’s “vanished” 
Jewish past, moving from the local to the national as he photographs the pernicious effects of 
Ukrainian nationalism: destroyed Jewish tombstones and crumbling synagogue walls. It is a 
fascinating and beautifully photographed book, but it assumes that Jewish space and the 
“suppressed memory” of the Holocaust can be linked to the broader, analytical concept of the 
nation. The further one travels east, he concludes, the more exclusive this nationalism appears 
and the less inclusive national “memories” are of the Holocaust with Germany the most open and 
Poland somewhere in the middle.185 In a differently styled book, Jeffrey Herf approaches the 
similarly framed question of how much or how little the Holocaust fit into German political 
discussions about the Nazi past in the 1950s and 1960s. He develops a careful and nuanced 
analysis, but argues that the memory of the Nazi past went in different directions depending on 
which side of the Berlin Wall one stood. What nationalism is for Bartov, the cold war is for 
Herf.186 
This chapter on the immediate postwar decades, along with the two previous ones on the 
same time period, has attempted to stake out a more nuanced analytical position. Given that the 
importance of historic preservation in postwar urban reconstruction diverged along the lines of 
the Oder Neisse border, one might assume that the appropriation of Jewish sites parted sharply 
along national lines. But just as the earlier two chapters contextualized the role of the cold war, 
this one has pointed to the interplay of the local and the national in shaping the postwar handling 
of Jewish space. A broader argument from the different, yet shared histories of Jewish sites in 
these five urban landscapes lies not only in exclusive nationalism or divergent political cold war 
cultures, although both remain important and have been emphasized here, but also in the 
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ambivalent position of Jewish space in the temporal framing of urban reconstruction and historic 
preservation in the local built environment.  
In the immediate postwar decades, historic buildings played a marginal role in modernist 
and socialist realist visions of the future city, as the urge to build a new urban landscape paved 
over traces of the old with important exceptions in the Polish case. Given how quickly the 
wrecking ball was moving down the streets of most Polish and German cities, the destruction of a 
synagogue or the neglect of a Jewish district does not seem altogether that exceptional at first 
glance. But a closer look yields a different conclusion. As Germans and Poles rebuilt their cities, 
some historic buildings attracted attention from urban planners, historic preservationists, and 
ordinary citizens for understandable reasons. It makes sense that Potsdam’s majestic Stadtschloss, 
Wrocław’s towering Cathedral, and Essen’s Münsterkirche received numerous pleas to save and 
protect them. They were obvious cultural monuments of architectural importance central to each 
city’s past. In a certain sense, the comparison of Jewish sites with them is admittedly 
asymmetrical but nonetheless reveals how the remnants of Jewish life did not fit into the postwar 
transformation of each city’s urban identity. 
Essen’s synagogue, once deeply integrated into the city’s urban landscape and identity, 
became excluded from both after the war. It fell into near complete destruction as the rest of the 
old town was reconstructed to underpin Essen’s economic diversification. Separated spatially 
from the emerging shopping district by a highway and excluded from the nearby, historically 
reconstructed Burgplatz, the synagogue remained abandoned for fifteen years until city leaders 
found a way to tie it into the city’s identity of postwar consumerism and industrial ingenuity. In 
Wrocław, the postwar Jewish community was by far the largest of the three cities, but Jewish 
leaders struggled in vain to find even the slightest amount of support from local and national 
leaders for the preservation of its synagogue and Jewish cemetery. As historic preservationists 
and urban planners rushed to preserve “Polish” historic buildings throughout the city, they 
neglected or destroyed sites connected to ethnic minorities. A number of buildings constructed in 
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the Prussian period were torn down, but Jewish sites stood out even more than those perceived to 
be “German.” Historic preservationists initiated a discussion about what to do with “German” 
architecture and some buildings were adapted to fit into the “Polish” urban landscape. The same 
was simply not the case for the city’s Jewish sites, which received virtually no attention from 
local preservationists and municipal authorities. In Potsdam, no Jewish community ever emerged 
immediately after the war and the synagogue remained in damaged form for thirteen years until it 
was torn down in 1958. As local party leaders sought to build a new, socialist Potsdam, the urge 
for housing complexes, wide streets, and central squares took precedence over protecting historic 
buildings, but historic preservationists in the GDR, who vigorously opposed the destruction of the 
city’s urban landscape, remained ambivalent about its synagogue.  
Put simply, Jewish sites remained outside the temporal perceptions of each city’s 
reconstruction largely because they were Jewish. In both the GDR and PPR, the communist 
parties embraced an anti-capitalist, anti-cosmopolitan, and anti-Zionist stance that at times was 
overtly prejudicial against Jews. Although tearing down a synagogue or neglecting a Jewish 
cemetery certainly cannot be interpreted through the broad lens of anti-Semitism, the obstinance 
of local and national officials to numerous requests from Jewish leaders at the very least reflects 
the ambivalence of both communist parties toward sustaining Jewish life in the GDR and PPR. 
Such an overtly anti-Jewish posture rarely surfaced in the officially philosemitic FRG. A cold war 
difference is apparent in this sense, but its importance on the local level is debatable. The 
transformation of Essen’s synagogue into an exhibition to house industrial products might not 
reflect prejudice against Jews, but it certainly uncovers the deep ambivalence of one local 
community to the absence of Jewish life in a country made judenrein by a political party 
embraced by a not insignificant majority just fifteen years earlier. Jay Howard Geller has 
uncovered the important history of German-Jewish cooperation at the highest levels of the West 
German government just after 1945, but this rather dramatic shift did not penetrate deep into 
 239 
society and politics on the local level during the 1950s.187 The protests that did emerge in Essen 
tellingly never broached the issue that remained eerily absent throughout the entire time the 
synagogue remained in damaged form, trees and grass growing out from its charred cupola, 
pieces of stone falling off its wall onto the nearby street –– why no one was around in the first 
place to take care of the building.  
 Poles and Germans appropriated and interpreted empty Jewish sites in ways that rarely 
fell neatly along the lines of the Iron Curtain or the Oder Neisse border. As they sought to rebuild 
their lives from tattered ruins, the markers of persecution, violence, and hate were gradually 
paved over, expunged, and neglected not necessarily out of malice but out of a deep sense of 
discomfort with the fragility of human empathy that these shattered symbols reflected. To say this 
will provoke ire from some, especially in the Polish case, who will be deeply unsettled by my 
comparison of the “perpetrators” with the “victims.” Although historians must carefully maintain 
the central role of Berlin in designing the “Final Solution,” lest they produce simply bad history, 
they have in recent years rightly moved beyond such simplistic demarcations as they grapple with 
the geographic breadth of the Holocaust that made it like no other genocide before or after it. 
Even in places where Nazi colonialism was extraordinarily brutal –– in Poland, the Ukraine, and 
Belorussia –– the local population at the very least displayed little concern about the mass murder 
of their Jewish neighbors and at the most worked with the German occupiers to kill them.188 It is 
precisely this breakdown of Jewish-gentile relations during the war that helps explain the neglect, 
destruction, and abandonment of Jewish sites in the immediate postwar decades.  
As this past became refracted through different present and future concerns starting in the 
late 1970s, Poles and Germans began to recover the few Jewish sites still left remaining in the 
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midst of wider discussions about Jewish-gentile relations during the war. This conversation 
became at times most intense as one moved, not always west à la Bartov, but also east: it was in 
the PPR of the 1980s that discussion about the Jewish past became particularly intense, more so 
certainly than in the GDR and to a certain extent even than in the FRG. It is to understanding this 
striking, indeed rather puzzling shift that is the focus of the next two chapters; puzzling because 
the desire to preserve those few Jewish ruins left standing, to interpret the physical markers of 
trauma, is perhaps more of an analytical conundrum than is the urge to erase the shattered 
symbols of the past. Nowhere else in Europe have (mostly) non-Jews interpreted –– with timidity, 
conflict, circumlocution, intensity –– the absence of Jewish life in the wake of genocide as 
palpably as Germans and Poles have since the early 1980s. And nowhere else in Europe have 
they reacted to this absence with as obsessive an embrace of “Jewishness” than in Poland and 
Germany.189 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE PRESENCE OF ABSENCE: REDISCOVERING JEWISH SITES 
 
 
In 2002, the journalist and travel writer Ruth Ellen Gruber published a book about the 
recent surge of interest in almost anything “Jewish” over the past twenty years in Europe.1  
Involved in the so-called Jewish Flying University in Warsaw in the 1980s and in efforts to bring 
attention to dilapidated Jewish sites throughout Eastern Europe, she charts the creation of 
“virtually Jewish worlds” from the dual perspective of observer and protagonist.2 As she travels 
across the continent attending Klezmer concerts performed by non-Jews and dining in “Jewish 
restaurants” in cities without Jews, she uncovers a fascinating and richly textured narrative about 
the recreation of Jewish culture. She describes one of the most interesting developments of 
postwar Europe: the paradoxical urge by societies that violently expunged Jews only forty years 
earlier to now invite them back in through virtual reconstructions of Jewish life. But Gruber 
largely misses the opportunity to analyze the salient, historical question of why this “rediscovery” 
is taking place in the first place. If she does explain it, she repeats the now traditional argument 
that 1968ers, with disdain for their parent’s supposed silence about the Nazi past, initiated this 
recovery.3 She turns to West Germany to support this broad claim and implies that the urge to 
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“deal” with the Nazi past spread from the German center to the eastern peripheries after the 
collapse of communism. While writing about Europe, including much on Poland, she makes the 
Federal Republic out to be the part that explains the whole in a way similar to how Omer Bartov 
sees the memory of the Holocaust fading ever more away as he moves from Berlin to his final 
destination of Kiev.4  
This generational and geographic argument certainly holds some degree of truth, but it 
has been assumed more than it has been shown to be of compelling analytical value. Indeed, the 
most recent research on West Germany casts significant doubt on the importance of 1968 for 
engendering a stronger awareness of the Holocaust. 1968 is seen less now as West Germany’s 
cathartic, redemptive moment when the Federal Republic finally became a “western, liberal 
country.” The generation of 1968 is appearing less often in the staring role as Germany’s “savior 
from its National Socialist past.”5 Dagmar Herzog has convincingly untangled the layered 
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memories behind the New Left that combined a rejection of the alleged “fascism” of their parents 
with strong, at times violent anti-Jewish sentiments.6 Even as 1968ers vigorously critiqued the 
sexual, political, and ethical positions of the 1950s by subsuming them into the larger, amorphous 
category of “fascism,” they remained acutely ambivalent about their attitudes towards Jews, 
especially once the “older” generation expressed elation with Israel’s victory in the Six Days 
War. A careful working through the fractured nature of German-Jewish relations simply did not 
fit into their antifascist politics. The 1968ers raised the issue of the “Nazi past,” but what they 
understood as “fascist” only ambivalently and tangentially related to Hitler’s racial campaign of 
empire building in Eastern Europe that involved the mass murder of European Jewry, Soviet 
POWs, Poles, Ukrainians, and the Sinti and Roma. Herzog has done an excellent job of 
challenging the myth of 1968, but now West Germany itself needs to be contextualized. Such an 
analytical move is necessary because, as Gruber rightly notes, interest in the Jewish past and the 
Holocaust has become transnational and to some extent pan-European, even if it is most 
concentrated in Poland and Germany. 
This chapter hopes to take up this challenge. Working through the five local contexts of 
Warsaw, divided Berlin, Potsdam, Essen, and Wrocław, it takes seriously the transnational and 
cross-political dynamics of this interest in the Jewish past. In a region of almost no Jews, a 
veritable renaissance of Jewish culture started to take place in the 1980s in the GDR, PPR and 
FRG. Concern about Jewish space became one of the main modes of expressing this interest. 
Beginning in the late 1970s, all three countries witnessed a gradual increase in attention to the 
material traces of Jewish life that intensified over the 1980s and 1990s. This interest in Jewish 
sites was significant both in terms of its intensity and breadth as well as in its striking departure 
from the early postwar decades when they were cleared away with virtually no concern. As 
Germans and Poles started to reflect upon the fact that Jews no longer lived among them, they 
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became concerned about preserving, protecting, and cataloging Jewish sites. The absence of Jews 
became present to them as they rediscovered the ruins of Jewish life.  
In 1997, a young, non-Jewish Pole, Marcin Kacprzak, living in the small town of Płock 
not far from Warsaw, wrote a letter to the Polish-Jewish magazine Midrasz about his attraction to 
this absence. “For a long time now,” he writes, “I have felt an indescribable connection to the 
Jews who existed and who are no more. … Each time I passed the old Jewish cemetery or the old 
Jewish district I felt something …  I am not sure what to call it exactly  –– nostalgia, curiosity, 
fascination?”7 He goes on further to explore his allure, saying perhaps it is just “curiosity in a 
different culture, so mysterious.” The absence of Jewish life became present to him as he walked 
by his town’s empty Jewish spaces. It is this growing awareness and interpretation of the 
emptiness created by the Holocaust –– the realization that Jewish life was now gone –– that 
stands at the center of this chapter. I call this interpretation of the Holocaust the “presence of 
absence.” I do not mean here a stable, celebratory endpoint of successful remembrance, but rather 
the move to mark the absence of Jewish life in the built environment.  
Indeed, I am interested in different variations on the central theme of Jewish absence, the 
contradictory and problematic impulses that inform Polish and German interpretations of the 
Holocaust and Jewishness. I hope to show that as interpretations of the past slowly shifted to 
include more openly the fractured nature of Jewish-gentile relations the appropriation of Jewish 
spaces changed as well. Although there were particular reasons for these shifts in all three cases, I 
argue that several broader transnational and cross-political factors were at play: local, civic efforts 
to reappropriate Jewish sites that often stood in uneasy relation to the state; political disputes 
about the meaning and interpretation of the Holocaust; and international and local pressure from 
Jewish leaders about the condition of Jewish sites. What is perhaps most striking is that the 
appropriation of Jewish space unfolded in rather different, conflicting ways in each individual 
city, indicating that interpretations of the past involve a more complicated dynamic between the 
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local, national, and transnational than the current historiographical emphasis on generation and 
geography shows. More broadly, I suggest that arguably the most penetrating, searing discussion 
of Jewish-gentile relations during World War II in the 1980s occurred not in West Germany but 
in communist Poland where the “Jewish problem” became a pressing concern for both the ruling 
political elite and segments of the opposition in the 1980s. The reason for this difference stemmed 
from the unusual response of the PZPR to the student protests of March 1968. In perhaps the least 
expected case, the rediscovery of the Jewish past cannot possibly be explained without Poland’s 
peculiar 1968. 
I. Poland’s Peculiar 1968  
1968 unfolded in Poland in an unusual, even odd way. While student protests in the 
United States and western Europe fought against imperialism, authoritarianism, and inequality, 
those in Poland (and Czechoslovakia) aimed at reforming, changing, and possibly ending the 
communist system. The results of 1968 in capitalist societies, although hardly unified and 
contested politically afterwards, produced notable socio-cultural changes, even if they were 
clearly hindered by continued struggles for racial, gender, and sexual equality.8 In Poland, the 
results of 1968 were starkly different. Although the brutal repression of the student protests 
convinced the intelligentsia that communism could never have a human face, the Polish 1968 did 
not usher in a long-standing challenge to gender, sexual, and racial norms. Instead it engendered 
the most virulent anti-Semitic campaign of postwar Europe. In a verbal assault with also real, 
physical effects in terms of forced migration and lose of jobs, the state-controlled media 
showered Poland with thousands of verbal attacks against Jews in the spring of 1968. Some 
13,000 Jews left the country. 1968 marked the last major wave of postwar Jewish emigration 
from Poland and the virtual end of Jewish life until the collapse of communism two decades later. 
The PZPR expunged Jews from the Polish nation under the euphemistic banner of “anti-
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Zionism.”9 Similar to the dual move made by the SED in 1952-53, the PZPR claimed the 
antifascist mantle of opposing anti-Semitism just as it embraced anti-Jewish hatred.10   
The outbreak of the “anti-Zionist” campaign has long been explained by Polish historians 
as the result of factional divisions within the PZPR precisely at the moment when anti-Zionism in 
the Soviet bloc reached a feverish pitch in the wake of the Six Days War. Since the end of 
Stalinization with the return of the once ousted Gomułka in 1956, the PZPR split into two rival 
factions that disagreed about the pace and extent of reforming communism. The Natolin group, 
named after the part of Warsaw where it met, opposed sweeping change and was made up mainly 
of ethnic Poles. Its main opposition, the Puławska group named also after a Warsaw district, 
tended to be more diverse with both Polish and Jewish communist members and more reform-
minded in outlook. By the early 1960s, another, increasingly powerful faction emerged on the 
scene under the guidance of the communist war veteran General Mieczysław Moczar. Appointed 
Interior Minister in 1964, Moczar developed a strong base of supporters, known as “Partisans” for 
their wartime participation in the communist underground, in both the Interior Ministry and in 
Union of Fighters for Freedom and Democracy (Związek Bojowników o Wolność i Demokrację, 
or ZBoWiD). ZBoWiD became the most powerful veteran organization in postwar Poland with 
some quarter of a million members, and it strongly advocated for preserving a deeply “Polish” 
interpretation of the wartime years. Moczar’s partisans embraced the ethnically homogenous idea 
of the Polish nation. In 1968, they were the main attackers of Jews in the press and urged that 
they be removed from the government. The “anti-Zionist” campaign would not have occurred as 
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intensely and as virulently as it did without the crucial role of Moczar and his allies who 
remained hostile to even the smallest presence of Jews in postwar Poland.11 
 But factional divisions alone did not instigate Poland’s peculiar 1968; a series of 
international and local events also touched off the fury of hate. Israel’s crushing, rapid victory in 
the Six Days War initiated a flurry of anti-Zionist propaganda throughout the Soviet bloc but 
none as intense as in Poland. The Polish public reacted positively to the Israeli victory against the 
Soviet-supported Arab states. Gomułka and Moczar were incensed. The Interior Ministry claimed 
that Polish Jews were behind the response, and Gomułka suggested that those not loyal to Poland 
should leave the country.12 On June 19, 1967, he made his fateful speech that compared those 
supporting Israel to a “fifth column.” “Israeli aggression against the Arab countries has met with 
applause in Zionist circles of Jews –– Polish citizens,” he thundered, “we believe that every 
Polish citizen should only have one fatherland –– People’s Poland. … We do not want a fifth 
column to arise in our country.”13 Although some Politburo members listening to the speech were 
unsettled by its strident tone and successfully demanded that the fifth column reference be 
removed from published versions of it, Gomułka’s words sent a clear signal to Moczar’s Interior 
Ministry that now was the time for its long-awaited expulsion of “Zionists.”  
 A purge of Jews from the state apparatus soon followed, but a full-scale attack did not 
emerge until a year later in the midst of internal opposition to the regime.14 In March 1968, 
students at Warsaw University protested the party’s decision to ban a performance of Adam 
Mickiewicz’s famous play Dziady. The PZPR responded by brutally attacking a student rally on 
March 8 in the hope that the protests might end. The effort backfired. The protests spread to other 
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parts of Poland and continued for the next two weeks. The party leadership now searched in 
desperation for a way to quell them, fearing that this largely student dissent might expand to 
include workers. The PZPR leadership turned to the growing power base of Moczar and his allies 
such as Bolesław Piasecki, a wartime fascist turned postwar communist who founded the right-
wing, Catholic organization PAX, to unleash a verbal attack against the “Zionist” initiators of the 
protests. A mere three days after the first riots, PAX’s newspaper published an article that 
explained the outburst of the student unrest as the result of a “Zionist” conspiracy that had 
corrupted the Polish youth and the intelligentsia, making them turn away from their “patriotic 
responsibility for the People’s Republic.”15 This attack sparked a wave of anti-Jewish articles that 
turned on Jews from almost every conceivable direction.16 One of the central lines of assault 
alleged that international Jewish organizations were carrying out a broad “anti-Polish” campaign 
by focusing on the breakdown of Polish-Jewish relations during the Holocaust. Based on 
prejudices against Jews as cosmopolitan, international, conspiratorial, and intrinsically anti-
Polish, this attack claimed that “international Zionism” intended to smear “Poland’s good name” 
by imputing upon the Polish nation responsibility for the Holocaust (zagłada Żydów). West 
German and Israeli agents were “slinging responsibility for the murder of six million Jews onto 
the Polish nation.”17 The “anti-Polish smear campaign of world Zionism” focuses on “the alleged 
‘crazed’ antisemitism in our country and the cooperation of Poles in the extermination of Jews 
during World War II.”18  
Allies of Moczar from the Interior Ministry and ZBoWiD targeted what they perceived as 
one of the central components of this “anti-Polish” campaign: Jewish attempts to undermine 
                                                 
15 “Do studentów Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego,” Słowo Powszechne, March 11, 1968.  
 
16 A collection of some of the most important articles has been compiled by Piotr Osęka, Syjoniści, 
inspiratorzy, wichrzyciele. Obraz wroga w propagandzie marca 1968 (Warsaw: ŻIH, 1999).  
 
17 “Do studentów.” 
 
18 “Wspólnicy antypolskiej histerii,” Sztandar Młodych, April 4, 1968, 5.  
 
 
 
249 
Polish victimization during the war by stressing the singularity of the Holocaust. They responded 
no less than by challenging and even denying the particularity of the Nazi genocide of European 
Jewry. Beginning in the summer of 1967, the MSZ and ZBoWiD attacked the alleged 
“revisionist” work of an article on the “Nazi concentration camps” that had recently appeared in 
the official, state-published encyclopedia. The article differentiated between “concentration” and 
“death” camps, acknowledging that Jews were killed systematically in the death camps, but the 
MSZ and ZBoWiD interpreted this distinction as an attempt to mitigate the persecution of the 
Polish nation. Orchestrated by “West German revisionists and Zionists,” this deliberate effort to 
exclude Polish suffering from an official interpretation of the past was not merely some technical 
mistake, but part of a larger Jewish conspiracy against Poland.19 
This point of attack emerged most forcefully during the PZPR’s celebration of the 
twenty-fifth anniversary of the Warsaw ghetto uprising, which awkwardly coincided with the 
anti-Zionist campaign. The party interpreted commemorations that occurred outside Poland as 
merely one more weapon in a broad, Zionist arsenal of anti-Polonism. Although some reports 
published in international newspapers stressed the absence of Polish support for the uprising, they 
tend to be cautiously worded and focused mostly on the plight of the Jews.20 Commemorations of 
the uprising reflected the growing discussion of the genocide of European Jewry in the United 
States, Israel, and Western Europe.21 It was, in fact, this emerging consciousness about the 
                                                 
19 Piotr Osęka, “Encyklopedyści,” Gazeta Wyborcza March 6, 1998, 30.   
 
20 In 1968, the New York Times wrote with remarkable calm: “All during the agony of the Warsaw ghetto, 
the people of the city that encircled it lived more or less normally; there was no general uprising or other 
major effort to aid those so desperately fighting the Nazis, virtually with bare hands. Not all Poles were 
passive, of course, nor were all Jews heroes. There were numbers of non-Jewish Poles who lost their lives 
or risked them to help the doomed thousands in the ghetto. There were even a few Jews who betrayed their 
own people. But these were the exceptions –– on both sides.” “Warsaw, 25 Years After,” New York Times 
April 19, 1968.  
 
21 Although the early 1960s witnessed a general surge of interest in the Holocaust, it should be emphasized 
that throughout the 1950s discussion about the Holocaust –– even if that specific term was not used –– took 
place at times, especially in the United States, Israel, and West Germany. See Lawrence Baron, “The 
Holocaust and American Public Memory, 1945-1960,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies vol. 17, 1 (2003): 
62-88; Lawrence Baron and Peter Novick, “Letters to the Editor,” Holocaust and Genocide Studies vol. 18, 
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singular fate of European Jewry –– what was becoming known as the “Holocaust” –– that the 
PZPR found threatening in the midst of its anti-Jewish campaign.22 The concept of the Holocaust 
became twisted to conform to the party’s self-imagined fears, and now the PZPR challenged more 
than ever the notion that Jews were the supreme racial enemy in Nazi thinking. In the leading 
speech of the twenty-fifth anniversary, Kazimierz Rusinek, general secretary of ZBoWiD and 
major critic of the encyclopedia entry, thundered: “A mistake is being made by those who think 
and write today that Nazi ideology called for the extermination only of the Jews. Nazism sought 
the total extermination of Poles, Russians, Jews, and Greeks, the total destruction of France, Italy, 
and Czechoslovakia, and the total subjugation of the Scandinavians and the English.”23 In this 
narrative, the party portrayed ethnic Poles as equal victims of the Nazi regime who heroically 
rescued Jews.24 A key selection from an article published in Trybuna Ludu can perhaps stand for 
the many that appeared in 1968:  
A common strand in the fight against a common threat gave rise to the ghetto uprising: while 
perpetrating the horrendous crime of murdering millions of Jews, Nazi Germany intended the 
same fate for the Polish nation and advanced far in realizing this plan. Only the solidarity 
established across the wall enabled the undertaking of the ghetto fight; only Polish society and its 
underground organizations hastened effective aid in the uprising to the ghetto prisoners; only 
thanks to the heroism of Poles, ready to endanger their own lives, were tens of thousands of people 
of Jewish descent rescued from death … 25 
 
Although this passage continues the “Polonization” of the ghetto uprising that had been the 
hallmark of earlier anniversaries, it departs from previous commemorations in significant ways. If 
before the ghetto uprising represented the progressiveness of Polish communism, now it reflected 
                                                                                                                                                 
2 (2004): 358-375; Dalia Ofer, “The Strength of Remembrance: Commemorating the Holocaust during the 
First Decade of Israel,” Jewish Social Studies vol. 6, 2 (2000): 24-55; Marcuse, Legacies, pp. 199-220.  
 
22 On the emergence of the term Holocaust, see Zev Garber and Bruce Zuckerman, “Why Do We Call the 
Holocaust “The Holocaust”? An Inquiry into the Psychology of Labels,” Modern Judaism vol. 9, 2 (1989): 
197-211; Dalia Ofer, “Linguistic Conceptualization of the Holocaust in Palestine and Israel, 1942-1953,” 
Journal of Contemporary History vol. 31, 3 (1996): 567-89.  
 
23 “Zbrojny czyn warszawskiego getta –– integralną częścią ogólnopolskiej walki z okupantem,” Trybuna 
Ludu, 19 April 1968.  
 
24 “Gdy Polacy przelewali krew pod gettem …” Sztandar Młodych April 3, 1968, 3.  
 
25 “W 25 rocznicę. Getto walczące,” Trybuna Ludu April 19, 1968, 3. 
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the general benevolence of Polish society as a whole, which had bravely sacrificed for the good 
of others in the face of its own extermination. The image of Poles as equal victims and as heroic 
resisters against Nazi anti-Jewish policies became the leitmotif of the twenty-fifth anniversary 
commemorative events.  
This attack against the western, Jewish “Holocaust” might seem like a predictable effect 
of the 1968 campaign, as merely one more additional consequence of an antisemitic propaganda 
machine that went after anything associated with Jews. It might not be surprising, but this assault 
on the Holocaust reflected a much deeper anxiety about memory than explaining it as Orwellian 
politics allows.26 The 1968 anti-Zionist campaign was a linguistic assault that turned precisely on 
the kind of discursive and symbolic politics that shaped the interpretation of the past. The 
perceived challenge that the “Holocaust” posed to Polish martyrdom and resistance mattered 
greatly to the leadership of ZBoWiD and the Interior Ministry. It was not some trivial issue; it 
was more than merely a “policy instrument.”27 The “Holocaust” had to be taken seriously and 
confronted vigorously because the stakes appeared high –– no less than Poland’s honor and 
reputation. Moczar’s “partisans,” who had actively opposed the Nazis during the war, were privy 
to plenty of information about the everyday ways that ordinary Poles became entangled in the 
persecution of the Jews. Some were surely involved themselves. They deeply feared this past 
because it revealed the fragility of their own empathy. They feared this past because the 
Holocaust challenged precisely the heroic interpretation of the war that they had been fashioning 
and celebrating for the past two decades. They were afraid. They were anxious. They were 
paranoid. They responded by expelling the physical and mnemonic traces of Poland’s Jews in a 
verbally violent attack that pushed some 13,000 Jews out of the country.  
                                                 
26 Although I find Stola’s work insightful, he tends to over emphasize the importance of the communist, 
Orwellian bureaucratic monolith in explaining the eruption of hate. Stola, Kampania; Stola, “Anti-
Zionism.” 
 
27 Stola, “Anti-Zionism.” He does not focus specifically on this attack against the Holocaust, but sees the 
anti-Zionist campaign broadly speaking as a “policy instrument.”  
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II. Rediscovering Poland’s Jewish Past    
 But their actions had deep consequences for the PPR. 1968 proved to be one of the major 
turning points in postwar Poland much more so than in either the GDR or FRG. It convinced 
most of the country’s intellectuals that communism was no longer the future and many now 
turned toward opposing the regime in the 1970s. They sought to create alternative spaces of 
power and to deal with weighty issues that they believed had to be discussed in order to build a 
better, more humane, post-1968 Poland. Polish-Jewish relations were one of the most important 
of these issues. The anti-Zionist campaign awakened among Poland’s intelligentsia the “Jewish 
problem” and stimulated an intense debate about Polish-Jewish relations that helped to destabilize 
the regime. This interest in the Jewish past started first among a particular group of lay, Catholic 
intellectuals without whose efforts the debates about Polish-Jewish relations in the 1980s would 
not have taken place as intensely as they did.  
The lay Catholic intelligentsia formed a distinct milieu in postwar Poland. Writing in 
three main lay Catholic publications, Tygodnik Powszechny (Universal Weekly), Znak (Sign), and 
Więź (Link), intellectuals such as Jerzy Turowicz, Stanisław Stomma, Antoni Głobieu, Zbigniew 
Herbert, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Bohdan Cywiński, and Jerzy Zawieyski emphasized the shared 
values of openness, dialogue, and tolerance.28 With only a few women among their ranks, they 
continued the prewar tradition of the salon as a male-dominated space of intellectual exchange 
and debate. Centered mainly in Cracow and Warsaw, they became known as the Znak group after 
both the publication and the small parliamentary faction that was allowed to enter the Sejm after 
the reforms of 1956 during de-Stalinization.29 This group did not have much political power and 
accepted the permanent reality of the communist state, forming a peculiar form of semi-
                                                 
28 Christina Mannetti, “Sign of the times: The Znak circle and Catholic intellectual Engagement in 
Communist Poland, 1945-1976,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Washington, 1998). 
 
29 I will call them either the Znak group or lay, open Catholic intellectuals. The second formulation is 
probably the most accurate: they were intellectuals outside the official Church hierarchy who usually 
approached issues with the aim of stimulating dialogue.  
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opposition that worked within the system and at times absorbed its ideological commitments.30 
One might be tempted to call this group “liberal” or “progressive.” On some issues, such as what 
constitutes “Polishness,” they were to a large extent. Most tended to argue for a more open sense 
of Polish national identity, while also accepting the political importance of the post-1945, 
ethnically homogenous Polish nation.31 But on other issues, like gender and sexual equality, they 
were much more traditional. They were liberal in John Stuart Mill’s sense of the word, coalescing 
around the ideas of openness, dialogue, and the free exchange of ideas.  
They also came together as a relatively cohesive group because of the similar social 
background that a number of them shared. Intellectuals of Znak usually came from the upper 
echelons of prewar Polish society. They represented the surviving remnants of Poland’s nobility, 
or szlachta, that had long dominated the ranks of the intelligentsia, but now was fading in 
importance after the war and the efforts of the communist regime to build a new intellectual elite 
from the working class and peasantry. An important core of the group –– Turowicz, Stomma, 
Gołubiew, and Herbert — came from the kresy, the eastern borderlands that Poland lost to the 
Soviet Union after 1945.32 This area, made up of a panoply of ethnic, religious, and political 
groups, was more diverse than the rest of Poland but its “pluralism” became mythologized after 
the war.33 Gołubiew claimed that those who lived in the kresy were more likely to identify with 
the seemingly innocuous “state” than with the pernicious “nation,” while Herbert mournfully 
looked back on the absence of Poland’s multiethnic borderlands: “Poland without Jews, without 
                                                 
30 On this “neo-positivist” acceptance of the communist state, see Mannetti, “Sign of the Times,” 168-182. 
Neo-positivism built upon the positivist tradition of Polish patriotism that developed after 1863 in 
opposition to the romantic demand for resistance. Positivists emphasized the need for “organic work” to 
strengthen the nation from within in the face of the failed 1863 rebellion against Russian rule.  
 
31 This duality emerges perhaps most clearly in the group’s relationship toward Germany as Annika 
Frieberg has shown in “The Project of Reconciliation: Journalists and Religious Activists in Polish-German 
Relations, 1956-1972,” (Ph.D diss., University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2008).  
 
32 Manetti, “Sign,” 45.  
 
33 Poles were, in fact, a minority in the kresy making up only one third of the population.  
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Ukrainians, without Armenians, as it was in Lwów ... stopped being Poland.”34 Few mentioned 
that the kresy witnessed some of the bloodiest attacks against Jews and Ukrainians. They seemed 
to have forgotten that past altogether perhaps now because in a post-1945 Poland they could. 
With Poland’s minority “problem” gone after the Nazi genocide of the Jews and the removal of 
Germans, Lemkos, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Belorussians, one could think of “pluralism” 
without it actually causing any serious challenges to the sustenance and integrity of the Polish 
nation.  
Still, these nostalgic imaginations of a cosmopolitanism that never existed reveal the 
general importance of a more pluralistic national identity for this group that contested the most 
exclusivist tendencies of Roman Dmowski’s anti-Semitic, ethnic nationalism.35 In 1945, Jerzy 
Turowicz, editor of Tygodnik Powszechny, forcefully rejected past attempts to “reconcile 
Catholicism with ideological positions such as totalitarianism, extreme nationalism, and racial 
anti-Semitism.”36 In another essay, he underscored that “it would be a mistake to claim that the 
[Church’s] role was always positive, that in this picture there are no shadows.” He criticized the 
nationalization of Catholicism, suggesting that the notion of the “Polak-katolik” included 
“potentially or actually a certain element of intolerance or discrimination.”37 Turowicz was 
attacking here the exclusivist ideas of Dmowski who believed that any attempt to “dissociate 
Catholicism from Polishness and to separate the nation from its religion and the Church, is to 
destroy the very essence of the nation.”38 At the same time, other leading Znak intellectuals, such 
                                                 
34 Antoni Gołubiew, “Tutejsi,” Znak no. 10 (1970): 1313; Jacek Trznadel, Hańba domowa. Rozmowy z 
pisarzami (Paris: Instytut Literacki, 1986), 191.  
 
35 On Dmowski’s conception of the nation, see Porter, When Nationalism Began to Hate.  
 
36 Jerzy Turowicz, “Sprawa katolicyzmu,” Tygodnik Powszechny, no. 11 June 1945.   
 
37 Jerzy Turowicz, “1000,” Tygodnik Powszechny, April 10-17, 1966; reprinted in Turowicz, Kościół nie 
jest łodzią podwodną (Cracow: Znak, 1990), 232 and 242. 
 
38 Roman Dmowski, “Kościoł, naród, i państwo,” reprinted in Roman Dmowski. Wybór Pism, vol. 4 (New 
York: Instytut Romana Dmowskiego, 1988), 99.  
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as Stanisław Stomma and Stefan Kisielewski, absorbed the reality that Poland had become a 
homogenous nation-state after war, genocide, and expulsions. These intellectuals were, in short, 
by no means imagining a post-nationalism of supra allegiances.39  
But they were still clearly a different voice in postwar Poland. Most members of Znak ––
 although by no means all –– generally opposed most of the positions advocated by PAX, a rival 
Catholic organization that forged closer ties with the communist state and strongly embraced the 
anti-Semitism of Dmowski. In 1947, PAX came into existence thanks to the energy and 
persistence of Bołesław Piasecki, an eclectic figure who began his political career before the war 
as the leader of a small fascist group called the National-Radical Movement and ended it in 
support of the communist regime. Captured after the war for battling the Soviets in eastern 
Poland, he convinced his captors that he could garner support for the regime from Catholics and 
members of the radical right. He established PAX to bridge Marxism and Catholicism, to unify 
believers and non-believers under the banner of God, nation, and socialism. If there were two 
ideas that remained consistent in Piasecki’s political biography, it was his strong belief in the 
Polak-katolik and anti-Semitism. He embraced with fervor Dmowski’s idea that Poland should be 
a country made up only of Poles and his hatred of Jews was infamous in postwar Poland.40 
The conflicting worldviews of PAX and Znak collided most sharply in 1968. Piasecki 
became one of the “drum majors” of the “anti-Zionist” campaign with articles in his newspaper 
Słowo Powszechne (The Universal Word), which launched the opening salvo of the linguistic 
assault.41 Meanwhile, the Znak group, represented in parliament by six members, moved at times 
in a different direction, if cautiously and tepidly. In June 1967, the group reacted to the PPR’s 
                                                 
39 As Frieberg has noted, this led at least some Znak intellectuals, Stomma especially, to embrace 
Dmowski’s understanding of European geopolitics as made up of single nation-states rather than 
multinational empires or kingdoms. Frieberg, “Project of Reconcialition,” 67.  
 
40 Kunicki, “The Red and the Brown;” Kunicki, “The Polish Crusader: The Life and Politics of Bolesław 
Piasecki, 1915-1979,” (Ph.D diss., Stanford University, 2004).  
 
41 Ibid., 212-22. See also chap. 6 of his dissertation. “Do studentów.” 
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critical response to the Six Days War by drafting a parliamentary interpellation that criticized the 
government for siding with the Arab states without recognizing the right of Israel to exist as a 
state. The draft implied that Israel deserved special consideration, especially from Poland “where 
Jews lived together with us under the same roof for centuries and where in 1939-1945 together 
we suffered persecution.”42 But these courageous words never left the table on which they were 
drafted. Just before the interpellation was to be sent to the PPR’s foreign minister, the Znak group 
pulled it. Such criticism was probably too politically risky with news coming from Moscow that 
the Soviet bloc had officially condemned Israel and would soon end diplomatic relations with it.  
  The Znak group did not, however, buckle under pressure a year later when it came to the 
PZPR’s brutal suppression of the student protests in March 1968. It drafted another interpellation 
and submitted it this time. The measure put forward two direct, frank questions for the state to 
answer: “What does the government intend to do to quell the brutal actions of the police and the 
ORMO against the student youth and to find out who is responsible for this brutal treatment of 
the youth? What does the government intend to do to offer a substantial answer to the burning 
questions of the youth, which are also nagging questions for a broad section of public opinion, 
concerning the democratic rights of citizens and the cultural politics of the government?”43 In the 
highly politicized environment of 1968, these were bold and even risky words spoken from a 
group that had much to lose and almost nothing to gain by expressing them. The students 
protesting on the streets were hardly part of the lay Catholic intellectual milieu. Most of them 
identified themselves with the secular Left that at this point wanted little to do with the Church. 
Znak bravely stood up for them at a dire moment, but its intervention throughout the spring of 
1968 was limited in one crucial respect. The parliamentary group remained completely silent 
about the anti-Zionist campaign. Its silence was understandable at first. The Znak interpellation 
                                                 
42 Interpellation, June 8, 1967 (not sent), reprinted in Andrzej Friszke, Koło posłów “Znak” w Sejmie PRL 
1957-1976 (Warsaw: Wydaw. Sejmowe, 2002), 475-77. 
 
43 Interpellation, March 11, 1968, reprinted in Friszke, Koło, 488.  
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came out on the exact same day that Piasecki’s newspaper published the opening attack of the 
verbal hate that showered Poland in the days to come. Although the anti-Jewish position of 
Moczar and his allies would have been clear to anyone, no one could possibly have imagined the 
virulence of hate that was to come. But Znak’s silence is much less understandable a month later 
during a parliamentary debate that took place about its interpellation. The parliamentary session 
was organized to allow the government to respond formally to its questions and allow Znak to 
elaborate further on its views. By now the anti-Zionist campaign was at its peak and even Znak 
was being attacked for its “Zionist” leanings. “Today the [Znak] group departs even further from 
the interests of Poland,” thundered politburo member Zenon Kliszko, “it stands on the side of the 
Zionist and revisionist elements who have inspired and organized this entire provocation.”44  
But the Znak group remained entirely silent about these absurd charges and the hundreds 
of Jews now fleeing from Poland. Znak debated long about the official response it was to deliver 
in the Sejm. Three days before the parliamentary session, it met in the apartment of Jerzy 
Zawiejski, a prominent writer and Znak member who was to deliver the response. Zawiejski read 
his remarks with great tension and energy. At the end, he even collapsed and started sobbing.45 
Although he focused mainly on defending the writers under attack by the regime, he briefly 
touched upon the anti-Zionist campaign.  Everyone approved of his speech with the exception of 
Janusz Zabłocki who suggested removing those parts concerning the party’s attacks against Jews. 
Zabłocki had earlier signed the Znak interpellation, but now had second thoughts as he grew 
closer to the Moczar camp and envisioned creating a new, separate lay Catholic group that would 
foster closer church-state ties.46 He soon left the Znak group, but his opposition had the effect he 
                                                 
44 Sprawozdanie stenograficzne z 19 posiedzenia Sejmu PRL, April 9, 1968, 115. 
 
45 Andrzej Friszke, “Trudny egzamin. Koło Posłów Znak w okresie Marca 68,” in Marcin Kula, Piotr 
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46 Zabłocki approached the Moczar camp already on February 10, 1968. In 1968, he and his allies started a 
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wanted. The part about the anti-Zionist campaign never made it into Zawiejski’s speech delivered 
in the Sejm on April 10. Perhaps Zawiejski hoped to ameliorate the rift that had now emerged in 
Znak, or perhaps he did not want to offend Gomułka whom he clearly admired, even going so far 
to praise him in his speech: “I see him as a dramatic figure with a sense of responsibility not only 
for the Party, but for the Polish nation.”47 As a member of the State Council from 1957 to 1968, 
Zawiejski still wanted to believe, naively and tragically in April 1968, that the PZPR was 
interested in reforming communism.48 He could not have been more wrong. He left the Sejm 
utterly defeated. None other than Piasecki replaced him on the State Council on April 11, one day 
after his speech, in part as reward for being such a loyal spokesman against “Zionism.” Zawiejski 
committed suicide in 1969.    
The other members of Znak also made no mention of the anti-Zionist campaign with two 
exceptions. At the end of the parliamentary session, Konstanty Łubieński, who soon allied with 
Zabłocki and left Znak as well, stood up and remarked: “Like all Poles, we condemn the 
campaign carried out abroad accusing Poles of participation in the extermination of the Jews, but 
I remind you, honorable Ladies and Gentlemen, that the only book containing documentation 
about Poles offering help to Jews during the occupation came out precisely in our publishing 
house ‘Znak.’”49 Znak was being portrayed as a patriotic defender of Poland’s good name, 
bravely fighting against Jewish anti-Polonism that the PZPR largely invented. The other voice 
came from the now defected Zabłocki. In May 1968, he submitted an article to be published in 
Więź that the editorial staff rejected because it embraced elements of the party’s anti-Jewish 
                                                                                                                                                 
Research, a catholic organization founded by Zabłocki that opposed Znak and its growing ties with the 
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47 Sprawozdanie stenograficzne z 19 posiedzenia Sejmu PRL, April 9, 1968, 167. 
 
48 On Znak’s position toward communism, see Mannetti, “Sign,” esp. chap. 2.  
 
49 Sprawozdanie stenograficzne z 19 posiedzenia Sejmu PRL, April 11, 1968, 275. He is referring to 
Władysław Bartoszewski and Zofia Lewinówna, Ten jest z ojczyzny mojej. Polacy z pomoca) Z*ydom, 
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rhetoric. Zabłocki seemingly approved of Znak’s silence about the anti-Zionist campaign when he 
asked rhetorically: “Did someone not care enough about it to include it in our interpellation, 
putting us in the role of fighting against “anti-Zionism,” a battle that we would be waging 
ourselves about an issue that is not our issue?”50 He then went on to say that the state should not 
be led by “people who feel no connection with any fatherland or whose solidarity with another 
fatherland puts them above solidarity with Poland.”51 In the end, the Znak group not only did not 
officially speak out against the anti-Zionist campaign but two of its members actually absorbed 
and propagated elements of it.  
These remarks and the general silence of Znak during the most virulent outbreak of anti-
Jewish hatred in postwar Poland are striking. Znak conceived of itself at least as offering an 
alternative intellectual tradition to PAX that involved at times directly engaging with the problem 
of anti-Semitism. In 1957, Jerzy Turowicz published an article that explored the connections 
between Christianity and anti-Semitism, while three years later Tadeusz Mazowiecki wrote a 
lengthy, penetrating analysis of anti-Jewish sentiments in postwar Poland where he argued that 
the “struggle against a climate that is conducive to anti-Semitism is a struggle for human 
dignity.”52 And yet this universal message simply fell apart at the very moment when anti-
Semitism in Poland reached its height, precisely when the dignity of the 13,000 Jews who left 
Poland needed to be defended the most. A few Znak members obviously did not share 
Mazowiecki’s universalism as they absorbed the anti-Semitism around them –– the anti-Zionist 
campaign was not their “issue” –– but he and others like him probably did. Perhaps they were 
simply surprised by the virulent outbreak of anti-Semitism, or were distracted by the brutality of 
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52 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, “Antysemityzm ludzi łagodnych i dobrych,” Więź no. 5 (1960); reprinted in Pod 
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the state against the student protesters. Or perhaps they acted out of pure political calculation. As 
political players who accepted the permanent reality of the communist state in exchange for their 
voice being heard, they probably knew that opposing the anti-Zionist campaign would surely end 
their careers or at the very least hamper them.  
Whatever the possible reason, Znak’s conflicted involvement in 1968 proved pivotal for 
the growing interest in Polish-Jewish relations in the 1970s and 1980s. Although few Znak 
members have ever reflected on their failure to react to the anti-Zionist campaign, I would argue 
that the surge of interest in the Jewish past that began just a few years after 1968 among the lay, 
Catholic intelligentsia stems in part from a sense of shame that Znak remained silent about an 
issue so salient to its own imagination of a better Poland. When it counted most, its noble words 
were nothing more than words. A desire to discuss the “Jewish problem” was a deeply internal 
matter that involved not just the Church’s long history of anti-Jewish bias, but also its most recent 
failings.53 The entanglement of Znak in 1968 also had another, broader effect. It pushed Poland’s 
religious and secular, left-leaning intellectuals into dialogue with each other. Although both 
intellectual groups crossed paths in publications such as Tygodnik Powszechny and Znak in the 
1950s and 1960s, they still kept to their own intellectual circles until after 1968 when they came 
to realize that they had been targeted by the regime for the common values that they shared.54  
Two towering intellectuals, the Catholic writer Bohdan Cywiński and the leftist, secular 
dissident Adam Michnik, were central to advancing this alliance. In 1971, Cywiński published his 
landmark book, Genealogies of the Indomitable, that urged the lay Catholic intelligentsia to join 
                                                 
53 The Church hierarchy, although expressing deep concern about the response of the state to the student 
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(Warsaw: IPN, 2006), 633-710.  
 
54 In saying “groups,” I do not want to imply a false sense of stable cohesiveness. As seen with Znak’s own 
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with the secular Left in fighting for the common values of dialogue, tolerance, and pluralism. 
Four years later, Adam Michnik came from the other side and attempted to convince the secular 
Left to embrace progressive Catholics such as Cywiński, Turowicz, and Mazowiecki. In The 
Church and the Left, he argued strongly that when it counted most the intellectuals of the Znak 
group were the only ones who had the courage to defend the secular Left in 1968. Michnik’s book 
stands as one of the single most important intellectual texts of the Polish opposition, even if it is 
written with an air of naïve exuberance as he shows the most progressive sides of the Church for 
his suspicious, secular audience (he completely overlooks Znak’s silence on the anti-Zionist 
campaign). Michnik shaped the intellectual core of Poland’s version of the “anti-politics” that the 
Hungarian György Konrád first formulated.55 In dialogue with fellow opposition intellectuals 
Leszek Kołakowski and Jacek Kuroń, he advocated for creating a strong, engaged civil society 
that would stand outside and against the politics of the state.56 This alternative politics, like the 
New Left on the other side of the Iron Curtain, located power in civil society rather than the state. 
It wanted to create an empowered, engaged, and independent citizenry involved in an open, 
democratic dialogue that aimed for a pluralistic and tolerant polity, even if it did not always 
achieve that goal (there were few feminists among the male-dominated opposition leadership).  
A component of this alternative politics involved thinking about what kind of society 
should exist in Poland, about, in a phrase, the very meaning of what it meant to be Polish. This 
working through the different shades of identity brought the religious and secular intelligentsia 
into an extended discussion about Poland’s relationship with its minorities, including its 
entangled and fraught history with Jews, Germans, and Ukrainians. In The Church and the Left, 
Michnik advocated for learning about Poland’s “not always glorious past,” while embracing its 
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“pluralism, its variety.”57 In 1981, Jan Józef Lipski, founder of KOR and a prominent intellectual, 
published a penetrating essay about Polish nationalism with the searing title of “Two Fatherlands 
– Two Patriotisms: Remarks on the National Megalomania and Xenophobia of Poles.”58 Widely 
circulated in the clandestine press, the article called for a patriotism that followed the humanistic 
values of Christianity with its basic creed to “love our fellow man.” Lipski strongly criticized 
Poland’s hatred toward Germans, Russians, Czechs, and Ukrainians, but his prose became 
particularly impassioned when it came to anti-Semitism. Moving broadly from the Middle Ages 
to 1968, he analyzed the presence of anti-Jewish hatred in Poland and the general weakness of 
opposition to it with deep regret.  
Such critical sentiments were all the more powerful after the hate of 1968. “For me and 
my generation –– people born after the end of the war –– the Jewish problem did not exist,” wrote 
the essayist and Warsaw University professor Marcin Król. “Today, I do not know if it was good 
or bad, but until 1967 I was not aware that Jews or so-called “people of Jewish desent” are among 
my professors, colleagues, and good friends. The Jewish problem, the problem of Polish-Jewish 
relations, was forced upon us and it was because of March 1968 that I decided to participate in 
the work on the Jewish cemetery in Warsaw a few years after the March events.”59 Król points to 
a generation born after the war that had no lived experience of Jews and were young during the 
period of Stalinization. He is right to stress that this generation became interested in the Jewish 
past more eagerly than their parents, but young people were hardly the only ones. Some of the 
leading figures in rediscovering the Jewish past were born in the interwar years such as Jerzy 
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Turowicz, Jerzy Woronczak, Jerzy Tomaszewski, and Jan Jagielski.60  What seems more salient is 
that 1968 shattered the social acceptance of the fact that Jewish life in Poland no longer existed. 
The absence of Poland’s large Jewish community had become assimilated into everyday life after 
the war; it had become so normal, so banal that it rarely received much thought, reflection, or 
discussion. That is hardly to say that Jews were not discussed or that there was no “Jewish 
problem” in the early postwar decades, but that the banality of the absence of Polish Jewry 
eventually became less banal only after 1968. The absence of Polish Jewry gradually became 
present as Poles sought out alternative interpretations of Jews other than the singular conception 
offered by the regime: Jews as non-Polish Zionists who after heroically being saved during the 
war by Poles became traitors by first imposing a brutal, Stalinist dictatorship on them and then by 
slandering Poland’s good name with accusations of anti-Semitism. Working through the linguistic 
hate of 1968 became part of the anti-politics of the opposition.  
The process of working through it started out in rather small ways immediately after 
1968. Already in 1971, members of the Club of the Catholic Intelligentsia (KIK) in Warsaw 
organized the first annual “Week of Jewish Culture.” The event hoped to provide a better 
“understanding of a rich and yet poorly known culture” that “lived among us for centuries,” but 
whose “gigantic tragedy in the last war we witnessed.”61 It offered lectures on a host of different 
topics such as Jewish religious practices, National Democracy, the Kielce pogrom, and Christian-
Jewish relations. By paying attention to “forgotten or distorted issues,” the event sought to 
contribute its own part to building a “new, rich, and diverse society.” It hoped to “defend” a 
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cultural heritage from being “cut off from our own history” and from being excluded by a 
“homogenous and bland conception of the nation.”62  
As these small efforts to rethink the Polish-Jewish past were emerging, a number of Poles 
who now increasingly identified themselves as Jewish also became interested in joining the 
dialogue with their co-religionist (most of these “new” Jews articulated their Jewishness through 
religion).63 These Jews, who knew as little about Judaism as their Catholic friends, rarely thought 
about their Jewishness until 1968. “In the first dozen or so years of my life,” Stanisław Krajewski 
explained, “I knew absolutely nothing about my Jewish background.” A leading voice of self-
described “Poles trying to be Jewish,” Krajewski pointed to 1968 as the “turning point:” “That 
made me aware that I am of Jewish origin, that it counts, and that I can be beat up for it.”64 He 
and others like him became intensely interested in learning more about Judaism. In 1979, they 
started what became known as the Jewish Flying University (Żydowski Uniwersytet Latający, or 
ŻUL) in the spirit of the partition-era underground “Flying University” that KOR revived two 
years earlier.65 ŻUL was the first independent Jewish grouping in the PPR and had strong 
connections to the opposition. Held usually in private apartments and involving as many as one 
hundred people, ŻUL sponsored lectures about Jewish history, culture, and religion in an attempt 
to discuss issues either little known by its participants or ones that were believed to have been 
falsified by the academic establishment.  
A sense of loss shaped much of this growing rediscovery of the Jewish past among both 
Jewish and non-Jewish Poles. As Krajewski observed, “I would like to say that the absence of 
Jews leaves me, for one, with a sense of irreplaceable loss. I voice here not just a sentiment in 
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which is enshrined an idealized memory of old Poland, but rather an awareness of a real, manifest 
impoverishment of Polish culture.”66 This urge rested on a deep realization that this past could no 
longer be retrieved in the present.67 The various impulses of this melancholic nostalgia were 
captured perhaps best of all in a volume published in 1986 by the journalist and dissident 
Małgorzata Niezabitowska. On the editorial staff of the Solidarity Weekly during its abbreviated 
existence and contributor to Tygodnik Powszechny, Niezabitowska became intensely interested in 
the absence of Jewish life. She spent five years traveling throughout Poland with her husband, a 
photographer, to experience the “remnants” of Jewish life: abandoned Jewish cemeteries, desolate 
prayer houses, and the country’s “last Jews” who occasionally fill them.  
Although published in the United States in English translation, the book consists of 
conversations between the non-Jewish Niezabitowska and her Jewish interviewees that are as 
probing as they are intimate. They are themselves Polish-Jewish dialogues about the rupture and 
displacement of a deeply entangled relationship. The conversations constantly return to –– indeed 
cannot stay away from –– the common theme of absence. Speaking with the esteemed historian 
Szymon Datner, Niezabitowska confesses at one point that, despite years of talking with people, 
reading books, and looking at old photographs, she still cannot “imagine the world of the Polish 
Jews that existed on this land such a short time ago. It seems as distant as the ancient Etruscans 
do from the present-day inhabitants of Rome.” Datner responds by describing at length the 
“world” of Polish Jewry, but his narrative tellingly remains in the past tense: “the world of the 
Polish Jews was extraordinarily varied, rich, and colorful.”68 They seem to agree with what the 
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poet Antoni Słonimski expressed over thirty years earlier in his “Elegy for the Little Jewish 
Towns,” a poem often reprinted in the 1980s underground press:  
  No more, no more Jewish townships in Poland.  
  In Hrubieszów, Karczew, Brody, Falencia  
  Vainly would you look for lighted candles in windows, 
  And listen for chanting from a wooden synagogue.69  
 
At times, this sense of absence became expressed through essentialized imaginations of 
the “exotic” Jew who stands out as different, unique, and separate, yet seemingly authentic, 
wholesome, and beautiful.70 As Niezabitowska probes her subjects, the “last Jews of Poland,” her 
husband follows behind her, snapping photographs of them and of their dilapidated, desolate 
surroundings. Jews become a reified subject to be displayed, catalogued, and preserved. They 
become objects of curiosity and study, intriguing artifacts of the past that could be put into a 
museum. The contents of Niezabitowska’s book were first showcased in an exhibition in Warsaw 
and excerpts of it appeared in the premier depository of exotica and discovery –– the National 
Geographic.71 Thus a sense of inquiry into the unknown and unfamiliar motivated much of this 
interest in the Polish-Jewish past. In 1983, both Więź and Znak published issues devoted entirely 
to Polish-Jewish relations on the occasion of the fortieth-anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto 
Uprising. The sheer existence of these extensive volumes, the Znak volume had four hundred 
pages, speak powerfully to how much the “Jews” had become an intellectual concern for Poland’s 
secular, Catholic, and Jewish intelligentsia.72 But both volumes avoided a critical, probing look 
into the dynamics of Polish-Jewish relations, providing instead a series of interesting and 
thoughtful, yet fairly basic essays that deal with topics such as Catholic-Jewish relations, Jewish 
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religious practices, and Jewish literature. These were essays that introduced the unknown and lost 
“world” of Polish Jewry, captured in the words, photographs, and artifacts of the past.  
There were, however, some, albeit guarded attempts to engage more critically with what 
was often called the “Jewish problem.” In November 1980, an underground bulletin published in 
Wrocław devoted an entire issue to “Jews and Poles” and confessed in its introduction that Jews 
are a “problem for us.” There is the “problem of our conscience, burdened by the excesses of 
anti-Semitism before the war, the ghetto benches in universities. There is the problem of the 
indifference of parts of society to the extermination [of the Jews].”73 The underground journals 
Krytyka, Aneks, and Arka continued this critical, reflective look into the “conscience” of the past, 
probing topics such as the exclusivity of Polish nationalism, the history of anti-Semitism, and the 
issue of “Jewish-Communism.”74 These discussions continued in a series of international 
conferences about Polish-Jewish relations throughout the 1980s held in the US, the UK, and 
Israel. Closer to home, Jan Józef Lipski gave a long and powerful speech on the “Jewish 
question” at a conference on 1968 held at the University of Warsaw and attended by several 
thousand people.75  
It was, however, a confused speech, one that reflected the ambivalence, discomfort, and 
anxiety that often emerged when discussing the “Jewish problem” beyond superficial issues. 
Lipski remained unable to probe deeply the central issue of anti-Semitism in Polish society. He 
spoke with equivalence, hesitancy, and even defensiveness, especially about World War II when 
he pointed to unfair accusations from the West spread by Jews. “What is written about the Polish 
nation in the West is sometimes really unjust … I am hurt when I sometimes read about a ‘nation 
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of blackmailers.’”76 Taking his own family’s assistance to Jews as reflective of the national 
whole, he asked: “What are we being hit in the face for today?” “Anti-Polonism is not any 
morally better than anti-Semitism or anti-Ukrainianism,” he concluded in another speech.77 Such 
defensive posturing precluded Lipski from thinking about Poland’s relationship to the Holocaust 
except in the most equivocating of terms: “Did we all do as much as was possible, or too little, or 
nothing at a time when dying people and our own moral norms called for more than the 
possible?”78 What is more, Lipski actually reinforced the regime’s position in 1968 that any 
notion that Poles actively participated in the Holocaust was subversive, suspicious, and harmful 
to the nation. Even as he distanced himself from the “propaganda” of the party, he claimed that 
“Jewish circles” in the West have made “irresponsible accusations” about Poland’s “complicity” 
in the Holocaust.79 
Lipski was hardly alone in this regard. In 1985, when the PZPR finally decided to air 
selections of Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah, an eruption of criticism against this “western” 
intervention into Polish-Jewish relations exploded onto the pages of Poland’s official, Catholic, 
and underground press. Lanzmann’s landmark film is not directly about Poland. Interviews with 
survivors form its cinematic core, but some of the film’s most stunning scenes come from an 
intentionally portrayed dark, drab, poor, and anti-Semitic Poland.80 In the PPR, the film provoked 
defensive and hysterical comments about its “anti-Polish” agenda from broad segments of 
society. Few defended it; many condemned it. The state television station received 149 letters that 
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were overwhelmingly critical of it.81 Most intellectuals responded in kind. Jerzy Turowicz, 
perhaps most telling of all, could barely hold back his anger, calling the film “definitely partial 
and tendentious.” “It is quite a reflection,” he thundered, “of the common, simplistic, and unfair 
stereotype in the West about the issue of Poles and Jews; it is in a word –– anti-Polish.”82 
Turowicz received strong criticism outside Poland for these words. Timothy Garton Ash wanted 
him, as a Catholic intellectual of “distinction, integrity, and longstanding opposition to anti-
Semitism,” to think more critically about the role that the Church played in disseminating anti-
Jewish prejudices.83 In a similar way, Lipski was criticized for his hesitancy to think more boldly 
about Polish-Jewish relations during the war. In 1987, Jan Gross, writing in the American 
magazine Dissent, urged Lipski to recognize that Poles provided little assistance to Jews because 
they accepted the Nazi anti-Jewish policies of ghettoization.84 Both critics wanted their colleagues 
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to think about the direct causes that explain the active ways that Poles became involved in the 
Holocaust. They wanted them to conceive of Poles as agents whose chosen behavior had an 
impact on the lives of their Jewish neighbors. Poles were not just passive observers who could 
and should have done more.  
In the end, these two interventions from across the Atlantic had little effect and provoked 
little discussion in Poland. Gross’s time would come thirteen years later. Instead, for now, it was 
an “inside” voice that started to move in the direction that Lipski, Turowicz –– and indeed most 
Poles –– so strongly resisted. In 1987, the literary critic Jan Błoński published in Tygodnik 
Powszechny his now famous essay, “The Poor Poles look at the Ghetto.” Czesław Miłosz’s poem, 
“A Poor Christian Looks at the Ghetto,” served as his starting point. Writing in 1943 with smoke 
still billowing out from Muranów, Miłosz imagines himself buried alive among the charred ruins 
and dead bodies of the Warsaw ghetto as an apparently Jewish “guardian mole” bores through the 
rubble, making his way ever closer to the suffocated, fearful poet. The world has now come to an 
end and Miłosz asks: 
 What will I tell him, I, a Jew of the New Testament, 
 Waiting two thousand years for the second coming of Jesus? 
 My broken body will deliver me to his sight 
 And he will count me among the helpers of death:  
 The uncircumcised.85  
 
Błoński takes the fear that permeates Miłosz’s poem to interpret the inability of Poles to address 
the Holocaust. The fear that paralyzes the poet has paralyzed Polish society. Imagining a 
conversation between a traveling Pole and a “westerner,” Błoński works through the deep anxiety 
and pain that he himself has felt when the question of “Why are Poles anti-Semites?” is inevitably 
asked. Defensive responses follow ever more frustrated tones that only seek to deny this harmful 
“accusation.” The Polish-Jewish past comes up only as a problem that has to be refuted, batted 
away no matter how hysterically because, Błoński boldly concludes, Poles are deeply afraid of 
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their own guilt. The Jewish mole has never stopped burrowing the Polish “subconscious.” The 
only way to work through this fear is to accept openly Miłosz’s claim that “yes, we are guilty.” 
Błoński defines this guilt passively as sharing responsibility for a crime without actually taking 
part in it: “participation and shared responsibility are not the same thing. … Our responsibility is 
for holding back, for insufficient effort to resist.” He, too, cannot characterize Poles as agents, 
even when pressed by “voices claiming just that” from Jews in the west. Instead he concludes that 
only if Poles had been more “humane” to Jews before the Holocaust then perhaps genocide 
“would not have met with the indifference and moral turpitude of the society in whose full view it 
took place.”86  
 Błoński’s bold, yet at times cautious intervention was simply too much for the vast 
majority of Poles. Some two hundred people published critical responses to his essay.87 Although 
some of the Polish intelligentsia defended his position, a wide range of people from state 
authorities to Solidarity members to ordinary citizens firmly denounced his piece as unpatriotic 
and false. Władysław Siła-Nowicki, an important Solidarity lawyer, could have easily have been 
mistaken for a PZPR spokesman. He framed the problem exactly as the party had since the mid-
1960s, claiming that Błoński’s article reflected the “quintessence” of a “virulent anti-Polish 
propaganda campaign conducted endlessly for dozens of years by the enemies of … the Polish 
nation.”88 Kazimierz Kąkol, a state official who played a major role in the “anti-Zionist” 
campaign, placed Błoński’s essay firmly within broader, western attempts to defame the Polish 
nation, including Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah.89 The journalist Witold Rymanowski went even 
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further in an essay published in Życie literackie, one of the main outlets of the linguistic attack of 
1968, when he challenged the notion of Jews as historical victims. He argued that Jews had 
always been a “privileged group” over the “commercially inept and disunited” Polish peasantry 
who could never “dream of competing effectively against such a superb, indeed, masterly and 
world-class adversary.”90 Just as in 1968, so twenty years later: the Jewish mole caused such deep 
fear and anxiety that the only response seemed to be defensive, hysterical refutation.  
III. The “Jewish Problem” in Post-1968 Poland 
Just as these debates about Polish-Jewish relations were raging in the underground and 
official press, the PZPR became interested in the Jewish past as well. Part of this interest was 
simply because the state did not want to lose control over a sensitive topic to a growing 
opposition. Part of it also came from the change in leadership with the rise of Edward Gierek. 
Taking over the party in 1971, he hoped that softening the PZPR’s approach toward the now 
miniscule Jewish minority might help improve Poland’s image abroad at time when it desperately 
needed foreign loans to modernize its economy. He adopted a more pragmatic approach to 
politics than the hysterical, ideologically driven one of Gomułka and Moczar. Moreover, the 
PZPR was effectively forced to shift its policy toward the Jewish minority. Its “Jewish problem” 
did not suddenly fade away with the departure of 13,000 Jews. In a paradox that doubtlessly no 
one in Moczar’s Interior Ministry could have foreseen, it only intensified after 1968, transforming 
from an imagined “problem” in the Manichean minds of communist leaders to a real issue with 
actual consequences for the Polish state. As international Jewish leaders from the United States 
and Israel became more interested in Poland because of 1968, they increasingly expressed to 
Polish officials their deep concern about the state of Jewish life in the country. The poor, 
dilapidated condition of Poland’s numerous Jewish sites became a primary issue. In the span of 
just three years from 1976 to 1979, Jewish leaders and Polish state officials met for a total of nine 
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times in discussions that often lasted several days about the preservation of Jewish sites and the 
return of confiscated Jewish property.91 Meetings with top-level Polish officials involved 
prominent Jewish leaders such as Elie Wiesel, Nahum Goldmann, and Yitzhak Arad, as well as 
representatives from the World Jewish Congress, the American Federation of Polish Jews, the 
Federation of Polish Jews in Israel, and groups of American and Israeli rabbis.92 Many of these 
Jewish leaders had either survived the Holocaust in Poland or were born there, making their 
interest in preserving the material traces of Jewish life and ensuring the memory of the Holocaust 
highly personal.  
The PZPR interpreted this interest from Jewish leaders through the ideational frames of 
1968. Although Gierek’s regime approached politics more practically than Gomułka, a number of 
his top officials, including himself, had strongly supported the anti-Zionist campaign.93 Kazimierz 
Kąkol, Gierek’s point man for Jewish issues as head of the Office of Religious Affairs, was one 
of the main mouthpieces of 1968 and still believed as late as 1998 that the student protests were 
part of a Zionist conspiracy.94 In the 1970s, he and the party leadership interpreted the interest of 
Jews in Poland as a “Jewish problem” (problem żydowski or sprawa żydowska), a euphemistic 
phrase stamped on hundreds of pages coming from the Central Committee, the Foreign Ministry, 
and the Ministry of the Interior.95 These documents described the surge of interest in Poland as 
coming from “national-Zionist circles” in the west that controlled “the powerful mass media.” 
This supposedly coordinated attack used every “pretext” to carry out an “anti-Polish campaign” 
by making “slanderous claims about ‘traditional Polish antisemitism’” and “to burden our nation 
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with the guilt and joint responsibility for the Nazi extermination of the Jews and the destruction 
of Jewish culture.”96 The PZPR admitted that this interest in Poland had increased “especially 
since 1968,” but resisted probing any connections of the past with the present.97 It missed the 
chance to rethink seriously its past policy toward the Jewish minority, reinforcing instead the 
stereotypes and prejudices of 1968. Caught in a web of suspicion spun by themselves, party 
leaders such as Kąkol and others involved in the “Jewish problem” could not escape the anxiety 
of 1968: “Since Jewish organizations have such an enormous influence in the areas of politics, the 
economy, and the government in western countries, particularly in the United States, the anti-
Polish propaganda campaign is having a negative effect on the political and economic interests of 
our country because it creates an adverse climate in the international arena.”98 
 But this anxiety became expressed in a qualitatively new way than it did in 1968. By the 
late 1970s, the PZPR realized that it had to act boldly and resolutely to deflect growing demands 
from Jewish leaders. If in the spring of 1968 it settled on a solution to its Jewish problem by 
forcing Jews to leave Poland, it now decided that the best way to handle its new, post-1968 
Jewish problem was to bring the Jews back in. It decided to support a virtual reconstruction of 
Jewish life, centered around the preservation of Jewish sites in select cities and a stronger 
emphasis on the specificity of the Holocaust at death camps such as Auschwitz.99 In notes on a 
meeting concerning “the matter of counteracting attacks against Poland by international Jewish 
circles,” it was suggested that the party “create appearances of a Jewish authenticity” in 
Poland.100 When this meeting took place in 1976, the official Jewish community totaled a mere 
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1,319 members.101 The reconstruction of Jewish life in Poland could therefore be nothing more 
than virtual. It had to involve renovating synagogues, maintaining Jewish cemeteries, and 
commemorations of the Holocaust because that was the only visible way that the PZPR could 
possibly create some semblance of “Jewish authenticity.” But while the PZPR found a solution to 
the problem fairly quickly, it took a rather long time to implement it.  
Warsaw, Poland’s most visible city and the one most often visited by international Jewish 
leaders next to Auschwitz, gradually became the centerpiece of this new strategy but only after 
much hesitation and reluctance. Although many of the physical remnants of what was left of 
Jewish Warsaw after the Nazi occupation had vanished over the 1950s, several prominent Jewish 
sites were still left standing in the capital. Warsaw had two Jewish cemeteries, a synagogue, a 
Jewish historical institute, and a state-run Jewish theater. These Jewish spaces, especially the 
synagogue and the cemeteries, were in pitiful shape after years of neglect and destruction. In a 
city of a mere ninety Jewish community members, they dramatically reflected the collapse of 
Jewish life in Poland after the Holocaust and 1968.102 By the early 1970s, these sites started to 
become a problem for the PZPR as they attracted attention from international Jewish leaders and 
journalists. In 1973, James Feron, a New York Times foreign correspondent, published a 5,600-
word article on contemporary Jewish life in Warsaw for the Sunday paper. He declared that 
“Poland is perhaps witnessing a final chapter of the thousand-year-old history of Polish Jewry.”  
Warsaw’s abandoned Jewish spaces provided the most arresting evidence for his 
conclusion. “We were circling the Nożyk Synagogue … looking for an open door. The century-
old building is the last synagogue still standing in Warsaw, and it looks ready for the wrecker’s 
hammer. All the windows are bricked and boarded shut.” Feron then described the wanton 
destruction of the building, implying that Jews were not wanted in Poland: “The walls were 
                                                 
101 Ibid.  
 
102 AAN, UdsW, 131/514, ZRWM to UdsW, February 18, 1974. The number of Jews in the capital was 
obviously higher than those who registered with the official community.  
 
 
276 
chipped, and along the lower portions, occasionally defaced with what the scrawler apparently 
felt was an epithet itself –– Żyd (Jew).” Feron later moved on to Warsaw’s main Jewish cemetery 
on Okopowa –– the “largest and possibly busiest surviving Jewish site for Warsaw Jews.” That a 
resting place of the dead is described as more lively than a synagogue is an obvious ironic play 
with words, but Feron leaves it at that and returns to his theme of purposeful destruction: “The 
cemetery today bears evidence of age and abuse. … One whole section in the most remote corner 
has been systematically looted, evidently some years ago. A rumor persists that Polish authorities 
will build a road through the cemetery, or turn it into a park.”103 Feron’s piece absorbs 
stereotypical images of Poland as grey, drab, cold, lifeless, and anti-Semitic that probably 
surprised few American readers and only confirmed their assumptions of the Jewish graveyard of 
communist Eastern Europe.104  
Yet Feron’s reporting, while based clearly on cold war and anti-Polish prejudices of the 
anti-Semitic, dictatorial “east,” observed the results of the PZPR’s policy of neglect and 
deliberate destruction, revealing that any attempt by the party to create a “Jewish authenticity” in 
the capital would be difficult to say the least. Plans to build a road through the cemetery were not 
rumors. In 1956, Warsaw’s building department drew up plans to build a thoroughfare and 
streetcar line through the southern-most point of the cemetery. At a meeting when the idea was 
first discussed, the TSKŻ opposed the plans from the outset since it would involve exhuming 
around 5,400 graves. The city’s chief engineer discounted these concerns and urged the TSKŻ to 
think of its “civic approach” to the “needs” of Warsaw residents.105 In 1957, the Department of 
Religious Affairs noted further that the position of the TSKŻ was “unjustified” since the city had 
planned to use only 1/17 of the cemetery for its planned road, a small parcel that will not 
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“infringe upon the current needs of the Jewish population.”106 As years passed, the city continued 
to press Jewish leaders on the issue, but they refused to relent, arguing that the “cemetery is a 
symbol of the great tragedy of Polish Jewry” and destroying any part of it would “provoke 
outrage among Jews in Poland and throughout the entire world.”107 The city persisted. When the 
Jewish community suggested doing repairs on the cemetery in 1968, it said the idea was 
“pointless” since plans for the road were now “entering the phase of implementation.”108 Such 
certainty proved, however, unfounded; the road was never built. In the 1970s, international 
Jewish leaders voiced their opposition to it and the PZPR gradually realized that building a road 
through a Jewish cemetery in its capital city was politically unwise.109  
The Nożyk Synagogue suffered a similar fate from years of indecision on the part of the 
PZPR’s highest authorities. The building had virtually been closed down since 1968 and 
symbolized the ravages of the party’s approach toward the Jewish minority. Kazimierz Kąkol 
realized the symbolic potency of this ruined Jewish space and advocated strongly its 
reconstruction as he became more aware of Poland’s “Jewish problem” by the mid-1970s. In 
meetings with international Jewish leaders, he seemed to understand earlier than any other official 
in the Polish government the need for developing a new approach toward Jewish sites. In 1978, 
he wrote to Central Committee member Jerzy Łukasiewicz that the “complex of Jewish matters” 
carried “great weight” and could be either of “great harm or of a good deal of benefit” to the 
party. “It cannot be taken care of in the old style, temporarily without a broader political 
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perspective,” he concluded.110 Kąkol led the way for finding a “new style.” After meeting with a 
group of American rabbis in 1976, he sent a memo to every municipal government in Poland 
indicating that the state “maintains in principle” that “all existing Jewish cemeteries shall be 
preserved.” Doubtless aware that the state was not going to put any money behind this bold 
gesture, he added that “in practice” this means ending the long-standing policy of liquidating 
cemeteries and putting them to other uses.111 
 Kąkol soon realized, however, that a more proactive response was necessary. He argued 
that the state could display its concern for Jewish sites by renovating Warsaw’s synagogue. A 
visible site often visited by tourists, journalists, and Jewish leaders, he pointed out that the state 
could receive maximum benefit at a relatively low cost. He and other state authorities made 
promises to visiting Jewish leaders that the synagogue would be quickly rebuilt, but for over eight 
years reconstruction work languished as the state equivocated. In 1979, premier Piotr Jaroszewicz 
responded to Kąkol’s request for eight million złoty for the synagogue by suggesting that “rich 
Jewish organizations in the west” could pay for the expenses. Kąkol replied that this was hardly a 
large sum compared to the financial claims that “international Jewish circles” appeared to be 
making for confiscated Jewish communal property.112 As few seemed persuaded, Kąkol grew 
ever more worried about the repercussions of the synagogue’s dilapidated condition and appealed 
directly to Gierek for intervention:  
For many years, the Office for Religious Affairs has pointed out that the rebuilding of the Warsaw 
synagogue would be an important showpiece politically for Poland. … It was expected that it 
would be rebuilt as quickly as possible. Unfortunately, the reconstruction work is being carried out 
very sluggishly. Intervention from this office over the past years has led to no visible results. … 
Meanwhile, each day that its rebuilding is delayed causes negative political consequences. 
Tourists from the west, and among them a large number of aggressive representatives from Jewish 
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circles, visit the synagogue as a general rule. Its pitiful appearance is causing undesirable 
commentaries and political repercussions for our country.113 
 
Kąkol’s plea was to little avail. It took another three years for the highest officials of the PZPR to 
approve the renovation of the synagogue. In 1982, Kąkol’s successor, Jerzy Kuberski, urged that 
the synagogue be rebuilt in time for the upcoming fortieth anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto 
Uprising when numerous guests from abroad would be in the capital.114 This last intervention 
finally had an effect. In June 1982, General Wojciech Jaruzelski, the new First Secretary who had 
declared martial law seven months earlier, ordered the reconstruction of the synagogue given that 
its “devastated condition” was souring “relations with influential Jewish circles in the world.”115 
He instructed that the reconstruction be completed in a short ten months just before the fortieth-
anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. After the suppression of Solidarity with martial law, 
the Jaruzelski government desperately needed to improve its blemished image abroad and 
believed that supporting Jewish issues would help ease tense relations with the United States.116 
The opening of the synagogue on April 18, 1983 was widely celebrated. The director of the 
Department of Religious Affairs, Adam Łopatka, presented the state’s reconstruction of the 
destroyed building as a form of rescuing “Jewish monuments” from “Nazi barbarism.”117  
 The party hoped that such a bold, public gesture would mollify Jewish concerns and 
provide some stability after months of internal unrest. But Jewish interest from abroad only 
increased. In 1983, Sigmund Nissenbaum, a Warsaw Jew who survived the Holocaust and settled 
in Konstanz on the German-Swiss border, returned to his hometown for the fortieth-anniversary 
celebration of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising to find his city’s remaining Jewish sites in shambles. 
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The decrepit condition of the Jewish cemetery in his childhood district of Praga where many of 
his relatives were buried struck him in particular.118 The Nazis had destroyed many of the 
cemetery’s gravestones and after the war about 5,000 had been piled together by a tractor. Parts 
of the cemetery were even used for pasture in the 1950s.119 Nissenbaum set out to establish a 
foundation to take care of the cemetery and other Jewish sites in Poland. Officially recognized by 
the state in 1985, the Nissebaum Family Foundation was instrumental in restoring some of the 
cemetery’s tombstones and erecting a new gate for it. The PZPR welcomed its work not least 
because of the money it brought into the country, but it also worried that the foundation might 
gain too much influence over a sensitive topic.120  
But the greatest threat to the state’s ability to maintain control over Jewish space 
ultimately came from within Poland. As discussion about Polish-Jewish relations emerged among 
Catholic and opposition intellectuals, interest in Jewish sites increased greatly. As the last 
physical remnants of Poland’s Jewish community, they became one of the central modes of 
expressing interest in Jewish life. Monika Krajewska’s Czas kamieni (The Time of Stones), a 
photographic book of Poland’s Jewish cemeteries, became a bestseller in the 1980s, while Znak 
and Więź included articles that aimed toward a “reconstructed memory” of Jewish space 
(odbudowa pamięci).121 One of the main features of KIK’s annual “Week of Jewish Culture” 
involved restoration work on Warsaw’s largest Jewish cemetery on Okopowa street. The group 
used the space to reflect upon the loss of Jewish culture in Poland: “There will never be in Poland 
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again the rich and authentic culture of the Jews ... the traces of the thousand-year Jewish culture 
were destroyed during the war.”122 At the same time, such words and actions were laden with 
political symbolism in the highly politicized environment of post-1968 Poland. The reason why 
the Jewish cemetery needed such care in the first place was obviously because the state had 
neglected it for the past twenty-five years. 
Indeed, the party and segments of the opposition engaged in intense competition over 
Warsaw’s Jewish sites, especially in 1983 and 1988 when the PZPR staged two massive 
celebrations at the ghetto space. The 1983 commemoration of the ghetto uprising reflected 
perhaps like no other the schizophrenia of the PZPR’s approach toward the “Jewish problem.” In 
the months before the event, the party lodged anti-Semitic attacks against Solidarity in the hope 
of weakening its appeal.123 It then appointed none other than Moczar as vice-chair of the event’s 
organizing committee.124 In 1981, he had sensed the shifting direction of the party and suddenly 
realized that “it is impossible not to mention also that of the six million murdered Poles there 
were about three million Polish citizens of Jewish descent who lived among us on Polish soil and 
created together with us our history and made a great contribution to our culture and science.”125 
Just as awkwardly as Moczar pivoted, so too did the PZPR. In a carefully orchestrated event, the 
state used the anniversary to pay homage to the Jewish victims of the war and to emphasize the 
“harmonious coexistence of Poles and Jews.”126 
                                                 
122 AAN, KIK, 212, “Dlaczego Tydzien Kultury Żydowskiego?” 1976.  
 
123 “The Current Polish Crisis and the 1968 Antisemitic Campaign,” Research Report. Institute of Jewish 
Affairs no. 3 (1980): 3-15; “Jewish Themes in Polish Crisis,” Research Report. Institute of Jewish Affairs 
nos. 10 and 11 (1981): 1-19; “Poland’s Jewish Policies Under Martial Law,” Research Report. Institute of 
Jewish Affairs no. 3 (1982): 1-16; “Antisemitism in Today’s Poland,” Soviet Jewish Affairs no. 1, vol. 12 
(1982): 55-65. 
 
124 AIPN, BU 0236/264, t. 1, Projekt składu osobowego Komitetu Obchodów 40-tej rocznicy powstania w 
Getcie Warszawskim, 1983.  
 
125 “Przekazać młodemu pokoleniu życiową mądrość ojców,” Trybuna Ludu November 4, 1980.  
 
126 AIPN, BU 0236/264, t. 1, “Notatka dotycząca programu uroczystości związanych z obchodami 40-tej 
rocznicy powstania w Getcie Warszawskim.”  
 
 
282 
The awkwardness of this shift was not lost on parts of the opposition. In years past, 
participants of KIK and the Jewish Flying University had organized small, unofficial 
commemorations at the Warsaw ghetto memorial. 1983 was to be no different with the exception 
that this time it would involve one thousand people. It attracted such large attention in no small 
part because Marek Edelman, the only surviving leader of the ghetto uprising living in Poland, 
rejected the state’s invitation to attend its ceremony in a highly public letter that circulated 
throughout the opposition. Edelman explained that he could not participate in a ceremony when 
“words and gestures are completely falsified.”127 His boycott empowered the opposition to 
organize a large ceremony of its own, which took place on April 17 at the Umschlagplatz and the 
ghetto memorial. The secret police had been tracking plans for the ceremony since March and 
worried about its potential effects given that the “majority of Polish society” viewed the state-
sponsored ceremony “with little interest as an event for foreign Jews.”128 The police precluded 
Marek Edelman from leaving his hometown of Łódź and stopped Lech Wałęsa on his way to 
Warsaw, while dozens of police cars lined the streets of Muranów on the day of the unofficial 
ceremony. Flowers were placed at the base of Rapoport’s monument and several speeches were 
given, including a letter from Edelman that was read aloud. “It was my burning desire and duty to 
be with you today,” he wrote, “but unfortunately the security forces made that impossible.”129 The 
event lasted about an hour before the police dispersed the crowd. The foreign press focused more 
on the unofficial ceremony than on the regime’s shift in approach toward the Jewish minority. 
“To many of the demonstrators, the jackbooted policemen, with their long gray-blue belted 
overcoats, caps, and submachine guns, recalled the stark photographs of similarly dressed Nazi 
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soldiers here 40 years ago,” the New York Times sardonically quipped. The PZPR probably could 
not have imagined a more damaging indictment. And opposition leaders probably could not have 
imagined a better write-up: they too were obviously acting for international attention, using the 
ghetto uprising for their own political gain to challenge the authority of the regime.  
The state and opposition engaged in this competition again five years later. The PZRP 
held another elaborate ceremony to celebrate the forty-fifth anniversary of the ghetto uprising. 
The crowning moment came with the unveiling of a new Memorial Route of Jewish Martyrdom 
and Struggle, which took visitors along a tour through the streets of Muranów from the ghetto 
memorial to a newly erected monument at the Umschlagplatz designed by architects connected to 
the opposition. The idea of the route came from dissidents who founded the Civic Committee for 
the Preservation of Jewish Monuments. It demanded a new kind of memorialization that marked 
the individual lives of exemplary ghetto figures such as Emmanuel Ringelblum, Janusz Korczak, 
and Rabbi Yitzhak Nyssenbaum. The committee also wanted a monument to be erected at the 
former site of the Umschlagplatz. After the war this space had been turned into a trucking depot 
with a gas station built right next to it. Sensing a key opportunity to retake control over an 
important, international issue, the PZPR approved of the committee’s ideas and sponsored the 
construction of the memorial route complete with a new monument at the Umschlagplatz. It also 
approved of removing the adjacent gas station, although plans surfaced to return it just a month 
after the commemorative events had ended and the foreign guests had left. Polityka, a weekly, 
state-controlled magazine that had long included penetrating pieces on Polish-Jewish relations, 
published a scathing letter to the editor by five local activists who chastised the government for 
caring about nothing more than making a “good impression” on foreign guests.130  
The intentions of the PZPR might in fact have been clearly cynical, but the creation of 
this memorial route signaled a major departure from the decades-long appropriation of the ghetto 
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space. Rapoport’s monument had long been the only major sign of the Nazi campaign against 
Warsaw Jewry. The building of a new, socialist Warsaw had paved over the ruins of the ghetto 
space. In 1988, the history of the ghetto had partially been reinserted into the urban landscape 
thanks to the efforts of opposition leaders in Warsaw. Segments of the opposition expressed a 
genuine interest in rediscovering the Jewish past as part of its own imagination of a better Poland, 
but their intentions could also be just as fiercely political as those of the PZPR. The ad hoc 
protests at the site of the Umschlagplatz that started the movement to erect a monument there, the 
annual meetings at the Jewish cemetery, or the thousands who marched with banners through 
Muranów in 1988 in spite of government orders not to do so were all small acts of a much larger 
drama unfolding throughout Poland in the 1980s. Acting rebelliously was part of the carnival of 
revolution.131 Photos of the 1988 unofficial ghetto celebration, with banners of “Freedom and 
Independence” held up by a large crowd, could easily be mistaken as having been taken from a 
political protest. With western news organizations snapping pictures of these rallies, the 
opposition was also clearly using the ghetto uprising for their own political purposes. Just as the 
PZPR was attempting to gain support from western political leaders, so too were opposition 
leaders displaying their “cosmopolitan” embrace of the Jewish past for transnational 
consumption.  
And yet participation in the anniversary at least for some also stemmed from a deeply 
humane interest. One of the main initiators of the 1988 unofficial ceremony was Jacek Kuroń. 
Born in 1934 in Lwów (now Lviv) into a family with strong ties to the Polish Socialist Party, he 
followed the trajectory of a not insignificant number of European intellectuals who gradually 
moved away from their initially fervent embrace of communism. He joined the Polish communist 
youth organization at age fifteen, but in 1953 and then most famously in 1965 strongly criticized 
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the regime for straying from the principles of Marxism.132 He severed all ties with communism 
after 1968. In the 1970s, his critical writings and activism made him one of the most important 
figures of the opposition.133 Kuroń also cared deeply about Poland’s relationship with its 
minorities, working tirelessly toward reconciliation with Jews and Ukrainians in particular. As an 
eight-year old boy, he witnessed the suicide of a 14-year old Jewish girl for whom his father 
provided shelter and false identity papers. Her death made a deep impression on him, as did his 
trips through the Lwów ghetto on the streetcar en route to the swimming pool where he saw 
“people lying in the street dying of thirst” while he later chewed on “large, juicy cherries.”134  
In April 1988, Kuroń handed over to western journalists an appeal that a number of 
opposition members and intellectuals had signed regarding the upcoming anniversary of the 
ghetto uprising. It expressed a sense of loss: Jews “were our brothers. For eight centuries the 
Polish land was a shared land. The fate of Polish Jews is part of Poland’s fate, and their faith, 
language, culture, and tradition were an essential component of its social landscape.” It continued 
with “deep regret” that Poles did not always “notice this truth.” “We express with deep sadness 
that everything we could and were able to do to save our brothers was too little for what was 
needed.” The appeal called on Polish society to pay “remembrance to Polish Jews” by coming 
together on April 17 for an unofficial celebration of the ghetto uprising.135 Kuroń predicted that 
the event would express “the voice of an independent society” and by the sheer numbers of those 
who participated it did.136 It started at the ghetto memorial with about 2,000 in attendance and 
grew as the crowd moved through the streets toward the Umschlagplatz to at least 4,000 and 
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perhaps as many as 10,000.137 In a letter addressed to Marek Edelman read aloud to the crowd, 
Lech Wałęsa asked that the “painful and shameful manifestations of anti-Semitism be 
forgiven.”138 Kuroń could not have been more pleased with how the event unfolded. Gathered 
with friends in his apartment that evening, he triumphantly declared that the “voice of society” 
had been heard today. “The government in Poland never speaks in the name of society.”139  
Perhaps. But the precise voice Polish “society” expressed about the Polish-Jewish past 
was not at all clear. No sooner than the following evening, the difficulty of talking about Polish-
Jewish relations beyond a few noble sentences became yet again strikingly apparent when a small 
church in the Solec district of Warsaw hosted a panel discussion on the topic. Three academics 
spoke about the Bund, the poetry of the Warsaw ghetto, and the anti-Semitism of the wartime 
underground press. Hundreds of people packed into the church on a warm, spring evening for 
well over two hours. When the floor opened for questions, the defensive posturing began as “fifty 
years of unresolved anger and guilt flooded the room.” That description, coming from an 
American Jewish observer, probably is an exaggeration that speaks to its own kind of unresolved 
trauma, but still one can easily imagine that the discussion was intense and emotive as it had been 
during the Błoński and Shoah controversies. Three audience members apparently stood up in 
defiance. “‘People always say the Poles didn’t do enough for the Jews; it’s not fair! We hear so 
much about Poles who betrayed Jews; why not talk about the Poles who risked their lives to help 
Jews?’”140  Once the crowds dispersed and the banners were put away, the problem of Polish-
Jewish relations remained as polemical, raw, sensitive, and difficult as ever. The Polish-Jewish 
past provoked a deeply felt “fear” about the fragility of human empathy, and it was on this level 
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that Kuroń was only half correct that the state did not speak for society. Since 1968, the PZPR’s 
shifting, contradictory policy toward the “Jewish problem” partly reflected deeper, societal fears 
about the Holocaust and its inherent challenge to Polish identity as a martyr nation.  
The state did have, however, more to fear because its policies since 1945 had made the 
problem only worse. The fortieth-fifth anniversary of the ghetto uprising fell rather untimely on 
the twentieth-anniversary of March 1968. In a long article published in Trybuna Ludu, the party 
attempted to satisfy growing demands that it apologize and take responsibility for the anti-Semitic 
campaign. Although the piece officially acknowledged for the first time that the campaign pushed 
13,000 Jews out of Poland, it downplayed its significance and argued that the vast majority of 
party officials played no role in propagating anti-Semitism.141 In private meetings with 
international Jewish leaders, Jaruzelski resisted going any further than this official declaration, 
emphasizing that the March events “did not just fall down from the sky but was a consequence of 
a larger, historical process” that did not have “only a Jewish element.”142 Such evasiveness only 
reminded Jewish leaders that they were dealing with a government that for decades had pursued a 
number of anti-Jewish policies that even now it could not admit were wrong. Indeed, one of the 
central reasons why the “Jewish problem” emerged in the first place was because of the state’s 
long policy of confiscating, neglecting, and destroying Jewish property. This problem was not 
simply going to subside after hosting a few state-sponsored celebrations and renovating a few 
synagogues. For once one traveled outside the capital the condition of Jewish sites quickly 
deteriorated. By the early 1980s, Warsaw had become an exceptional case in terms of the 
attention paid to its Jewish sites by both state and society. No other city in Poland experienced 
such focused, intense, and contested attention from party, opposition, and Catholic leaders.  
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This was the case not just for the small towns, the vanished shtetls, but also for larger 
cities such as Wrocław. By the 1970s, Wrocław’s Jewish community had declined greatly after its 
postwar high of 16,057 in 1946. In 1963, two thousand Jews were living in the city but after 1968 
only a handful remained.143 A 1974 estimate put the number of religiously affiliated Jews at 331 
for the entire province of Wrocław with most living in the city.144 Almost all that was left of 
Jewish life in the city were its crumbling, shattered Jewish spaces. By the early 1960s, the White 
Storch Synagogue had fallen into disrepair as a result of both vandalism and neglect. The 
condition of the building had become so poor that local officials ordered it to be vacated in 1966 
for the “sake of public safety.”145 Wrocław’s Jewish community was now forced to use a small, 
fifty-person prayer room in an adjacent building for religious purposes. After most of Wrocław’s 
Jewish community fled the country in 1968, the building became virtually abandoned, but some 
members still appeared to be using it. In 1972, city officials wrote to the Jewish community 
demanding that it “vacate and leave the illegally occupied establishment” within seven days 
before it would be forced to do so. The Jewish community responded tersely that what it called an 
“establishment” (lokal) was the “only synagogue in the city of Wrocław.” It then requested that 
the property be returned to it based on a recent law that allowed religious organizations in the 
“recovered territories” to obtain the rights to property that they were using.146 Meanwhile, the 
city’s conservator for architectural monuments had already approved that the building could be 
used for other purposes given “difficulties” in getting the Jewish community to renovate it. This 
reasoning was particularly ironic given that the Jewish community received 10,000 dollars in 
1968 from the American Joint Distribution Committee for repairs on the building and all it 
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needed was a construction firm to carry out the work.147 The city never provided one and then 
insisted that the Jewish community renovate the building. In 1974, the city legally confiscated the 
synagogue from the Jewish community.148 
Since the city government now owned and managed the property, it faced for almost 
twenty years what the city of Essen had confronted two decades earlier –– a synagogue problem. 
The political context could not have been more different. Wrocław officials had legally 
confiscated property from a small extant Jewish community that still wanted to use the building. 
Essen officials acted boldly, but not that boldly. Moreover, the “synagogue problem” in Wrocław 
did not attract as much attention in the local press as it did in Essen until after the fall of 
communism. In the 1970s and 1980s, the issue remained confined mainly to the bureaucratic 
offices of the city administration. But the question remained effectively the same: What now 
should be done with this abandoned building? In 1970, the city placed the synagogue on its 
official list of historic monuments as an example of “classical” architecture.149 This decision had 
mixed results. It ensured at least that the building would not be destroyed, but it meant little in 
terms of the building’s actual treatment and appropriation. The building for the next twenty years 
remained virtually desolate and completely neglected. Indeed, it received more attention from 
“young groups” who “disturbed the peace of local residents” by making it their hangout than 
from city officials interested in preserving it.150 
Nevertheless, city officials gradually realized that they needed to find some kind of 
solution to their synagogue problem. A number of plans surfaced throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
to use the building for other purposes. They first suggested using the synagogue as a storage 
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house, but then proposed turning it into a library reading room for the nearby Wrocław 
University. In 1978 and 1983, the city drew up extensive architectural plans for the complete 
redesign of the building’s interior with space created for book storage, a reading room, and a 
cafe.151 The plans were never implemented for lack of funds, and in 1984 the city then turned the 
building over to a local cultural center to be used as a space for artists. But it, too, had no ability 
to fund its renovation.152 The city and regional governments were now growing ever more 
anxious to find an “urgent decision” to the problem, especially since Warsaw’s Department of 
Religious Affairs started to make inquires about it in the 1980s as part of its effort to urge local 
governments to preserve Jewish sites.153 The city now suggested turning it into a theater and in 
1989 transferred the property to Wrocław’s Musical Academy, which planned to use it as a 
concert hall. This final decision before the collapse of communism led to no tangible results; the 
building only fell deeper into destruction. 
This shifting appropriation of the synagogue in itself is perhaps not altogether that 
surprising, but what is puzzling is the complete lack of attention toward the building by historic 
preservationists staffed in the city government’s conservation department and the local branch of 
Poland’s renowned Workshops for the Conservation of Architectural Monuments (PKZ). In a city 
that took pride in its extensive historic reconstruction program, it is startling that none of its 
historic preservationists argued for preserving the building. The archives of both the city’s 
conservation department and the PKZ do not hold any attempts to contest either the city’s neglect 
of the building or its many plans to alter its interior. By 1989, the synagogue remained the only 
religious site in the entire old town that had not received extensive reconstruction, underscoring 
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how strongly cultural perceptions of the “historic” shaped the postwar appropriation of Jewish 
space. As the city continued to reconstruct its numerous churches into the 1980s, its one, sole 
synagogue still did not fit into Wrocław’s identity as a “Polish” city.    
And yet, at the same time, there were a few historic preservationists in Wrocław who 
started to push beyond this exclusivist conception of the historic. Just as the synagogue remained 
neglected, interest in the condition of the city’s oldest Jewish cemetery started to grow. In the 
early 1970s, the city planned to level the entire area of the still damaged cemetery, but protest 
from local architectural historians ultimately prevented it from taking place. The city agreed to 
place the cemetery on its list of historic monuments in 1975. It was, however, mainly thanks to 
the efforts of one local architectural historian, Maciej Łagiewski, that the Jewish cemetery was 
gradually restored. Łagiewski carried out painstaking restoration work on the cemetery starting in 
1978 with a basic cleaning of the grounds and then in 1983-84 with more detailed restoration 
work on select tombstones.154 Although associated with the Wrocław Museum of Architecture, 
Łagiewski worked with a small staff of conservationists and with limited financial support from 
the state.155 A genuine interest in the city’s past and the architectural richness of the cemetery 
seemed to motivate him. “I am searching for the history of the city,” he explained.156 His efforts 
had a significant impact in bringing attention to the history of Jewish life in Wrocław. A number 
of articles on the Jewish cemetery appeared in the local press, while Łagiewski himself organized 
an exhibition entitled “Wrocław Jews, 1850-1945” in the town hall in 1989.157  
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This interest in Wrocław’s Jewish past attracted press coverage in the United States, 
Israel, and Great Britain but above all in West Germany.158 The Friedrich-Ebert Stiftung provided 
funds for the restoration of the tombstone of the Jewish labor leader Ferdinand Lassalle, which 
Willy Brandt as SPD party leader personally advocated in a letter to General Jaruzelski. In 1989, 
Johannes Rau, deputy-chairman of the SPD, led a delegation to Lassalle’s grave on the 125th 
anniversary of his death where they were met by members of Solidarity who joined in the 
celebration. German newspapers applauded this interest to save from further destruction one of 
the “last traces of German culture in the Silesian capital,” turning the Jewish cemetery into a 
“German” space in order to comment on the postwar defilement of “German” culture after the 
expulsions. Reporting on a visit to “Breslau,” one journalist spoke of his struggle to find any sign 
of the “German past” until he came upon the Jewish cemetery and “suddenly” he stood before 
“tombstones with German inscription.” He immediately entered into a seemingly familiar, 
German world when Breslau had the “second largest Jewish community.”159 Another article 
spoke of the many years that the cemetery had been left to ruin with “weeds meters high” and 
“shattered gravestones,” implying that the neglect of this place with “many figures of Germany’s 
economic, academic, and political life” amounted to malevolent destruction of German culture.160 
The Jewish cemetery became no less than a spatial metaphor for German suffering. “With a few 
exceptions,” another article wrote, “the Polish victors bulldozed all German cemeteries as they 
seized the Oder-Neisse territory after 1945. It did not happen any differently in Breslau –– the 
German-Jewish cemetery is a true exception. This European cultural monument of an invaluable 
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status survived.”161 This appropriation of the Jewish cemetery is stunning. It reflects a cultural 
domination of Germanness over both Polishness and Jewishness. In a kind of cultural 
colonization, Wrocław becomes Breslau and the Jewish cemetery becomes German.  
What then is one to make of this interest in Wrocław’s Jewish cemetery as the synagogue 
remained completely neglected? Even in one single city the appropriation of Jewish sites could 
vary. The cemetery, perhaps partially because small, practical work on it could be done (the 
synagogue required massive reconstruction), became a localized effort to reappropriate the Jewish 
past. The Jewish cemetery also carried different cultural meanings, becoming at once a local and 
transnational space. While German interest looked past the Jewishness of the cemetery, the local 
Polish population seemed attracted to it at least in part because of its Jewishness. The cemetery 
came to be seen as an important historical “source of the urban culture of nineteenth-century 
Wrocław.”162 A noticeable, if limited shift in perceptions about the historical and cultural value of 
the cemetery started to take hold. Yet what exactly this shift meant was less clear. In a perceptive 
article on the Wrocław cemetery, the journalist Ewa Berberyusz described a scene in front of its 
gates as a large, diverse crowd of people of “various professions and ages” waited to enter into 
the grounds. “Why are they going?” The cemetery had after all been sitting here the entire time 
and “no one was interested in this place” until now. She concluded with a mix of skepticism and 
befuddlement about the crowd’s motivations: “A herd instinct, a transformed consciousness, a 
new relationship toward Jews? Perhaps someone knows the answer. Because I do not.”163 In the 
end, a number of Poles became involved in rediscovering Jewish sites and contesting the PZPR’s 
political use of Jewish space, but this interest did not amount to a “transformed consciousness” in 
Polish-Jewish relations. It was, in many ways, a superficial interest in the strictest sense of the 
word: an interest that only rarely cut below the surface to probe deeper, uncomfortable questions 
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about the fractured history of Polish-Jewish relations without quickly falling into the 1968-trap of 
defensive posturing.  
IV. East Germany’s Jewish Problem  
 The re-appropriation of Jewish space in the GDR became entangled in a similar set of 
social, political, and cultural changes over the 1970s and 1980s. Just as in Gierek’s Poland, East 
Germany underwent significant changes with the appointment of Erich Honecker as First 
Secretary in 1971. Although Honecker’s Germany initially experienced solid economic growth 
thanks to free trade agreements with the FRG, its economy slowed as foreign imports of fuel and 
raw materials became more expensive. In an effort to modernize the economy, Honecker’s 
regime sought to establish better relations with the United States and looked for ways to improve 
its image abroad. One of the strategies the SED employed, like the PZPR, was to shift its 
approach toward the Jewish minority.164 By the early 1980s, the antifascist antisemitism of the 
early GDR had given way to a rhetorical embrace of Jewish culture, however uneven, 
contradictory, and problematic it often was. Emerging first from “below” among local residents 
and religious leaders, a stronger sensitivity toward Jewish sites began to appear in East German 
society and politics. Just as the PZPR gradually lost total control over the handling of Jewish 
space, so too did the SED. 
The re-appropriation of the Jewish past emerged first on the local level with grassroots, 
Christian-based organizations interested in discussing Christian-Jewish relations and the 
Holocaust. Two organizations, Aktion Sühnezeichen and Begegnung mit dem Judentum, were 
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especially important in creating a dialogue with East Germany’s small Jewish community. 
Supported by the Evangelical Church with some help from Catholic leaders, they organized local 
projects to repair Jewish cemeteries and sponsored lectures on Jewish religion, history, and 
culture.165 These groups formed part of a broader effort among church leaders to confront the 
church’s role during the Holocaust.166 In 1978, on the fortieth-anniversary of Kristallnacht, 
churches throughout the GDR hosted discussions about the Nazi persecution of the Jews for the 
first time. In a statement urging them to do so, the Conference for Evangelical Leadership noted: 
“We call to the attention of the churches the fortieth anniversary of Kristallnacht and remember it 
with shame. An enormous guilt lies on our people. … In light of the failure and guilt of 
Christianity revealed by [Kristallnacht], today everything must be done to spread knowledge 
about historic and contemporary Jewry.”167 
This growing interest in the Holocaust was not, however, limited to the churches. 
Contrary to what has normally been assumed, the Nazi persecution of the Jews did not remain 
entirely taboo in East Germany. To be sure, the GDR never experienced the kind of intense, 
searing debate about Jewish-gentile relations that erupted in the PPR. Nevertheless, by the 1960s 
and 1970s, topics such as the Nazi persecution of the Jews received fairly broad discussion with 
the Adolf Eichmann trial that was reported on by Friedrich Karl Kaul. Although Kaul’s The Case 
of Eichmann used the trial to criticize the “fascist” West Germany, it did draw significant 
attention to the mass murder of the Jews.168 A series of DEFA films about the Third Reich such as 
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Jakob der Lügner, which received international acclaim and East Germany’s only Oscar 
nomination, also brought public attention to the Holocaust. Finally, historians like Helmut 
Eschwege, Walter Mohrmann, Kurt Pätzold, and Konrad Kwiet published studies that explored 
the dynamics of Nazi policies against Jews.169  
Most of these works appeared in the 1970s and 1980s when the party gradually started to 
revise its interpretation of German history with a policy of “heritage and tradition” (Erbe und 
Tradition) that moved away from a strict Marxist-Leninist presentation of the past. It revived 
figures like Frederick the Great and Martin Luther in order to reinforce the distinctly German 
elements of communist rule.170 The SED had long attempted to ground the East German state in 
German history, but the “heritage and tradition” campaign conceived of the German past more 
broadly. Benefiting from this new approach, the Jewish communities in Berlin, Leipzig, and 
Dresden received support from the state to develop an array of cultural programs from lectures on 
Jewish literature to concerts featuring synagogue music.171 A popular biography of Moses 
Mendelssohn appeared in 1979, and a year earlier the state supported the first exhibition on 
Jewish history during the fortieth anniversary of Kristallnacht.172 The SED supported these 
activities because they fit into its understanding of “heritage and tradition,” but also because the 
party wished to project a more positive image of the GDR abroad. This became especially 
important in the 1980s when Honecker wished to secure “most favored nation” status with the 
United States (he hoped that American Jewry would argue on behalf of the GDR through 
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congressional lobbying).173 As the GDR faced continued economic hardships and an increasingly 
restive population, Honecker eventually came to believe that developing relations with the West 
was the best option for the GDR. Since East German leaders had long linked the Jews to the 
West, a policy of supporting Jewish culture made sense. In the midst of shifting cold war realities, 
philosemitism increasingly replaced the antifascist antisemitism of the past, but one of the most 
important anti-Semitic stereotypes had remained operative — Jews dominate and control life in 
the capitalist West.  
These broader shifts in SED policy had rather mixed and contradictory results on the 
local level. The appropriation of Jewish space in Potsdam and East Berlin could not have differed 
more starkly. In Potsdam, local SED officials appeared particularly resistant to demands from 
local residents to preserve its Jewish sites, never seeming to grasp fully the increasingly 
philosemitic approach coming from East Berlin. The city’s last major Jewish site –– its cemetery 
–– only fell deeper into disrepair. After agreeing to maintain it in 1949, the city paid no attention 
to the cemetery for the next three decades; the first mention of its preservation does not appear 
until 1970. In a letter to city officials, the State Association of Jews in the GDR solicited funds 
for the preservation of the cemetery and the erection of a small monument in remembrance of the 
Nazi persecution of the Jews. An official in the mayor’s office rejected the request, explaining: 
“In its perspective plan for the period of 1971-80, the city of Potsdam has a number of tasks that 
it must take care of, above all the building of the city center.  At the heart of the city center will 
be the Karl Liebknecht Forum with a monument dedicated to all the victims of the Nazi 
regime.”174  
By the late 1970s, this continued neglect of the cemetery caught the attention of local 
residents. In 1978, Theodor Goldstein, a Jewish resident of Potsdam who survived the Holocaust, 
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sent a letter to the city noting the cemetery’s “unsatisfactory” condition and asking city officials 
to restore it.175 Ten months later, Potsdam’s interior department agreed to supply a limited 
amount of funds for “small repairs” at the cemetery.176 Although this decision represented a step 
toward its preservation, the extent of the city’s commitment remained unclear. In 1983, 
Potsdam’s city council received two letters from concerned citizens that clearly put the intentions 
of city officials in doubt. Heidi Merkel, a local resident, explained that when she went to visit the 
Jewish cemetery, a woman who lived next door said that Potsdam’s city council had issued an 
order prohibiting citizens from visiting the cemetery given its “disorderly condition.” Merkel 
bluntly let city officials know how much hearing this surprised her: 
The reasoning behind such a prohibition is not at all satisfactory since everyone knows that today 
there are no Jewish citizens who can see to the regular upkeep of this cemetery because of the 
Nazis’ complete annihilation of the Jewish people. But still this place should be left open to the 
people as a place of remembrance for this brutal genocide (grausamer Völkermord). The fact that 
state institutions have prohibited visitations to it can easily be associated with antisemitic 
tendencies.177 
 
An official at the city’s interior ministry flatly denied the accusations, writing to Merkel: “the 
woman . . . certainly received the wrong information. The cemetery is not in a condition in which 
it cannot be seen.”178 That is not how another letter, written during the same month as Merkel’s, 
assessed the situation. On a recent trip to the cemetery with his youth group, a local Christian 
pastor reported that the cemetery was in poor condition with a number of its tombstones suffering 
from neglect and vandalism.179 City officials ultimately agreed with both accounts, privately 
acknowledging that the cemetery was in fact in a condition that visitors should not see. In a letter 
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to the publisher of A City Guide to Potsdam, officials requested that future editions of the 
guidebook not include a passage about the Jewish cemetery in light of its “current condition.”180  
It was, in fact, not until 1988 that any major restoration work on the cemetery began.  As 
part of the GDR’s elaborate, state-sponsored commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary of 
Kristallnacht, Potsdam city officials allowed members of the East German youth group, the Free 
German Youth (FDJ), to perform minor repairs at the cemetery.181 But once the events of 1988 
ended, the FDJ concluded its work and the cemetery once again would have suffered from neglect 
had it not been for Theo Goldstein. After having requested the city’s assistance a decade ago, 
Goldstein now found himself having to ensure its preservation. In the words of one local citizen, 
the fact that Goldstein was the only one concerned about the cemetery revealed the true intentions 
of the city: “It is a disgrace for the city of Potsdam that the only living Jew in Potsdam, who is 
seventy-eight years old, must see to the maintenance of the cemetery. There are overturned 
tombstones. . . . Rain comes through the roof of the mortuary. As a citizen of the GDR, it is 
shameful that the state has not given more support to the cemetery.”182  
Some local residents were also disturbed by how city officials dealt with the city’s other, 
now absent Jewish space –– the former site of the synagogue. In a small ceremony on November 
9, 1978, city officials gathered in front of where the synagogue once was—now an apartment 
building—and dedicated a plaque in remembrance of Kristallnacht that read: “Here stood the 
synagogue of Potsdam’s Jewish Community. During the nights of November 9 and 10, 1938, this 
synagogue was plundered and destroyed by the fascists.” The citizens assembled there that 
afternoon probably were unaware that the “fascists” were not the only ones who had torn it down, 
that in fact the war and ultimately a wrecking ball in 1958 had also caused its destruction. 
Potsdam officials overlooked that part of the story. Moreover, they seemed oddly reluctant to use 
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the plaque for commemorative purposes. Until 1988, Potsdam’s local newspaper reported no 
official ceremonies at the site of the plaque during successive anniversaries of Kristallnacht.  
When one did occur, organized by a group of citizens in 1982, city officials responded with a 
bizarre set of actions. In a three-page letter to Potsdam’s mayor, a local citizen described how 
authorities prevented residents from placing flowers in front of the plaque. Three separate 
bouquets of flowers were removed, and when pressed to explain who might be doing this a police 
officer explained that “probably was not citizens, but most likely was done by order.” The officer 
then added that “it was not allowed” to place flowers underneath the plaque.183  
In East Berlin, the appropriation of Jewish space differed substantially from Potsdam, but 
only after a long and politically contested process. By the late 1970s, a similar kind of “Jewish 
problem” emerged in the GDR. In 1982, East Germany’s Jewish religious community totaled a 
mere 470.184 Jewish life in the “antifascist” Germany was on the verge of ending almost 
completely and its capital clearly reflected this reality: the few remaining spaces of Jewish life 
were almost all that was left in East Berlin and many of them were in terrible condition. Hundreds 
of tombstones had fallen over at Schönhauser Allee Jewish cemetery in Prenzlauerberg, while the 
city’s most visible Jewish space, the synagogue on Oranienburgerstraße, still remained in 
damaged shape from the war.185 Beginning in the mid-1970s, state officials in the Ministry for 
Religious Affairs became increasingly concerned about East Berlin’s shattered Jewish spaces. 
One memo noted that something had to be done with the ruins of the Oranienburgerstraße 
synagogue, which the Jewish community was still using as its administrative office. It suggested 
vacating the building and concentrating Jewish life in the synagogue on Rykestraße that since the 
1950s had been the Gemeinde’s main location. The Oranienburgerstraße synagogue could then 
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either be torn down to make room for nearby “important, economic operations” or be turned into 
a Jewish museum with “international monetary support.”186 Another memo stressed that either 
solution would be better than the current one of neglect, which hardly presented a vibrant image 
of Jewish life to the many “international Jewish tourists” visiting the anti-fascist capital. It would 
also create a “political counterweight to the offensive, reactionary activities of the West Berlin 
Jewish community under the leadership of Heinz Galinski.”187 Similarly, the poor condition of the 
Jewish cemetery in Weißensee had become a problem. As the largest of its kind in Europe, it 
received “numerous international and local visitors.” State officials concluded that the only 
solution “from a political perspective” was to carry out a gradual restoration of the cemetery over 
the next ten years.188   
This growing concern about Jewish space came from significant pressure put on the party 
by groups both within and outside the GDR. Local churches in East Berlin were the first to begin 
preserving Jewish sites in the capital in a clear effort to address an issue that the SED had failed 
to confront. As early as the mid-1950s, the East German Protestant Church called for the 
preservation of Jewish sites, but it was not until the early 1970s that any serious reconstruction 
efforts took place under the leadership of youth organizations such as the Mission for Symbolic 
Atonement (Aktion Sühnezeichen, or AS).189 The AS played an important role in the 1970s and 
1980s in bringing attention to the Nazi persecution of the Jews; they created space for an open 
dialogue about the past outside the confines of the party, and organized work on East Berlin’s 
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Jewish cemeteries. In 1976, the AS performed minor repairs on the Weißensee cemetery and 
listened to a lecture about “Jews after Auschwitz and the Formation of the Israeli state.”190 In 
1978, the group gathered with other Christians in the Berlin Sophienkirche for the fortieth 
anniversary of Kristallnacht for a commemorative service that included afterwards walking along 
a “track of silent remembrance.” The memorial route ended in front of the “ruins of the great 
Berlin synagogue” on Oranienburgerstraße.191 In 1986, the AS organized efforts to preserve the 
Jewish cemetery of Berlin’s orthodox community Addas Israel. One member wrote poignantly 
about the meaning this abandoned space and the Addas Israel community had for him. Walking 
through the Scheunenviertel in search of the few “traces” of Jewish life left in the city, he made 
“painful discoveries” when he came upon the communal building of the no longer existing 
community. “These discoveries are painful,” he continued, “because I know that the people who 
lived and worked in these buildings were expelled and killed by Germans. The immense and 
abstract number of six million murdered Jews became somewhat more comprehensible to me in 
this concrete area.”192  
This emerging interest in the capital’s Jewish spaces became even greater in light of a 
series of highly public controversies about the SED’s handling of Jewish sites. In 1986, city 
officials resurrected an old plan to build a highway over a portion of the Weißensee Jewish 
cemetery. The idea for the project stretched back to 1921 when the city of Berlin purchased an 
unused portion of the cemetery from the Jewish community.193 In the mid-1970s, the city 
government secured general approval for the plan from Jewish community chairman Peter 
Kirchner, although his support was tepid and he emphasized the importance of leaving untouched 
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this “eternal” place.194 Plans to carry it out continued for years until 1986 when the city seemed 
determined to begin construction on it. The SED probably did not expect the storm of protest that 
ensued from almost every conceivable direction. Jewish leaders, ordinary citizens, West German 
journalists, and local pastors came out strongly against the project. The dissident Bärbel Bohley 
collected 130 signatures against it that she sent to the mayor along with a letter of protest. “It is 
irresponsible,” the letter stated, “to destroy this piece of cultural history that is not only a part of 
the history of Jews but also of our history.”195 Newspapers in West Berlin reported on this protest 
action, which particularly angered the SED since it now feared that the matter would “get played 
up through the imperialistic media as ‘desecrating a cemetery.’”196 Johannes Hildebrant, a local 
pastor and organizer of the working group “Christians and Jews,” worked tirelessly behind the 
scenes to convince state officials not to construct the road.197 And Heinz Galinski, the towering 
West German Jewish leader, personally appealed to Honecker to stop the project. In the end, the 
stream of protest proved too much. In October 1986, Honecker canceled plans for the road in a 
letter to Galinski.198  
Yet just as this controversy was finally coming to an end, the SED faced yet another one. 
In 1980, Kirchner approached city officials about the condition of the Jewish cemetery of Berlin’s 
former orthodox community Adass Israel, which had now become an “unauthorized waste 
dump.”199 Since the East Berlin Jewish community could not maintain the cemetery, he suggested 
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that the city take control of it. City officials agreed, but oddly decided to turn the property over to 
the Ministry of State Security. Although the Stasi placed a protective fence around the cemetery, 
it started to build an administrative building on an unused portion of it. In 1984, Kirchner warned 
Klaus Gysi, the Minister of Church Affairs, that this unseemly situation had to change not least 
because Jewish tourists were beginning to visit the cemetery in greater numbers.200 The city 
government drafted an official order to improve maintenance of the cemetery, but its decision 
came too late.201 The poor condition of the Jewish cemetery had already started to attract critical 
attention from journalists and citizens abroad.202 One protest in particular—from the West Berlin 
Jew Mario Offenberg—received attention from the GDR’s highest authorities. A descendant of 
an Adass Israel family, Offenberg grew up in Israel and came to West Berlin to complete his 
dissertation at the Free University. He visited the cemetery just as workers were beginning to 
construct the Stasi complex on it. Offenberg was nothing less than shocked by the Stasi presence 
and the general run-down condition of the cemetery.  
He sent an impassioned letter to Gysi. In July 1985, he asked angrily, “how could this 
have happened? Why was this continued destruction never brought to anyone’s attention? Why 
was it never prevented and stopped? Why was no one prosecuted for it? How could this have 
gone so far?” He wondered how it was possible to treat a Jewish cemetery with such “efficient 
destruction and methodical desecration” right here “in Berlin, the capital of the GDR, thirty and 
some years after the collapse of fascism and its murderous anti-Semitism.” He noted sardonically 
that he was writing about a cemetery that “survived the dark night of fascism almost 
undamaged.”203 The response to these sharp attacks was initially defensive. The director for 
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Church Affairs for the Central Committee, Rudi Bellmann, interpreted them as mere political 
attempts from “imperial circles from the FRG, the US, and Israel” to challenge the “basic, 
antifascist position of our state.”204 But Honecker responded more calmly when the matter was 
finally brought to his attention. Offenberg forwarded to him his letter to Gysi after waiting three 
months without any response. Honecker wrote back in a swift, ten days.205 He assured that the 
cemetery would be rapidly restored. He delivered on his promise. In no less than six months, 
Offenberg, Honecker, Gysi, surviving members of Adass Jisroel, and Jewish community 
members from both East and West Germany came together for a celebratory reopening of the 
newly restored cemetery.206  
The rapid response of the state to this controversy marked the key turning point in the 
GDR’s appropriation of Jewish space in the capital city. East Berlin now became the center for 
the SED’s sudden celebration of Jewish life in the midst of shifting cold war relations and 
external pressure. Since only about two hundred Jews actually belonged to the Gemeinde by this 
point, state officials realized that reviving Jewish life could only mean restoring the physical 
remnants of Berlin’s prewar community.207 Jewish space became central to the regime once it 
realized that the capital had many Jewish sites to offer, which could now be made “visible.”208 
The SED’s broadened conception of “heritage and tradition” combined with growing 
transnational attention toward the capital’s dilapidated Jewish sites just as the SED hoped to 
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improve its foreign image set the main foundation for this sudden interest in Jewish space. But it 
was also social pressure from below that caused this shift. The state was keenly aware that the 
Protestant church and its organizations had become interested in Jewish topics.209 The 
preservation work of local, church groups on Jewish cemeteries brought attention to the fact that 
the state had long neglected them. It also limited the control of the state over an increasingly 
sensitive, controversial, and volatile topic. Just as the PZPR had, so too did the SED seek to take 
back control of Jewish space.  
This strategy reached a dramatic height in 1988 when Honecker announced plans for the 
eighty-five-million mark restoration of the Neue Synagoge. The selection of this building could 
not have been more ironic. Although the synagogue survived Kristallnacht with only minor 
damage, it sustained severe destruction during the war. For nearly four decades, East German 
officials did not know what to do with the building. In 1958, the SED ordered the destruction of 
the bombed-out sanctuary, but left the façade standing at the request of the East Berlin Jewish 
community. In four attempts in 1961, 1965, 1975, and 1981, the East Berlin Gemeinde petitioned 
state and party officials to rebuild the synagogue in order to house a museum of Jewish history.210 
“There is no more important place than this site,” the Gemeinde wrote, “to build a Jewish 
museum in the GDR in order to bear witness to Nazi barbarism, the destruction of Berlin Jewry, 
and to the Jews who once lived in Germany.”211 All four requests went unanswered. In 1975, a 
GDR citizen, Salomea Genin, made a similar recommendation. She suggested developing a 
museum that would foster a secular Jewish identity in the GDR; she wanted to create a space 
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where Jews could discuss their culture and history independent of the Gemeinde.212 The Office 
for Church Affairs rejected her request. 
But by the mid-1980s the government had changed its position entirely, arguing now that 
the state must preserve the remnants of Jewish life in East Berlin to showcase the GDR’s support 
for Jewish life.213 The Neue Synagoge quickly surfaced as the centerpiece of this new effort and 
plans were approved in June 1988 for the restoration of its facade. The building was to house the 
newly formed foundation “Neue Synagoge – Centrum Judaicum” that was designed to be at once 
a monument and museum. A Jewish site that had been rejected for rebuilding as late as 1981 had 
now suddenly become a building of immense symbolic meaning: “During the years that the so-
called final solution to the Jewish question was prepared, this building became throughout Berlin 
and Europe a symbol of Jewish life, of Jewish solidarity, but also of the brutality of the Nazi 
annihilation of the Jews.”214 As state officials envisioned the project, the synagogue’s rebuilding 
would be “viewed as an international and national event” to reinforce the GDR’s new approach to 
the Jewish minority.215 In 1987, Gysi even went so far as to frame the project as a symbolic 
gesture of accepting limited responsibility for Nazi crimes. Meeting with the vice-director of the 
World Jewish Congress in Geneva, he observed that “we are Germans and thus we naturally are 
responsible for what was done in the name of Germans, even if those who did it were our fiercest 
opponents.”216 Coming from someone who was persecuted in Nazi Germany for being both a 
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communist and a Jew, Gysi’s statement at once reinforced the political persecution of 
communists and acknowledged the racial persecution of the Jews.  
The ceremonial start of the synagogue restoration project was timed to coincide with the 
GDR’s elaborate celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of Kristallnacht. What the Warsaw Ghetto 
Uprising anniversary was for the PZPR, Kristallnacht was for the SED. The state hosted a 
number of different events from lectures on German-Jewish history to commemorative speeches 
to a politburo viewing of “Nathan the Wise.”217 Some 140 events in over sixty cities took place 
across the GDR. Although the state’s sudden embrace of Jewish victimization on such a grand 
scale did not provoke nearly as much protest as it did in Poland, a number of events organized by 
local churches throughout the GDR produced in effect a parallel, non-party anniversary. East 
Germans who wanted to reflect upon Kristallnacht outside the parameters of the state certainly 
had more than enough opportunity to do so. Churches held services, led commemorative events at 
Jewish cemeteries, hosted exhibitions, seminars, and lectures, and even published their own 
pamphlets.218 Even the Stasi was prepared for this semi-underground commemoration and any 
possible way it might embarrass the SED. In advance of the anniversary, it ordered that Jewish 
sites be carefully protected against any “fascist and anti-Semitic markings” and it carefully 
watched the church events for any hints of political protest.219  
The reports MfS agents drafted indicated that segments of East German society were not 
persuaded by the state’s sudden embrace of the Jewish past. East Germans clearly saw through 
the superficiality of the state’s new approach, pointing out that the party was now restoring 
Jewish sites that had long been “forgotten” simply for “political propaganda.” Church groups 
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connected the persecution of the Jews under the Nazis with their own plight under the communist 
dictatorship, while others saw support for the Neue Synagoge as hypocritical of the GDR’s long-
standing rejection of the “‘Guilt of the Germans.’”220 An article in the underground journal 
Umweltblätter pointed out that a state that persecuted “those with different views for decades” 
cannot “seriously raise the question of despotism.”221 A leaflet distributed at a silent protest in 
Leipzig put it more bluntly, co-opting the anniversary for its own political agenda: “If we accept 
the memory of the pogrom for ourselves, we must exercise our responsibility as human beings; 
the responsibility for human freedom in our country; the responsibility for peace, justice, and 
safeguarding the environment.”222 Others just seemed plainly uninterested in the entire affair. At a 
church gathering of 440 people in Karl-Marx-Stadt, one pastor claimed that the East German 
population was more interested in obtaining car replacement parts than learning about the 
“murder of an entire people and the extermination of a culture.”223   
What is more, Jewish space could be appropriated and interpreted in rather disturbing 
ways. In the months and weeks before the anniversary, the Stasi registered a number of anti-
Semitic attacks throughout the GDR that targeted both Jewish property and the Jewish 
community.224 The day before the unveiling of a plaque at the Jewish cemetery in Fürstenwalde 
the Stasi quickly arranged for the removal of three swastikas that had been smeared on it, while in 
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July it reported that tombstones at the Potsdam Jewish cemetery had been damaged.225 In May, 
the Jewish community office of Thüringen received for the second time an aggressive and 
frightening phone call. A male voice asked: “Who is there? –– Who is there? –– Jews –– Are 
there still any? Are they still here? Forgot about you. The ovens are still warm. They are calling 
for you.”226 In February 1988, five teenagers jumped over the wall of the Jewish cemetery on 
Schönhauser Allee in Berlin-Prenzlauerburg and destroyed as many as one hundred of its 
tombstones.227 The five were quickly arrested, Honecker was immediately informed of the 
situation, and the state prosecuted the case with a panicked, zealous urgency. The Stasi 
interrogated the five teenagers for three and a half months. A public trial was staged to 
demonstrate the GDR’s resolve not to tolerate such extremism. The defendants received 
excessively harsh sentences ranging from six to two years, but were later released in 1990.228   
As the SED sought to blunt whatever effects these incidents might have in disrupting its 
carefully planned anniversary, it confronted one final issue that it most certainly wanted resolved 
before the November celebration. In 1988, the question of returning Jewish property arose once 
again in the wake of the controversy over the Weißensee Jewish cemetery. Honecker proposed to 
Gysi that the issue be resolved once and for all by simply giving the strip of land back to the 
Jewish community. But this suggestion raised the complicated question of Jewish property in 
general. In a candid, three-page reply to Honecker, Gysi sharply portrayed the political 
repercussions of the state’s confiscation of Jewish property over the past four decades, going so 
far as to say that it was now on the verge of becoming a “small sitting time bomb.” Gysi pointed 
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out three main ways that the issue could become a problem for the GDR: the state’s control of 
property seized by the Nazis gave credence to the claim that the East German state had become 
“de facto the legal successor to the old fascist Reich;” not returning Jewish property was clearly 
prejudicial, given that “all churches and religious communities in the GDR and in Berlin … have 
fully received their property;” and public awareness of the situation could be “unpleasant and 
damaging” to the GDR.  Thus Gysi concluded that those holdings the Gemeinde was currently 
using should be returned, the five out of some eighty pieces the community had been given the 
right to use in the 1950s.  Returning all property, he noted, would be “impossible from a practical 
standpoint.”229 Honecker agreed with Gysi’s assessment and on 25 February 1988 the GDR 
officially prepared to return five pieces of property to the Gemeinde.230 In the waning hours of the 
GDR, the highest officials of the SED had realized the costs of their party’s earlier policies. 
Attempting to understand the motivations of both Gysi and Honecker is difficult. As a communist 
of Jewish decent, Gysi had little interest in the Gemeinde, but expressed concern about Jewish 
issues as reflected in the somewhat regretful tone of his letter. It is possible that he and perhaps 
even Honecker shared some sense of responsibility for preserving Jewish sites and returning 
confiscated property, reflecting trends on the local level where religious groups and ordinary 
citizens increasingly showed interest in Jewish space. But clearly their main concern was to 
protect the GDR’s image. 
V. The Localization of Jewish Space in West Germany    
In contrast to both the PPR and GDR, the West German federal government never faced 
the explosive “Jewish problem” of abandoned, desolate, and crumbling Jewish spaces in the 
1980s. Part of the reason lies in the simple fact that West German cities were rebuilt much more 
quickly and extensively than those in the east during the 1950s when urban modernism remained 
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supreme. The shattered spaces of Jewish life gradually vanished from the urban landscape as the 
“new” replaced the “old.” Clearing away Jewish ruins was one of the consequences of West 
Germany’s rapid economic recovery. As the state-run economies of East Germany and Poland 
failed to take off, urban reconstruction slowed and stretched over decades, leaving numerous 
historic buildings still standing into the 1980s. The east offered a landscape of Jewish ruins that 
Jewish leaders, citizens, church leaders, dissidents, and party leaders could contest and 
reappropriate. West Germany did not and therefore never received the kind of international 
attention that Jewish space did in both Poland and the GDR. Moreover, when the destruction of 
damaged Jewish sites did occur in the 1950s it took place under the cover of West Germany’s 
relatively extensive program of restitution. If the West German state had not embraced restitution 
as strongly as it did, the disappearance of the Jewish past in the urban landscape probably would 
have provoked more attention from outside observers at the time. The posture alone of appearing 
to make amends for the Nazi past went a long way in improving West Germany’s relationship 
with both international and local Jewish leaders.  
More importantly, the actual preservation of Jewish sites was part of West German 
restitution. In the 1950s, the federal government confronted and largely solved its “Jewish 
problem” after long negotiations with Jewish leaders. As early as 1949, the American-created 
Jewish Restitution Successor Organization (JRSO) realized that it had to find a solution to the 
physical handling of Jewish communal property. For most Jewish sites –– schools, hospitals, 
community centers, and even synagogues –– the JRSO sold the property after getting it returned 
and then left it up to the new owners to decide what to do with it. This solution led to the 
destruction of numerous Jewish sites across West Germany once local municipalities took over 
the property. Such a solution, however, was simply not possible for Jewish cemeteries, which 
according to Jewish religious law must be perpetually maintained. The JRSO appreciated the 
delicacy of the matter, and in 1951 joined forces with the Central Council of Jews in Germany to 
find a viable solution. Both organizations turned to the Interior Ministry to see if the state would 
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be willing to take over the care of the nearly 2,000 Jewish cemeteries left in the FRG. The Interior 
Ministry was fairly sympathetic to their needs from the beginning. It had already been thinking 
about the issue and understood its political importance in light of a surge of attacks against Jewish 
cemeteries in the late 1940s. In 1950, it wrote to all state interior ministries that they needed to 
protect Jewish cemeteries from vandalism. A year later, the Interior Ministry reached out to the 
Central Council to inquire about preserving Jewish cemeteries.231 All the while, it had been 
supplying funds for the repair of those that the Nazis had damaged. By 1954, nearly all of them 
had been adequately restored.232  
But the broader issue of the perpetual maintenance of Jewish cemeteries had not yet been 
resolved. The JRSO and Central Council firmly maintained that the state must accept 
responsibility for it since the entire situation of abandoned Jewish cemeteries was a “direct 
consequence” of the Holocaust.233 In April 1952, the Interior Ministry accepted this basic 
premise, but it took another four years for a resolution finally to be found as federal and state 
officials fought over who should carry the bulk of the financial responsibility.234 As no resolution 
appeared in sight by early 1956, the Interior Ministry decided to bring the issue to a cabinet 
meeting of Adenauer’s government. Noting that this was a “pressing issue” for Jewish leaders in 
Germany and abroad, it advocated strongly that the government pass a resolution for the 
preservation of Jewish cemeteries.235 On August 31, 1956, the cabinet approved a measure and 
announced it publicly in its annual good wishes to the Jewish community on Rosh Hashonoh. In a 
letter to Central Council president George van Dam, Interior Minister Gerhard Schröder (CDU) 
wrote that “in order to secure equality and freedom for our Jewish co-citizens” the federal and 
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state governments had agreed to accept responsibility for the maintenance of Jewish cemeteries.  
Van Dam responded with warm thanks that an issue, about which he had received “incessant 
inquires” both in and outside Germany, had finally been resolved.236 On a national level, the 
problem of Jewish sites had now largely been settled.  
That does not mean, however, that the issue of Jewish space simply vanished. On the 
contrary, it reemerged with particular intensity in the 1980s in cities and towns across the Federal 
Republic. West Germans sought to reappropriate Jewish sites that after the war had either simply 
been neglected or had been used for other purposes such as garages and storehouses. The 
difference was that in the FRG these efforts typically remained confined to the local level, 
attracting little attention from national politicians and international Jewish leaders with a few 
exceptions.237 Groups of concerned or politically engaged citizens became interested in their local 
Jewish space or the absence of that space. Local politicians participated in these efforts, but the 
role of the state was notably minimal. In a democratic society relatively sure of its international 
standing among Jewish leaders and organizations, these civic projects neither threatened the 
power of the state nor posed any serious challenges to its foreign policy.  
The sheer multiplicity of these efforts is striking. In the 1980s, Jewish sites became 
contested, negotiated, and reappropriated from the metropolis to the smallest village: the 
synagogue in Kippenheim was renovated and turned into a Jewish museum after serving as 
storage for agricultural products for over three decades; the Jewish district of Rothenburg that had 
long been neglected as the rest of the city was rebuilt was eventually restored; a citizens’s 
coalition fought to preserve the archaeological remnants of Frankfurt’s earlier Jewish community 
on Börneplatz; a controversy erupted as a new mall was built on part of the Jewish cemetery in 
Hamburg; the synagogue in Rendsburg that was a fish smokehouse from 1939 until the early 
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1980s was turned into a Jewish museum; local residents pushed city officials to place in Essen’s 
synagogue an exhibition on the Third Reich; a group of citizens in Berlin-Schöneberg researched 
the local history of the district’s Jewish past and developed a memorial route to inscribe in the 
urban environment the absence of this community.238 The list could go on much longer. All of 
these attempts sparked intense discussion among citizens, politicians, historic preservationists, 
local Jewish leaders, and urban planners, and did not always come to the resolution that local 
activists in support of them wanted. The city of Frankfurt preserved only traces of Börneplatz and 
oddly displayed them in the cellar of the service center that was constructed on top of it.  
Still, what is striking is the desire to mark, historicize, contest, and discuss the absence of 
Jewish life that these spaces reflected, which leads to the central question of why. What led to the 
proliferation of interest in the Jewish past in the FRG in the 1980s? In the PPR, interest in Jewish 
space emerged from a mix of political contestation, international attention, and searing debates 
about Polish-Jewish relations, while in the GDR it came more directly from the state as a result of 
both external and internal pressure. The West German case more closely converges with the 
Polish one in the sense that highly public discussions and media attention about the Holocaust 
helped to stimulate local interest in Jewish space. Of course, significant differences between the 
two exist not least of all in what caused such discussion in the first place. In Poland, 1968 is 
crucial to understanding the surge of interest in Jewish-gentile relations, whereas in the Federal 
Republic it is of less singular importance despite attempts by historians and 1968ers to make it 
out to be. The historiography on West German memories of the Nazi past is rich and nuanced but 
has produced a rather predictable narrative: Germans generally suppressed the Nazi past (1940s-
1950s), gradually recalled it (1960s-1980s), and now have come to confront it with general 
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frequency (1990s-2000s).239 In this framing, 1968 often appears as the assumed, explanatory 
caesura when students protested the supposed silence of their parents. To be sure, 1968 broadly 
challenged the “myth of ignorance” and many of its generation were later at the forefront of a 
more critical interpretation of German history in the 1980s, but the amount of emphasis that has 
often been placed on it is exaggerated as the most recent research suggests.240 Moreover, it is 
important to clearly distinguish what part of the Nazi past started to become discussed. If the 
“Nazi past” is conceived in the broadest of possible terms, 1968 might be able to maintain some 
of its mythic, protest status but not if it is analyzed more narrowly. In the case here of explaining 
growing concern about local Jewish space, I am interested above all in the part of the Nazi past 
that deals explicitly with the persecution and mass murder of the Jews.  
 This past was on the minds of New Leftists in the 1960s, but not in a way that they wish 
to remember years later.241 In protest of what many saw as the state’s superficial philosemitism, 
they distanced themselves from “the great atonement market” of the past two decades.242 In so 
doing, they embraced anti-Jewish prejudices while claiming to be antifascist.243  Israel’s swift 
victory in the Six Day War provided the context for an explosion of anti-Jewish sentiment.244 Its 
most extreme, radical form took place on November 9, 1969 when a West Berlin militant group 
placed a bomb in the Jewish community center on Fasanenstraße to disrupt the commemoration 
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of Kristallnacht.245 This Jewish space became home to a resurrected West Berlin Jewish 
community, built as it was on top of the ruins of the Fasanenstraße synagogue in 1959 with 
financial assistance from the city. It was the city’s most prominent Jewish space and was no 
doubt selected for its symbolic importance. Although fortunately the bomb never went off, the 
perpetrators got their loud and angry message across. The police found a letter left in the building 
that explained the political motives behind the attack. It spoke of hindering the spread of 
“imperialism” in the Middle East, embracing what it called the “true antifascism” that did not 
stand in perpetual solidarity with Israel but with the victims of “Zionism.” “Every memorial in 
West Berlin and the FRG,” it continued, “suppresses the fact that the Kristallnacht of 1938 is 
being repeated today by Zionists in the occupied territories, in the refugee camps, and in the 
Israeli prisons. … The Jews who were expelled by fascism have themselves become fascists.”246 
This particular incident is admittedly an extreme example, but anti-Jewish sentiments pervaded 
parts of the New Left much more than its members at the time and even years later were willing 
to acknowledge. It was not until the 1980s that anti-Semitism on the Left slowly became 
discussed when it was sharply brought into the open by some of the movement’s earlier Jewish 
supporters. In 1981, Henryk Broder, who was born in Poland and moved to Germany in 1958 
before joining the student movement a decade later, expressed his disappointment with his Leftist 
colleagues. “I only want to concern myself here,” he wrote, “with one point in your racial 
reservoir, one that affects me in particular: your anti-Semitism. That a leftist…cannot be an anti-
Semite, because that is the domain of the right, is a much cherished lying excuse to which you 
cling.”247 
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Yet Broder’s scathing indictment of the New Left was only partially accurate. He rightly 
challenged the post-1968 construction of 1968 as a heroic moment of much-needed democratic 
rebirth and Vergangenheitsbewältigung, but he overlooked the longer impact of the New Left. 
The movement later had a fairly noticeable influence on politicians of the SPD and the Greens 
who in the 1980s became the most outspoken proponents of interpreting the Holocaust. This 
effect is important because the broad stroke urge of 1968 to discuss the “Nazi past” became more 
narrowly focused on the persecution and mass murder of the Jews during the 1980s. This is not to 
imply that certain segments of West German society did not think seriously about the Holocaust, 
German-Jewish relations, and the problem of anti-Semitism earlier; they certainly did even as 
early as the 1950s when historians have often long believed an impenetrable silence had fallen 
upon West Germany.248 In particular, the Churches and their organizations such as Aktion 
Sühnezeichen provided forums for discussions about German-Jewish relations and trips to 
Auschwitz.249 Since 1967, hundreds of West Germans have traveled to Poland to learn about the 
Holocaust through AS.250 But what was different in the 1980s is that the Holocaust became a 
touchstone issue for West Germany’s increasingly left-leaning political, intellectual, and cultural 
elite. By the early 1980s, leftist and left-liberal intellectuals had made significant inroads in West 
Germany’s museums, universities, schools, and media after thirteen years of Social Democratic 
rule under the leadership of Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt. They tended to embrace with 
different shades of intensity the “non-German German identity” represented most clearly by 
Jürgen Habermas who argued for a kind of postnationalism that included indignation for the 
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permanent stigma of the Holocaust.251 These leftists intellectuals wanted to reform the political 
culture of the Federal Republic, fought for human rights, and advocated reflecting upon the 
catastrophe of German history.  
Their vision sharply clashed with a more conservative one that rejected the Holocaust as 
a permanent, German stigma. In 1982-83, when Helmut Kohl came to power, conservatives 
sought to repeal what they saw as an excessive attack on German identity by the Left at a 
particular, postwar moment when what it meant to be “German” seemed all the more threatened 
by the country’s now sizeable foreign worker population. With nearly five million foreign 
workers in the country by the early 1980s, Christian Democrats strongly opposed the idea that 
Germany had become an “immigrant nation” and any attempts to liberalize Germany’s ethnically 
defined citizenship law of 1913.252 The Nazi past became the touchstone issue for the release of 
broader anxieties about “Germanness” in a changing, increasingly multicultural West 
Germany.253 The last thing conservatives were going to tolerate was a handful of once radical, 
now middle-aged “68ers” telling them that they should think of themselves as “non-German 
Germans.” Of course, some of the most vocal proponents of such ideas, not least of all Habermas 
(born 1929), were hardly 68ers, but that did not matter since the perception of 1968 as a 
disturbing cultural revolution injected verve and urgency to the “spiritual-moral change” that 
Kohl promised.  
What followed were a series of intense, political debates between Right and Left: over 
Kohl and Regan’s visit to Bitburg; over Ernst Nolte’s plea for a “normalized” Nazi past; over the 
construction of history museums in Bonn and Berlin. These debates have received extensive 
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coverage by historians and do not need to be rehearsed here, but what is important is that they 
ultimately produced a “culture of contrition” among West Germany’s political and intellectual 
elite.254 The insistence of the Holocaust as a stigma of German history and identity became 
embraced more broadly than the conservative attempt to treat it as a normal, comparable past. A 
kind of “political correctness” took hold by the late 1980s that stressed remembrance and 
contrition.255 This sensitivity to the Holocaust unfolded mostly in public, political discourses, but 
the media also played a crucial role in transmitting and popularizing it. In the 1980s, the 
television channel ZDF showed numerous productions about the Nazi persecution of the Jews. 
These were mostly survivor stories without a clear sense of who was perpetrating the crime, but 
the surfeit of programs alone popularized the growing political and intellectual interest in the 
Holocaust.256 The print media also contributed its part and not just through highbrow, intellectual 
weeklies such as Die Zeit, but also through tabloids like Bild.257 Axel Springer’s tawdry and 
populist paper –– issues are rarely complete without some form of female nudity on its pages –– 
would hardly seem like the venue for spreading a leftist culture of contrition. But German-Jewish 
reconciliation has long been one of the political foundations of Springer’s media empire, and Bild 
has urged Germans to show shame for their past in terse and blunt editorials. All of this is not to 
imply a progressive narrative of unilinear remembrance. A number of tensions and conflicts have 
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shaped this interest in the Holocaust.258 Studies have shown that even as Germans have learned 
more about the Holocaust they continue to describe the experiences of their own families in terms 
of resistance, antifascism, and victimization.259  
Indeed, the contradictory impulses of West German interest in the Holocaust are perhaps 
no more evident than on the local level. In Essen, the city’s main Jewish site, its towering stone 
synagogue, remained as late as 1978 an exhibition for displaying the newest industrial, consumer 
products of the West German economic miracle. The city unveiled the exhibition in 1961 after 
nearly fifteen years of attempting to resolve its “synagogue problem.” City officials had finally 
found a solution but discussion about the building only continued. At the unveiling of the 
exhibition itself, the cultural minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, Werner Schütz, expressed 
awkwardness with the decision, realizing as he spoke that perhaps he had agreed to an idea that 
did not seem altogether right. He suggested that “perhaps it would have been a good solution if in 
the future the [synagogue] had been devoted only to the purpose of remembrance, as a powerful 
monument and eloquent accuser of the terrible things in the past.”260 His unease reflected the fact 
that no matter how much the building had been transformed into the “Haus Industrieform” it still 
remained the synagogue, a space saturated with a past that could not simply be “forgotten” or 
“suppressed.” It reflected the absence of a once prominent Jewish community. As Schütz 
recognized, “the Jewish community, which has been melted down to less than one hundred 
members, can no longer use for its purposes this enormous building.”261 The absence of Jewish 
life remained present, if not articulated by the exhibition itself.  
                                                 
258 Herzog, Sex; Kansteiner, Pursuit; Moses, German Intellectuals; Marcuse, Legacies.  
 
259 Harald Welzer, Sabine Moller, and Karoline Tschuggnall, Opa war kein Nazi. Nationalsozialismus und 
Holocaust im Familiengedächtnis (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2002); Olaf Jensen, Geschichte machen. 
Strukturmerkmale des intergenerationellen Sprechens über die NS-Vergangenheit in deutschen Familien 
(Tübingen : Edition Diskord, 2004).  
 
260 ESA, 143, nr. 10798, speech by Werner Schütz, November 24, 1961.  
 
261 Ibid. 
 
 
 
322 
This unease with the synagogue continued long after the “Haus Industrieform” was 
unveiled, as journalists, Christian leaders, politicians, and leftist historians pushed city officials to 
change the use of the building. In the 1960s, the Essen branch of the Association of the Victims 
of the Nazi Regime (VVN) and two regional newspapers pressed city officials to build a 
monument to commemorate the hardship of “victims” conceived in the broadest sense. In 1964, 
the Neue Ruhr-Zeitung demanded that the city “finally” erect a “dignified monument for all 
victims of war and terror.”262 It invited five individuals from the city government, the Jewish 
community, and the Protestant church to comment on the proposal. All supported the basic idea 
but none suggested whose victimization the memorial was to commemorate. Only the mayor 
(CDU) seemed to narrow the category of victim down slightly to those who suffered during the 
“war and in particular those for whom it was a deadly crime to have another opinion or to be 
Jewish.” The chairman of the Jewish community responded that “our victims” had its own 
memorial, but he welcomed a “communal monument for the terror and death of the past.”263 Two 
years later, the local VVN wrote to Essen’s mayor urging him to build quickly a monument for 
“the victims of Hitler’s war” and the “murdered opponents” of his regime.264 
By the mid-1960s, appeals to find a different use for Essen’s synagogue emerged from 
these broad pleas. In 1966, a principal of a local high school published a short piece in the 
Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung calling for the construction of a museum for contemporary 
history in Essen.265 The suggestion sparked numerous letters to the editor, fifteen of which the 
newspaper reprinted. Several proposed putting the museum in the synagogue since, as one 
explained, the building “itself is through its own history a part of the evidence” of the period. 
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Another wrote that a museum would be a “better, more suitable use” of the building than its 
currently “crude” purpose. “The city settled on this solution,” it continued, “for monetary reasons, 
but it should only be a temporary solution.”266 A letter co-written by Ernst Schmidt, an active 
VVN and German Communist Party (DKP) member who would become one of the main 
organizers of a new exhibit in the synagogue, strongly advanced this idea. Calling the exhibition 
“crude” was to “put it very mildly,” he exclaimed. He added that a museum in the synagogue 
would allow “our city leaders to make up for their own failures and crudities in dealing with the 
past.”267 The idea appealed to “a number of individuals” in Essen.268 The local Jewish community 
indicated that it had no problem with the plan, suggesting that it, too, still remained 
uncomfortable with the display of industrial, consumer products in the synagogue. “It is 
difficult,” it wrote “to find a suitable purpose for this building that was erected as a house of 
worship.”269  
In 1967, Schmidt prepared a proposal for the VVN’s annual meeting that called for the 
construction of a museum to be located in the synagogue. The exhibition on contemporary history 
would focus on ten themes, including the Nazi seizure of power, the persecution of the Jews, 
resistance, occupied Europe, Stalingrad, and the postwar peace.270 Coming from the VVN, the 
focus was broad with Jewish victimization merely one part of a broader narrative of Nazi 
persecution and communist resistance. As Schmidt put it, “thousands of social democrats, 
communists, trade unionists, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews starved, were convicted by special 
courts, were put under the guillotine, were beaten to death in the concentration camps, were 
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gassed or shot while fleeing.”271 In 1973, Schmidt and the local VVN had the chance to put some 
of these ideas into practice. They organized the first exhibition on the Third Reich in Essen in the 
Karl Liebknecht bookstore. The local press barely paid attention to the exhibition but a large 
number of citizens attended it. One of them was a brilliant student from the University of 
Bochum. Detlev Peukert, who would publish his first book three years later on worker opposition 
to Nazism in the Ruhr, rapidly became one of the most imaginative German historians of the 
postwar era before his sudden death in 1990 at the age of thirty-nine.272 A member of the DKP 
and then later the SPD, Peukert had much in common with Schmidt politically and intellectually. 
Schmidt was no Wunderkind, but he was able to complete his PhD in history at the University of 
Bremen on the workers’s movement in the Ruhr. Peukert became like a “kid” to Schmidt, visiting 
his home often, as they forged an intergenerational friendship and alliance to increase knowledge 
about the history of Nazi Germany.273 
Schmidt and Peukert focused on developing a permanent exhibition on the Third Reich 
that they hoped would be housed in the synagogue. 1978-79 proved to be fateful years for their 
plans. In 1978, Kristallnacht was commemorated throughout the Federal Republic on a scale not 
matched earlier; the fortieth anniversary was the major turning point that put Kristallnacht on 
West Germany’s national memorial calendar.274 In Essen, the anniversary directed attention 
toward the destruction of the synagogue during the Third Reich and its postwar transformation 
into the “Haus Industrieform.” A SPD state representative wrote into the Westdeutsche 
Allgemeine Zeitung with sharp criticism of the wording of the plaque placed before the synagogue 
in 1949. He derided the passive voice construction of the phrase, “Jews had to lose their lives,” 
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calling it a “harmful belittlement of the most evil, outrageous actions of German history.”275 In 
late September, the Neue Ruhr Zeitung reported that local SPD leaders now supported the idea of 
transforming the synagogue into a museum for contemporary history.276 It was the first indication 
of official, municipal support for a project that had been initiated and pushed entirely by ordinary 
citizens. The idea now started to gain traction like it had not a decade earlier, pushed by a sense 
of outrage with the city’s postwar appropriation of the building. One local citizen put it sharply: 
“Give due reverence back to the synagogue! This form of restitution is perhaps Essen’s moral 
duty. What a blasphemy it was after the war to debase this old architectural monument of Essen 
into an exhibition room of industrial products, washing machines, and schnapps glasses.”277 In 
November 1978, Protestant church leaders working with the local chapter of the Organization for 
Christian-Jewish Cooperation founded the “Alte Synagoge” working group. It was established to 
develop plans for turning the building into a memorial for “all victims of violence.”278 And then 
finally, on the actual day of the fortieth-anniversary of Kristallnacht, a memorial took place 
inside the synagogue. The glass cases filled with industrial design products had temporarily been 
pushed aside as the group gathered in the building to recall its destruction forty years earlier. The 
surrounding “profanation” of the space made a deep impression on Essen’s mayor who 
spontaneously uttered: “We must make a drastic change here!”279 
The mayor followed on his words. No more than a month passed than the city 
government finally seemed willing to rethink its use of the building. On December 8, 1979, 
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Schmidt, Peukert, city archivist Hermann Schröter, Bremen professor of history Hans-Joseph 
Steinberg, and city officials gathered for a meeting about an exhibition on “resistance in the Third 
Reich.” The synagogue surfaced as the most desirable location for it.280 Peukert quickly drafted a 
preliminary sketch of the exhibition’s layout, which he divided into four parts: the crisis of the 
Weimar Republic and the Nazi seizure of power, the Third Reich, World War II, and the new 
beginning of 1945.281 Meanwhile, more local political leaders came out in support of the idea.282 
But plans came to a stop on January 18, 1979. At 3:30 in the afternoon, Schmidt, at work, 
received a call from Peukert: “You can forget the synagogue as the exhibition space,” he 
exclaimed. “It is on fire!”283 Schmidt ran up stairs where he had a view of the downtown. He 
watched as billows of smoke puffed out from the building. Coming just two months after the 
Kristallnacht anniversary, one can easily imagine what he and others were thinking. If it was not 
already clear, an article in the NZR made it so. The newspaper placed two large pictures on its 
full-page spread, both showing crowds of people in front of the burning synagogue. In large, 
boldened type, it placed the years “1938” and “1979.”284 It was a provocative gesture, but one that 
elided the clear difference between the two: this time it was a burning cigarette that accidentally 
started the fire, not barrels of gasoline.  
Ironically, though, it was the fire in the synagogue that finally freed the way for a new 
exhibition in the building. The “Haus Industrieform” was almost entirely destroyed, and the city 
now created a working group to explore the idea of putting a new exhibition in the synagogue. In 
January 1980, the city council formally accepted its recommendation to turn the building into a 
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museum with an exhibition on resistance and persecution during the Third Reich. This decision 
represented a clear triumph for Schmidt, Peukert, the VVN, and others who had long been 
advocating the erection of either a monument or a museum to remember the victims of the Third 
Reich. Proponents of the idea doubtlessly believed they were engaging in a significant re-
appropriation of the space from its earlier, defamed use. The exhibition that opened to the public 
on November 9, 1980, “Resistance and Persecution in Essen, 1933-1945,” followed closely the 
basic conceptual design that Peukert laid out in 1978-79. It focused broadly on the “rise, meaning, 
and effects of the Nazi regime.”285 Mirroring Peukert’s own scholarly interest in resistance and 
later in the socio-cultural conditions that made Nazism possible, the exhibit sought to understand 
how Germany reached 1933 and what local Esseners did to oppose the regime once it was 
established.286 In telling this story, the exhibition paid attention to violence and persecution, but 
here, too, the focus remained problematically broad, grouping together under the category of 
victim “Jews, ordinary opponents, the old parties, resistance fighters, war prisoners, and foreign 
workers.”287  
This appropriation of the synagogue produced several meanings. As Essen’s only site of 
remembrance for the Nazi period at the time, it represented the suffering, persecution, and 
resistance of the German population as a whole. As the WAZ put it, the “synagogue is a 
memorial for all victims of violence.”288 This formulation oddly placed Jews on the same level as 
Germans who were supposedly resisting rather than perpetrating Nazi crimes. Historians have 
long shown the elisions of German memory, but this use of the Essen synagogue uncovers 
something more than merely a “suppressed” or “forgotten” past. Although the exhibition 
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obviously mitigated the singularity of the Jewish experience, it remained acutely ambivalent 
about the deeper issue of German complicity in the everyday persecution of Jews over twelve 
years of Nazi rule. This part of the Nazi past permeated the stones of Essen’s synagogue. It could 
not be forgotten or suppressed, but because it caused deep anxiety and fear about the collapse of 
German empathy, it could and was utterly transformed into something altogether different. The 
exhibition took a feared, anxious past and made it approachable, even soothing for a German 
audience. It turned an unequivocally Jewish space into a German one. The “Haus Industrieform” 
had vanished. The building was now called the “Old Synagogue.” But the Jewishness of the space 
still remained contested because its Jewishness contested Germanness. The published pamphlet 
for the exhibition began by describing a photo of the synagogue. It was not the one snapped in 
1938, showing a crowd of Esseners gawking at the burning building, but one taken just after the 
war that showed the synagogue in the middle of a city full of “rubble and ash.” The pamphlet 
took from this picture the dual meanings of Nazi “destruction in a material, moral, and physical 
sense” and the plight of the “few who were prepared to offer resistance.”289 This photo, placed in 
the synagogue where the Torah ark once stood, offered a spatial, visual, and mnemonic 
interpretation of German suffering, provocatively using the powerful, symbolic image of the 
bombed-out German city.290  
On November 9, 1980, about 800 Esseners gathered in a synagogue renovated for the 
second time. In 1961, the unveiling took place two weeks after the anniversary of Kristallnacht. 
The organizers were doubtlessly aware then that opening a display of industrial products on the 
anniversary of the building’s 1938 desecration might suggest uncomfortable parallels. But twenty 
years later, city officials seemed confident that this time their display matched the solemnity of 
the anniversary. They had gotten it right this time. Just as in 1961, Essen’s mayor stood up to give 
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a celebratory speech about the building. Horst Katzor (SPD) touched briefly on the “terrible 
times,” “guilt,” “murder,” and “undesirable crimes” that the building symbolized before moving 
to a perhaps intonated “doch” (but), a sound and word that his audience’s ears might have 
registered with fulfilled anticipation. “But this building in the middle of the city is also a symbol 
of courage, bravery, inner greatness, human dignity, steadfastness, sturdy belief, unique sacrifice 
–– examples for us and future generations.” The “old synagogue belongs” to all Germans who 
suffered and resisted Nazism. “The people, who in this city did not succumb to the madness of 
Nazism, and who still believed in life after barbarism, even though the stranglehold of barbarism 
took to the air, are our hope. The old synagogue belongs to them.”291 It was a stunning 
interpretation of the synagogue. On the anniversary of its violent destruction, the mayor crafted a 
narrative of redemption and hope about a victimized German population that made it through 
tough times, tragedy, and barbarism to build the peaceful, democratic society of today.  The 
meaning of the synagogue could not have become more German.  
In West Berlin, the re-appropriation of Jewish space took place in a starkly different way. 
First of all, the city’s Jewish sites –– especially the synagogues that the postwar Jewish 
community no longer needed for religious worship –– had long vanished from the urban 
landscape by the 1980s. Most of the Jewish spaces still left standing remained located on the 
other side of the Berlin Wall. Even so, Berlin never had a definably Jewish area of town or a 
centralized Jewish space to re-appropriate like there was in Essen and other West German 
cities.292 To take just another example, the controversy that erupted in the mid-1980s over 
Frankfurt’s Börneplatz, the central space of Jewish life in the city since 1462, could not have 
                                                 
291 Ruhrlandmuseum, AES, 19-606, box 1, Speech by Horst Katzor, November 9, 1980.  
 
292 “Nowhere in this city do we run into a district that would amount to the center of Jewish Berlin,” a 
guidebook wrote in 1926. Jüdisches Jahrbuch für Gross-Berlin. Ein Wegweiser durch die jüdischen 
Einrichtungen und Organisationen Berlins (Berlin: Scherbel, 1926), 9.  
 
 
 
330 
unfolded in the more diffuse urban landscape of West Berlin.293 That is not to say, however, that 
West Berlin did not witness its own growing interest in Jewish sites and its own share of 
controversy about how best to interpret them. It is merely to illuminate that the mode of 
appropriating Jewish space differed. West Berliners first rediscovered their city’s Jewish past in 
highly localized ways with the emergence of grass-roots efforts to mark the absence of Jewish life 
in their individual districts (Bezirke). These efforts focused mainly on demarcating what was no 
longer present, seeking to interpret this absence through a variety of ways such as publishing 
local histories, sponsoring museum exhibitions, writing guidebooks, and erecting monuments.294  
One might term this interest as the localization of the absence of Jewish space. The 
German word, Verortung, captures more precisely the duality of this process: the marking of 
absence in physical spaces that are found in one’s own neighborhood. This interest emerged at a 
particular moment when local history was fairly popular in West Berlin. In the early 1980s, the 
city became home to a number of active, local history workshops that focused on producing 
counter-narratives to those developed by professional historians. These organizations embraced 
“everyday history” with its emphasis on experience as opposed to the grand, structural narratives 
of social history. Using less traditional types of historical sources such as oral history, they 
focused on the local, the individual, and the everyday with the aim of understanding one’s own 
space, or as the saying went, to “excavate where you stand” (“Grabe wo du stehst”). In 1981 and 
1983, the Berlin History Workshop and the Active Museum of Fascism and Resistance were 
founded and started supporting local, everyday approaches to the study of the city’s past with a 
particular interest in gender history, the Nazi period, and German-Jewish relations.  
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A number of similar local groupings in each district of West Berlin also emerged around 
this time, and one of the most active ones was located in the affluent, middle-class neighborhood 
of Schöneberg. In 1983, it organized an exhibition on the Nazi period about “Life in Schöneberg-
Friedenau.” Intended to engage critically the “failures of the official historiography,” the 
exhibition looked at the past from “below” in order to provide a “piece of everyday life in Nazi 
Berlin.”295 While preparing the exhibition, the organizers discovered that a sizeable Jewish 
population had once lived in their district, especially around the area of Bayerischer Platz 
(Bavarian Square). They began to search in the archives for material about Jewish life in 
Schöneberg, which culminated five years later in an open-air exhibition about the deportation of 
Jews and the war of destruction in Eastern Europe. These two exhibitions spurned further interest 
in the district’s Jewish population. In the late 1980s, Schöneberg’s local history museum initiated 
a research project on the persecution of its Jewish residents.  
Carried out almost entirely by volunteers who sifted through Nazi documents an hour or 
so before going to work, the year-long research project unearthed a plethora of material about the 
everyday persecution of Jews in Schöneberg. The richest source base came from the Nazi 
regional financial office where hundreds of documents were found about the confiscation of 
Jewish property. This collection revealed that nearly 6,000 Jews had been deported from the 
district. The high number shocked ordinary residents and local, district politicians. Calls to 
commemorate the persecution of the district’s Jewish population immediately followed. The 
Schöneberg branch of the SPD submitted a city-council resolution to a build a monument on 
Bayerischer Platz to remember “the 6,000 Jewish victims.”296 It argued that residents of the 
district should know “where the people that the Nazis deported to the concentration and death 
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camps lived.”297 This spatial demarcation of the district’s absent Jewish population would make 
the crimes of Nazism concretely visible both in a literal and figurative sense: “If one can envision 
the number of victims from each individual street, almost every citizen today will probably be 
stunned to confront this situation.”298 The city acted with remarkable speed on the SPD 
resolution. It quickly approved the idea and established the Working Group for a Memorial at 
Bayerischer Platz, a civic organization charged to carry out a competition for the memorial and to 
assemble additional material about Jewish life in the district.  
 What spurred this rather sudden interest in the district’s Jewish past? Part of it came from 
a melancholic awareness that a rich, cultural life had been lost and now could never be retrieved. 
In 1933, about 16,000 Jews lived in Schöneberg. Most of them came from the middle-class and 
were highly acculturated. In the prewar and postwar imaginary of “Jewish Berlin,” Schöneberg, 
along with the districts of Wilmersdorf, Tiergarten, and Grunewald, formed the “aristocratic, 
assimilated” west as opposed to the “proletarian, unassimilated” east located along the streets of 
the Scheunenviertel.299 The Bayerische Viertel was often called the “Jewish Switzerland.” By the 
1980s, some mourned the loss of this seemingly rich world of acculturated German-Jewry. In the 
words of the local SPD paper, “just as in Eastern Europe the Jewish culture of the ‘Shtetl’ was 
completely destroyed, so too here in Germany Jewish life in many regions disappeared without a 
trace.” The article went on to say that many think this cultural loss is not found in a city such as 
Berlin with its “historical consciousness and cultural diversity.” “Far from it! … Jewish culture 
once formed a fundamental part of Berlin’s urban culture.” Today, alas, no one remembers this 
past. No one remembers that Schöneberg was once the “Jewish Switzerland” with “intellectuals,” 
“professionals,” and prominent figures such as “Einstein” and “Egon Erwin Kisch” walking its 
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streets.300 In a similar vein, the written materials prepared for the memorial competition spoke of 
the Bayerischer Viertel as the “center of bourgeois-Jewish life” with numerous “doctors, lawyers, 
store keepers, and architects.”301 Schöneberg’s Jewish population seemingly reflected the best 
elements of the German-Jewish symbiosis.  
 But it also represented the catastrophic, violent breakdown of that symbiosis –– a 
fundamental fact that the Schöneberg project interpreted with extraordinary directness. This local 
effort to “excavate the past” avoided the temptation to essentialize and romanticize a lost 
“world.” In a rather remarkable way, it reflected on the violent destruction of Jewish life in the 
district. Just a few sentences after the ones quoted in the above SPD article came a sharp, bitter 
turn to the violence of the past and the apathy of the present: “Today, those of us who in our 
beautiful, old ‘Berlin apartments’ enjoy the blessings of Wilhelmian architectural design, often do 
not know that these apartments and houses were the setting for indescribable tragedy.”302 The 
SPD demanded that knowledge about this “part of our city’s and our district’s history” not remain 
limited to just “an interested minority.” It organized an effort to place posters on all houses where 
deported Jews had lived in remembrance of the fiftieth-anniversary of Kristallnacht. On 
November 9, 1988, over seventy houses had temporary, cardboard plaques (Papptafeln) on them 
with the names, ages, and deportation dates of Jews. This “Papptafelaktion” had a lasting impact 
on the design and intention of the monument that was eventually erected on Bayerischer Platz. A 
year later, the city district hosted an open-air exhibit of possible designs and collected ideas from 
local residents. More than half of the citizens who submitted ideas favored a decentralized, non-
monumental design much like the cardboard campaign. Such a memorial would provoke, stun, 
and surprise those passing by on their otherwise normal routine. At a panel discussion sponsored 
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by the Berlin History Workshop, the organizers reached a consensus that it would not be “a 
solitary monument,” but one made up of individual “stumbling blocks” that provide concrete, 
localized experiences of Jewish suffering.303  
The idea was to situate and localize the past as a seemingly ordinary part of the built 
environment, dramatizing the fact that the gradual, step-by-step persecution of the Jews unfolded 
as a “normal” process of everyday life accepted and absorbed by German society. The description 
for the competition put it clearly: “In the normality of the past, these events crept in and could be 
seen and experienced by anyone alert on a daily basis. The crimes of exclusion and mass murder 
began before everyone’s eyes and were implemented through the participation, cognizance, and 
acquiescence of many.”304 The artists who designed the memorial, Renata Stih and Frieder 
Schnock, articulated this normalized prejudice through a set of signs posted throughout the 
Bayerischer Viertel. The signs included on one side one of the numerous Nazi anti-Jewish laws 
enacted over 1933-1945 and on the other side a seemingly innocuous, ordinary image. For 
example, a sign with an image of musical notes reads: “Jews are excluded from choral groups, 
August 16, 1933.” If one follows the posts, the ever-increasing persecution of the Jews becomes 
clear.305 Located on otherwise everyday streets in quiet, suburban Berlin, the signs are at once 
jarring and normal parts of the urban landscape: they are as easily overlooked as they are not 
easily ignored. As the district mayor framed their meaning, the “really terrifying” aspect of the 
numerous Nazi laws is that the “majority of the German population accepted” them.306  
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By articulating this “normality of terror,” the memorial could not have differed more 
clearly from the exhibition installed in the Essen synagogue.307 Politically engaged citizens on the 
Left organized both projects, but with different interpretations of the Nazi past. While the Essen 
synagogue reflected German persecution and resistance, the Schöneberg memorial starkly 
inscribed in the built environment the everyday persecution of Jews by German society. Given its 
postwar history as a stronghold of leftist and alternative politics, West Berlin perhaps not 
surprisingly reflected a local embrace of the “non-German German identity” that made central the 
stigma of the Holocaust. Essen, with its strong ties to the labor movement, resembled the 
continuing presence of an older, antifascist interpretation among DKP and SPD members that 
emphasized German victimization and resistance. The point here is not to suggest that the Berlin 
effort is more successful than the Essen one, but to mark the dissonant and contradictory impulses 
in West German interpretations of the Holocaust that these two projects illuminate.   
VI. Conclusion  
 In the 1980s, Germans and Poles became interested in the Jewish past by contesting, 
renegotiating, and reappropriating the cultural meanings of Jewish sites. This interest marked a 
paradoxical shift in postwar European history. In the region where the Holocaust originated and 
unfolded, the material traces of Jewish life were being brought back into the urban landscape as 
part of a broader virtual recreation of the Jewish past. Both societies only forty years earlier had 
expunged Jews from everyday life and now were suddenly welcoming them back in at roughly 
the same time in three different states on both sides of the Iron Curtain. This urge stemmed from 
a growing awareness that the Jewish minority was indeed now gone and its perceived cultural 
richness had forever been lost except from the few Jewish sites still left standing. This “presence 
of absence” did not produce any stable meaning of Jewish space, but involved various strategies 
to mark, historicize, contest, discuss, manipulate, control, and appropriate it. In short, what is 
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striking about the 1980s, and what distinguishes it from the earlier, postwar decades, is that the 
absence of Jewish life became a “problem” that had to be dealt with, worked through, solved, 
deflected, or refuted. In a word, the absence of Jewish life became contentious: it provoked 
debate, discussion, dispute, discomfort, and interest. In framing it so, I do not mean to imply a 
logical opposite, namely that the “the presence of absence” was itself absent in the immediate 
postwar years. One of my central, overarching arguments has been that this absence remained 
omnipresent, permeating the stones of the empty spaces of Jewish life. It could not simply be 
suppressed or forgotten in a collective form of cultural amnesia. The absence remained always 
there, if not always made present as a contentious “problem.” It is thus this act of becoming 
contentious that demands analytical explanation.  
This “becoming contentious” unfolded in both different and similar ways across political 
and national boundaries. In both the GDR and PPR, Jewish sites became a national problem in 
light of internal and external pressure placed on the SED and PZPR. Unlike in West Germany, the 
political leadership in the GDR and PPR had long pursued overtly anti-Jewish policies that no 
longer remained tenable in the midst of shifting cold war tensions. Just as both parties sought to 
improve their image abroad, Jewish sites started attracting attention from tourists, Jewish leaders, 
and journalists. This growing transnational interest turned Jewish space into a contentious, 
political issue that the SED and PZPR had to mitigate in some way. Both parties decided to 
restore a few select Jewish sites in East Berlin and Warsaw, while staging massive 
commemorations of Kristallnacht and the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising. In the process, they 
legitimized the concerns of Jewish leaders who now saw an opening to press them even more. 
Jewish space became all the more contentious.  
Segments of the growing opposition saw the party’s shift as nothing more than a crass, 
hypocritical attempt to curry favor with international Jewish leaders. Since some of them had 
already been working on preserving Jewish sites for years, they knew well the regime’s long-
standing policy of neglect and destruction. Jewish space became yet another issue that further 
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divided state and society, although the extent of this fissure at times was limited despite 
imaginations to the contrary by dissidents acting the rebellious part. In the PPR especially, the 
opposition and lay, Catholic intelligentsia became heavily involved in rethinking Polish-Jewish 
relations, but they also absorbed ideas long propagated by the state. In the wake of 1968, 
interpretations of Polish-Jewish relations involved at times as much absorption of the PZPR’s 
linguistic and mental framing of the “Jewish problem” as resistance to it. Moreover, the 
opposition clearly used their embrace of Jewishness for political gain and transnational 
consumption. They were responding to a distinct political moment and saw an issue they could 
exploit: it was after all none other than the consummate politician Lech Wałęsa who, just two 
years after his grand statements about “forgiveness” in 1988, sought to use “Jewishness” in a 
much different way by implying that his campaign opponent was Jewish in the changed political 
context of 1990.308  Opposition figures in the GDR used Kristallnacht in similarly political ways 
to advance their agenda against the state.  
Nevertheless, such direct tension between state and society certainly existed more overtly 
in the GDR and PPR than in West Germany. Since the FRG had long established good relations 
with international Jewish leaders, Jewish space never became a transnational problem that was 
contested among international, national, and local leaders. Civic projects to reappropriate Jewish 
sites simply did not provoke concern from the federal government. Instead when conflict did 
emerge it typically remained confined to the local level. In Essen, politically engaged citizens 
pressed city officials to change the use of the building for over a decade, while in West Berlin the 
organizers of the memorial deliberately sought to create an alternative historical narrative than the 
one fashioned by professional historians and political leaders. More broadly, left-leaning, 
politically active citizens and historians in both cities sought to bring attention to their 
understanding of the Third Reich that they believed had been forgotten. They launched direct, 
sharp criticisms of postwar West German “amnesia” that they rather simplistically identified as 
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the result of incomplete democratization under the conservative, even reactionary rule of the 
Christian Democrats for the first twenty years of the republic. That now the CDU was back in 
power under Kohl and seemed determine to “normalize” the Nazi past, deny the serious legal, 
cultural, and social questions of West Germany’s “foreign” population, and implement a 
“spiritual-moral change” after a thirteen-year respite from CDU domination in the 1970s injected 
verve and urgency to their efforts. The actors in Essen and West Berlin were not, of course, cast 
in the larger drama of revolution, although a few might have dreamt of such roles, but they 
seemed just as powerfully engaged, concerned, and motivated to create change as their 
counterparts in the east.  
In this sense, the “becoming contentious” of the absence of Jewish life did not always fall 
along distinct cold war lines. The striking degree of variance from city to city challenges any 
attempt to produce a grand, homogenizing narrative about remembrance in the pluralistic, 
democratic west and suppressed memory in the dictatorial, communist east. In all three cases, 
Jewish sites became contentious on the local level and engaged different social actors. The extent 
of social engagement and the results their efforts produced depended on the dynamics of a given 
city where the interactions between the local, the national, and the transnational varied 
considerably. In the GDR and PPR, Jewish sites in the highly visible capital cities became spaces 
of intense political contestation among the opposition, state, and international Jews, while those 
in Potsdam and Wrocław received attention mainly from local citizens (and German tourists in 
the latter case). In the FRG, no single city became the center for reappropriating the Jewish past, 
but here, too, the political dynamics in West Berlin and Essen could not have differed more 
starkly. In short, a stable, definable German and Polish interpretation of the Jewish past in the 
built environment does not emerge from these five urban contexts.   
But can this interpretation be defined –– as I just have –– as “German” and “Polish”? If 
cold war differences become less pronounced when looking at the local level, do national 
differences as well? The historical legacy of the Holocaust is inflected in obviously different 
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ways in Germany and Poland. As the country that created the problem in the first place, it is not 
surprising that Germany became home to some of the most sharply self-critical efforts like the 
one in Berlin-Schöneberg. But such efforts were not that common in the 1980s, and the GDR still 
remained fixed to its antifascist interpretation of the past that eschewed responsibility for the 
Holocaust. In many ways, the history of Jewish-gentile relations remained similarly fraught in 
divided Germany and Poland. The Holocaust became an anxious, feared past that could not be 
ignored but could be altered and shaped to become less discomforting. And yet, in a certain way, 
the Holocaust was even more contentious in Poland given its historical, asymmetrical relationship 
to it. Poland did not produce the “Final Solution” and even refused Hitler’s invitation to ally with 
Nazi Germany. The Holocaust remained in a kind of perpetual contestation with a broad range of 
socially and politically accepted viewpoints. A Pole could deny responsibility for the Holocaust 
in a way that West Germans and even to some extent East Germans simply could not (lest they 
become neo-Nazis). This difference is not so much a “national” one as it is a historically 
conditioned one.  
This asymmetrical relationship to the Holocaust partially explains the uniquely intense 
dominance of the “Jewish problem” in postwar Poland. Although more than a few historians have 
tried, one could easily argue that it is impossible to write a history about the PPR without 
extensive treatment of Polish-Jewish relations.309 The issue remained dominant across the forty-
year history of the communist state as the often-entangled stereotypes of the “Jewish-
Communist,” “Zionist,” “non-Pole,” and “cosmopolitan” emerged with varying degrees of 
intensity in 1945-46, 1956, 1968, and 1981. One reason is the geographically and historically 
specific intensity of the żydokomuna anti-Semitic stereotype in Poland, but another is the history 
of the Holocaust in that country.310 Poland became, not by choice, the geographic epicenter of 
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where the Holocaust unfolded. The mass murder of its Jewish community and the everyday 
entanglement of Poles in the Holocaust was one of the factors that produced the physical violence 
of 1945-46 and the linguistic violence of 1968. The verbal hate of 1968 not only pushed some 
13,000 Jews out of Poland, but it also intensely attacked the idea of the Holocaust and shaped 
afterwards the mode of discussing it. It is probably true that communist officials were particularly 
well suited to pen this linguistic hate. As Thomas Haury has shown for the GDR, the communist, 
Manichean obsession with “friends” and “foes,” “good” and “evil,” “enemies” and “allies” 
created an inherent, almost structural urge to purge.311 To this argument I might add for 1968 at 
least the importance of the Polish context. The virulence of 1968 and the attack on the Holocaust 
occurred in Poland because the communist regime, unlike its East German counterpart, had 
almost no limitations to the intensity of the anti-Jewish hatred it could embrace. Its predecessor 
never produced the “Final Solution” or a Quisling supporter of it. As Kazimierz Wyka noted in 
1945: “If Polish anti-Semitism had comprised itself as collaborationist, it would later have been 
destroyed or at least unmasked. But since it never had a Quisling character, it retained its position 
and is still considered a mark of patriotism.”312 Although anti-Semitism certainly was never 
destroyed in postwar, divided Germany, Wyka points to at least a partial explanation for postwar 
Poland’s particularly uneasy, contested relationship with the Holocaust that no less than denied its 
specificity in 1968.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
communists. One could say “nationally specific,” but that can imply a false Polish/cultural singularity when 
accusations of “Jewish-Communism” existed across the European continent. The idea of “Jewish-
Communism” is strong in Poland largely because of the weakness of the interwar communist movement, 
the 1919-1921 Polish-Soviet war, the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland, and the Soviet occupation after 
WWII. It is, in short, historically conditioned. On żydokomuna, see Pufelska, Judäo-Kommune. 
 
311 Haury, Antisemitismus.  
 
312 Kazimierz Wyka, “Potęga ciemnoty potwierdzona,” Odrodzenie September 23, 1945; quoted in Huener, 
Auschwitz, 41.  
  
 
 
CHAPTER FIVE  
“VIRTUAL” OR “REAL”? 
JEWISH SITES AFTER 1989 
 
 In Vanishing Diaspora, Bernard Wasserstein declares that Europe’s Jewish population is 
currently on the verge of near total collapse. The long history of Diaspora in Europe has come to 
an end after the Holocaust. “Soon nothing will be left save a disembodied memory,” he 
concludes, noting that the low birth rates of Jews on the continent do not hold any promise for the 
situation changing anytime soon.1 Published in 1996, Wasserstein’s observations seem not only 
exaggerated and dramatic but simply outdated for certain parts of the continent, especially 
Germany and Poland. Both countries have witnessed a reemergence of Jewish life since the 
collapse of communism that is striking. The number of Jews is not even remotely close to what it 
was before the war and it is probably safe to say it never will be, but the growth over a fairly short 
period of time challenges the notion of a “vanishing Diaspora.” Germany has seen by far the 
largest increase with the migration of tens of thousands of Jews from the former Soviet Union 
since 1989, while Poland’s revival has been much more modest, yet still notable as Poles with 
Jewish roots have expressed a desire to discover their Jewishness. Moreover, Wasserstein defines 
“Jewishness” narrowly in terms of demographics alone with the pre-war numbers as the reference 
point for his implicit comparison.2 But non-Jewish Germans and Poles have increasingly 
expressed a fascination with the Jewish past, producing a staged, parallel “Jewish” existence that 
works both against and with the Jewish community. This interest began in the 1980s as the 
                                                 
1 Wasserstein, Vanishing Diaspora, 290. 
 
2 On the hybridity of Jewish identity, see Jonathan Weber, ed., Jewish Identities in the New Europe 
(London: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1994).  
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absence of Jewish life became present, but it has intensified since 1989 as an almost insatiable 
appetite for anything perceived to be “Jewish” has taken hold among some segments of society.3  
As more tourists have been coming to reunited Germany and postcommunist Poland, this 
attraction has also become increasingly more transnational. In the 1980s, Jewish sites attracted 
international attention, but the level of interest has risen dramatically as tens of thousands of Jews 
and non-Jews from the United States, Israel, Canada, and elsewhere have traveled to Germany 
and Poland in search of the “Jewish” past. Although Jewish heritage travel is a pan-European 
development with at least thirty-five guidebooks currently available to lead travelers across the 
continent, trips almost always include Poland and more increasingly Germany with the growing 
international appeal of Berlin.4 The German word Spurensuche neatly captures this transnational 
and local interest in the Jewish past. The “search for traces,” although less compact in English, 
reflects the basic idea behind what has been propelling Germans, Poles, Americans, Israelis, and 
others to search both near and far for the vestiges of the past. It stems from a certain urge for 
something seemingly old, authentic, and real that goes beyond the modernist obsession with 
functionality and novelty; it is part of the heterogeneous postmodern embrace of the “historic” in 
the urban landscape.5 As the “traces” part of the word indicates, actual, concrete sites are central 
here: physical spaces seem particularly real; they can be touched, experienced, photographed, 
examined, discovered, protected, preserved, recreated, restaged. This act of searching out for the 
past produces real effects on the built environment, not least of all with the reconstruction of 
“old” sites or the creation of new ones that display artifacts of the old: “authentic” Jewish sites 
                                                 
3 It is impossible to say with any kind of accuracy the number of non-Jewish Poles and Germans who have 
expressed interest in the Jewish past. It is probably safe to say that most Poles and Germans –– just like 
virtually everyone else in the world –– are consumed in their daily lives of work, family, and friends, rarely 
stopping to think about Jews either positively or negatively. Nevertheless, the intensity of interest since the 
1980s is palpable.  
 
4 The number of guidebooks comes from the USHMM website list of books for “Holocaust-related travel:” 
http://www.ushmm.org/research/library/bibliography/index.php?content=holocaust_travel. On European 
Jewish heritage travel, see Gruber, Virtually Jewish, chap. 7.   
 
5 Koshar, Transient Past, chap. 7; Rosenfeld, Munich, chaps. 9-11.  
 343 
have been restored, while new “Jewish” spaces, especially museums, have been or are currently 
being built.  
Germany and Poland have been witnessing what one might call the reconstruction and 
musealization of the Jewish past just as its Jewish communities have been growing.6 The 
temporal and geographic tension between these two developments –– between the transnational 
obsession with the past and the present, local expansion of Jewish communal life –– is palpable, 
but it does not amount to a clear binary between the real and the virtual. Some have bemoaned the 
creation of virtual Jewish worlds on a continent with no “real” Jews.7 But the notion of the 
“virtual Diaspora” is as problematic as the “vanishing Diaspora.” As Jewish life reemerges in 
Germany and Poland, the boundaries between the “real” and the “virtual” are not always so 
clearly drawn. In some cases, interest in Jewish sites, for example in Potsdam as the city looks to 
build a new synagogue, is directly connected to the new Jewish Diaspora that has emerged in 
post-1989 Germany, even if it still remains clearly embedded in interpretations of the past. This 
interest does not just involve discussions among non-Jews for non-Jews. Jewish sites engage the 
attention, interest, and concern of Germans, Jews, Poles, and tourists in both similar and 
conflicting ways.  
This chapter analyzes this multifaceted interest, while continuing to explain what 
accounts for its emergence. This chapter builds on the last, which argued that the “presence of 
absence” emerged in the GDR, FRG, and PPR because of discussions about the Holocaust, 
international pressure, and political conflicts over Jewish spaces. The one feature that all three 
cases roughly shared, albeit less so in the GDR, was a growing reflection on the Holocaust. The 
centrality of the Holocaust has only increased in Germany and Poland after 1989, thanks in no 
small part to interventions from across the Atlantic by Jan T. Gross and Daniel Goldhagen, but I 
                                                 
6 Offe, Ausstellungen; Hoppe, Jüdische Geschichte; Pieper, Musealisierung.  
 
7 Gruber, Virtually Jewish. A somewhat similar argument, although limited to the German case is found in 
Y. Michal Bodemann, Gedächtnistheater. Die Jüdische Gemeinschaft und ihre deutsche Erfindung 
(Hamburg: Rotbuch Verlag, 1996).  
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would argue that as intense as theses debates were –– and they were intense –– they advanced the 
basic parameters of discussion established in the 1980s. In the Polish case, such an argument will 
perhaps seem odd given the neo-liberal, postcommunist, westernizing demand to view the 
communist period as some frozen, closed moment of time when the sinister, totalitarian behemoth 
controlled every aspect of intellectual life. But, in fear of sounding Rankean, the “real” really 
does matter here: a number of efforts to reappropriate the Jewish past in the built environment 
came before Neighbors (2000).8 In what follows then, I forgo analyzing the continuing working 
through of the Holocaust in post-1989 Germany and Poland –– Goldhagen, Gross, the 
Wehrmachtaustellung, Walser-Bubis, the crosses of Auschwitz, the Berlin Holocaust memorial. 
These public discussions have already received extensive treatment and it is important to make 
room for other levels of analysis.9 What is more, the on-going appropriation of Jewish sites does 
not stem exclusively from concern about the Holocaust, although it certainly remains central. It 
also comes from the presence of tourists on Spurensuche, the postmodern embrace of the historic, 
and the urge for “cosmopolitanism” in a globalizing world. These factors unfold with various 
levels of intensity in the five cities discussed here with their different degrees of interest in the 
Jewish past, number of tourists, and size of Jewish community. Just as in early parts of the 
                                                 
8 More broadly, the interest in “Jewishness” has been strong since the late 1970s: Irwin-Zarecka, 
Neutralizing Memory; Madeline G. Levine, “Wrestling with Ghosts: Poles and Jews Today,” Occasional 
Papers, No. 36, East European Studies, Woodrow Wilson Center, 1-18; Steinlauf, Bondage; Lehrer, 
“‘Shoah-Business;’” chap. 4 of this dissertation.  
 
9 Jan-Holger Kirsch, Nationaler Mythos oder historische Trauer? Der Streit um ein zentrales “Holocaust-
Mahnmal” für die Berliner Republik (Köln: Böhlau Verlag, 2003); Hans-Georg Stavginski, Das Holocaust-
Denkmal. Der Streit um das “Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas in Berlin (Paderborn: Schöningh, 
2002); Ute Heimrod, Günter Schlusche and Horst Seferens, eds., Der Denkmalstreit--das Denkmal? Die 
Debatten um das “Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas.” Eine Dokumentation (Berlin: Philo 
Verlag, 1999). Neue Gesellschaft für Bildende Kunst e.V., ed., Der Wettbewerb für das “Denkmal für die 
ermordeten Juden Europas.” Eine Streitschrift (Berlin: Verlag der Kunst Berlin, 1995); Michael S. Cullen, 
ed., Das Holocaust-Mahnmal. Dokumentation einer Debatte (Zürich: Pendo Verlag AG, 1999); Michael 
Jeismann, ed., Mahnmal Mitte. Eine Kontroverse (Köln: DuMont, 1999); Gerhard Schwepphäuser and Jörg 
H. Gleiter, eds., Wegschauen? Weiterdenken! Zur Berliner Mahnmal-Debatte (Bauhaus-Universität 
Weimar: Universitätsverlag, 1999); Riki Kalbe and Moshe Zuckermann, eds., Ein Grundstück in Mitte. Das 
Gelände des künftigen Holocaust-Mahnmals in Wort und Bild (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2000); Holger 
Thünemann, Das Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas. Dechiffrierung einer Kontroverse (Münster: 
LIT Verlag, 2003); Frank Schirrmacher, Die Walser-Bubis-Debatte. Eine Dokumentation (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1999); Geoff Eley, The “Goldhagen Effect:” History, Memory, Nazism (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan, 2000); Polonsky and Michlic, Neighbors Respond; Zubrzycki, Crosses. 
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postwar period, so too after 1989 it remains difficult to pull from diverse urban landscapes a 
singular narrative about Jewish space. Yet Berlin, Warsaw, Potsdam, Essen, and Wrocław do 
converge in the central feature that they share: all have witnessed, some more intensely than 
others and some in rather strikingly similar ways, interest in Jewish sites. All of this has been 
taking place precisely at the moment when Jewish communal life is arguably at its most secure 
point in Germany since 1945 and in Poland since 1968. In their rush to find the vestiges of the 
past, Germans, Poles, and tourists admittedly often overlook this present, on-going reality, but a 
few subtle hints are surfacing that the reemergence of Jewish life in Germany and Poland is 
having some impact on interpretations of the past. There is at once intermingling and tension 
between the “virtual” and the not completely “vanishing” spheres of Jewish life.  
I. The Revival of Jewish Life after 1989  
 In one of the most stunning transformations in its postwar history, Germany has become 
home to one of the largest and until recently fastest growing Jewish communities in Europe 
thanks to tens of thousands of Russian Jewish immigrants. The migration started during the 
waning hours of the East German regime when the new government of Lothar de Mazière opened 
its borders to Jews from the Soviet Union. What began as a trickle suddenly became a flood after 
German unification.10 Germany’s historically liberal refugee laws (in contrast to its strict 
naturalization laws) allowed Jews to enter the country with the legal rights of immigrants, 
although parliament has steadily been restricting these laws since 1989. In 1993, the Bundestag 
put tighter restrictions on foreign immigration, while in 2005 it approved an entire overhaul of the 
system. Now the number of foreigners entering the country has decreased dramatically. In 2007, a 
mere 2,502 Jews came to Germany, down sharply from a high of 19,437 in 1997.11 Still, in total 
                                                 
10 On selecting Germany, Yvonne Schütze, “Warum Deutschland und nicht Israel? Begründungen 
russischer Juden für die Migration nach Deutschland,” BIOS Zeitschrift Biographieforschung und Oral 
History no. 2 (1997): 186-208.  
 
11 Deutscher Bundestag, 16. Wahlperiode, Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die kleine Anfrage der 
Fraktion Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Drucksache 16/8716, April 4, 2008.  
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some 200,000 Jews from the former Soviet Union have made their way to Germany since 1989.12 
These predominantly Russian-speaking Jews have increased the size of Germany’s Jewish 
religious community by 250 percent. In the late 1980s, the community in the FRG had around 25-
30,000 Jews, while the one in the GDR had about 400.13 In 2005, the Central Council of Jews 
(Zentralrat) reported a total of 105,733 Jewish community members with the largest Gemeinde 
located in Berlin (11,014).14 This migration of Russian Jews reflects what has long been 
occurring throughout Germany’s postwar history but rarely articulated in public until recently –– 
Germany has become an immigrant nation. It has the largest foreigner population in Europe with 
6.7 million (8.2 percent of the population).15 
 Although the Jewish community has officially welcomed this influx of Jews, the 
transition has not been easy. Despite being the founder of Reform Judaism, the Jews of Germany 
today are almost entirely Orthodox with only a few liberal synagogues (conservative in the 
Jewish-American context). The local Gemeinde maintains the Halakhic law and is answerable to 
the Zentralrat, a central, organizing body formed in 1950 with the idea that the small Jewish 
community needed to form an Einheitsgemeinde (unified community).16 The Russian Jewish 
                                                 
12 A summary of the numbers from 1991-2007 is found in “Deutschland: Weniger jüdische Zuwanderer,” 
Migration und Bevölkerung Newsletter, no. 4, May 2008 (on-line edition; last accessed May 29, 2008). 
Focus Migration publishes this newsletter, which is an information portal on global immigration in 
partnership with the Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI), the Netzwerk Migration in 
Europa, and the German Federal Agency for Civic Education. 
 
13 Burgauer, Erinnerung, 358-59. 
 
14 “Neue Zahlen,” Zukunft October 28, 2005. The number for Berlin comes from the Zentralrat’s website 
with statistical date for each community: www.zentralratdjuden.de/de/topic/59.html?gemeinde=6. 
 
15 Ausländerzahlen (Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2008), 4. On this postwar 
transformation, see Chin, Guest.  
 
16 On the formation of the Zentralrat, see Geller, Jews; Jurgen Zieher, “Weder Privilegierung noch 
Diskriminierung. Die Politik des Zentralrats der Juden in den fünfziger Jahren,” Jahrbuch für 
Antisemitismusforschung 13 (2004): 187-211.  
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population has complicated this long-standing, postwar balance.17 A number of them either know 
little about Judaism or do not meet the conservative, religious criteria for membership in the 
Gemeinde. Russian immigrants who consider themselves Jewish because the Soviet state had 
marked them as a nationality might or might not be halakhically Jewish. If for instance they do 
not have a Jewish mother, they cannot become a full, religious member of the Gemeinde.18 This 
has naturally caused resentment, frustration, and anger among Russian Jews.  
Moreover, many Russian Jews arrive in need of jobs, housing, education, and welfare 
support. The resources of the local Gemeinden, the Zentralrat, and the state have simply been 
overwhelmed. Although many of them are well educated, they have struggled to find suitable 
work with doctors, engineers, teachers, and intellectuals having to settle for jobs outside their 
field. Finally, there is the on-going, culturally fraught issue of “integration,” the catchword of late 
not only for German society as whole as it wrestles with what it means to be an immigrant nation 
but also for the Jewish community. Just as demands have grown for Germany’s Turkish 
immigrant population to acculturate into German society, so too have parallel assumptions 
surfaced about Russian Jews among the still predominantly German-speaking leadership of the 
Gemeinden and Zentralrat. The assumption is that Russian Jews should integrate into the 
religious life of the community by learning German and becoming versed in Jewish practice. The 
problem is that such “integration” assumes a cultural and religious superiority that some Russian 
Jews resent. Many have little attachment to German culture and little desire to pratice religious 
Judaism, especially Orthodoxy. The result has been fissure, dissonance, and pluralization in the 
once, seemingly “unified community.”19  
                                                 
17 An extended, insightful reflection on the points I touch upon below is Jeffrey M. Peck, Being Jewish in 
the New Germany (New Brunswick: Rutges University Press, 2006), chap. 3.  
 
18 Russian Jews also struggled to convince German authorities that they were really Jewish and should be in 
Germany in the first place. See Franziska Becker, Ankommen in Deutschland. Einwanderungspolitik als 
biographische Erfahrung im Migrationsprozeß russischer Juden (Berlin: Reimer, 2001).  
 
19 Peck, Jewish, chap. 3. 
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Perhaps no other Jewish community in Germany reflects this fragmentation more acutely 
than the one in Berlin. The capital of unified Germany has become home to the country’s largest 
Jewish community of 11,000 members and eight synagogues. This number is obviously nowhere 
near the prewar community of 160,000, but it represents a doubling of the community’s size in 
just fifteen years. But as more Jews have come to the city, what it means to be Jewish has become 
less unified.20 Although Berlin’s fractious and at times even chaotic Gemeinde clearly dominates 
“Jewishness” in the capital, it is no longer the sole representative of Berlin Jews as it was from 
1945 to 1989 in both east and west.21 A number of Jewish organizations have emerged since 1989 
that offer different spaces for Jews to express their identity.22 There are secular, cultural ones, 
such as the Jewish museum in Kreuzberg or Centrum Judaicum in Mitte, as well as smaller, 
religious groups like Adass Yisroel, Chabad Lubavitch, and the World Union of Progressive 
Judaism. The Jewish Cultural Club, founded by Irene Runge in East Berlin in the late 1980s, 
offers lectures and discussions about Judaism. Bet Deborah provides space for feminists, while 
Yachad does the same for gays and lesbians.23 Finally, the internet has provided an almost 
limitless space for diversification. Cyberspace has become a central forum for Jews in Berlin and 
elsewhere to create their own sense of community through chat groups and information portals.24  
                                                 
20 Micha Brumlik, Zuhause, keine Heimat: Junge Juden und ihre Zukunft in Deutschland (Gerlingen, 
1998); Michael Brenner, ‘The Transformation of the German-Jewish Community’, in Leslie Morris and 
Jack Zipes, eds., Unlikely History: The Changing German-Jewish Symbiosis, 1945-2000 (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002), 49-62. 
 
21 On the divisions of the Berlin Gemeinde, see Peck, Jewish, 45-49.  
 
22 For an extended analysis of the various Jewish groups in Berlin, see Alexander Jungmann, Jüdisches 
Leben in Berlin. Der aktuelle Wandel in einer metropolitanen Diasporagemeinschaft (Bielefeld: Transcript 
Verlag, 2007), 427-542.  
 
23 As to be expected, the internet is crucial to the proliferation and sustenance of these groups. Some have 
their own websites, such as Bet Deborah, but most are grouped under the portal “Berlin Judentum,” which 
the website haGalil publishes (http://www.berlin-judentum.de/deutsch.html). HaGalil is the largest German 
language website on Jewish topics with over 140,000 entries per month. See Thomas von der Osten-
Sacken, “A German Jewish Internet Portal Combating Anti-Semitism,” HaGalil.com (last accessed May 
30, 2008).  
 
24 On cyberspace, see Peck, Jewish, 165-68; Jungmann, Jüdisches Leben, 530-41. 
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Such plurality of Jewish life is less visible across the German border. Poland has 
witnessed a much less dramatic revival of Jewish life after 1989. There is no steady stream of 
Jewish immigration into the country. Russian Jews come to Germany in no small part because it 
is a wealthy country with a strong welfare state. But a revival of Jewish life in Poland has taken 
place after near extinction in the wake of 1968. It is estimated that the country now has about 
10,000 people who describe themselves as Jewish, which is up significantly from the roughly 2-
3,000 in the late 1980s.25 These “new” Jews are Polish citizens who fall into two main groups: 
1968ers who discovered their Jewishness in rather negative terms during the anti-Zionist 
campaign and 1989ers who have become “Jewish” because it is seen as different, interesting, 
exotic, and cool. These young Poles form the bulk of Poland’s expanding Jewish community. 
They become Jewish in part out of sheer curiosity. As the 1968er Stanisław Krajewski put it: 
“You know, young people try various alternative, minority ways of life, also religion. So for Jews 
it may be Judaism, just because it’s such an alternative, minority religion.”26 Young Poles also 
become “Jewish” in search of an imagined cosmopolitanism, believing that Jewishness represents 
a pluralistic, open, and tolerant form of Polishness.27 
Several key institutions have been central to stimulating and sustaining this rediscovery 
of Jewish roots. The Ronald Lauder Foundation, founded in the mid-1980s by the son of the 
founder of the cosmetics conglomerate Estée Lauder, established an office in Warsaw in 1992 
and has played a vital role in the revival of Jewish life in the country through its educational 
programs, youth retreats, and funding of projects such as the Polish-Jewish magazine Midrasz. 
The foundation also heavily subsidizes the Religious Union of Mosaic Faith, which is headed by 
                                                 
25 Unlike in the German case, the exact number of Jews in contemporary Poland is not known exactly.  
Although today it is fashionable to be “Jewish,” there still may be some Jews who do not want to identify 
themselves as Jewish or simply do not think of themselves as Jewish.  
 
26 Quoted in Claire Ann Rosenson, “Jewish Identity Construction in Contemporary Poland: Influences and 
Alternatives in Ethnic Renewal,” (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1997), 69.  
 
27 Marius Gudonis, “Particularizing the Universal: New Polish Jewish Identities and a New Framework of 
Analysis,” in Zvi Gitelman, Barry Kosmin, and Adrás Kovács, eds., New Jewish Identities: Contemporary 
Europe and Beyond (New York: Central European Press, 2003), 247-48.  
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the American Rabbi Michael Shudrich. As the anthropologist Claire A. Rosenson discovered in 
her ethnographic study, young Polish Jews strongly credit the Lauder Foundation and Schudrich 
for strengthening Jewish life in Poland, but remain ambivalent about their insistence on 
Orthodoxy and whether it makes sense for their contemporary lives.28 Just as in Germany, 
Orthodoxy remains dominant in Poland with few other, “Jewish” alternatives beyond the TSKŻ –
– which given its close ties with the PZPR and its failure to shift its purpose after 1989 –– has 
attracted few young Polish Jews.  
Jews in Poland have confronted a number of different conflicting perspectives on what it 
means to be Jewish in their country. Their experience as Jews is shaped in part by their 
interactions with both foreign Jews and non-Jewish Poles. Jews outside of Poland, especially in 
the United States and Israel, have a particular attraction to Poland that is stronger than to 
Germany. Although statistics are hard to come by, it is safe to assume that many more Jewish 
tourists visit Poland per year than to Germany.29 Poland is at once imagined as the familiar, 
welcoming place where the rich, pure, and authentic culture of the Shtetl blossomed and 
remembered as the graveyard where this glorious heritage came to a tragic burial. Since the 
collapse of communism, Jewish tourism to Poland has increased dramatically as tens of thousands 
of Americans and Israelis have poured into the country in search of the “vestiges of Jewish 
                                                 
28 Rosenson, “Jewish Identity,” chap. 4. 
 
29 In 2003, a New York Times reporter indicated that more than 100,000 Israeli and American Jews visit 
Poland every year. I do not know of a similar estimate for Germany, but it is most likely lower because 
standard Jewish tours, for instance those organized by the American Jewish Congress, do not include 
Germany. The main exception is Berlin, which has become a major site of Jewish travel. Germany 
probably also gets a sizeable number of non-Jews who come to visit Holocaust sites (as does Poland to 
Auschwitz). The German National Tourist Office and travel companies such as the Berlin-based Milk and 
Honey Tours has been trying over the years to increase Jewish tourism to Germany. See Peter S. Green, 
“Jewish Museum in Poland: More than a Memorial,” New York Times January 9, 2003; Germany for the 
Jewish Traveler (German National Tourist Office, published and updated since 1990). The Berlin travel 
company web site is www.milkandhoneytours.com and the American Jewish Congress Travel Program one 
is www.ayelet.com/AJC/AJCongress%20Homepagev1.htm.   
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Poland” that was “wiped out in the Holocaust.”30 Coming from fairly affluent, middle-class 
backgrounds (they have to afford the trip), they perceive “Eastern Europe” as the foil of their own 
liberal, bourgeois sensibilities –– drab, corrupt, backward, digressive, poor, and intolerant. This 
“Euro-Orientalism,” although rooted in the Enlightenment, became solidified during the cold war 
and has remained strong after the collapse of communism with a commensurate shift from anti-
communism to anti-Polish sentiment.31 These broader perceptions of the “east” strongly shape the 
mode of Jewish travel to Poland, which has become a ritualized form of engagement with the 
barren, Jewish graveyard of “Eastern Europe.”32 This is no ordinary heritage tourism taken for 
pleasure and leisure; it is a “secular ritual,” an obligatory encounter with a singular time and 
space –– 1941-1945 and Auschwitz.33 Just to take one prominent example: the Likud party 
member Avraham Hirschorn established in 1988 the first annual “March of the Living” trip that 
over the years has brought thousands of Jews from all over the world to march from Auschwitz to 
Birkenau on Holocaust Memorial Day.34 Although billed as an “international, educational 
program,” the MOL rarely explores Poland beyond the death camps and reinforces negative 
                                                 
30 Ruth Gruber, “Visiting the Vestiges of Jewish Poland,” New York Times October 21, 1990. See also her 
guidebook: Jewish Heritage Travel: A Guide to Central and Eastern Europe (New York: Wiley, 1992); 
republished in 1994 by Wiley and then in 2007 by National Geographic.  
 
31 Ezequiel Adamovsky, “Euro-Orientalism and the Making of the Concept of Eastern Europe in France, 
1810-1880,” Journal of Modern History (September 2005): 591-628. On the earlier origins of the concept, 
see Wolff, Inventing.  
 
32 I think Adamovsky’s neo-Marxist reading of “Euro-Orientalism” makes sense here. The contrast with 
Germany could not be clearer. With at least one half of the country part of the “West” throughout the cold 
war, Germany did not become part of “Eastern Europe.” Indeed, it became its opposite –– a flourishing, 
liberal, middle-class, democratic, capitalist miracle. Middle-class Jewish tourists visiting today see its 
wealth and vibrancy, its excellent roads, fast-speed trains, expensive cars, and clean cities.  
 
33 Jack Kugelmass, “The Rites of the Tribe: The Meaning of Poland for American Jewish Tourists,” YIVO 
Annual 21 (1993): 419.  
 
34 See Carolyn Slutsky, “March of the Living: Confronting Anti-Polish Stereotypes,” in Robert Cherry and 
Annamaria Orla-Bukowska, eds., Rethinking Poles and Jews: Troubled Past, Brighter Future (New York: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 189-196.  
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impressions of the country that probably most participants had before they even left.35 The trip 
concludes by flying to Israel from Poland. As one student from Hollywood, Florida put it, the 
trajectory of the trip is obvious, “from hell to heaven, from despair to joy.” Another, from Boca 
Raton, summed up Poland simply: “We couldn’t find anything good there.”36 If in 1968 anxiety 
on the part of Poles about “anti-Polish” attitudes was largely imagined, it has now become all too 
real.37 Poles are often offended by the comments they encounter from foreign Jews and those who 
are Jewish have distanced themselves from the American-Israeli insistence on the Holocaust as a 
central marker of Jewish identity.38   
The experience of Polish Jews is also shaped by their interactions with non-Jewish Poles 
whose attitudes about them are of central importance in a country of virtually no minorities. Jews 
tend to be framed in binary ways as either a complicated problem of discussion or an exotic 
fascination that is worth experiencing (there is also the far-right, anti-Semitic framing that has 
gained strength since 2001 but it is still relatively marginal compared to the other two).39 Since 
1989, discussions about Polish-Jewish relations, especially during the Holocaust and the 
immediate postwar years, have sparked enormous controversy. In 1998, ultranationalist Polish 
                                                 
35 Quote from its official website, www.motl.org. In the US case at least, these trips reinforce stereotypes 
that American Jews have of non-Jewish Poles. As Madeline Levine succinctly puts it, “the anti-Semitic 
Pole has become a stock character in Jewish folk culture,” (Levine, “Ghosts,” 6).  
 
36 Greer Fay Cashman, “The March of the Living,” The Jerusalem Post May 15, 1990.  
 
37 For a full discussion of these points, see Zubrzycki, Crosses, 112-131. 
 
38 Rosenson, “Jewish Identity,” chap. 5. See also Konstanty Gebert’s critical piece on the MOL under his 
pen name, Dawid Warszawski,“Mieszkając na ziemi popiołów,” Gazeta Wyborcza April 21, 1998.  
 
39 Since 1989, Polish politics has been erratic. Although the post-communist Left gained strength in the 
1990s, forming governments in 1993-97 and 2001-2005, the right has had a strong surge of support since 
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Catholics placed hundreds of crosses at Auschwitz that ignited an intense debate about Polish and 
Jewish interpretations of the war, while two years later Jan Gross, who left for the United States 
in 1968, published his landmark study about Polish involvement in the murder of Jews in the 
village of Jedwabne.40 In the spring of 2008, a flurry of reactions about another intervention from 
Gross flooded Poland’s media, this time about the murder of Jews in Kielce after the war.41 As 
these controversies about the past have unfolded, some Poles have shown continued fascination 
with almost anything associated with “Jews.” This “Jewish fashion,” moda na Żydów, has been 
expressed in an almost insatiable desire for Jewish studies programs, festivals, Isaac Bashevis 
Singer, Klezmer music, wooden carvings, and the like. Although this interest probably engages 
only a small part of the total population, it reinforces the mental framing of Jews as different and 
strange, as exotic objects of wonder or complicated problems of discussion. A similar dynamic is 
also found in Germany for sure, but it is perhaps sharper in Poland because of its stronger 
attraction among foreign Jews and the sheer homogeneity of its society (there are other “others” 
in Germany, not least of all Turks).  
II. Reclaiming Jewish Sites in “Cosmopolitan” Capitals  
Indeed, even as Jewish life has reemerged in both countries, Germans, Poles, and tourists 
seem particularly interested in experiencing, creating, and inventing what they perceive to be 
“Jewish.” This interest stems in part from the perception that Jews represent a minority culture 
that is uniquely rich, authentic, and cosmopolitan. This urge to experience a “culture” that is at 
once singular and transnational has perhaps not surprisingly become expressed most clearly in the 
urban environment. Jews have long been linked to the city: their cosmopolitanism comes from 
their association with urban life for good or bad depending on who is doing the interpreting. In 
the late nineteenth century, this linkage was often cast in negative, hostile terms in a changing, 
industrializing world. The anti-Semitic press portrayed Jews as city-dwellers with innumerable, 
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un-desirable characteristics: the rootless cosmopolitan who has no ties to the “nation,” the city-
dwelling banker who causes economic misfortune, the urban criminal who brings prostitution, 
pornography, and incest. Jews came to represent the social, cultural, and economic ills of modern 
society that the city itself epitomized.42 
 But this cosmopolitanism could also be evaluated differently at times. In 1925, the 
Austrian journalist and Jewish convert to Christianity Hugo Bettauer published his novel, The 
City without Jews, that imagined what life would be like in Vienna if Jews were suddenly gone. 
This odd, sardonic novel became a bestseller, was made into a film, and inspired Artur 
Landsberger to write his own version for Berlin (Berlin ohne Juden). The book, the movie, and its 
Berlin copy portrayed the impoverishment of capitals without Jews.43 All accounts end with the 
return of the Jews just in time to prevent the collapse of cultural and economic life.44 These books 
when read today seem eerily close to the actual removal of Jews fifteen years later with the 
exception that there was, of course, no happy ending. The impoverishment was now more than 
real. In 1956, the scholar Harry Zohn, in an article entitled the “City without Jews,” described the 
“provincialism of daily life, the brutalization of taste, the reduction of cosmopolitanism” in 
contemporary Vienna.45 
A similar kind of impulse has emerged since 1989 as non-Jews and Jews seek out 
“cosmopolitanism” in the restored, preserved, and created Jewish sites of the “Jewish” capitals of 
Berlin and Warsaw. This attraction surfaced earlier in the 1980s as Germans and Poles started to 
reflect upon the “presence of absence” in a melancholic nostalgia for the Jewish past, but since 
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1989 it has expanded in multiple directions. It now engages not just local and national actors but 
also tourists who have been coming to Germany and Poland in large numbers on “Jewish” and 
“Holocaust” tours. The different, at times conflicting impulses that have informed this discovery 
of the Jewish past in the built environment have only increased as Jewish space becomes 
interpreted locally, nationally, and transnationally.  
These tensions are perhaps most pronounced in the city of Berlin where the multiple 
ways of articulating interest in the Jewish past is dizzying. The new capital has become home to 
not only the largest, most diverse Jewish population in Germany, but also to the most visible 
explosion of interest in what is perceived to be Jewish. Contemporary Berlin is perhaps ideal for 
such a rediscovery. Edgy, young, energetic, and the current European darling of papers like the 
New York Times, Berlin has exploded onto the post-1989 imaginary as a hip, cool, tolerant, free-
flowing, almost-everything-goes kind of city where one can drink, smoke, dance, and sex the 
night away.46 With a budget deficit in the billions and a structurally weak economy from the 
city’s forty-year division, Berlin is poor and stagnant but revels in its image as a cosmopolitan, 
tolerant, fun loving, tourist-haven city. “Poor, but sexy,” is how the city’s hip and media-friendly 
mayor put it.47 Of course, this image simplifies and elides the reality of the city’s streets.48 Berlin 
has problems with right-wing extremism, while its sizeable Turkish population remains spatially 
and culturally separated from most Berliners.49 Still, the image persists and millions of tourists 
keep coming to the city with over 17 million in 2007. Most tourists rarely visit the city’s districts 
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where its divisions are most apparent.50 Many absorb the image of the “new Berlin.” The vast 
majority of the 2,164 tourists interviewed by the city’s main marketing firm described the city 
with such adjectives as “multicultural,” “creative,” “alternative,” “young,” “innovative,” 
“vibrant,” “historically interesting,” and “dynamic.”51  
One important part of this image is Berlin’s embrace of its Jewish heritage, which has 
increased dramatically since the fall of the wall. It is now “cool to be Jewish” in Berlin.52 In 1998, 
the bi-monthly magazine Zitty took stock of this “hype” about Jews in a six-page article. For such 
an essay to appear in Zitty, a popular events magazine that along with its competitor, Tip, serves 
as a kind of cultural arbiter in the city, alone speaks to the wide popularity that “what counts as 
Jewish” currently has in the city. The front-cover of the issue carried a cubic, psychedelic-looking 
Star of David with the headline on the bottom right corner: “Trendy Judaism: The Hype about the 
Star of David.” The article began with the evidence: the Jewish restaurants, stores, organizations, 
and cultural clubs; the menus that cannot possibly leave out the bagels; the city tours of “Jewish 
Berlin” offered in both German and English; the theater that offers Klezmer music almost every 
evening. The article, however, did not revel in this “cosmopolitanism” as many Berliners and 
tourists do. Instead it provided a penetrating analysis of it through a series of interviews with 
Jewish academics, artists, writers, and community members. Almost all Jews were deeply critical 
of this interest, viewing it as a form of cultural domination that essentializes and exoticizes Jews. 
The gadfly Henryk Broder mockingly observed that “the good souls were not there when the train 
with my mother was rolling out; such enthusiasm was much more guarded then.” Julius Hans 
Schoeps, professor of Jewish history at Potsdam University, argued that “positive” evaluations of 
Jews were essentially inversions of negative stereotypes that can easily turn into hatred. The co-
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founder of the Jewish artistic group Meshulash, Gabriel Heimler, went so far as to even call this 
“domination of Jewishness with socially suited clichés a ‘cultural Shoah.’” Such charged 
comments are extreme to say the least and are of little analytical value. But others interviewed 
offered more insightful observations. One Jewish community member noted simply that it can be 
“stressful to be a Jew here” since Jews are almost always seen as different and exotic, people to 
be studied, experienced, preserved, examined, discovered, and identified. As the Berlin Jewish 
museum director Michael Blumenthal aptly put it, “every time I visit Germany I arrive as an 
American and then leave as a Jew.”53 
This rediscovery of “Jewish Berlin” is predominantly a spatial experience that involves 
encountering traces of Jewish culture in the urban landscape, especially in one area of town –– 
the Spandauer Vorstadt, popularly known as the Scheunenviertel (barn quarter). Located in the 
middle of the city and once part of East Berlin, the Scheunenviertel has become one of the 
trendier places in the city with a number of bars, restaurants, cafes, and art galleries.54 The city of 
Berlin has poured millions of dollars into the careful restoration of the neighborhood, which had 
fallen into deep disrepair during the GDR.55 This area, now increasingly gentrified through a 
postmodern recovery of the “old,” has become Berlin’s “Jewish” district, a cultural construct that 
only partially reflects the history of the area.56 In the late nineteenth century, East European Jews 
fleeing from the pogroms of 1881 and 1905 settled in the tenement houses of Spandauer 
Vorstadt. By the early 1900s, about 40,000 Jews lived in this area of town. Mostly orthodox and 
relatively poor, they stood out from the city’s acculturated, middle-class Jewish community, but 
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they hardly formed an isolated community.57 The Spandauer Vorstadt was a mix of Jews and 
non-Jews. Berlin never had one single, densely populated Jewish neighborhood like Warsaw had; 
its population lived in all parts of the city. Nevertheless, the “Scheunenviertel” was imagined as 
the city’s “Jewish district” because of the type of Jews who lived there. It was constructed as a 
kind of quaint Shtetl within the metropolis, drawing on long-standing orientalist perceptions of 
East European Jews. This mental mapping of “Jews” with the “east” stretches back to the 
Enlightenment when “Ostjuden” were seen as dirty and backward, yet also authentic and 
beautiful.58 In 1822, Heinrich Heine captured this mix of repulsion and attraction perhaps best 
when he wrote after visiting Poland, “in spite of the barbarous fur cap which covers his head, and 
the still more barbarous notions which fill it, I esteem the Polish Jew.”59 The ambivalent reaction 
to the backward, yet authentic East European Jew reached a climax in World War I when many 
German soldiers encountered “Ostjuden” in Poland for the first time. In the early interwar years, 
the exotic East European Jew emerged in a number of literary and pictorial representations.60 
Ostjuden became “authentic” traces of Jewishness in a modern, assimilating world.61 But in the 
late 1920s and 1930s, this strangeness was more often derided than celebrated. In Berlin, anti-
Semitic novelists and writers created the “Scheunenviertel” as the city’s “ghetto.”62 The area, also 
home to pimps, bars, and prostitutes, seemed like the ideal space to make racist connections 
between criminality, moral degeneration, urbanization, and Jews.  
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The contemporary construction of the Scheunenviertel rests on similar, essentialized 
notions of “Jews” as exotic, as Eastern European, as Orthodox, as Hasidic that have almost 
nothing to do with Berlin’s historically acculturated Jewish community. The East European Jew 
represents the authentic, albeit now vanished world of the dirty, backward, yet beautiful and 
romantic Shtetl.63 Today the Scheunenviertel is the geographic space for the staging of “Jewish 
Berlin.”64 Even its edgier side has returned: prostitutes roam the streets of Oranienburgerstraße 
by dusk. It is only the Jews who have not returned. The city’s new, burgeoning Jewish 
community is located mainly in the western parts of the city. But the absence of Jews does not 
seem to matter much to the numerous tourists who walk through the streets of the Scheunenviertel 
everyday on Spurensuche. Tourism has played a major role in the revival of the Scheunenviertel 
myth after 1989. In one week alone, there are at least ten city tours walking the streets of “Jewish 
Berlin.”65 These tours and the guidebooks that accompany them almost always orient the traveler 
to the Scheunenviertel.66 The journey often begins in Mitte around the area of the Spandauer 
Vorstadt, passing through the renovated apartment building of the “Scheunenviertel,” the grounds 
of the former Jewish cemetery on Grosse Hamburger Straße, and then ending at the Neue 
Synagoge on Oranienburgerstraße where one can buy items in shops with Jewish ritual objects in 
their windows or dine in restaurants called “Makom.”67 Tourists are involved in this staged drama 
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as much as the German storekeepers, guides, and writers who propagate and benefit from it. They 
seem equally attracted to the traces of the vanished cultural heritage of East European Jewry, 
which seems more authentic and real to them than that of acculturated Jewry.68 In 1992-93, the 
traveling American installation artist, Shimon Attie, showcased a slide projection of pre-war 
images of “Jewish street life in Berlin” on the buildings of “Berlin’s former Jewish quarter, the 
Scheunenviertel.”69 Although obviously more so than any normal tourist, his recreation of this 
seemingly authentic, now lost “world of the Jewish working class” reflects the intertwined mental 
mapping of the far away traveler and the local guide, engaged as they are in a process of creation 
and experience that affects both the identity of place and the actual, material treatment of space.70  
 Some have argued that this interest in the Scheunenviertel has effectively produced a 
“Jewish Disneyland.”71 The Berlin Jewish publicist Iris Weiss, who herself leads tours in the city 
including one called “Jewish Disneyland –– The Marketing of Jewishness,” sees a number of 
problems with this recreated “Jewishness” in the area around Oranienburgerstraße. Her main 
complaint is similar to the ones expressed by other Jews in Berlin –– what is “fictitious” becomes 
“real.” “The themes of Jewish Disneyland are romanticism, exoticization, folklorization, and 
historicization of everything Jewish. As a result, that which is really Jewish becomes (or is made) 
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invisible.”72 This imagined, essentialized, virtual Jewish world rarely reflects deeply on the 
Holocaust and ignores the “real” Jewish life in the city. These critical remarks hold some truth. 
As the Gemeinde member astutely observed in the Zitty article, Jews remain marked for their 
difference and strangeness, although now for their celebrated cosmopolitanism. One visits the 
Scheunenviertel to experience a different “world” from what one finds in other tourist areas such 
as the Brandenburg Gate, Unter den Linden, and Potsdamer Platz. Weiss also marshals some 
compelling evidence at times. The American singer Gayle Tufts, who lives in Berlin, remarked 
rather glibly, “the fact that right here in Berlin’s former Jewish quarter one can get bagels, a 
typical Jewish bread that you find everywhere in New York, well, that’s almost a sign of 
healing.”73 Still, Weiss’s observations are not without their own contradictions. She assumes that 
a definable, real “Jewishness” exists, reducing it to an identifiable feature –– typically religion –– 
in a city of multiple meanings of Jewishness. This binary between fictitious Jewishness and 
authentic Jewishness does exactly what it critiques: it produces a reified understanding of 
Jewishness.74  
 What is more, the area of Berlin that Weiss leads tourists through does not contain just 
fictitious productions of Jewish space. She rightly is skeptical of the kitsch and marketing of the 
Scheunenviertel, but the reason why the area attracts the number of tourists and locals that it does 
is because there is a bit of “real” behind it. Tourists and Berliners walk through an area of town 
where a number of Jewish sites and Jewish organizations are located. The restaurants, shops, and 
tour guides make it a staged drama, but they pull into their production actors who are part of the 
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contemporary rebuilding of Jewish life in the city.75 Indeed, perhaps no other Jewish site reflects 
this complexity more clearly than the building that has become the symbol of “Jewish Berlin,” 
more photographed and celebrated than any other –– the Neue Synagoge on 
Oranienburgerstraße. In 1988, Erich Honecker promised to rebuild this bombed-out building to 
house the newly created “Centrum Judaicum” that was to be a cultural center, archive, museum, 
and Holocaust memorial. The fall of the Berlin Wall intervened, but the rebuilding of the 
synagogue continued throughout the 1990s. In 1996, the meticulously restored façade of the 
building was unveiled, including its golden cupola that towers over the area today. The building’s 
exterior was retuned to its original, prewar design, while the interior of the building was not. The 
main prayer hall that was cleared away in 1956 was not restored with the deliberate intention of 
leaving visible the history of the building’s destruction.76  
If one simply walks by the carefully restored exterior, the building does indeed seem to 
reflect a reconstructed staging of the Jewish past in the urban landscape, little more than a 
physical and mental façade of “Jewish Berlin.” But if one walks inside its doors such a reading 
proves superficial. The synagogue contains an exhibition that narrates the history of Berlin’s 
Jewish community through its stones with particular attention to the violent destruction of the 
building, brought into sharp relief by the large glass wall that looks out onto an empty space 
where the 3,200-seat prayer hall once stood. This void in the heart of the building starkly 
represents the absence of Jewish life, suggesting that the beautifully restored façade by no means 
covers over the emptiness of the Holocaust. The building stands mainly as a memorial to the past, 
fulfilling the main purpose set out by the East German regime with one main exception: it has 
now also become a vital space for the city’s growing Jewish community. The synagogue’s small 
prayer room is one of the only two liberal, so-called egalitarian houses of worship officially 
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recognized by the Gemeinde where men and women can participate equally. The Neue Synagoge 
is at once a monument, cultural center, and house of worship, a multifunctional space for tourists, 
scholars, and Jews. The “real” and the “virtual” parts of Jewish Berlin overlap at times in more 
complicated ways than initially appears.  
Such intermingling is, however, less pronounced outside Berlin when one moves east to 
the Polish capital. Warsaw has neither Berlin’s sizeable Jewish community nor its millions of 
tourists. The only other city in Poland that matches, if not exceeds Berlin’s “hype about the Star 
of David” is Cracow, which has become a major tourist destination with its own kind of “Jewish 
Disneyland” in the reconstructed Jewish district of Kazimierz. But Cracow is an exceptional case 
in Poland and to a certain extent in Europe (Prague is probably the only other city that rivals it; 
one scholar has called the production of its Židovské město “Kazimierz on steroids.”)77 The 
intense level of local and international interest that has produced “Jewish Kazimierz” simply 
cannot be found in any other Polish city.78 Part of the reason is that Kraków’s Jewish sites were 
not destroyed during the war. Although neglected throughout the postwar years, they were never 
torn down and today provide an “authentic” setting for Jewish restaurants, museums, and shops. 
In contrast, Jewish sites in many other Polish cities were heavily damaged during the war and 
were later torn down after 1945. Warsaw is a case in point. Most of the physical traces of Jewish 
life vanished from its urban landscape when the Nazis leveled the district of Muranów. The 
rubble that was left behind was then used after the war to build a sprawling, socialist realist 
housing complex. “Jewish Warsaw” disappeared almost entirely.  
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But there were a few fragments left and today just as in Berlin they have been 
rediscovered. The sole, remaining tenement houses of Muranów located on Próżna street have 
become important “Jewish” traces worthy of preservation. This small side street in the heart of 
Warsaw runs into Grzybowski square, a central part of prewar Jewish life and today the location 
of the city’s only synagogue. The city’s drab, tired-looking Yiddish theater and a few Jewish 
shops are also located nearby. Most of the area was entirely rebuilt after the war and became 
home to Warsaw’s most celebrated, social realist building project, Stalin’s gift to Poland  –– the 
“Palace of Culture and Art” that to this day remains the focal point of Warsaw’s skyline. The 
rediscovery of this “Jewish” area began in the late 1980s when a group of architects, historic 
preservationists, and historians fought to put the tenement houses on Próżna street on the city’s 
list of historic monuments. In March 1987, city officials finally relented after a bombardment of 
petitions from the Jewish Historical Institute, the Warsaw branch of the Society for Historic 
Preservation, the TSKŻ, and the Group of Cultural Conservators.79  
But plans to save the heavily damaged buildings only emerged nearly a decade later. In 
1997-98, the Ronald Lauder Foundation through its newly created Jewish Renaissance Project 
purchased the tenement houses on Próżna street with the intention of “reconstructing the 
appearance of the street from the time when the majority of its residents were Jews.”80 The street 
was to have a kosher restaurant, Jewish bookstore, bakery, and shop, but would not be exactly “as 
it was before the war.” Instead the “material setting” of the street would be returned.81 When 
asked by a journalist if this would not produce a “Jewish Disneyland,” the director of the project 
confidently said no, explaining that Próżna would somehow be an “authentic” Jewish space: 
                                                 
79 Tomasz Markiewicz, “Próżna: czas podsumowań,” Gazeta Wyborcza March 19, 1999; Janusz Sujecki, 
Próżna. Ocalona ulica żydowskiej Warszawy (Warsaw: Ortis, 1993), 26-28.  
 
80 “Próżna po staremu,” Gazeta Wyborcza February 6, 1998.  
 
81 Dariusz Bartoszewicz, “Próżna jak dawniej,” Gazeta Wyborcza March 12, 1999.  
 365 
“Próżna will be a living part of Warsaw, as well as of Jewish Warsaw.”82 The project was 
estimated to cost about 10 millions dollars, but no work on it ever began, and as each year passed 
the buildings only fell deeper into disrepair. In 2004, the Lauder foundation, probably realizing 
that it was going to cost too much, abandoned the project. It sold the buildings to an Austrian 
developer, who is planning to use them to build a luxury hotel. Plans for restoring the “material 
setting” of this “Jewish” street now seem unlikely. 
This decision has not been popular. The Warsaw section of Gazeta Wyborcza, Poland’s 
largest and most influential newspaper, has included sharp commentaries about plans to build a 
luxury hotel on Próżna street. “The talk is no longer about kosher restaurants and Jewish stores. 
Today what matters is economic calculations,” one article wrote.83 Another decried the “sad and 
lifeless” appearance of the street that has not changed since 1989 despite numerous promises.84 
Even as the project appears to be going forward, resistance has only mounted.85 The greatest 
challenge to it has come from the “Singer’s Warsaw” Jewish festival that has taken place along 
Próżna street since 2004. Inspired in part by the annual Jewish festival in Cracow, this one started 
out as a celebration of the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of Isaac Bashevis Singer who 
grew up in Warsaw before leaving for the United States in 1935. It has since grown into an 
annual event with the entire street of Próżna turning into a staged, imagined Jewish world.86 The 
street takes on its “prewar appearance” as “Singer returns to Próżna.”87 Just as in Berlin where the 
staging of the Jewish past takes place in the “Scheunenviertel,” so, too, in Warsaw it unfolds 
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within a physical space that seems “authentically” Jewish, as if the festival’s “Jewish” musicians, 
artists, and shopkeepers somehow seem more real along Próżna than they would elsewhere in the 
city. The festival produces a kitschy nostalgia of “Jewish Warsaw” that glosses over the tensions 
of prewar Polish-Jewish relations when few Poles would have looked so favorably upon the dirty, 
cramped tenement houses of Muranów. It reflects an urge to discover something “real” and 
“authentic,” to experience one of the few streets left in Warsaw that still has “prewar buildings” 
in an urban landscape dominated by drab communist buildings and glossy, capitalist 
skyscrapers.88 The festival on Próżna provides a bit of cosmopolitanism to one of the world’s 
most ethnically homogenous capital cities. It rarely includes efforts to think deeply and 
reflectively about the fractured relationship between Poles and Jews, producing instead an 
imagined, fictitious multicultural past and present.  
Yet there are a few exceptions that go beyond the festival’s kitschy surface. In 2006, a 
group of artists installed a series of exhibitions about Jews and the Holocaust in the building on 
Próżna no. 9. Once part of the Warsaw ghetto, the building sits today in catastrophic state with 
rain coming through its roof. This is the structure that the Austrian developer has slated to turn 
into a luxury hotel, but for a brief moment it served as a physical testament to the destruction of 
Polish Jewry. One artist narrated the death of her family in the Warsaw ghetto through a display 
of toys in an aquarium, while another showed an Israeli film of elderly Jews singing Polish songs. 
A review of the exhibition published in Gazeta Wyborcza applauded these efforts to move beyond 
the “sentimental-folk climate” and the “fiction” of “playing back” the past that dominates the 
festival just outside the building. “The artistic exhibition in Próżna no. 7/9 is something 
different,” the journalist wrote, “no orchestral beats, no singing cantors, no Jewish cuisine, no 
folk paper cut-outs. Here nobody believes it is possible to go back to the past.”89 The stark 
contrast between the outside noise of Klezmer music and the inside solemnity of remembrance 
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uncovers the long-standing, uneasy presence of the Holocaust that has long complicated Polish 
interest in the Jewish past since the 1980s.  
 Indeed, this tension has clearly surfaced in the most ambitious project to display the 
Jewish past in Warsaw –– the Museum of the History of Polish Jews currently being built. In a 
truly transnational effort that has involved funding and organization from Germany, Israel, the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Holland, the idea to build the museum came 
from the Warsaw native Jeshayahu Weinberg in the early 1990s. A major initiator of the United 
States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Weinberg headed the planning committee until his death in 
2000, the same year Jerzy Halberszstadt took over as museum director after working for the 
USHMM for over a decade. As with any project of its size, the planning for the museum has 
moved slowly but the response in Poland has been overwhelmingly positive. In 1997, the Warsaw 
city council donated about 145,000 square feet of land for the museum and the Polish government 
has committed 26 million dollars towards the costs of construction (the rest has come from 
donations including five million Euros from the German government).90 The 2005 design 
competition became one of the most celebrated architectural moments in Warsaw’s postwar 
history. The jury selected eleven finalist designs by some of the world’s most renowned 
architects, including Daniel Libeskind and Peter Eisenman. Libeskind, himself of Polish-Jewish 
background, was believed to be the favorite, but the winning prize went to the Finish architects 
Rainer Mahlamäki and Ilmari Lahdelma with their compact design of glass dramatized by a large 
tear that cuts through the building, reflecting the “complicated and tragic” historical journey of 
Jews in Poland.91 On June 26, 2007, the ground breaking of the museum took place with 
dignitaries from around the world. The Polish president, Lech Kaczyński, emphasized the 
importance of the museum in offering a “tremendous opportunity to overcome a mutual lack of 
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understanding,” while the Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, Meir Lau, said that the museum will ensure 
that no one “forget[s] the Jews of this land.” Former German president Richard von Weizsäcker 
spoke of his country being moved in a “special way” by the project given its “responsibility for 
the Shoah.”92 
 Located on the former site of the ghetto just in front of Rapoport’s monument, the 
museum rests on a plot of land steeped in the past –– the center of prewar Jewish life, the site of 
mass murder, the space of the socialist future. Close to the Umschlagplatz and surrounded by 
socialist realist apartment buildings, it sits in an area that reflects above all the absence of Jewish 
life in the city, captured by the museum’s design: the large tear through the building intentionally 
looks out to the ghetto monument. The Holocaust obviously dominates the museum, but it is not 
intended to be just a “Holocaust museum” as the organizers and Polish press have stressed 
countless times.93 The master plan for the exhibition, which was prepared before the design 
competition was announced so that the interior and exterior would form a cohesive whole, 
envisions nine galleries that narrate Polish-Jewish history from its earliest beginnings to the 
present.94 The gallery on the interwar period that includes a virtual reconstruction of Nalewki 
street, Warsaw’s commercial center of Jewish life, has tellingly attracted the most attention in the 
Polish press.95 Visitors will be able to travel along the street as it “once was before the war, as 
described by the writer Isaac Bashevis Singer.”96 Although one could interpret this as yet another 
kitschy attempt to recreate a lost Jewish world, it comes in part from an urge to show a more 
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multidimensional view of Polish-Jewish relations than the one offered over the 1990s by tourist 
trips such as the March of the Living. Both non-Jewish and Jewish Poles resent the perception of 
Poland as simply one large “cemetery, one black hole in the history of Jews.”97 Some of this 
resentment stems from an anxiousness about the Holocaust that has long been present in Polish 
discussions about Polish-Jewish relations (so strongly reinforced by 1968). But it is also a 
reaction to the numerous Jewish tourists who see the country as temporally frozen in the 1940s, 
as nothing more than the landscape of the Holocaust.98 These visitors are often astonished to find 
out that people actually live in Poland. “It was a place where millions of people had been 
slaughtered,” remarked a Jewish student from Toronto. “I always had images of it in black and 
white. I didn’t expect to see grass, and shopping malls, and billboards, and people holding 
hands.”99 In part, the museum aims to counterbalance this perception by providing a different 
space than simply Auschwitz to experience, think about, and reflect upon the long, entangled, and 
complex history of Jews in Poland. 
 The design and the purpose of the museum is also a rather direct response to Europe’s 
other, most celebrated and discussed post-1989 Jewish museum, designed by none other than 
Warsaw’s runner-up –– the famed Daniel Libeskind. Historians have already analyzed at length 
the long, disputed history of the Berlin Jewish Museum and I do not wish to repeat it here, but I 
would like to put it into conversation with the one in Warsaw to think through these two attempts 
to narrate, catalogue, and preserve the Jewish past.100 The Berlin and Warsaw museums reflect 
similar and different variations on a broader trend in Europe to represent the Jewish past in the 
built environment through the formation of Jewish museums. This “Musealisierung” of the 
Jewish past started in the 1980s in West Germany with the conversion of synagogues into 
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museums with Essen as one, if complicated, example, and reached an apex in 2001 with the 
opening of the Jewish museum in Berlin.101 The idea for the museum, technically an expansion of 
the Berlin City Museum founded 1962, emerged in the early 1970s when the West Berlin Jewish 
community under the leadership of Heinz Galinski organized an exhibition on the history of 
Jewish life in the city. The exhibition, entitled “Achievement and Fate –– The 300 Year History 
of the Berlin Jewish Community,” focused mostly on the positive contribution of Jewish culture 
and largely avoided any serious reflection on the tragic “fate” of the Jewish community. The 
Holocaust remained an implicit, but nebulous aspect of the exhibition. The goal was to show that 
“the best times of communal existence and impact can reemerge in contemporary Berlin after a 
terrible caesura.”102  
The positive response to the exhibition encouraged Galinski to push for a permanent one 
in Berlin. The Berlin Museum director at the time, Irmgard Wirth, supported the idea and argued 
that the exhibition should be integrated directly into the city museum so as to avoid separating 
“German” and “Jewish” history into distinct, separate parts.103 Galinski agreed with this 
integrated concept and Wirth submitted a general plan for the exhibition that envisioned three 
main sections on the history of Berlin Jewry from the beginning to the present, Jewish religion, 
and the cultural accomplishments of Jewish figures in the city.104 The Berlin city council 
approved of this basic plan, but years passed with little action as it searched for the best location 
for the Jewish department of the museum. By the mid-1980s, as the East German leadership 
announced its own plans for a Jewish museum in the Neue Synagoge, the city rushed to find a 
solution. In 1986, it temporarily installed the Jewish department in the newly restored Martin 
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Gropius building about a mile away from the Berlin Museum. Although Galinski supported this 
temporary solution, he remained adamant that the city build an annex to the Berlin Museum to 
ensure the spatial integration of the Jewish department with the city museum, reflecting his 
continued commitment to the idea of showcasing Jewish history as part of Berlin’s history.105 The 
model of an integrated museum was itself to reflect the integration of Jews in Berlin society.  
 Galinski eventually got his way. In November 1988, at the height of the fiftieth 
anniversary of Kristallnacht widely celebrated in East Berlin, the city agreed to expand the Berlin 
Museum by building an annex for the Jewish department. It launched a major architectural 
competition that year. The materials drafted for the competition emphasized that the annex should 
be spatially integrated into the current building to dramatize “Jewish history as a definite 
component of Berlin.”106 The museum was still envisioned mainly to be about the cultural, 
economic, and religious development of German-Jewish history in Berlin, although by the late 
1980s a stronger emphasis on the Holocaust started to emerge in discussions about the 
exhibition’s content as the mass murder of the Jews became more widely debated in the FRG.107 
But these ideas remained rather vaguely formulated and the entire issue of exactly how to narrate 
Jews as an “integrated” part of the city’s history after the Holocaust was left unresolved.108 In 
contrast to Warsaw where the entire concept of the exhibition was developed before the design 
competition, the architects for the Berlin Jewish Museum had little sense of the overarching 
purpose of the exhibition. The design of the building by Daniel Libeskind was selected before any 
consensus was reached about what actually to put in it. The result was not surprising. Libeskind’s 
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building today directly conflicts with the entire conceptual thrust of the integrated museum. It 
stands as an architectural symbol of the Holocaust with its empty voids, underground axes, 
Holocaust tower, and Garden of Exile.109 The building orients visitors to the failure of integration 
with its powerful, imposing design that is only nominally connected to the Berlin Museum 
through underground hallways. It hardly appears as an integrated element of the original museum, 
separating German and Jewish history into distinct, spatial parts.  
And yet the exhibition eventually installed in the building after intense discussions over 
the 1990s strives for a unified narrative of German-Jewish history over two millennia.110 Just as 
in Warsaw, the exhibition intends to put the Holocaust into broader historical perspective. The 
Jewish Museum is not supposed to be only about the Holocaust. As the American museum 
director Michael Blumenthal explained, the exhibition displays the “ups and downs” of German-
Jewish history.111 In his speech at the opening of the museum in 2001, German president 
Johannes Rau put it more clearly: “The Berlin Jewish Museum does not want to be and should 
not be a Holocaust museum. … We must keep alive the memory of this catastrophe. This 
building, which today we are opening, does that, this exhibition does that. But that must not lead 
to the wrong conclusion that the Holocaust is the sum of German-Jewish history.”112 And yet, 
oddly, the Holocaust dominates the structure of the building, making for an awkward, discordant 
interaction between exterior and interior.  
 The construction of Jewish museums in Warsaw and Berlin produce several shared 
meanings. Both museums intersect in certain ways with the rediscovery of “Jewish Berlin” and 
“Jewish Warsaw” along the streets of Oranienburger and Próżna. Of course, they hope to move 
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beyond precisely the clichés that these productions reinforce, but at the same time they also 
reflect a similar urge for “cosmopolitanism.” These museums make Jews an integral part of 
German and Polish society, celebrating and mourning the presence and absence of “integration,” 
“tolerance,” and “multiculturalism.” The Warsaw museum, with its reconstructed Nalewki street, 
embraces this perhaps more overtly than its Berlin counterpart, but the impulse to stage, 
catalogue, and preserve the Jewish past in both capitals reflects a shared longing for the 
cosmopolitanism that Jews seem to reflect. They become modes of producing cosmopolitan 
capitals as Germans and Poles, especially those on the political Left, take plurality and 
cosmopolitanism to be crucial components of Germanness and Polishness after a century of war, 
genocide, ethnic strife, and expulsions.113 The stakes are, to be sure, different in Berlin and 
Warsaw. Sitting in the district of Kreuzberg, Berlin’s most concentrated area of Turks, the Jewish 
museum’s narrative of acculturation, destroyed by unchecked prejudice, implicitly produces 
contemporary meanings. By making the “Jewish co-citizen” (jüdische Mitbürger) a part of 
German society, culture, and history, the museum reinforces the demand for integration, 
tolerance, and acceptance, putting Germany’s current minorities into the conceptual category of 
“foreign co-citizen” (ausländische Mitbürger).114 Warsaw has no such contemporary 
implications. It is Berlin’s opposite –– almost entirely ethnically homogenous thanks to the 
policies of an earlier Berlin. The Jewish museum now being built sits on top of the material ruins 
of the city’s once large minority population. It offers not just a more complicated, sophisticated 
narrative about the past for Polish citizens and Jewish tourists alike, but a powerful symbol of the 
“Central European,” cosmopolitan capital now embracing its rich, Jewish heritage.  
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 In short, the striking feature of both museums is the link between Jewishness and 
cosmopolitanism. For most of the twentieth century, Jews appeared as quintessential 
cosmopolitan urbanites for which they were more likely to be derided than celebrated by fascists 
and communists alike. I do not submit to the simplistic argument that philosemitism is just the 
inverse of anti-Semitism. But this move to extract from the Jewish past broader meanings about 
“integration,” “acculturation,” and “cosmopolitanism,” even while recognizing the failure of all 
three, essentializes, reifies, and categorizes: Jews become an object of study, fascination, 
reflection, preservation, and discussion. This is not a German and Polish peculiarity –– witness 
the Smithsonian National Museum of the American Indian and the Smithsonian National 
Museum of African American History and Culture, to take just two American examples. It is 
perhaps a peculiarity of both the allure for and the fragility of cosmopolitanism itself, an idea that 
celebrates human difference as much as it creates it.  
III. Jewish Spaces in Wrocław, Essen, and Potsdam 
 Indeed, these paradoxes of cosmopolitanism surface clearly in the city of Wrocław, 
which has been imagined among some since 1989 as the quintessential border town of 
multiculturalism. In the 1980s, local, ordinary citizens became interested in moving beyond the 
state’s decades-long narrative of Wrocław as a bastion of Silesian, Polish culture by exploring its 
German and Jewish past. This rediscovery of “Breslau” increased dramatically after the fall of 
communism as the once eternally Polish Wrocław became stylized as the “multicultural 
metropolis,” the eternally fluctuating border town rich in its variety and diversity. As the city’s 
official website proudly boasts: “Wrocław is an excellent example of a multicultural metropolis 
situated at the interface of ethnically diverse areas.”115 It leaves out the fact that the city today is 
almost completely Polish and Catholic. This postwar Polonization of the city is in fact even 
offered as just further evidence of Wrocław’s ever-changing, diverse history: “Multiculturalism 
again left a very deep impression on the city’s character after the Second World War, when the 
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city’s German population was largely replaced by people arriving from various regions of Poland, 
including those resettled from the eastern provinces of Poland taken over by the Soviet Union. In 
particular, many former citizens of Wilno and Lwów settled here.”116 Such rather imaginative, 
deeply problematic constructions of the “multicultural metropolis” are part of a much broader 
rethinking of the city’s identity since 1989 as writers, journalist, and historians have rushed to 
rediscover the city’s cosmopolitan past.117  
The most prominent example came in 2003 when the British historian Norman Davies, 
who is probably more beloved in Poland than any other historian for the hagiographic narratives 
he writes, published a new history of Wrocław commissioned by the city. Davies takes Wrocław 
to be a “microcosm” of the diversity, multiplicity, and cosmopolitanism of this region of 
Europe.118 He plays with the city’s at least fifty recorded names –– Vratislavia, Wrotizla, 
Vretslav, Presslaw, Breslau, Wrocław — in a grandiose and solipsistic account. Such imaginings 
create a past that seems so different from the harsh reality of the twentieth-century when the 
city’s Jewish population was murdered, its former German residents expelled, and its current 
inhabitants forcibly resettled from central and eastern Poland. The provincialism of the book 
conflicts with the invented multiculturalism of the subject, reinforced all the more by its 
seemingly innocuous subtitle: “a portrait of a central European city.” The concept of “Central 
Europe,” long embraced and constructed by writers in the region, is “Eastern Europe’s” foil: 
sophisticated, urban, tolerant, diverse, cosmopolitan, multiethnic, multilingual.119  
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 And Jewish. “Jewishness” has become one of Central Europe’s defining elements. In 
Wrocław, the newly reconstituted Jewish community is small, but its White Storch Synagogue 
has recently become an important space of the “multicultural metropolis.” Its now celebrated 
status is a dramatic shift from the appropriation of the building in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Just before the collapse of communism, the “synagogue problem” continued to plague city 
officials as they searched for a suitable use for the crumbling, dilapidated structure. The last 
solution proposed before 1989 was to transform the synagogue into a performance hall for the 
Wrocław Musical Academy, but lack of funds prevented such plans from being carried out. 
Shortly after the collapse of communism the new Wrocław Jewish community under the 
leadership of Jerzy Kirchler expressed interest in renovating the synagogue. In 1993, it secured 
funds from the Foundation for Polish-German Cooperation to rebuild the roof.120 But the Music 
Academy was the official owner of the building and expressed no desire to return it to the Jewish 
community. In 1992, it even sold the building to another party just as the community had made it 
clear that it wanted it back.121 The new owner, a local developer, seemed equally intractable. In 
1993-1994, Kirchler and other members of the Jewish community attempted to negotiate the 
return of the building from him, but he simply kept demanding a higher price every time they 
met.122 The Jewish community turned to the city and the citizens of Wrocław for help.123 In a 
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public letter in 1995, it wrote with a sense of frustration and sadness that it now found itself 
fighting for its property: “The authorities of the German Reich pursued the extermination of the 
Jewish population in Wrocław. After the war, Polish authorities robbed the Jewish community of 
all of its property and to this day this injustice has not been redressed.”124  
 On April 21, 1995, the Warsaw Council of Ministers finally returned the synagogue to 
the Jewish community after a long, extended series of negotiations. It based its decision on a 1971 
law that allowed religious organizations in the “recovered territories” to reclaim their property.125 
This decision cleared the way for the renovation of the building after nearly thirty-five years of 
neglect and destruction. “I feel sick when I look through the window,” Kirchler said as he 
described the total destruction of the building’s interior to the local newspaper before its 
renovation.126 In 1996, the reconstruction of the building finally began and it continues to this 
day. As the synagogue has slowly been brought back to life, it has become a celebrated space in 
the multicultural metropolis, the site to experience and discover the city’s Jewish past and present 
among both Jews and non-Jews. In 1996, a local musical director established the Choir of the 
White Storch Synagogue. The group has been performing concerts in the synagogue and 
elsewhere in Poland for over a decade now. Although developed in consultation with Kirchler, 
the choir is made up mainly of non-Jews who sing in Hebrew and Yiddish.127 It has played an 
instrumental part in the city’s annual “Festival of Jewish Culture” that is now in its tenth year.128 
Taking place mainly in the synagogue, the Wrocław version is less kitschy than its Warsaw 
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counterpart on Próżna street. It involves mainly lectures, film showings, theatrical performances, 
book readings, and Klezmer concerts.  
 Kirchler and the local Jewish community are also more directly involved in these events 
than is the case in Warsaw, blurring the seemingly clear lines between the “real” and the 
“virtual.”129 Although many of the locals attending the events are non-Jewish, this is not simply a 
“Jewish revival minus the Jews.”130 Wrocław has the second largest Jewish community in Poland 
after Warsaw with around 1,000 members. It has made reaching out to non-Jews one of its central 
priorities. In 2005, the Jewish community established the Wrocław Center for Jewish Culture and 
Education and appointed the well-known Jewish-Norwegian performing artist Bente Kahan to 
head it through a foundation she created in her name. The Kahan foundation organizes Klezmer 
music concerts, theatrical performances, and educational activities that focus mainly on the 
Holocaust. It is also involved in carrying out the final stages of the reconstruction of the 
synagogue where eventually a museum on the history of Jews in Wrocław will be installed. The 
museum will preserve “the rich heritage of the city’s decimated Jewish community.”131 Since the 
building also serves as a place of religious worship, it is unclear exactly how this interplay 
between past and present will be negotiated in one single space.  
 This revival of Jewish culture in the city has been welcomed and celebrated. In 2006, 
Bente Kahan received the Wrocław Mayor’s Prize for her work, while the local edition of Gazeta 
Wyborcza has published numerous articles on Jewish life in the city.132 Two coffee table-style 
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books on the history of Jews in Wrocław appeared in 1994 and 2000.133 The presence of Jewish 
culture fits neatly into the city’s image as a “multicultural metropolis” that Kirchler, Kahn, and 
others have clearly absorbed. Kahn writes about a “vital Jewish heart in the middle of Europe,” 
while Kirchler helped establish the “District of Four Religions” that celebrates the presence of the 
Jewish, Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox faiths in the surrounding area of the synagogue.134 
These cultural constructions of cosmopolitanism not only overlook the violent, destructive history 
of the city, but they also rest on rather exaggerated interpretations of the present. The synagogue 
to this day remains unfinished in a city of beautifully restored buildings. The contrast becomes 
clear as one walks just a few blocks away from the lively, tourist-centered old town to the street 
where the synagogue stands next to the Jewish community’s dilapidated building.  
Moreover, the only open Jewish cemetery in the city remains in deep disrepair. Lacking 
funds to maintain it, the Jewish community depends on others for help. A group of American 
students from Albion and Alma Colleges have been coming to Wrocław since 1999 to restore the 
cemetery.135 After visiting Prague, Berlin, Cracow, and Auschwitz, this group finally makes its 
way to the border city of Wrocław, but there they do not find the richly textured multiculturalism 
that the city promises. Coming mostly from middle-class backgrounds probably with little 
knowledge about Poland beyond a few clichés about its poverty and backwardness, they spend 
their time in the “jungle” of the Jewish cemetery helping out a community too “old and poor to 
cook for themselves,” let alone “perform hard labor.”136 If there is a revival of Jewish life in the 
city, it seems to have escaped them altogether. This view of the present is, of course, as provincial 
and naïve as is the one of the “multicultural metropolis,” but it shows at least the continued 
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neglect of some Jewish sites even as others are restored. It also points to a clear tension between 
past and present. The transnational and local attraction to Jewish culture can at times mix 
awkwardly with the on-going rebuilding of Jewish life. In this case, American tourists overlook it 
entirely, while in the earlier example of the synagogue the Kahn foundation hopes to somehow 
integrate a museum about “decimation” in the same building that Jews gather to worship.  
 This uneasy relationship between past and present is perhaps even starker in the case of 
Essen, which has seen yet another shift in the appropriation of its towering stone synagogue since 
the “Haus Industrieform” exhibition was removed in 1979-80. In that year, Ernst Schmidt and 
Detlev Peukert convinced city officials to change the exhibition after a fire broke out in the 
building. The newly installed exhibition, “Resistance and Persecution in the Third Reich,” 
explored the suffering and resistance of Germans with limited attention to the Nazi persecution of 
the Jews. Yet this redemptive, German appropriation of the synagogue did not last long. As the 
Jewish past and the Holocaust became the subject of intense discussion throughout the Federal 
Republic in the 1980s, segments of Essen’s population advocated changing the function of the 
building yet again to express more explicitly its “Jewishness.” In the early 1980s, the 
organizational working group for the synagogue discussed the idea of restoring the interior of the 
synagogue to its original, pre-war design, which had been heavily damaged in Kristallnacht and 
then completely altered in 1960 with the construction of the “Haus Industrieform.”137 Local 
church leaders were especially pushing for restoration.138 They were joined by former Jewish 
residents of Essen who returned to the city in the early 1980s only to find that the interior had 
been transformed into a functional exhibition space. Just as these plans to restore the interior were 
emerging, members of the local Jewish community and Jewish leaders outside of Essen voiced 
discomfort with the exhibition that Peukert had designed, arguing that it eclipsed the history of 
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the very community that once worshiped in the building. The chairman of Essen’s Jewish 
community argued that a permanent exhibition on Jews in Essen was “paramount,” while chief 
rabbi of North Rhine Westphalia Abraham Hochwald strongly urged city officials to include a 
much “clearer explanation of the Jewish fate” in the current exhibition since the “overwhelming 
number of victims were Jews.”139 As criticism of the exhibition continued to mount, the mayor of 
Essen called a high level meeting with Jewish leaders in the fall of 1986 to discuss future plans 
for the building. He met with the chairperson of the Essen Jewish community, Rabbi Hochwald, 
and Ignatz Bubis of the Central Council of Jews in Germany. The mayor told them that the city 
had decided to restore the interior of the building to its original form. It also planned to revise the 
current exhibition to make the Jewish experience and fate more central to it.140  
This meeting ultimately produced the most significant change in the postwar 
appropriation of the Essen synagogue since its adaptation into a museum of industrial products. 
After two years of meticulous reconstruction work that cost the state and federal governments 
about twelve million marks, the synagogue was returned to the basic shape and design of its pre-
war interior. It was not restored exactly as it once was in a complete nostalgic recovery of the 
past; rather the point was to bring back its general design without “obscuring the irreparable 
damage the building suffered” since 1938.141 But the synagogue looked more like it did in 1913 
than it ever had since its first destruction during Kristallnacht. In the newly renovated building, 
an entirely new exhibition was created that focused solely on Jewish life in Essen. This new 
exhibition, called the “Stations of Jewish Life: From Emancipation to the Present,” was placed in 
the newly restored main hall of the synagogue, while Peukert’s original exhibition on resistance 
and persecution remained unchanged with the exception that it was now given a new, much less 
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prominent location.142 Placed in the balcony, its importance could not have been more clearly 
reduced.  
Reaction to these changes was mixed. The local press celebrated the restoration of this 
“masterwork” by the Essen architect Edmund Körner.143 The architectural splendor of the 
building still continued to amaze, perhaps all the more so in the 1980s when Essen’s urban 
landscape had little more to offer than rows of modernist department stores, towering 
skyscrapers, and wide boulevards. But few articles explored in much depth why such a restoration 
was necessary in the first place. The destruction of the building, especially during the postwar 
period, was rarely discussed. One newspaper article included photos of the building from 1913, 
1938, and 1945, billing them as “three pictures that exemplify German history.”144 A photo from 
1961 with the interior of the building turned into a museum of industrial products tellingly did not 
count. Another article began by claiming that “after 1945 much was destroyed,” but then offered 
little specific information about what was actually torn down.145 The violent destruction of the 
building in 1938 proved easier to discuss than its adaptation in a peaceful, democratic West 
Germany. The installation of a new exhibition provoked an even more ambivalent response. City 
officials found themselves in an awkward position. As one noted frankly, the synagogue belongs 
to “Jews” but since 1945 it has been taken over by “non-Jews.”146 The exhibition had to be re-
worked to satisfy the growing concerns of Jewish leaders, while not dismissing altogether the 
work of “non-Jews” such as Schmidt and Peukert. Someone was bound to be offended. It turned 
out to be Schmidt who was hardly pleased with the idea of the new exhibition. “There must not 
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be two exhibitions,” he thundered, “two exhibitions will mean that one will be valued over the 
other.”147 But this was a battle he was not going to win. 
On November 5, 1988, the synagogue reopened its doors to a restored interior and new 
exhibition on Jewish life. It was the third, post-1945 transformation of the building. Just as in 
1961 and 1981, a large crowd gathered for the ceremony to hear speeches about the synagogue’s 
importance. Mayor Peter Reuschenbach (SPD) emphasized that the building served as a 
countermeasure to “any attempts to smooth over our history,” while prime minister Johannes Rau 
(SPD) urged Esseners to act “against forgetting and silence.”148 The synagogue, long incorporated 
into Essen’s identity of postwar consumption and then briefly re-appropriated as a symbol of 
German resistance and victimization, was now articulated as a specifically “Jewish” space whose 
symbolism should never be forgotten. This singular expression contradicted the spatial and 
architectural modes of acculturation that the building once reflected. Located in the heart of the 
city and grandly built in massive stone, it captured the dual identity of Imperial Germany’s 
confident, exuberant Jewish community. The Holocaust shattered that symbiosis, however 
fraught and fragile it was at times before 1933. With the shattering of that dual identity came the 
shattering of Essen’s synagogue, a space that could be appropriated as “German” or “Jewish” but 
rarely as “German-Jewish.”149 
 Indeed, the synagogue today is undergoing yet another transformation –– its fourth –– 
that will express even more clearly its identity as a singularly “Jewish” space. In February 2008, 
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Essen’s city council approved a 7.4 million Euro plan to transform the building into a “House of 
Jewish Culture.”150 A building whose “Jewish character for too long was ‘deformed, concealed, 
or ignored’” will now be openly displayed and celebrated just in time for Essen’s debut as the 
2010 “European Capital of Culture.”151 The synagogue will no longer be simply a memorial that 
“reduces Jews only to the role of the victim” but will be an “open house, a meeting point for 
lively exchange.”152 As the Israeli-born director Edna Brocke put it, the new exhibition will move 
beyond the “See, I told-you-so pedagogy” of focusing only on shamefully reminding Germans of 
the crimes of National Socialism.153 The Peukert-Schmidt exhibition will move out of the 
building to the House of Essen History, while the sarcophagus memorial just outside the front 
door of the building that the city erected in 1949 to the “Jews who had to lose their life” will be 
taken down. The exhibition on the “Stations of Jewish Life” will become part of a larger cultural 
space for exchange between Jews and non-Jews. This new center will be spoken in the “same 
breath with the Jewish museum in Berlin.”154  
Essen might dream of being put alongside Berlin, but this rather dull “shopping city” will 
never get there. Even if it did the comparison would not be apt because this latest shift in the 
synagogue’s purpose could not be more different from developments in Berlin where the 
Holocaust has become a permanent mark on the urban landscape with its Jewish museum and 
most recently its enormous Holocaust memorial right near the Brandenburg Gate.155 The Essen 
case suggests the possible emergence of a shifting relationship to the Holocaust at a moment 
when Germany’s Jewish community has been expanding rapidly. Essen’s Orthodox community 
                                                 
150 “Neukonzeption Alte Synagoge Essen,” Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Rates der Stadt, February 27, 
2008.  
 
151 Marcus Schymiczek, “Ein Haus des Austauschs,” Westdeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung March 5, 2008.  
 
152 Ibid.  
 
153 Ibid.  
 
154 Ibid.  
 
155 Kirsch, Nationaler Mythos; Stavginski, Holocaust-Denkmal. 
 385 
now has 905 members.156 Although the “House of Jewish Culture” will be secular, it reflects the 
desire among some to contextualize and situate the Holocaust at a time when the Jewish 
community in Germany is more secure, confident, and stable than it has ever been since 1945. It 
also reflects perhaps a certain degree of discomfort with the now ritualistic, redemptive quality of 
the “non-German German” emphasis on the stigma of the Holocaust.157 Finally, this new 
appropriation of the building serves as perhaps the coda to the synagogue’s long, seemingly ever 
shifting history since 1913. As one local journalist put it: “It was for twenty-five years the 
spiritual center of Jewish life in Essen until November 9, 1938 when the Nazis turned synagogues 
throughout the country into rubble and ash. It protruded through the rubble of the bombed-out 
city as a kind of memorial. It was transformed into a museum of industrial products and today it 
is a monument. Now it is to become a house of Jewish culture.”158  
Although much less dramatically than in Essen, Wrocław, Warsaw, and Berlin, there has 
also been an on-going reemergence of Jewish culture and life in the city of Potsdam. This once 
Prussian military town, now self-proclaimed to be “a European influenced city,” draws a large 
number of tourists to visit its palaces just outside the city-center but continues to be dwarfed by 
nearby Berlin.159 Its downtown, dominated by East German Plattenbauten except for the 
historically preserved Dutch quarter, hardly fits the confident billing that Potsdam is “without a 
doubt one of Germany’s most beautiful cities.”160 As with other East German cities, Potsdam also 
suffers from persistent problems with right-wing extremism that politicians and local citizens 
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have strongly attempted to counteract.161 Most recently in 2006, a German citizen originally from 
Ethiopia was beaten almost to death at a Potsdam bus stop. Occurring just as Germany was about 
to invite millions of tourists for the World Cup, the incident attracted prolonged and extensive 
coverage in the national media about the threat of right-wing violence.162 This explosion of 
anxiety came just as minorities within Germany and outside were making lists of “No-Go-Areas” 
that foreigners should avoid.  
Post-1989 Potsdam is certainly not a “No-Go-Area,” but that these perceptions exit has 
only made the revival of Jewish life there all the more important for the city, even if it is often 
overlooked with Berlin’s booming Jewish life and “hype” only a commuter rail ride away. There 
is indeed little hype in Potsdam, but there is a notable presence of Jewish life in the city that is all 
the more astonishing since a Jewish community has not existed there since the late 1930s. Today 
the Orthodox community totals 396 Jews, mainly from the former Soviet Union. Its prayer house 
is located in the center of town on Schloßstraße, and just around the corner sits the Moses 
Mendelssohn Center for European Jewish Studies founded in 1992. Directed by the outspoken 
Julius Hans Schoeps, son of a famously acculturated German-Jewish family, the center focuses 
mainly on scholarship but its many public lectures, conferences, and cultural activities make it an 
important part of Jewish cultural life in the city. Its quarterly newsletter, Dialog, aims to stimulate 
a broad conversation about Jewish culture, religion, and history.163 With the opening in 1995 of 
the Simon Dubnow Institute in Leipzig, a certain degree of academic prominence has eluded the 
MMZ, but it has a large staff, a growing Jewish studies program, and financial commitment from 
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the state. Each year Potsdam also hosts with the city of Berlin a Jewish film festival. Founded in 
1995, it welcomes Jewish artists from around the world to both cities to display their work.164 
 Yet the most important, symbolic development that has been going on now for years in 
the city are plans to construct a new synagogue. The building of new synagogues has long carried 
heavy symbolic importance in postwar Germany. They are highly visible, spatial markers of 
Jewish presence and reflect the notion that “who builds a house stays.”165 The fact that Jews wish 
to live in Germany still stirs discussion and reflection even as the country has become home to a 
new Jewish Diaspora. In 2006, Munich unveiled a 72 million-dollar Jewish center with a 
synagogue, museum, and kindergarten that replaced the city’s main synagogue destroyed in 1938. 
Although the new building could not be erected on the same plot of land as the old one, it was 
constructed only a few blocks away and given the exact same name. Unveiled on the anniversary 
of Kristallnacht by the German president with hundreds of onlookers and 1,500 police officers, 
this new presence of Jews in Hitler’s “capital of the movement” served as a powerful symbol of 
renewal and growth after the Holocaust. Potsdam’s new synagogue has received much less 
attention, but it faces the same kind of questions that Munich did: Is the new synagogue to be a 
replacement of the old? Where should it be built? How should it be constructed? How should it 
negotiate the relationship between past and present, between memory and communal life?  
 Discussion about these questions has been going on with various degrees of intensity 
since the mid-1990s. Both the Jewish community and the city have struggled in particular to 
figure out where the building should be located. Several different locations have emerged. In 
1995, the city agreed to give the Gemeinde an abandoned church in nearby Babelsberg, but the 
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Jewish community was not enthused about the idea of being located outside Potsdam.166 The old 
synagogue was after all located right in the heart of Potsdam. As the Babelsberg location lost 
appeal, plans to rebuild a replica of the old one gained traction. Since 1990, a local, grass-roots 
organization, the Working Group for the Construction of Potsdam’s Historic Downtown, had 
been urging city officials to rebuild the synagogue as part of restoring the old, Wilhelmian square 
of which its was the architectural focal point. The local Jewish community welcomed the idea and 
Potsdam’s city council officially approved of the plan in January 1998.167 But no sooner had these 
plans been accepted than the idea became “precarious” and “a complex problem.”168 The 
recreation of the synagogue was going to involve tearing down the apartment building located 
there and relocating all of its residents. The idea quickly seemed impractical, expensive, and 
unrealistic. It also seemed more like a nostalgic urge to reconstruct “old” Potsdam than an attempt 
to met the needs of the current Jewish community. As Julius Hans Schoeps put it simply, 
Potsdam has a “new Jewish community –– it should build a synagogue in a different location.”169 
Plans for the synagogue stalled and no viable alternative surfaced for years as the Jewish 
community insisted that it was not going to pay for a new plot of land.170 In late 2004, a 
resolution finally appeared likely as both parties settled on a site for the synagogue. The city 
offered to sell for one euro the plot of land on Schlosstraße 1 where the community currently 
resides in a Plattenbau. The current plan is to tear down the apartment building and erect in its 
place a synagogue, library, and community center. In 2005, the Building Organization of the 
Potsdam Synagogue was founded to raise private donations and hold an architectural competition 
for the building.  
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 But plans for the synagogue have only continued to move slowly and frustration has 
mounted. “We have four hundred community members,” one member explained, “but our prayer 
room is only seventy square meters large; we have to fight for seats at gatherings with the 
shortage of space.”171 Standing in front of the plaque of the old synagogue on the anniversary of 
Kristallnacht, another community member remarked: “Without a synagogue in Potsdam it is 
difficult to get my children excited about our religion.”172 The main problem, as the mayor noted 
at the same event, is money. The city and state cannot afford to pay for all of the synagogue’s 
construction. It “has to be built by everyone,” the mayor explained.173 But private funds have 
been slow to come in and the Central Council of Jews has appeared ambivalent about the project. 
Stephan Kramer, the General Secretary of the Council, called the plan “cynical” and a “mockery” 
given the poor financial state of the Potsdam Jewish community.174 The Council’s president, 
Charlotte Knobloch, distanced herself from these remarks and publically supported the project, 
while Kramer later implied that his comments were directed at city and state officials who must 
finance the project for it ever to be realized.175 The financial situation remains tenuous, but 
appears to be improving as of late. In May 2008, Brandenburg’s cultural minister indicated that 
the state might be able to finance part of the construction, recognizing that private donations 
alone would not be enough to cover the estimated five million Euro project.176 An architectural 
competition is supposed to begin soon and the current plan is for the synagogue to be completed 
by 2012. Since the initial target was 2001, few are holding out hope that this deadline will be met. 
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“A synagogue is more than a symbol,” Potsdam’s Rabbi remarked, “it is fundamental to Jewish 
life in Potsdam. So far, all of our estimates have been false.”177 In spite of such pessimism, it 
appears likely that Potsdam will have a new synagogue at some point. The long, frustrating 
process has caused bitterness and frustration, but when the building is finally unveiled the 
symbolism of it will be lost on few. The synagogue will mark Jewish life in the city for the first 
time since 1957 when the pre-war synagogue was torn down, reflecting the presence of a new 
Jewish Diaspora in Germany.  
IV. Conclusion  
In light of this new Diaspora, the Jewish writer and historian Diana Pinto has recently 
argued for embracing a new, European Jewish identity around the concept of Jewish space. 
Conceiving it as places where Jews and non-Jews gather, she invites Jews in Europe not to view 
their small numbers as an “impoverishment” but as a challenge “unique to Europe.” “For if Jews 
now live in Europe in a voluntary manner,” Pinto writes, “it means they share a series of complex 
affinities with ‘others’ and it is this link that must be deepened and turned into creative dialogue, 
starting with non-Jews who choose to enter the Jewish space.”178 In fashioning this new, 
European Jewish identity, Jews on the continent cannot be seen as merely a “dying species.” 
“European Jews in the future if they are to flourish must above all not be the guardians of a static 
and finalized pre-Holocaust heritage. They must not become the museum keepers of world 
Jewry.”179 They must, in short, form a “third pillar” between the “American and Israeli poles of 
world Judaism.”180 Although these observations are intended to be programmatic and for some 
Jewish commentators are overly optimistic, they point to one of the central tensions that has 
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emerged since 1989 –– the temporal dissonance between past and present, between the insistence 
on the Holocaust and the growth of a new Jewish communal life.181  
This tension has emerged precisely because of the transnational interest in the Jewish past 
that has accelerated since 1989. Just as the Jewish populations of Germany and Poland have 
increased, Germans, Poles, Americans, Israelis, Jews, and non-Jews have only continued to 
express interest in “Jewishness,” including a particular fascination with Jewish spaces, whether 
they are “authentic” Jewish sites or newly created ones. This obsession with the material 
remnants of Jewish life has effectively led to the reconstruction and musealization of the Jewish 
past. “Jewishness” becomes something to be experienced, photographed, catalogued, preserved, 
displaced, and recreated. It is essentialized, reified, managed, and controlled; it is located in the 
past as artifacts of a lost population and cultural heritage. This interest in the Jewish past builds 
on the melancholic nostalgia for Jews that emerged in the 1980s, what I have called the becoming 
presence of the absence of Jewish life, but it also stems from presentist urges for 
“cosmopolitism,” postmodern appeals for recovering the “historic,” and tourist Spurensuche. 
There are few signs that this obsession with the past will abate anytime soon sustained as it is by 
strong local and transnational interest. Even if Germans and Poles tire of the “Jewish fashion,” it 
is probably safe to assume that American and Israeli tourists will continue to travel to Germany 
and Poland to experience Europe’s “pre-Holocaust heritage.”  
This transnationalization of Jewish space is, in fact, one of the most important 
transformations since 1989. Jewish sites certainly attracted international attention earlier, but 
nothing like they have since the collapse of communism. Jewish spaces now engage an array of 
people across the European continent and parts of the world. It is not just the thousands of 
tourists, but the architects, museum directors, intellectuals, artists, and ordinary citizens who are 
deeply invested in a given locality and project: the American director of the Berlin Jewish 
Museum and its Polish-Jewish architect; the Israeli founder of the Warsaw Jewish museum and 
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its British exhibition design team; the Jewish-Norwegian artist of the Wrocław Jewish cultural 
center; the largely Russian population of Potsdam’s Jewish community; the Israeli director of 
Essen’s Alte Synagoge. Today this transnationalization of Jewish space is accelerating at an 
almost frantic pace thanks to the globalizing power of technology. One now does not even need 
to leave one’s home computer, television, or reading chair to experience the material traces of 
German and Polish Jewry. Numerous books have appeared that offer pictures and narrative 
descriptions of Jewish sites, while images of Jewish spaces dominate film and documentaries.182 
As just one example, the Polish-Jewish survivor and film director Marian Marzynski produced for 
PBS’s Frontline two searing portraits of Holocaust memory in contemporary Poland and 
Germany. In Shtetl (1996), he followed his American friend as he searched for his family’s 
history in the village of Brańsk east of Warsaw. As they walked through the town, they asked 
local villagers if they remember where the town’s five synagogues once stood, now all empty 
spaces.183 In A Jew Among the Germans (2005), he traveled to Berlin to visit the city’s Holocaust 
memorial and Jewish museum, debating with Germans and Americans the best ways to “preserve 
the memory.”184  
Of course, the most globalizing, transnational medium today is not a book or even a 
television anymore but a computer. Cyberspace transmits images and stories about Jewish sites 
around the world at the click of a mouse. One can watch videos on YouTube of Jan Jagielski, an 
employee of the Jewish Historical Institute and long-time conservator of Jewish sites, discussing 
the history of Poland’s Jewish cemeteries, or a three-minute memorial that melancholically 
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moves through Warsaw’s Jewish cemetery (there are dozens more of other Polish cities).185 The 
American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, a non-profit organization established in 1993, publishes 
as part of its well-known “Virtual Jewish Library” a “Virtual Jewish History Tour” of select 
cities, including Berlin and Warsaw, that provide pictures of Jewish sites accompanied by brief 
historical narratives.186 The internet portal “Polin – Polish Jewish Heritage,” managed by the 
Foundation for the Preservation of Jewish Heritage in Poland, offers a multimedia presentation of 
Jewish towns, while the University of Technology in Darmstadt has recreated 2,200 synagogues 
using CAD technology.187 These appropriations of Jewish sites truly are virtual. 
But what are the effects of this transnational insistence on “preserving the memory” that 
today appears to be spreading at an almost dizzying rate? One of them, to return to Pinto’s 
observations, is clear. This obsession with Europe’s “pre-Holocaust heritage” implicitly assumes 
the death of the continent’s Jewish Diaspora when it has not just vanished but is growing. “I left 
for America with the image of Shtetl life frozen in time. It smelled of death,” Marzynski explains 
at the beginning of his film.188 Some Jews in Germany and Poland see this fixation on the 
Holocaust as problematic. As Edna Brocke of the Essen synagogue put it succinctly, it 
automatically puts Jews into the category of the victim. She hopes to broaden the definition of 
Jewishness by creating a “House of Jewish Culture.” The Berlin and Warsaw museums move 
toward a similar aim. The Holocaust will obviously remain a dominant point of identity and 
discussion in Germany and Poland, although some non-Jews have attacked it in disturbing, 
apologetic, and at times even anti-Semitic ways. But such voices, while hardly marginal 
especially in Poland where the right wing at the moment is stronger for precise reasons, are 
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probably less pronounced than those who have embraced the Holocaust and Jewishness.189 
Although one might be tempted to interpret this as the culmination of a successful “learning 
process,” it is not without its own tensions. This almost frantic interest in the Jewish past does not 
just dominate, reconstruct, create, and invent Jewishness in a kind of “memory theater,” putting 
Jewish artifacts in museums, restoring Jewish sites, recreating Jewish streets.190 It also has real 
consequences for Jews living in Poland and Germany today. A Berlin Jewish community member 
perhaps put it best when she noted that at times it can simply be “stressful” to be Jewish in 
Germany. The same could easily be applied to Poland. What she means, I think, is not something 
overly negative; she is not scared or anxious. She is plainly exhausted at times because by being 
Jewish she inevitably gets pulled into the observed, discussed, probed, and created world of 
“Jewishness” no matter if it is located on a real street or a virtual one. The transnational interest in 
the Jewish past makes an already elusive “normality” in Poland and Germany even more so. In 
this sense, Pinto’s notion of dialogue in Jewish spaces does indeed seem overly optimistic. 
Perhaps some spaces –– the Warsaw museum or the Essen synagogue –– will eventually provide 
such forums. But at the moment the tension between the past and present, between the 
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transnational and the local has not been adequately worked out. “One of the still unresolved 
questions,” Pinto admits, “is how to define Auschwitz in terms of the Jewish space.”191 
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CONCLUSION  
SPATIAL HERMENEUTICS AND REDEMPTIVE COSMOPOLITANISM  
In Truth and Method, Hans Georg Gadamer builds on the hermeneutical tradition that 
takes human understanding to be interpretative, finite, and non-absolute. His most enduring 
contribution is to show how the past fundamentally shapes our interpretation of reality. History 
limits and makes possible our understanding; the past cannot be overcome, denied, forgotten, or 
suppressed. “Our usual relationship to the past,” he writes, “is not characterized by distancing and 
freeing ourselves from tradition.  Rather, we are always situated within traditions.”1 He 
concludes: “in all understanding, whether we are expressly aware of it or not, the efficacy of 
history is at work.”2 This omnipresence of the past –– what Gadamer calls the “history of effect” 
(Wirkungsgeschichte) –– is what makes up our “standpoints” of interpretation. The past makes 
our interpretations prejudicial not in the pejorative sense of the word but in the purer sense of pre-
judging. Our various, multiple “standpoints” limit our “possibility of vision.”3 But they do so not 
necessarily in a deterministic, rigid way. Our “horizons” of understanding are “always in motion” 
as we encounter conflicting viewpoints from others and attempt to understand the past, to 
challenge ourselves to think about our own prejudices and traditions.4 The perspectives of others 
and our consciousness of history can broaden our horizon of interpretation.  
This constant entanglement with the past I called earlier “spatial hermeneutics” as a way 
to capture the various, conflicting ways that Poles, Germans, Americans, Israelis, Jews, and non-
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Jews have interpreted the material remnants of Jewish life after 1945. The shifting history of 
Jewish space in Poland and Germany has unfolded within different standpoints and horizons of 
interpretation at changing points in time. The basic narrative of this history divides roughly into 
three periods when interpretations of Jewish sites shifted as different horizons of the past 
emerged. These shifts occurred as divergent, transnational interpretations conflicted and as some 
Poles and Germans started to think reflectively about the traditions that conditioned their own 
prejudices. They emerged because of the transnationalization of Jewish spaces and the growth of 
localized efforts to think about the past, to understand one’s own historical standpoint, to be 
conscious, in short, of the “hermeneutical situation” of being thrown into a world conditioned by 
a traumatic past.5  
In the early postwar decades, the immediate, wartime past and to a certain extent the 
presentist demands of the cold war conditioned the way Germans and Poles interpreted Jewish 
sites. They first confronted them as a legal problem as Jewish survivors and international Jewish 
leaders demanded the return of property confiscated by the Nazis. Government officials 
responded to these demands differently depending on which side of the Iron Curtain they were 
on. In both the GDR and PPR, state authorities flatly refused to return Jewish property despite 
numerous pleas from local Jewish leaders that they do so. As the SED embraced antifascist anti-
Semitism and the PZPR feared the political backlash from Poland’s obsession with żydokomuna 
expressed in widespread violent anti-Semitism, any support that Jews might have once enjoyed 
from communists vanished almost completely. Communist leaders knew that fighting for Jews 
after 1945 gained them virtually nothing in societies where Jewish hatred had become a 
normalized part of everyday life after the Holocaust. Abandoning Jews was an “implicit ‘give’ for 
the ‘take’ of power” in the GDR and PPR.6 In contrast, support for Jews in West Germany was a 
requirement for power. The American occupiers made this clear from the beginning, arguing that 
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combating anti-Semitism and supporting Jews were integral elements of democratization.7 The 
CDU and the SPD continued this policy and usually supported restitution in the face of growing 
opposition to it. There was little broad, social acceptance for the return of Jewish property, which 
was dismissed as “victor’s justice.” Few German intellectuals, church leaders, writers, journalists, 
and ordinary citizens were pushing for it. Restitution did not become an accepted and normalized 
part of West German politics and society.8 In this sense, the seemingly sharp divergence of the 
West German case from its communist neighbors appears less stark. In all three cases just after 
the war, no broad, social norm emerged that called for and sanctioned the return of Jewish 
property. The Iron Curtain was not always so ironclad. 
Indeed, the appropriation of Jewish sites in Warsaw, Berlin, Potsdam, Essen, and 
Wrocław points to the central importance of the local level. Of course, the local was deeply 
entangled in the political –– perhaps it makes sense to speak of the localization of the cold war –– 
but the point here is that the postwar history of Jewish space did not necessarily fall neatly along 
the lines of divergent political cultures. In the immediate postwar decades, the material traces of 
Jewish life rarely fit into the postwar transformation of each city’s urban landscape and identity. 
Essen’s synagogue, once an integral part of the city’s built environment, became spatially and 
physically excluded from its postwar transformation into the “shopping city.” The synagogue was 
abandoned for fifteen years until city leaders turned it into the “Haus Industrieform,” making it a 
peculiar space for displaying and celebrating the city’s postwar consumerist identity. In Wrocław, 
Jewish leaders struggled in vain to find even the slightest amount of support for rebuilding its 
properties in a city of massive historic reconstruction. As local officials rushed to preserve the 
city’s “Polish” buildings, they completely neglected the synagogue and Jewish cemetery. In the 
late 1960s, they even went so far as to confiscate the synagogue from the Jewish community. In 
Potsdam, no Jewish community ever emerged after the war. Its now abandoned synagogue 
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remained in damaged form for thirteen years until city officials tore it down in 1958. As local 
party leaders sought to construct a new, socialist Potsdam, they built in its place an apartment 
complex. This decision received little opposition from historic preservationists even as they 
fought strenuously for the protection of other historic sites in the city. The synagogue did not fit 
into the culturally constructed boundaries of the “historic.”  
The material traces of Jewish life also rarely fit into the postwar reconstruction of divided 
Berlin and Warsaw. Brutally destroyed by the Nazis, Warsaw became after the war Poland’s 
“martyr city,” the national symbol of the country’s rebirth and reconstruction from the 
catastrophe of the Nazi occupation. In an eclectic blending of the old and the new, urban planners 
combined modernism, socialist realism, and historic reconstruction into one monumental project 
that preserved the cultural remnants of the nation and built the socialist future. A similarly 
grandiose plan did not emerge in divided Berlin. With the main exception of the competing, cold 
war projects of Stalinallee and the Hansaviertel, both Berlins implemented a fairly practical form 
of urban modernism that involved few major, highly symbolic architectural projects (although the 
East German regime certainly organized many that never materialized). In spite of these 
important differences, divided Berlin and Warsaw reflected a shared, teleological sense of time. 
Muranów, Stalinallee, and the Hansaviertel were common appropriations of urban space that 
were used for the building of new socialist and democratic societies. Urban reconstruction 
promised to deliver a better, more progressive tomorrow, but Jewish spaces did not fit into these 
visions of the future. The material traces of Jewish life remained bracketed from the temporal 
framing of urban renewal, one of the consequences of modernity’s destructive creativity.  
In five diverse urban landscapes, Jewish sites were transformed, neglected, and cleared 
away for the building of something perceived to be better. This shared, parallel history across 
national and political borders is perhaps what is most salient about the immediate postwar 
decades. In the 1950s and 1960s, Poles and Germans interpreted and appropriated Jewish sites in 
strikingly similar ways. Jewish sites reflected a minority culture that did not easily fit into the 
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temporal demands of urban modernism, socialist realism, and the cultural aesthetics of historic 
preservation. As cultural geographers have shown, the production of urban space is a socio-
cultural construct that conditions, manages, and controls reality; the creation of urban space 
reflects and reinforces dominant economic, social, cultural, ethnic, racial, and gender norms.9 In 
the GDR and PPR, this production of space configured to the ideological demands of communism 
as both states attempted to fashion a new, socialist city from the ruins of war, while in the FRG it 
conformed to the social relations of capitalism. In all three cases, the aesthetics of the “historic” 
reflected the dominance of exclusivist, ethnically defined perceptions of cultural goods. This 
dynamic is perhaps most evident in Wrocław and Warsaw where historic reconstruction was 
much more dominant, but it also clear in Potsdam and Essen where historic preservationists 
remained acutely ambivalent about the cultural importance of each city’s synagogue. There was, 
in short, a spatial version of the Jewish question. As urban officials rushed to build postwar 
capitalist and socialist cities, they produced new urban spaces for a more progressive future and 
restored only select historic buildings that conformed to their cultural biases. Warsaw dramatizes 
this duality like few other cities. As Jan Zachwatowicz’s team of conservators waded through the 
ruins of the old town searching for every possible architectural trace to be saved, catalogued, and 
rebuilt, Varsovians sifted through the rubble of Muranów scavenging for anything that could be 
reused, sold, or taken. The ruins of the old town were preserved as “sacred” remnants of Polish 
culture; the ruins of the ghetto were recycled as just material to be consumed and used for the 
socialist future.  
Jewish spaces such as Muranów also symbolized violence and persecution on otherwise 
everyday streets. They were paved over, expunged, and neglected not necessarily out of malice, 
                                                 
9 Christine Bauhardt, Stadtentwicklung und Verkehrspolitik. Eine Analyse aus feministischer Sicht (Berlin: 
Birkhäuser, 1995); Michael Keith and Steve Pile, Place and the Politics of Identity (New York: Routledge, 
1993); Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
1991); Doreen B. Massey, For Space (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2005); Karen M. Morin and Jeanne Kay 
Guelke, Women, Religion, and Space: Global Perspectives on Gender and Faith (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse 
University Press, 2007); Edward W. Soja, Postmodern Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical 
Social Theory (New York: Verso, 1989).  
 402 
but out of a deep sense of discomfort with the fragility of human empathy that shattered Jewish 
spaces reflected. One might be tempted to interpret this appropriation of Jewish sites as a 
mnemonic attempt to flee from the past, as yet additional evidence that Germans and Poles 
suppressed the “memory” of the Holocaust. But the absence of Jewish life saturated the stones of 
these shattered spaces. It remained always there, if not always made present as a contentious 
“problem.” In the early postwar decades, Germans and Poles did not make the absence of Jewish 
life a “problem” because the most recent, wartime past shaped their hermeneutical standpoint of 
interpretation. Germans and Poles became entangled in the persecution and mass murder of the 
Jews in ways similar, yet also clearly different as I attempted to stake out earlier. This past itself 
conditioned the postwar appropriation of Jewish space; it limited the horizon of interpretation. 
There were few others around in these early postwar years to contest and resist this dominant 
mode of interpretation, to expand the hermeneutical horizon of Germans and Poles by challenging 
their prejudices. There were some and they tended to be mostly Jews. I have attempted to include 
their voices here as much as possible, but they often went unheard in the 1950s and 1960s.10 
This dynamic started to shift in the late 1970s as the absence of Jewish life gradually 
became present. The fact that Jews were no longer around became a contentious “problem” that 
deserved discussion, reflection, and contestation. This act of becoming contentious unfolded in 
both different and similar ways across political and national boundaries. In the GDR and PPR, 
Jewish sites became a national issue in light of internal and external pressure placed on both 
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ruling elites. Just as the SED and PZPR were hoping to improve their image abroad, Jewish sites 
started attracting attention from tourists, Jewish leaders, and foreign journalists. This growing 
transnational interest turned Jewish sites into a major political issue that the SED and PZPR were 
forced to mitigate by shifting their policies toward the Jewish minority. But in doing so they only 
exacerbated the problem as Jewish sites became intensely contested among state officials and 
members of the growing opposition. Although this conflict emerged strongly at times in the 
GDR, it was most pronounced in Poland because of the “anti-Zionist” campaign of 1968 that 
stimulated intense local, national, and transnational interest in the Jewish past. The centrality of 
1968 for Poland distinguishes it from both the GDR and FRG; it marks in a sense a key 
“national” difference, although one more precisely embedded in the postwar history of 
communism and Polish-Jewish relations.  
Indeed, this direct tension between state and society was much less palpable in West 
Germany because of its democratic system and long-standing, officially philosemitic policy 
formulated at the dawn of the cold war. Jewish sites in the FRG never became a national and 
international problem as they did in the PPR and GDR; they remained an issue confined mainly to 
the local level. As the Holocaust became widely contested in the 1980s, historians, religious 
leaders, politicians, and ordinary citizens, typically on the Left, challenged the postwar 
appropriation of Jewish sites. In a democratic society, their civic engagement did not provoke 
anxiety among national leaders who had little to fear about West Germany’s relationship with the 
United States and Israel. National leaders had no reason to embrace “Jewishness” like their 
counterparts in the GDR and PPR in order to improve blemished images and secure foreign loans. 
The stark politicization of Jewish space in the GDR and PPR was a direct consequence of earlier, 
anti-Jewish policies that simply did not exist in the FRG.11 
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In all three cases, Jewish sites engaged a variety of social actors who shared a common 
purpose of contesting dominant modes of interpretation. The 1980s were pivotal years when some 
Poles and Germans started to broaden their horizon of interpretation. This shifting, widening 
standpoint emerged as they challenged themselves and were challenged by others to think about 
the past. They became more aware of their hermeneutical condition as constantly situated within 
a past and considered the prejudices that it involved. This self-reflective understanding became 
entangled in a broader melancholic nostalgia for the “lost world” of Polish and German Jewry. 
This sense of cultural loss emerged precisely because Jews –– at least in their prewar, large 
numbers –– were gone and no longer a “real” problem as a minority group. It emerged from the 
ashes of genocide and ethnic hatred. Nostalgia can, after all, only “survive in a long-distance 
relationship” as the desired object remains something sought after, yet never fully grasped.12 In 
Poland and Germany, this sentimental nostalgia took on both “reflective” and “restorative” forms 
                                                                                                                                                 
day. For example, Poland is still continuing to struggle with the return of Jewish communal property since 
the passage of legislation in 1997 (so far less than 20 percent of communal holdings have been returned. 
This law does not apply to individual properties). Almost the opposite is the case with reunited Germany. 
Although the FRG inherited the problems left by the collapsed GDR regime, it settled them over the 1990s 
in numerous restitution agreements, including the return of Jewish property (both communal and 
individual). The West German, cold war framework of restitution was simply applied to the former 
territories of the GDR (Germany obviously also had the means to do so as Europe’s largest economy). 
What is more, the fairly strong perception that Germany has successfully reckoned with its past is based 
only on the postwar history of the FRG. It requires ignoring the GDR almost entirely, a mental move that 
does not work for Poland and the PPR. Germany is seen as the “successful” example of moral reckoning, 
while Poland is perceived to be the case of its complete failure –– it not only did nothing to help the Jews 
after the war but even murdered them in 1945-46 and expelled them in 1968. Indeed, I think the rise of 
anti-Polish sentiment after 1945 is in large part a cold war product on two entangled levels: 1) the 
“east”/“Poland” is demonized for not being a liberal, democratic, and capitalist country; 2) the 
“east”/“Poland” is demonized as inherently anti-Semitic, a mental connection that is made automatically 
with the “east” and with “communism.” Of course, there is evidence to support both claims; these are not 
“myths” so much as they are orientalist, bourgeois perceptions of reality that view Poland in exaggerated, 
essentialized, and stereotypical terms. Although more research would have to be done on this, my hunch is 
that anti-Polonism is more directly a product of the postwar/cold war order than of the Holocaust, which 
caused for sure numerous bitter memories among survivors. But my guess is that these memories became 
even more bitter refracted through the lenses of 1945-46 and 1968. Jews certainly had bad memories of 
Germans after all, but today the country is not portrayed nearly as negatively as Poland is in part, I believe, 
because of the West German narrative of “successful” integration into the democratic, capitalist “west” that 
involved not least of all, as the Americans clearly stressed from the beginning, restitution and strong ties 
with Israel. In short, Germany got it right after the Holocaust, Poland did not. This narrative of (West) 
Germany overshadows the anti-Zionist, anti-Semitic, and anti-restitution one of the GDR.  
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–– the lingering on the patina of Jewish ruins and the urge to rebuild them, to harness them for the 
present and future.13 The tension between these two expressions of longing, as well the 
fundamental, traumatic symbolism of shattered Jewish spaces, has strongly animated the 
conflicted, interrupted, circumlocutory, and intense engagement with Jewishness in Poland and 
Germany.  
This attraction to the Jewish past has remained, of course, deeply embedded in the 
different historical conditions of Germany and Poland. In the FRG at least, Germans on the Left 
embraced the “stigma” of the Holocaust more strongly than their counterparts in Poland given 
their country’s unequivocal responsibility for mass murder. Poland’s asymmetrical relationship to 
the Holocaust, as the geographic epicenter of where it unfolded but not the country that caused 
the entire problem in the first place, strongly shaped its interpretation of the past. Non-Jewish 
Poles experienced the brutality of Nazi colonialism; they often viewed this past through the eyes 
of the colonized. As Barbara Engelking-Boni has insightfully put it, Poles looked upon the war as 
a sacred, heroic, lofty time of communal strength, survival, and resistance that fit into deeper, 
collective self-perceptions of victimization.14 But in the 1980s some started to consider the “dark” 
moments of this past.   
This mnemonic shift was precipitated in no small part by the growing transnational 
appeal of the Jewish past. Although Jewish sites attracted international attention in the early 
postwar decades, it increased steadily in the 1980s as tourists, international Jewish leaders, and 
foreign journalists paid more attention to the material traces of Jewish life in divided Germany 
and Poland. This transnational interest emerged most strongly in Poland as American and Israeli 
Jewish leaders became intensely concerned about Jewish sites in the wake of 1968, but it was 
present in the two Germanys where it involved mental and physical traversing of the German-
German border. In the late 1980s, the two Germanys intensely competed over embracing 
                                                 
13 Ibid., chaps. 4 and 5.  
 
14 Engelking-Boni, Holocaust and Memory.  
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“Jewishness” and the “Holocaust.” West Berlin finally approved of the Berlin Jewish Museum in 
1988 at the height of the GDR’s massive celebration of Kristallnacht, while Honecker’s regime 
preserved Jewish sites such as the Addas Israel cemetery in direct response to West German 
provocation.  
This steady transnationalization of the Jewish past has increased dramatically since 1989. 
Thousands of American and Israeli tourists now travel to Germany and Poland on “Jewish” and 
“Holocaust” tours in search of the vestiges of the Jewish past. The collapse of communism 
obviously opened up the possibility of such travel, but the linkage between 1989 and this 
transnationalization is not so direct. It is not simply the consequence of democracy’s progressive 
expansion. One can, of course, view 1989 as a major, historical caesura, a revolution on the order 
of 1789 that precipitated great change; such an argument is probably generally true for Europe 
where the cold war really was cold.15 But this neo-liberal embrace of 1989 often involves 
essentializing the communist period as merely some frozen, totalitarian moment.16 “Polish and 
Jewish relations [since 1945] were in the freezer,” Poland’s chief Rabbi and New York native 
commented to the Boston Globe, “the fall of communism was the single most positive event for 
                                                 
15 Of course, other parts of the world were not so lucky. The Americans and the Soviets kept their hot, 
imperial clashes confined far away to Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (with Afghanistan 
an exception for the Soviets). Historians are now only beginning to conceptualize the cold war globally. 
See Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
 
16 A number of historians working on the GDR (the PPR is far off on this score) do not submit to such 
assumptions, especially those working at the Potsdam Center for Contemporary Research. A recent 
discussion of much of their work is Corey Ross, The East German Dictatorship: Problems and 
Perspectives in the Interpretation of the GDR (New York: Arnold, 2002). Recent examples of such an 
approach on the PPR are Stegmann, “Die Aufwertung der Familie,” and Zaremba, Komunizm. The 
historiography on Soviet Russia is also well beyond this conceptualization. As examples of some of the 
most recent work, see Dan Healey, Homosexual Desire in Revolutionary Russia: The Regulation of Sexual 
and Gender Dissent (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2001); Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: 
Stalinism as a Civilization (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997); Amir Weiner, Making Sense of 
War: The Second World War and the Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002). Two recent, powerful books that strongly contest the neo-liberal embrace of 1989 by vividly 
showing the violent, on-going impact of the cold war are Heonik Kwon, Ghosts of War in Vietnam (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), and Greg Grandin, The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America 
in the Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2004).  
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these relations in 50 years.”17 I have attempted to suggest otherwise by showing the fluidity of 
political and cultural appropriations of the Jewish past in both the GDR and PPR, drawing on and 
advancing the work of historians who have put forward a more differentiated approach to state 
and society in the Soviet bloc.18 The 1980s laid the foundation for the multifaceted interest in the 
Jewish past that has taken hold since the collapse of communism. The local helped enable the 
transnational. The rediscovery and preservation of “Jewish” sites has provided the cultural spaces 
for tourists, architects, museum directors, and tour guides to experience, photograph, discover, 
design, and narrate.  
What has changed since 1989 is the interactive dynamic between the local and the 
transnational. Tourists who visit Berlin’s Scheunenviertel on “Jewish tours” help to sustain its 
identity as the city’s “Jewish” district, while American college students who come to Wrocław as 
travelers of a different sort restore its Jewish cemetery. The local and transnational intersect in 
interactive, reinforcing ways.19 They produce different, conflicting meanings, but shape together 
the mental and physical politics of space. It is not just the growing discussion about the Holocaust 
that brings tourists and locals together, but also the urge for “authenticity” and 
“cosmopolitanism” in a globalizing world. Jewishness has become attractive at a particular 
postmodern, global moment when the “historic” seems somehow “real” and the “Jewish” seems 
somehow “cosmopolitan.” Jewishness serves the fantasies of the actors involved in its cultural 
construction and consumption. Although it is impossible to know for sure the socio-economic 
background of all involved, it is safe to assume that most are well educated with relative 
                                                 
17 Rory Boland, “In Poland, lamp of Jewish culture shines anew,” Boston Globe September 30, 2007.  
 
18 See Ross, East German, chap. 3 and 5.  
 
19 Recent research on tourism and the built environment has uncovered a similar dynamic. See Hagen, 
Preservation, and Lehrer’s fascinating discussion of the interplay of the transnational and the local in the 
production of Jewish Kazimierz in Cracow, “‘Shoah Busines.’” 
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affluence (based on where they are from).20 These are educated, bourgeois appropriations of 
Jewishness that configure to similar socio-economic, yet different national identities as Poles, 
Germans, Americans, Israelis, and Jews find various shared and conflicting meanings in the 
Jewish sites they encounter. 
This entangled, transnational engagement with the Jewish past is indeed the most visible 
shift since 1989 and it appears only to be increasing with the globalizing power of cyberspace. As 
a way to touch on some of the tensions and conflicts that underlie it, I would like to return briefly 
to the two films directed by the Polish-Jewish survivor and American citizen Marian Marzynski 
mentioned earlier but only in passing. The Shtetl, produced in 1996 for PBS Frontline, follows an 
American Jew as he travels to his parents’s hometown in the village of Brańsk about 60 miles 
east of Warsaw. As the two men walk through the streets of this impoverished small town, they 
search for the traces of Jewish life. Their tour guide is the non-Jewish Pole Zbyszek Romaniuk 
who has made it his life’s work to rediscover Brańsk’s Jewish past, including digging up and 
restoring Jewish tombstones buried throughout the village. This is, however, no ordinary heritage 
travel. Marzynski’s mission is to explore the role that Poles played in persecuting Jews during the 
Holocaust. This task involves traveling to the United States and Israel where one of the film’s 
most tension-filled scenes unfolds with a group of Israeli high school students who have just 
returned from a trip to Poland. They are ruthless in their assault on Romaniuk who visibly 
appears angered by their accusations of Polish complicity and their complete historical ignorance 
of Nazi occupied Poland.   
Marzynski’s other film, A Jew Among the Germans (2005), is much shorter and less 
intense. He seems detached as he moves through Berlin, although his opening line that he is 
visiting the “land of my enemy” gives the film its anticipated tension. One of the most arresting 
scenes takes place just outside the Berlin Jewish Museum as Marzynski and an American friend 
                                                 
20 A somewhat analogous, class-based appropriation of Indianness emerged in the United States at the turn 
of the century and then accelerated greatly after post-WWII prosperity. See Philip J. Deloria, Playing 
Indian (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).  
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of his debate with a gentile curator the importance of the Holocaust. The German explains that 
the museum is not supposed to be only about genocide, but they do not seem to listen to him, 
urging that he agree with their point that the Holocaust must be central to the museum. Marzynski 
even oddly implies that the Libeskind building does not provide enough spaces to “contemplate 
Jewish death.”21 These two films offer at times absorbing moments, but they can be rather 
predictable and irritating. The cultural superiority of Americans over Poles and Germans is 
virtually a given. Romaniuk (and Poland) endures this insolence the most: the stark imagery of 
the impoverished, “third world” Brańsk versus the groomed, affluent Atlanta suburb, the peasant 
with dirt ingrained hands versus the American crisply typing on a word processor. In both films, 
Marzynski never speaks to one single Jew currently living in Germany and Poland. Both 
countries are just Jewish graveyards, this after 1989 with the expansion of Jewish communal life. 
Marzynski even throws in for good measure that it is a “well known secret” that Russian Jews 
have “fabricated their Jewish origin” to come to Germany.22  
The various interpretations that emerge in these two films, conditioned by and embedded 
in different pasts, conflict, yet potentially offer the possibility of a broader horizon of 
understanding provided that the actors involved try to transpose themselves from their own 
particular standpoints. This attempted embrace of the universal can never possibly be complete 
given our hermeneutical condition, but Marzynski does not even attempt such a move.23 He does 
not seem remotely interested in why a German would possibly spend his free time curating a 
Jewish museum, or why a Pole would possibly go around his small town digging up buried 
Jewish tombstones to be restored and reinstalled in a Jewish cemetery. Marzynski seemingly 
would agree with the explanation provided by the Boston Globe that Romaniuk’s actions are 
                                                 
21 PBS transcript published at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/germans/etc/script.  
 
22 Ibid.  
 
23 Based on one of the films, the book by Eva Hoffman provides a richer and more sophisticated analysis. 
Shtetl: The History of a Small Town and an Extinguished World (New York: Vintage, 1999).  
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simply “mysterious.”24 The same probably would have been said of the German curator had the 
newspaper been writing about him.  
In short, Marzynski overlooks several deeper questions about Polish and German interest 
in the Jewish past. What does this attempt to transcend one’s own particular standpoint involve? 
What are its consequences, tensions, and complications? These questions deserve some brief, 
final reflection here not to establish some kind of false analytical balance by focusing on the 
positive over the negative. Marzynski’s perspective is certainly valid: numerous Poles and 
Germans remain ambivalent about the Holocaust, some even hostile to it.25 A number also 
subscribe to ethnic notions of Germanness and Polishness that exclude Jews, Turks, Afro-
Germans, and other minorities.26 The point here is not to overturn a “Tory” narrative with a 
“Whig” one. Rather, it is to probe the underlying tensions that shape the move toward a broader 
standpoint –– a cosmopolitan embrace if you will. In Germany, this cosmopolitan impulse tends 
to come from the Left and celebrates pluralism, democracy, pacifism, the rights of minorities, and 
“Europe.” It strives to move beyond the ethnic nation-state, arguing that citizens are part of a 
democratic, constitutional state rather than a specifically German, cultural community. Its most 
well known proponent is the philosopher Jürgen Habermas who has envisioned for Germany a 
postnational, constitutional patriotism with supra allegiances to Europe.27 In Poland, 
cosmopolitanism also draws mainly from the Left and espouses similar notions of tolerance, 
democracy, and pluralism. If Germany locates its supra identity in “Europe,” Poland finds it 
perhaps more often in “Central Europe” with its supposed Polish-Lithuanian and Habsburg 
                                                 
24 Frederic M. Biddle, “Jewish Americans return to still divided ‘Shtetl,’” Boston Globe April 17, 1996.  
 
25 Welzer, Moller, and Tschuggnall, Opa; Jensen, Geschichte machen; Polonsky and Michlic, Neighbors 
Respond; Zubrzycki, Crosses.  
 
26 Ireneusz Krzemiński, Czy Polacy są antysemitami? (Warsaw: Oficyna Naukowa, 1996); Grzegorz 
Janusz, Raport o sytuacji osób należących do mniejszości narodowych i etnicznych w Polsce (Warsaw: 
HFPC, 1994); Heide Fehrenbach, Race after Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and 
America (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005); Chin, Guest.  
 
27 Jürgen Habermas, “Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe,” Praxis 
International no. 1 (1992): 1-19.  
 411 
multiculturalism.28 Poland’s version is also more deeply entangled with the progressive wing of 
the Catholic Church, which since the 1970s has been working through the ethnic and religious 
exclusivity of the “Polak-katolik.” As the highly respected politician and writer Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki put it, Poles need to embrace “open Polishness with open Catholicism.”29  
An embrace of “Jewishness” has become a central marker of cosmopolitanism in both 
countries.30 Jewish sites, such as the museums in Berlin and Warsaw, become spaces to display, 
reinforce, and celebrate tolerance, plurality, and multiculturalism. In 2005, the Polish president 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski (SLD) remarked at length about what the Jewish museum would 
showcase: “The Jewish community, which has lived here for eight hundred years, found in 
Poland a climate of freedom and tolerance. Many generations of Polish Jews had made a splendid 
spiritual, cultural, and economic contribution here and made an enormous contribution to our 
joint history, while also drawing on Polish influences and experiences.”31 Germany’s 
commissioner for cultural affairs framed the Berlin Jewish museum similarly, emphasizing how it 
showed that German culture “has always been, and today, under changed conditions, continues to 
be the result of cross-pollination and synthesis between diverse cultures and influences.” She then 
noted the museum’s contemporary “political impact:” “respect and recognition for minorities and 
                                                 
28 On the Central European cosmopolitanism, see Malachi Haim Hacohen, “Dilemmas of 
Cosmopolitanism: Karl Popper, Jewish Identity, and ‘Central European Culture,’” Journal of Modern 
History vol. 71 (March 1999): 105-149. On its rediscovery starting in the 1980s, see Timothy Garton Ash, 
“Does Central Europe Exist?,” in The Uses of Adversity: Essays on the Fate of Central Europe, compiled 
by Timothy Garton Ash (New York: Random House, 1989), 179-213; Tony Judt, “The Rediscovery of 
Central Europe,” in Eastern Europe, ed., Graubard, 23-58.  
 
29 Tadeusz Mazowiecki, “Questions to Ourselves,” Dialectics and Humanism no. 2 (1990): 13. 
 
30 In Poland, such an embrace carries, however, negative connotations that tend to be at least voiced more 
often by the far right than in Germany. “Cosmopolitanism” and civic nationalism are seen as inventions by 
Jews. Those who subscribe to it must either be Jewish or crypto-Jewish. See Geneviève Zubrzycki, “‘Poles-
Catholics’ and ‘Symbolic Jews:’ Jewishness as Social Closure in Poland,” Studies in Contemporary Jewry 
(2005): 79-80.  
 
31 Quoted in Newsletter of the Museum of the History of Polish Jews (Summer 2005): 17.  
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tolerance in the sense of appreciating difference as a necessary condition both of democracy and 
of a culture increasingly characterized by diversity.”32 
Jewish spaces are appropriated in part to validate claims of revived cosmopolitanism. 
They are spaces of Jewish-gentile symbiosis, tolerance, and cross-cultural pollination. In some 
eyes, Jewish spaces are made to produce more precisely what one might call “redemptive 
cosmopolitanism,” a counter discourse to the dominant narrative of redemptive suffering that has 
long pervaded German and Polish society.33 The recovery of material traces atones for the 
Holocaust and displays tolerance for local, national, and transnational consumption. Jews are 
brought back into contemporary Polish and Germany society: they become “Jewish co-citizens” 
and “co-stewards of this land” (Mitbürger, współobywatele, współgospodarze). One speaks of 
their “enormous contribution” to a “joint history” of symbiotic, harmonious relations broken only 
by brief periods of catastrophic and ethnic nationalism.34  This redemptive cosmopolitanism has 
cathartic appeal and effect. The recovery of Jewish culture purifies Germans and Poles of past 
sins by recalling the past and reconstructing in the present a tolerant, democratic society. Jewish 
spaces become signifiers of successful rehabilitation and respectful mourning. They are used for 
one’s own redemption from a past that was hardly tolerant, symbiotic, or multicultural; they are 
used to sustain a liberal, democratic politics of national recovery.  
                                                 
32 Stories of an Exhibition, 12-13. 
 
33 It is probably fair to say that this image of “victimization” is stronger in Poland where “redemptive 
cosmopolitanism” is less prominent. Germany’s “culture of contrition” –– at least in public –– is more 
ritualistically present, but it probably reaches a fairly limited percent of the populace. Wulf Kansteiner 
speaks of a “memory pyramid” with elite discourses at the top, which are more often than not self-critical 
to some degree. He estimates that these engage somewhere between 15 to 25 percent of the German 
population. Similar research to my knowledge has not been done on Poland, but it might be somewhere 
around there. There is, however, a significant difference in that Poland’s cultural, intellectual, media, and 
political elite has far from reached the kind of general consensus about the Holocaust that the German one 
has at the moment. Kansteiner, Pursuit, 319-22. 
 
34 I am using “catastrophic nationalism” to describe the German case, ethnic nationalism to describe the 
Polish one. “Catastrophic nationalism” is obviously much different in its violence, genocide, and 
imperialism, in its demand for empire in the east that involves mass murder, colonialism, and war. The term 
comes from Jarausch and Geyer, Shattered Past, 122.   
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This redemptive cosmopolitanism takes on predictable, almost ritualistic form in public 
discourse.35 In 2001, speaking in Washington, DC, the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer 
(Greens) noted the cultural loss of Jews that has made German “culture poorer ever since,” a 
cultural void “painfully visible –– especially where I live, in the old Jewish quarter of Berlin, the 
town of Moses Mendelssohn, who lies buried in the old Jewish cemetery not far from my 
apartment.” Moving away from this symbiotic past, Fischer turned to the present and to 
Germany’s cathartic “second chance:” “Only when our Jewish fellow-citizens can live in freedom 
and security in Germany, will Hitler’s terrible anti-Semitism finally be defeated.” This Jewish 
“yardstick” of “an open, tolerant society” is all the more important today in “multicultural” Berlin 
with its large Turkish population.36 In that same year, the Polish president Aleksander 
Kwaśniewski, speaking about Jedwabne, also pulled from a traumatic past glimpses of catharsis. 
The “truth,” he observed, “will allow the cleansing of memory’s wound. That is our hope. That is 
why we are here.” Poles offer words of “grief and bitterness” not just because the “world is 
listening” but because it is “we ourselves who need them most.” “We do this,” he concluded, “in 
order to be better, stronger in a moral sense, free of aversions, anger, and hatred. To respect 
mankind and love people. To turn evil into goodness.”37 Kwaśniewski admitted, openly, that such 
remembrance is a form of redemptive cleansing –– a communal baptism that washes away Polish 
sins. But this ritual act is not only for local and national consumption. It is not just Poles and 
Germans who need it. Just as Fischer was speaking to an international audience, so too was 
Kwaśniewski. Both politicians are engaged in a much broader, transnational appropriation of the 
Holocaust that extracts from it a liberal, democratic, and universal narrative of tolerance, human 
                                                 
35 An extended, highly insightful analysis for the German case is Moses, German Intellectuals, chap. 10.  
 
36 Joschka Fischer, “A Second Chance? Germany and the Jewish Community Today,” Annual Meeting of 
the American Jewish Committee, May 3, 2001, Washington, DC, published at www.germany.info/relaunch 
/politics/speeches/050301 (last accessed on July 3, 2008).  
 
37 Polonsky and Michlic, Neighbors Respond, 132.  
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rights, democracy, and pluralism.38 Redemptive cosmopolitanism offers, appropriately, 
international meanings, putting forward linguistic and mnemonic formulations that transnational 
audiences understand, appreciate, and perhaps even demand. 
And yet the national still has arguably a stronger pull. The embrace of Jewishness in 
Germany and Poland is informed by each country’s distinct, historically conditioned standpoints. 
In two countries on a “dark continent” that has seen genocide, war, expulsions, and ethnic hatred, 
redemptive cosmopolitanism has appeal, to put it modestly, all the more so in Germany as the 
primary source of Europe’s violent half century and the country where the leftist belief in 
redemption through democracy and “enlightened knowledge” has deep roots stretching back to 
the early years of the SPD.39 Its allure is perhaps understandable, perhaps even not altogether that 
troubling given its alternative. Indeed, some see it as a clear positive. Diana Pinto writes of 
Poland at the “heart of Europe’s cultural renewal” as it builds a new “Jewish and Polish 
memory,” while Germany presents a unique opportunity for Jews and non-Jews to interact in 
“Jewish space.”40 She has reason to be optimistic, but she overlooks the dilemmas of 
cosmopolitanism.41 At a moment when Jewish life in both countries is growing, Jews remain a 
“problem” or “issue” that is discussed, used, catalogued, preserved, restored, examined. Jews are 
offered as “second chances” to turn “evil into goodness,” to create a better, more secure liberal, 
democratic future. But just as Jews are embraced, they are held at a distance. Jews are not just 
                                                 
38 Paul Eisenstein, Traumatic Encounters: Holocaust Representation and the Hegelian Subject (New York: 
State University of New York Press, 2003). 
 
39 “Enlightened knowledge” from Geyer, “Politics of Memory.” Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe’s 
Twentieth Century (New York: Vintage, 1999).  
 
40 Diana Pinto, “Fifty Years after the Holocaust: Building a New Jewish and Polish Memory,” East 
European Jewish Affairs no. 2 (1996): 80-81; Pinto, “Jewish Challenges.”  
 
41 In marking the dilemmas of what I call “redemptive cosmopolitanism,” I am not attempting to embrace 
the “hermeneutics of suspicion” that others have in writing about philosemitism. As I suggested earlier, I 
do not see philosemitism as only a pernicious attempt to curry favor with Jews or worse as simply anti-
Semitism in disguise. I do, however, think that there are underlying tensions to it that deserve analysis. 
“Hermeneutics of suspicion” comes from Anthony Kauders’s insightful piece, “History as Censure: 
‘Repression’ and ‘Philosemitism’ in Postwar Germany,” History and Memory no. 1 (2003): 97-122.  
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“citizens” but “co-citizens” who are accepted as equals, yet marked as still different from the 
national politic. Redemptive cosmopolitanism reinforces ethnic difference even as it strives to 
overcome ethnic nationalism. As A. Dirk Moses has insightfully observed, the concept of 
“constitutional patriotism” that Habermas has envisioned demands that “German/German” 
citizens accept responsibility for the Holocaust based on their ethnic lineage to a national 
community of perpetrators.42 Minorities such as Turks who have become citizens do not count. 
Cosmopolitanism in Poland runs into a similar dilemma. As commentators, intellectuals, and 
writers embrace “civic nationalism” as a “counterdiscourse” to “ethnic nationalism,” they do so 
by creating a distinctly Polish narrative of religious tolerance and democratic pluralism that 
stretches back to the sixteenth-century Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as if somehow such 
ideas are ethnically ingrained parts of the Polish collective.43  
More broadly, redemptive cosmopolitanism harnesses the Holocaust for a European 
utopianism as Germany and Poland return to “Europe” precisely at a moment when the continent 
remains divided socially and politically. Jews are now part of Europe’s “core” for some in a way 
that other minorities are not.44 The social, cultural, and legal position of the numerous immigrants 
who have come to Europe through postcolonial, labor, and asylum migration remains precarious 
to say the least. The controversy over the wearing of the “veil” by Muslim women is merely one 
recent example.45 As these conflicts unfold, the embrace of the “Jewish co-citizen,” the display of 
restored Jewish sites, and the building of Jewish museums provide brief reprieves of redemptive 
cosmopolitanism, cursory moments of cultural diversity. It is what Europeans can agree upon: 
                                                 
42 Moses, German Intellectuals, 237-38. 
 
43 Such views are often published in Polityka, Gazeta Wyborcza, and Tygodnik Powszechny. 
“Counterdiscourse” comes from Zubrzycki, Crosses, 84. See also Zubrzycki, “‘We, the Polish Nation:’ 
Ethnic and Civic Visions of Nationhood in Post-Communist Constitutional Debates,” Theory and Society 
no. 5 (2001): 629-669. 
 
44 Daniel Levy, Max Pensky, and John Torpey, eds., Old Europe, New Europe, Core Europe: Transatlantic 
Relations after the Iraq War (New York: Verso, 2005).  
 
45 Joan Wallach Scott, The Politics of the Veil (Princeton, NJ: Princeton, 2007).  
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even as Germans and Poles remain bitterly divided over the war and the expulsions it produced 
they are able to stand united in Jewish spaces.46 The Holocaust has become since 1989 a thread of 
European unity that is transmitted and received transnationally.47 As Germans, Poles, Europeans, 
and Americans embrace a democratic, universal message from a catastrophic past, some at least 
run the risk of believing that such tolerance has been realized in the present day or where it does 
not that the main answer to achieving it is through greater remembrance of a singularly defined 
evil.48 In celebrating the triumph of the “civic nation” over the Holocaust, they run the risk of 
missing, overlooking, or at least underestimating the struggles for equality and acceptance going 
on around them in the present moment. Redemptive cosmopolitanism produces at times 
satisfaction with the strength of liberal-democratic institutions in a post-fascist and post-
communist world; it produces, ironically, a kind of provincialism that harnesses a singular past 
for democracy’s cathartic, celebrated arrival.49  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
46 Paweł Lutomski, “The Debate about a Center against Expulsions: An Unexpected Crisis in German-
Polish Relations?,” German Studies Review 27, no. 3 (2004): 449-468.  
 
47 Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945 (New York: Penguin, 2005), 803-831.  
 
48 For a somewhat similar view except for his overly wrought division of “eastern” and “western” Europe, 
see Tony Judt, “The ‘Problem of Evil’ in Postwar Europe,” New York Review of Books February 14, 2008. 
His invocation of Arendt is on target: “The greatest danger of recognizing totalitarianism as the curse of the 
century would be an obsession with it to the extent of becoming blind to the numerous small and not so 
small evils with which the road to hell is paved,” (Hannah Arendt, Essays in Understanding, 271-72).  
 
 
49 A similar dynamic is clearly evident in the United States. See Eisenstein, Traumatic Encounters.  
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